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INTRODUCTION
As William Golding (1911–1993) recognised on several occasions,  his whole life  was
dominated,  from his early childhood, by a deep sense of  wonder at the inexhaustible
spectacle  of  the  world.  According  to  John  Carey’s  biography,  one  of  the  novelist’s
earliest memories was of seeing, as a baby, a white cockerel strutting along a curtain’s
pole only to vanish before reaching the other end (Carey 2009: 1).1 Nor was this the
only experience of this kind that Golding had in those years. One winter evening, when
he was three or four, he spotted a spectral stag’s head over the brackens of the forest
near Marlborough, where the family lived (24). Golding went on to spend his whole life
in astonishment.  Several decades later, having become a highly respected writer, he
remarked that he would like his epitaph to read: ‘“He wondered”’ (Golding 1984a: 199).
The lasting sense of wonder pervaded, in one way or another, not only Golding’s life
but also his writings. In part, Golding inherited this astonishment from his parents,
Alec and Mildred. When Alec, an atheistic rationalist, was once looking at the stars in
the garden, young Billy heard him murmur, ‘I  wonder’.  Being asked why, Golding’s
father merely replied: ‘I just wonder, it’s all I can do’, with the addition: ‘I shall go on
wondering for the rest of my life’  (cited in Carey 2009: 29). The incident,  it seems,
taught Billy what a person ought to be — ‘a watcher and a wonderer’, in Carey’s words
(29).  Yet  the  similarities  cannot  obscure the differences  between Golding’s  and his
parents’ sense of awe. When confronted with such ‘appallingly beautiful’ phenomena as
a starry sky, his parents ‘could not but wonder, examine, speculate’ (Golding 1965: 34).
Golding saw their curiosity as limited, because it was merely scientific; by contrast, he
could never be satisfied with scientific explanations alone, and this dissatisfaction, he
1 For a summary and assessment of Carey’s book, see Saavedra-Carballido (2010).
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thought,  opened  the  door  to  a  more  thorough  comprehension  of  the  world.  The
distance between the two approaches — which, to borrow a pair of terms used by some
of Golding’s commentators, can be termed physical and metaphysical, respectively —
can be measured by the contrasting reactions to the ghost stories that his mother used
to  tell  him:  while  his  parents  could  not  hide  their  amusement  at  the  inexplicable
elements in the narratives,  Golding found their  truculence not only threatening but
revelatory of aspects of the world that the physical sciences could not account for (see
Carey  2009:  16).  Their  reactions  to  darkness  both  inside  and  outside  fiction  were
different too: for his parents darkness ‘was just … the absence of light’ (Golding 1965:
172), but their explanation could not dispel the terror that he felt when left alone in the
gloomy  cellar  of  the  family  house,  nor  could  it  cure  the  morbid  ‘fascination’  with
darkness and other ‘obsessions’ that his reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s Tales of Mystery
and  Imagination only  made  worse  (170).  Commenting  on  the  role  of  wonder  in
Golding’s  writings,  Philip Redpath says:  ‘To believe in  a realm beyond the physical
universe is a sign of man’s capacity to wonder and confront mysteries which science
and technology do not begin to explain’ (Redpath 1986: 120). It is the encounter with
this metaphysical realm, and the wonder that ensues, ‘that makes Golding write’ (33).
In Golding, metaphysical awe is closely bound with the conviction that ‘man suffers
from an appalling ignorance of his own nature’ (Golding 1957: 817). As a rule, people
only see the physical side of the world, therefore they remain blind to the metaphysical
dimension of their lives. Golding’s overriding aspiration is precisely to draw attention
to that dimension, the one in which his concern with human destructiveness (on both
the individual and the collective levels) and, more generally, with suffering makes more
sense.  This is  the reason why Golding puts the focus on human nature in order to
examine it ‘sub specie aeternitatis’, that is, from the standpoint of eternity (817).2 The
conclusions to which this enquiry leads him are usually regarded to be pessimistic.
The sense of wonder, the addition of metaphysical concerns to the interest in the
physical realm, the emphasis on violence and suffering, and the alleged pessimism that
ensues  are  also  among the  most  salient  characteristics  of  the  philosophy  of  Arthur
Schopenhauer (1788–1860). He declared more than once that since the dawn of history
2 Italics are extremely abundant in both Golding’s and Schopenhauer’s writings. Unless otherwise
noted, all italics that appear in quotations throughout this work are from the original sources.
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all search for adequate explanations for life had been triggered by astonishment, adding
that  at  its  purest  this  astonishment  is  necessarily  metaphysical.  According  to  his
account of the opposition between physics and metaphysics, followed in this study, this
means that some people do not wonder only at the physical working of the world but
rather at its ontological, moral and aesthetic features. For Schopenhauer, every single
person is ‘an animal metaphysicum’, one in which ‘wonder or astonishment about the
world  and  our  own  existence’  become  ‘the  mother  of  metaphysics’  (Schopenhauer
1969b: 170, 160). Moreover, he maintained that the main reason for such wonder is the
generalised suffering and death which make the world a horrible place. The ‘need for
metaphysics’, he says, appears whenever a person ‘stands consciously face to face with
death, … the finiteness of all existence, the vanity and fruitlessness of all effort’, in other
words, with ‘the consideration of the suffering and misery of life’ (160, 161).
The  issues  that  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  addresses include  —  to  follow  the
sequence  in  which  they  appear  in  his  main  work,  The  World  as  Will  and
Representation — epistemology,  ontology and aesthetics,  morality,  law and politics.
These  coincide  with  the  main  concerns  that,  according  to  most  critics,  make  up
Golding’s world view. Schopenhauer is famous for having posited an all-powerful will
operating  in  the  dark  as  the  essence  of  humankind  and  of  the  rest  of  the  world;
remarkably,  the  will  also  features  prominently  in  Golding’s  novels,  often  as  an
uncontrollable  force  round  which  the  characters’  lives  turn.  Like  Schopenhauer’s,
Golding’s  handling  of  this  issue  is  geared  to  show  the  primacy  of  metaphysics.
Moreover,  both  authors  coincide  in  highlighting  the  moral  characteristics  of  their
respective projects. Schopenhauer is confident that his philosophy is ‘the only one that
grants to morality its complete and entire rights’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 589). For his
part, Golding believes that, being ‘fully engaged to the human dilemma’ (Golding 1957:
817), he cannot ‘make a story without a human lesson tucked away in it’; consequently,
he describes himself as ‘a moralist’ (1965: 85). Another feature in common is that both
authors  couch  their  metaphysical  concerns  in  religious  terms.  Their  references  to
saintliness and to original sin, for instance, are recurrent.
Golding’s critics have been able to give a generally accurate interpretation of many
of the main metaphysical aspects of his works, but they have treated them in isolation.
If we compare Golding’s oeuvre to a mosaic, it becomes clear that previous critics have
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not been able to discover the positions that the pieces occupy vis-à-vis each other, let
alone to find out the global meaning that they convey.
This thesis is based on the assumption that  Schopenhauer’s philosophical model
may help us to clear out and bring together the apparently disconnected components of
Golding’s novels. The use of Schopenhauer’s model should thus make possible a critical
reconstruction  of  Golding’s  basic  world  view. Related  to  this  one  there  is  another
assumption:  that  Golding’s  attempts  to  correct  that  world  view  —  which  are
increasingly evident as his novels succeed one another — can be best understood in
comparison  with  the  stance  that  he  aspires  to  leave  behind.  My  analysis  does  not
presuppose that Schopenhauer’s and Golding’s world views are totally self-consistent or
entirely of a piece with each other. It does presuppose that it is easier to understand
some of the most important metaphysical issues tackled by Golding if we are aware of
the issues that Schopenhauer had tackled two centuries earlier. Further, it presupposes
that the connections among those issues in Golding’s writings are easier to appreciate if
we are aware of the way in which Schopenhauer connects them.
Surprisingly, the relationship between Golding’s and Schopenhauer’s concerns has
only  been  mentioned  by  two  critics,  and  just  in  passing.  Leon  Surette  highlights
Golding’s  and  Schopenhauer’s  common  criticism  of  the  limitations  of  physical
knowledge (Surette 1994: 215, 219). Eduardo Sánchez-Fernández focuses on Golding’s
and Schopenhauer’s shared conviction that without legal repression humankind would
slide into violent  anomie (Sánchez-Fernández 2002:  152 n.  23).  Sánchez-Fernández
does not even mention the key idea of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the belief that the
essential will is the metaphysical urge or force at work inside every body. While Surette
does refer to the will, noting that for Schopenhauer human knowledge is usually at its
service, he does not make much of its recurrent presence in Golding’s books. This study
argues that  the essential will  does play an important role in a number of Golding’s
novels, and that so does the more general conception of the world as comprising not
only  the  realm  of  appearances  but  also  the  hidden  essence  of  which  they  are  a
manifestation.
The points of contact between the outlooks of both authors are so numerous that it
is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Golding was familiar with Schopenhauer’s works.
However, Carey, the only researcher who has been granted access to Golding’s private
papers and library, does not provide any conclusive evidence in this respect. Carey’s
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biography mentions the most important books that Golding read, yet the list includes
none  by  Schopenhauer;  nor  did  Golding  own,  as  it  seems,  any  of  the  German
philosopher’s works. The similarities between the novelist and the philosopher may or
may not be a coincidence. Despite not owning any of his books, Golding could have got
acquainted with such a well-known and influential author elsewhere.3 The arguments
put  forward  in  the  present  study  do  not  depend  on  Golding’s  having  read
Schopenhauer’s books; they simply seek to prove that Schopenhauer’s thought provides
a  fruitful  standpoint  from  which  to  account  for  many  basic  aspects  of  Golding’s
writings. This attitude should make it easier to avoid the temptation of taking Golding’s
novels to be literary illustrations of Schopenhauer’s ideas.
The first part of this study offers a general survey of the main thematic lines of
Golding criticism so far. Though many other elements in Golding’s fiction have been
touched on by critics,  the main focus has generally remained on its presentation of
metaphysical  issues.  On  the  whole,  what  characterises  such  analyses  is  their
fragmentary, ad hoc character. The aim here is to evaluate the most widespread critical
3 Professor Carey himself confirms this possibility. As he has pointed out to me, none of Golding’s
works, published or unpublished, contains any reference to Schopenhauer. However, it must be
borne in mind that virtually no manuscript material survives from Golding’s formative years.
According to Carey, in the schools were he taught before becoming a famous novelist ‘Golding
had a reputation among his colleagues for having read widely in philosophy’; good evidence of
this is provided by his ‘philosophical conversations with his close friend Tony Brown while they
were both schoolmasters in Salisbury’, in the course of which Schopenhauer’s ideas may have
been discussed (personal communication, 1 June 2012). Carey’s biography says that Brown and
Golding became friends in 1940, if not a bit earlier; that is over a decade before the latter wrote
Lord  of  the  Flies (see  Carey  2009:  78).  Among  the  authors  with  whose  ideas  Golding  was
acquainted  there  are  two  that  knew  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  well:  one  was  the  Swiss
psychoanalyst  Carl  Gustav  Jung,  whom  Golding  did  certainly  discuss,  along  with  other
philosophical, religious and scientific figures, with Brown (see Carey 2009: 122); the other was
the founder of anthroposophy, the Austrian thinker Rudolf Steiner, whose influence could be felt
at Michael Hall, the first school where Golding taught after graduating in English from Oxford in
1934  (see  Carey  2009:  64–5).  Another  possible  point  of  contact  between  Golding  and
Schopenhauer  is  the influence  that  the latter  exerted  over  such novelists  as  Thomas  Hardy,




views of Golding’s metaphysical concerns, and thus to contextualise my own discussion
in relation to these readings.  The opening chapter deals  with the way in which the
novels  have  been  interpreted  as  illustrating  the  destructive  tendencies  with  which
humankind is born, and as presenting the repressive use of force as the only possible
remedy.  It  also  considers  how those  works  convey,  according  to  previous  critics,  a
confrontation between characters that are dominated by those destructive tendencies
and characters  that  are  not.  The second chapter  deals  with the related oppositions
between  the  rational  and  the  non-rational,  the  physical  and  the  metaphysical.  In
addition to recapitulating a number of critical analyses that link rational experience to
physical objects and non-rational experience to metaphysical objects, it examines how,
following Golding’s own habit, a number of critics associate physics and metaphysics
with two different worlds: of the body and of the soul, respectively. Though this might
be taken to suggest some kind of ontological dualism, its  details  are far from clear;
likewise, when these critics regard metaphysics as incompatible with rationality, they
fail to explain why this is the case. This chapter also discusses the scholarly treatment
given to sight and the metaphysical revelations that a number of Golding’s characters
have. Finally, it summarises the arguments according to which Golding’s novels make
different uses of language,  some of which serve to convey experiences that are non-
rational and metaphysical.
The  second  part consists  in  an  overview  of  those  aspects  of  Schopenhauer’s
philosophy which seem to be particularly relevant in relation to Golding’s works. This
overview  aspires  to  be  as  uncontroversial  as  possible,  though  occasionally  it  will
necessary to choose between remaining faithful to the philosopher’s literal words, even
at the risk of some logical incoherence, and adopting the solutions put forward by his
commentators.
To begin with, Schopenhauer’s model is placed in its philosophical context, paying
particular attention to the philosophical traditions that culminate in the assertion of the
limits of valid knowledge and in the questioning of the goodness of our world. As will be
seen,  when  he  insists  on  the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  Schopenhauer  presents
himself  as  the  true  heir  of  Immanuel  Kant’s  thinking.  When  he  refuses  to  justify
suffering, he positions himself against Gottfried Leibniz’s optimistic theodicy.
Moving  on  to  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  itself,  the  focus  is  on  his  theory  of
consciousness — i.e. of  representation, as he calls it. Here Schopenhauer introduces a
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distinction between the world and the region to which refers, following Kant, as the
thing-in-itself. For Schopenhauer, the world is the sum of all that can be legitimately
known, while the thing-in-itself is what lies outside the purview of valid knowledge.
Though not all of Schopenhauer’s commentators recognise this distinction, it may be
important to understand Golding’s thematics.
The introduction of Schopenhauer’s separation of what can be known from what
cannot is followed by a discussion of the way in which he distinguishes — as most of
Golding’s commentators do not — the opposition between rational and non-rational
consciousness from the opposition between being aware of  the  physical  side  of  the
world and being aware of its metaphysical side.  For Schopenhauer,  humans are the
only animals that can build rational concepts out of non-rational feelings, the latter
being the first way in which they enter into contact with the world; humans are also the
only  animals  that  can  grasp  the  metaphysical  side  of  the  world.  Schopenhauer
distinguishes  more  kinds  of  metaphysical  insight  than  Golding’s  interpreters:  the
contemplation of the objects’ aesthetic dimension, the self-conscious apprehension of
one’s  willing  through  inner  observation  (a  possibility  that,  in  his  view,  allows  the
subject  of  consciousness  to  become  an  individual  I),  and  the  saint’s  visionary
apprehension of the essence shared by the whole world. Relying on these distinctions
may  improve  our  understanding  of  the  varieties  of  metaphysical  experience  that
Golding’s characters have. It must be borne in mind, however, that, despite his detailed
account of conscious representation, Schopenhauer makes frequent reference but fails
to characterise in a precise way some of its modalities: the saint’s visions (leading either
to compassion and altruistic intervention or to a resigned withdrawal) and imaginative
representation. Given their importance within his model, and their possible relevance
to Golding’s works, they are discussed nevertheless.
In  Schopenhauer’s  view,  physical  perception  —  the  feeling  that  the  conscious
subject has of material objects as located within cause-and-effect chains — constitutes
the default mode of consciousness. However, it is inner observation that gives access to
the ceaseless urge that he calls the essential will and that he posits as the inner essence
of  the  world.  For  Schopenhauer,  the hypothesis  of  ontological  dualism with its  two
separate substances, the body and the soul, is untenable: what the subject discovers
through  inner  observation  is  neither  the  soul  nor  the  rational  mind,  but  the
metaphysical side of the same body that is also perceived from the outside. While the
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subject  of  physical  consciousness  is  fully  individualised  and  establishes  a  strict
separation  among  the  things  and  beings  that  make  up  the  world,  the  subject  of
metaphysical  consciousness  moves  away  from  individuality  and  towards  increasing
universality, doing away with that distinction.
Being endowed with reason, humans can offer conceptual descriptions of the world,
a few of which have been institutionalised in the course of history. On the one hand,
there are science and history, which can only offer physical, i.e. causal, explanations of
events. On the other hand, there are art, religion and philosophy, which deal with the
metaphysical  side  of  the  world.  According  to  Schopenhauer,  both  religion  and
philosophy cover the outside as well as the metaphysical inside of objects; therefore,
they compete to offer a complete description of the world.  As regards the linguistic
embodiment of these descriptions, Schopenhauer argues that the uses of language on
which science, history and religion rely elicit rational concepts from the audience, while
the uses on which art and religion rely arouse the audience’s non-rational feelings.
After dealing with Schopenhauer’s  analysis of  the varieties of  consciousness,  the
focus  shifts  to  his  conceptualisation  of  essential  will,  not  only  as  the  metaphysical
activity that stirs the entire world, but also as a yearning for organic existence and, at
the lowest level of generality, as the way of being of the individual. At the highest level
of generality, the essential will underlies the entire world; it is what Julian Young calls
the ‘world-will’ (2005: 76). At a lower level, Schopenhauer posits an amoral will to life
from the instincts of reproduction and self-preservation arise. At the lowest level of
generality, the essential will acts simply as the inborn and unchangeable character of
the individual.
The innate character determines one’s needs and desires from the very moment of
birth; this means that the individual is not free to chose what to will. This is the basis of
Schopenhauer’s account of suffering. Many readers of Golding’s novels have referred to
the  destructive  tendencies  in  humankind  as  evil;  following  Golding,  they  have
described the characters that display those tendencies as  egoistic. By doing so, they
confuse two issues that Golding tends to keep separated and that Schopenhauer may
help  to  distinguish:  a  person’s  desires  and  the  actions  that  result  from  them.
Schopenhauer identifies three ways of desiring: egoism (defined by him as desire for
one’s own weal) and malice (the desire for the others’ woe) are the most common, but
he also speaks of compassion (the desire for the others’ well-being). He then proceeds
8
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to describe as evil not a certain kind of desire, but the infliction of pain by a conscious
being on another (see Cartwright 2005: 48). Schopenhauer claims that, though egoism
and malice are important sources of suffering, they are not the only ones. As a rule, all
individuals  (whether  egoistic,  malignant  or  compassionate)  spend  their  lives  in
suffering. This is because, apart from the pain that they may inflict on other conscious
beings, there is the anxiety that arises from viewing all physical objects as potential
sources  of  dissatisfaction.  This  is  another  reason  why,  according  to  Schopenhauer,
suffering is so widespread, and why he describes our world as the worst possible world.
At this point, of course, we come against a fundamental difficulty in his philosophy,
because,  even  after  he  has  introduced  compassion  —  an  impulse  rooted  in  a
metaphysical  perspective  which  neither  distinguishes  among  individuals  nor  shows
them as engaged in any conflict, and which prevents suffering instead of causing it —
side by side with egoism and malice, he continues to describe the world as a whole as if
it were necessarily characterised by discord and suffering. This is also a problem that
can be identified in Golding’s basic stance. Both Schopenhauer and Golding agree in
characterising the world as hellish, but they can only do so because they forget that in
their works the state of consciousness that leads to this hellish situation is only the
most frequent not the only possible.
Though  he  believes  that  putting  an  end  to  all  suffering  is  not  in  our  hands,
Schopenhauer  acknowledges that there are a number of ways in which we can limit
pain in the individual and the collective spheres. Among the former, he mentions the
aesthetic contemplation of objects, the altruistic urge to help the other to which saintly
visions sometimes lead, the resigned withdrawal from worldly affairs in which saintly
visions  otherwise  result,  and the permanent  cessation of  all  kinds  of  consciousness
brought about by death. Remarkably, then, Schopenhauer reaches a point where he
realises  that  dying,  which  at  first  seemed  to  him  part  of  the  problem  of  human
existence, might be its most effective solution. As regards the collective remedies for
suffering,  he  begins  by  mentioning  moral  sanctions,  but  after  dismissing  them  as
largely ineffective he recommends the lawful use of force. The insistence on the need
for  repressive  laws  is  part  and parcel  of  Schopenhauer’s  dismissal  of  social  utopia,
which closes this second part.
The third and most important part  of this study consists in an interpretation of
Golding’s metaphysical views through the prism of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For the
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sake of convenience, the order in which Schopenhauer sets out his ideas is generally
followed. The discussion does not linger on those aspects of Golding’s novels that seem
to  be  accessory  in  a  discussion  of  his  metaphysical  concerns  or  on  those  that
Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  cannot  help  us  to  understand.  In  contrast  to  previous
critics, who have only related his fiction to a small number of his essays, extensive use
is  made of  both essays and interviews in order to support  the interpretation of  his
fiction  given  here.  At  the  same  time,  an  attempt  is  made  to  show  the  possible
discrepancies  between the  views  that  Golding  expresses  outside  his  novels  and the
views that his novels convey, and to elucidate Golding’s treatment of topics that do not
appear directly in his fiction.
The reading of Golding’s fiction begins by applying Schopenhauer’s theorisation and
classification  of conscious  representation  to  the  kinds  of  awareness  that  Golding’s
characters deploy. Schopenhauer’s distinction between feelings and concepts may be
relevant to better understand the role that Golding’s novels assign to non-rational and
rational  kinds  of  consciousness.  Moreover,  Schopenhauer’s  separation  between
physical perception and the different kinds metaphysical consciousness should help to
offer a more nuanced account of the kinds of metaphysical awareness that Golding’s
novels include; it may even help to elucidate whether or not they endorse ontological
dualism. Relying on Schopenhauer’s distinctions may also allow us to elucidate whether
Golding  conflates  non-rational  and metaphysical  consciousness,  as  Golding’s  critics
suggest, or not. It may also prove useful in characterising the different uses of language
that  Golding  employs  in  his  novels.  Likewise,  Schopenhauer’s  account  of  the
descriptions of the knowable world that have been institutionalised in the course of
history may help to specify the place that discourses like science, literature and religion
occupy in Golding’s writings.
Golding’s  treatment  of  the  modalities  of  consciousness  is  followed  by  an
examination of his treatment of the will. This is an aspect of Golding’s fiction that has
not  been  analysed  in  detail  yet,  let  alone  from  the  perspective  of  Schopenhauer’s
philosophy. The will merits careful study, however, because of its conspicuous presence
in  some  of  Golding’s  novels,  and  because  of  its  possible  links  to  the  characters’
obsession with sex and survival. Some of Golding’s most famous novels are designed to
bring human violence and suffering to the fore. The bleak tone of much of his fiction
and its concern with the metaphysical side of the world suggest that Schopenhauer’s
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belief that suffering is rooted in the essential will may also throw light on the reasons
why Golding’s character experience and cause so much suffering.
Apart  from  bringing  to  our  attention  the  metaphysical  sources  of  suffering,
Schopenhauer’s  philosophy identifies  the  available  remedies.  At  an individual  level,
some of  them consist  or  are  rooted in special  kinds of  metaphysical  consciousness.
Others involve going beyond all possible kinds of consciousness, for example through
death. Given the importance that critics have given to metaphysical consciousness in
Golding, it seems reasonable to expect that the characters that are capable of it will
enjoy some respite from suffering. Also, Schopenhauer’s discussion of the reasons for
dying may be of great help to understand not only the sheer number of characters that
die  in  Golding’s  novels  but  also  the possible  functions  that  death  may  have  in  his
fiction. As far as the collective response to suffering, Schopenhauer argues that society
can only survive if it resorts to repression, more specifically, in view that the effects of
moral repression cannot be guaranteed, to the legal use of force. Golding’s critics have
not hesitated to present the endorsement of repression as one of the defining features
of his works. It is necessary to determine whether this is indeed the case, and, should
the answer be positive, what forms repression can adopt in his fiction.
The analysis of the themes that Golding shares with Schopenhauer finishes with a
discussion  of  whether  or  not  the  distinction  between  the  knowable  world  and  the
unknowable thing-in-itself can be applied to the essays in which Golding speaks about
the existence of  worlds other  than ours.  Golding suggests  that  all  those worlds are
beyond the bounds of legitimate knowledge, and presents the belief in their possible
existence as a question of faith. Though so far overlooked by the critics, this is a topic
that deserves being pursued.
Reading  Golding’s  works  in  chronological  order,  it  becomes  evident  that  new
elements  are  gradually  added  which  run  counter  to  the  usual  interpretation  of
Golding’s oeuvre, and which, despite being so conspicuous in Golding’s later writings,
have been overlooked by many critics. These elements include, in order of appearance,
the possibility of free choice, understood as the freedom to choose what to will; the later
refusal  to  identify  the  inner  essence  of  the  world  with  the  will;  the  eventual
reassessment of the chance of utopia. It is clear that these new elements are extraneous
to the essentialist  and pessimistic  world  view so far  presented as  common to both
Schopenhauer and Golding. As regards free choice, Sylvère Monod states, for example,
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that  in some of  his  novels  ‘Golding does not  espouse the Schopenhauerian form of
pessimism’ (Monod 1982: 258); it is difficult to disagree with this statement. Relying on
Schopenhauer’s philosophy to elucidate Golding’s most easily recognisable can serve to
analyse  the  new  elements  as  departures  from  that  stance  (and  thus  from
Schopenhauer’s  philosophy).  This  will  make  it  easier  to  appreciate  both the family
resemblances among all of Golding works and the differences that exist between his
first novels and the last.
There is yet another important element that recurs in Golding’s novels and essays,
and which can be linked to his metaphysical views: the divinity. Though Golding never
failed to assert his belief in some kind of divinity, he assured Jack I. Biles that he did
not  ‘subscribe  to  any  religion’  (in  Biles  1970:  85).  Since  Schopenhauer  leaves  the
divinity out of his model, it cannot be included among the aspects of Golding’s world
view that coincide with the aspects of the philosopher’s thought. And since it appears in
Golding’s earlier and later texts alike, it cannot be treated as a later modification of that
world view. For these reasons, the divinity independently is dealt with independently.
This does not mean that the topic can be analysed without any reference to the other
aspects of Golding’s oeuvre. Given the emphasis on God’s will in some of the novels, it
is necessary to analyse whether the divinity has any relationship with the essential force
that, according to Schopenhauer, acts as the amoral kernel of the world, and whether
Golding’s references to the divinity can be understood in the light of his metaphysical
positions.
Though  the  overall  reading  of  Golding’s  fiction  offered  here  relies  mainly  on
Schopenhauer’s  philosophy,  the  theoretical  support  for  many  specific  details  of  my
argument  often  comes  from  other  philosophical  models  like  Kant’s,  Friedrich  W.
Nietzsche’s and  Jürgen Habermas’s, from psychoanalysis, from the Marxist theory of
ideology and from sociology.  One reason why these additions are necessary is  that,
when brought to bear on Golding’s novels, Schopenhauer’s model is revealed to have a
number of significant lacks. Thus, for example, in the chapter dealing with Golding’s
basic  metaphysical  stance,  Golding’s  attitude  towards  the  project  of  modernity,  in
particular towards the ambition to secure the autonomy of the scientific project, cannot
be understood with the help of Schopenhauer alone, but can be approached through the
characterisation, common to Habermas and to some sociologists,  of  modernity as a
process  of  increasing  differentiation  both  among  social  spheres  and  among  the
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discourses  associated  with  them,  and  of  postmodernity  as  reversing  this  process.
Likewise,  the  notion  of  repression,  taken  from  Freudian  psychoanalysis,  helps  to
understand the mechanisms whereby some of Golding’s earlier characters suppress the
desires that arise from the essential will,  and Freud’s comments about the origin of
moral conscience are used to fill an important gap in Schopenhauer’s account of moral
prescriptions.  The other reason for the inclusion of theoretical additions by authors
other  than  Schopenhauer  is  the  dual  perspective  from  which  the  examination  of
Golding’s  oeuvre  is  carried  —  as  a  coherent  structure  whose  main  thematic  lines
generally coincide with those of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and as a proposal that is
gradually modified through the addition of new elements. In the chapter dealing with
the additions gradually incorporated into Golding’s novels and that are at odds with the
kind of world view embodied in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Freud’s theory serves to
explain why all descriptions of the essence of the world are denounced as instances of
psychological  projection.  Likewise,  Marxist  theory  is  used  to  determine  in  what
respects the universalising and naturalising effect of those projections can be said to be
an ideological reification of attitudes rooted in a specific cultural situation, in this case,
in a capitalist society. As regards Kant’s theory of moral autonomy, it serves to explain
the kind of free choice that Golding’s earlier characters are denied — a position that
effectively  closes  the  door  to  utopia  —  but  which  Golding’s  later  characters  are
conceded — thus reinstating the possibility of utopia. In the last chapter of this thesis,
Nietzsche’s theory of the similarities and differences between the Apollonian and the
Dionysian impulses is employed to throw light on the image that Golding’s novels give
of the divinity.  Finally,  Max Weber’s  account of  the modern disenchantment of the
world as consisting in the use of instrumental reason to exploit its physical resources
clarifies how Golding’s subordination of science to such metaphysical approaches as the
religious  and the artistic,  which  do  not  describe  the  world  in  terms of  its  possible
usefulness to human beings, is linked to his environmental concerns.
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1. MAIN METAPHYSICAL THEMES IN GOLDING
CRITICISM
At first sight, Golding’s fiction exhibits what Carey has described as a ‘protean variety
and  inventiveness’  that  casual  readers  may  find  overwhelming  and  that  makes  it
difficult to categorise (2009: 516). In general, Golding’s narratives seem designed to
mock such common labels as realism and fantasy, theism (broadly defined as the belief
in the existence of a divinity or divinities) and atheism, conservatism and radicalism.
His fiction is characterised by the diversity of settings (from the lush forests inhabited
by  the  first  human  beings  and  their  primitive  enemies,  through  an  ancient  Greek
temple under the Roman conqueror’s rule, or an old British ship on its way to Australia
during the Napoleonic wars, to contemporary London and a tropical island set on fire
by a bunch of schoolboys), of narratorial stances (third-person and, with increasing
frequency, first-person; male and eventually female), of narrative forms (confessions
and autobiographies; journals; long letters, one of which turns into a private diary and
then into a retrospective travelogue intended for publication) and of tones (now tragic,
now  scatological  and  eschatological,  then  farcical  and  occasionally  light-hearted).
Equally hard to pin down is the dense, exuberant and frequently puzzling imagery from
which the narrative fabric of these works is woven. So bewildering is the variety with
which Golding’s readers are confronted that many critics have got lost in a labyrinth of
intertexts and elusive symbols. As a consequence, the family resemblance among his
works has often been neglected. Generalising from the verdict of a recent commentator,
it could be concluded that the standard Golding critic ‘provides a multitude of symbolic
readings’  but seems to  be  ‘unable’  to  draw their  interpretations  together  (Clements
2012: 94). According to the same commentator, such readings, ‘rather than clarifying
the text’s meaning’, leave us even more perplexed (94). I agree that the parallel and
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image hunt hardly adds to our understanding of the meaning of the particular work
under  consideration,  let  alone  of  Golding’s  writings  considered  collectively.  In  the
process, the bigger picture of his overall concerns receives little or no attention, as if
they were trivial or as if the expression they are given in his novels was uninteresting.
Needless to say, there are laudable exceptions to this tendency to concentrate on the
small picture. Some of Golding’s most prominent interpreters have not rested satisfied
with the inconclusiveness that would ensue from limiting their focus to specific textual
details, and try to offer broader readings of Golding’s works. The image of the novelist’s
metaphysical  concerns  that  emerges  from  these  interpretations  is  lacking  in  some
regards, yet basically correct. Because of their value as a preliminary presentation of
Golding’s major themes, in the first part of this study I shall be focusing on some of
these  readings.  The  first  chapter  of  this  part  will  present  the  treatment  given  by
previous  critics  to  the  novelist’s  view  of  human  nature  and  its  impact  on  social
organisation. The second chapter will deal with the varieties of experience that critics
have found in Golding’s fiction, and with the problems that his characters and narrators
encounter when trying to speak about them.
My purpose here will not be so much to assess the accuracy or coherence of the
arguments, or to point at their possible conceptual mistakes, though some of these will
be pointed out, as to introduce a few themes that recur in Golding scholarship, and that
can be subsequently clarified with the assistance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In my
own discussion of the novelist’s works I shall bring into line with Schopenhauer’s usage
the  labels  that  critics  have  so  far  applied  to  the  most  conspicuous  components  of
Golding’s novels, modifying, redefining and supplementing them whenever necessary.
For the time being, however, I shall keep many of the terms used by previous Golding
commentators; I shall make an attempt to specify in what sense they are used, though it
must be said in advance that such specification will not always be possible owing to the
critics’ failure to provide clear definitions.
1.1. Human Nature and Its Impact on Society
A good way of approaching the critical explorations of Golding’s metaphysical interests
so far conducted by critics is to divide them into two general categories. One includes
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the scholarly discussions of the destructive tendencies that characterise human nature,
of the constant use of repressive force required — even within democratic societies — to
control  them,  and  of  the  opposition  between  two  kinds  of  characters:  those,  the
majority, that display those tendencies, and those, a small minority, that seem to be
free from them. The other category pertains to the varieties of experience and of verbal
communication available to Golding’s characters. In the rest of this chapter I shall deal
with those  analysis  belonging to  the first  category.  In  the following chapter  I  shall
address those that belong to the second.
1.1.1. Humankind’s Destructive Tendencies
Even  a  cursory  perusal  of  Golding  criticism  reveals  that,  despite  their  different
approaches and emphases, most responses to his works are based on the assumption
that  he  conceives  of  human  beings  as  prone  to  violence.  Regardless  of  the  critical
perspective adopted, the initial focus when discussing Golding’s novels has usually been
on  the  vicious  and  rapacious  impulses  that  supposedly  dominate  many  of  his
characters. The ideas that humankind tends to be evil, and that this tendency is innate,
clearly  prevail  over  the  consideration  of  the  effect  that  social  factors  may  have  on
human behaviour.
From the very beginning of his novelistic career, Golding has been judged to occupy
an important yet somewhat eccentric position in the British literary scene. One of the
reasons adduced for this isolation from most of his contemporaries is his purported
emphasis on the unchangeability of human nature to the detriment of social factors.
Like  the  Angry  Young  Men — a  group  of  novelists  and  dramatists  which  included
Kingsley Amis, John Wain, John Braine and Stan Barstow (with other names such as
Alan Sillitoe’s sometimes being added to the list) — Golding published his first novels
in the Britain of the 1950s. However, as  James  Ginding points out, Golding differed
from those authors in that he ‘was not primarily interested in issues of society or class’
(Gindin  1988:  14).  Though  Golding’s  concerns  certainly  included  social  and  class
issues, he subordinated them to the exploration of the metaphysical sources of violence.
Kevin McCarron states that the Angry novelists seemed happy to espouse the notion
that  a  person’s  attitudes  and  conduct  are  ‘culturally  determined,  created  by  social
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circumstances’  (McCarron  2005:  289).  By  contrast,  critics  have  normally  seen
Golding’s  texts  as  unashamedly  conveying  the  idea  that  ‘what  is  important  about
human  beings  goes  beyond  any  social  system  or  construction’  (Gindin  1988:  74).
Instead of portraying the routines and aspirations of the post-war working-class, as the
Angry Young Men did, Golding preferred, in his earliest published novels at least, to
write ‘aggressively bold fables which claimed for themselves a universal applicability’
and which ‘strove to depict what lay beneath, or above, the observable surface of life’
(McCarron 2007: 185).
Golding’s  writing  during  the  fifties  has  recently been  described  as  ‘an  art  of
essences’ (McCarron 2007: 185). While the works of other writers may make it difficult
to  extract  some  absolute  statement  about  human  nature,  Golding’s  aspiration  was
precisely to represent humankind in its essential dimension. Though they have failed to
characterise that common essence in any detail, and even to explain how we can know
what it consists in, critics have have had little doubt human nature includes an innate
disposition to violence and mutual aggression; not only is it impossible to root out, it
has proven extremely hard to keep in check. Gindin sums up the opinion of the critics
that  have  dealt  with  this  issue  when he says  that  Golding’s  narratives  characterise
people as ‘inherently wicked’ (Gindin 1988: 15). He adds that, though in his works the
novelist also tackled ‘issues of society and class’, he never abandoned the ambition to
reveal the ‘inexpungeable evil or darkness in man’ (15). Though neither Gindin nor any
of the critics that use the term say is what this  evil consists in, this does not prevent
them from adding that,  in Golding’s  first  novels,  the prevalence of  our dark side is
sometimes expressed in terms of a congenital ‘disease’ (see, for example, Baker 1965:
92).  According to  Anthony Storr,  Golding drives  this  point  home by putting at  the
centre of his fiction a type of character that is ‘irredeemably flawed, and … only too
likely to bring about its own destruction’ (Storr 1987: 138).
Taking their cue from Golding’s use of Christian terminology to speak about his
novels, many readers have seen in his portrayals of humankind’s disease an exploration
of the consequences of original sin. Thomas M. Coskren assures us that, if nothing else,
Golding ‘has reminded modern man of the fact of original sin’, this being ‘a reminder
that we all need every so often’ (Coskren 1988: 280). E.M. Forster likewise asserts that
Golding ‘believes in the Fall of Man’, and that ‘his attitude approaches the Christian’
(Forster 1988: 230). As usual, neither Coskren nor Forster offer any clues as to the way
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in  which  Golding  understands  this  original  sin  and  this  Fall.  Leaving  religious
speculation aside,  other critics maintain that Golding’s portrayals of evil  exceed the
field of  human existence.  When Golding received the Nobel prize for literature,  the
Swedish Academy described his works as ‘sombre moralities and dark myths about evil
and  treacherous  destructive  forces’  in  a  world  that  is  simultaneously  ‘tragic  and
pathetic’ (cited in Doering 2002: 288). Judging from this description, it is clear that
part of Golding’s audience is willing to extend the grim view of human viciousness to
other living beings and even to inanimate forces, thus raising the spectacle of constant
conflict to cosmic proportions.
Even a critic  like Paul Crawford — who gives,  rather exceptionally,  a  full-length
analysis of the social and political factors at work in Golding’s novels — acknowledges
that inborn factors play a major role in the novelist’s works. Crawford opens his study
on  Politics and History in William Golding with the acknowledgement that literary
critics have usually focused on ‘Golding’s preoccupation with humankind’s perennial
battle between good and evil, its fallen nature and experience of pain, grief, and guilt’
(2002: 1–2). This is a perspective with which he personally disagrees, aspiring instead
to offer  ‘A  properly  historicized  and politicized  reading of  William Golding’s  major
novels’ (1). Despite his goal, Crawford cannot fail to mention, like those critics from
whom  he  tries  to  keep  a  distance,  ‘Golding’s  own  reluctance  to  view  himself  as  a
politically engaged novelist’ (2); as a consequence, this critic adds, his ‘politics are often
implicit  rather  than explicit’  (2).  For  Crawford,  this  reticence is  linked to Golding’s
concern with the unavoidable constraints that human nature puts on people’s attitudes
and behaviour rather than with the contingent social circumstances that may bear upon
their  lives.  Though  Golding,  according  to  Crawford,  lacks  any  clear  political
commitment,  his  emphasis  on  a  timeless  essence  shared  by  all  humans  is  itself
revelatory  of  certain  political  positions:  ‘The  reassurance  generated  by  ways  of
understanding human nature that are adequate and intelligible not just in our time but
across time as well is ultimately conservative’ (234).
The opinion that  the  whole  of  Golding’s  oeuvre  amounts to  a grim depiction of
humankind’s servitude to essential forces that cannot be controlled is quite widespread.
As a result,  Golding is  ‘often seen as a dark and pessimistic  writer’  (Doering 2002:
286). In treating his novels as if they all embodied one single idea, namely that that our
essence is impossible to alter and predisposes us to evil, some readers have attributed
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to Golding the intention to trump his readers’ optimism about  ‘humanity’s ability to
progress’ (Crawford 2002: 237). This explains, the argument goes, why he insists on
underscoring our flaws to the exclusion of whatever virtues we may have.  Although
Golding found it necessary, especially in the last decade of his life, to correct this view
of him, stating that he was in fact an optimist, as late as the mid-198os Storr wrote:
‘Although Golding calls  himself  an optimist,  there is  little  evidence in his novels to
support that claim’ (1987: 138).
Without  denying  that  Golding’s  works  may  be  an  exploration  of  the  human
potential  for  aggression,  some critics  have  suggested  that  Golding  does  not  always
present violence as inevitably triumphant. Even if the novels are both a demonstration
and a reminder of what human beings can do to each other, these critics suggest, we
should  not  forget  Golding’s  additional  belief  that  the  undeniable  reality  of  evil  can
neither reduce us to inactivity nor keep us immersed in defeatism. According to Philip
Redpath, all of Golding’s novels are designed to have far-reaching effects. ‘To ignore the
reality of what man is’, this critic writes, ‘is to ignore the reality of what man is capable
of doing’ (1986: 69–70). In Redpath’s opinion, if we turn a blind eye to the harmful
impulses in us, they are certain to destroy all chances of living together in peace. He
considers Golding’s art to have ‘a therapeutic value’, for ‘it can reveal man to himself
and enable him to see where his being is in need of some sort of cure or healing’ (161).
For  this  critic,  the  cure  entails  some  kind  of  modification  of  the  individual’s
‘relationship  to  the  universe’  (161).  Golding’s  art,  he  argues,  ‘not  only  involves  an
examination and diagnosis of man’s condition, it also constitutes within itself an act of
healing, awakening man to sources of experience that he has neglected or forgotten but
without  which  his  existence is  partial’  (162).  Redpath  does  not  give  any  additional
details concerning the nature of this regenerative experience. Though his comments
clearly  allude  to  the  beneficial  influence  that  Golding’s  works  may  have  on  their
audience, they do not clear out whether the readers are led to acknowledge and come to
terms with the essence that they share with the rest of humankind — and perhaps with
other  beings  and things  too  — or  if  they  are  expected  to  give  some other  kind  of
response. Neither does Redpath’s discussion make it clear whether the encounter with
Golding’s fiction can have any effects beyond the individual reader’s private sphere.
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1.1.2. Socio-Political Consequences of Humankind’s Destructive 
Tendencies
While  Redpath  fails  to  explain  whether the  effects  of  Golding’s  fiction  can  be  felt
outside  the  individual  sphere,  other  critics  have  not  hesitated  to  assert  that  an
important lesson about social organisation can be drawn from the novels’ presentation
of  collective  life.  In  their  opinion,  Golding  not  only  claims  that  evil  is  rooted  in
humankind’s  essence;  they  add  that  Golding’s  solution  to  indiscriminate  violence
involves the implementation of suitable means of social repression.
In an early article devoted to Lord of the Flies, Robert J. White argues that the novel
is  an  exploration  of  the  relationship  between  social  law  and  human  nature,  more
specifically, of the dependence of the former on the latter. Golding, he states,
attempts to explore the interaction of society and man: the traditional dichotomy of nomos and
physis. The development of society … depends upon the nature of man … The defects of society,
therefore, can be traced back to the defects of human nature (White 1964: 163).
White goes on to explain that for Golding man, ‘of whom society is a reflection, is never
wholly in conscious control of  himself’ (White 1964: 170).  Lord of the Flies makes it
clear that behind the veneer of civilisation man’s ‘passions are endowed with a vitality
and energy of their own, so that they can force him, as if from the outside, into conduct
almost alien to himself’ (170). The core of human nature is actually non-human, and it
is from this source beyond human control that violence and exploitation spring.
After discussing human nature, White focuses on society. His analysis relies on the
Platonic distinction between the different aspects of the soul — reason, appetite and
spirit, with the associated virtues of justice, temperance and courage — and the claim
that  it  is  wise  to  organise  collective  life  as  a  balanced  hierarchy  in  which  the
philosophers (in Lord of the Flies, Ralph and Piggy) are located at the top, the artisans
(the majority of children) are at the bottom, and in between them stand the warriors
(Jack  and  his  hunters).  According  to  this  reading,  the  boys’  downfall  takes  place
because  ‘the  rational  structure  of  this  society  is  sabotaged,  partly  because  of  the
sensuality of the artisans, but mainly by the aggressive character of the warriors’ (164).
In White’s view, the point of the novel is that just as individuals suffer if they are unable
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to keep their inner balance, so society collapses as soon as if the delicate hierarchical
relationships between the three social groups are altered.
A  similar  approach  to  White’s  is  adopted  by  David  Spitz,  whose  discussion  of
Golding’s  first  novel  relies  on  the  notion  of  political  legitimacy.  Spitz  begins  by
identifying four  possible bases of political power.  First,  there are democratic  rulers,
whose authority rests on consent; secondly, there are leaders that present themselves
as ‘the voice of reason’; thirdly, there are authoritarian rulers that combine force with
the manipulation of their subordinates’ passions; fourthly, there are leaders who act as
‘the voice of revelation’ (1970: 25–6). According to Spitz, in Golding’s novel the four
roles are performed by four different characters: Ralph, Piggy, Jack and Simon. What
Spitz does not explain is the exact relationship between these four sources of power. (It
is reasonable to suppose that democratic consent is opposed to authoritarian force, and
that reason goes against revelation. As it turns out, in  Lord of the Flies  it is not clear
whether  democracy  can  be  dissociated  from  reason,  or  whether  revelation  opposes
everything else.  In the novel,  the  focus  is  on the conflict  between Ralph and Jack,
whereas Piggy’s and Simon’s political roles are secondary; though Spitz is not explicit in
this  respect,  there  is  little  doubt  where  the  latter’s  sympathies  and antipathies  lie:
Piggy’s rationalism lends ideological support to Ralph, while Simon is pitted against
Jack.) The plot of the novel goes from democracy to totalitarianism, whose rise the
elected leader, the rational thinker and the seer cannot prevent. According to Spitz, the
triumph of  violence is  to some extent foreseeable,  given  Golding’s emphasis  on the
children’  destructive  tendencies  and  his  understanding  of  society  as  dependent  on
human  nature.  Just  as  important  as  the  boys’  inclinations  is  the  fact  that  Ralph’s
democratic rule is not protected by a suitable repressive force. (This emphasis on the
leaders’ lack of prevision is  a necessary addition to White’s description of the other
children’s faults.) Spitz suggests that laws are necessary for democracy to work, but not
sufficient: legality must be upheld and enforced in some way. Not realising that ‘Every
society  does  indeed,  in  some  measure  at  least,  rest  on  force’  (32),  Ralph  and  his
followers open the door to Jack’s reign of terror. In cases like this, Spitz claims, the only
realistic response is to create an efficient repressive apparatus. This is what adults do in
the real world:
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We … maintain an army and police force. Without them … the state cannot survive, or do the job
it purports to do. Without them, or so it is believed, we cannot resist the will of greater powers or
impress our will on those with lesser force (Spitz 1970: 32).
In  Spitz’s  opinion,  democratic  societies  must  always  try  to  steer  a  middle  course
between  excessive  permissiveness  and  unjustified  repression.  On  the  one  hand,
irresponsible leniency opens the door to gratuitous aggression. On the other, while it is
evident that ‘in our social and political arrangements and practices we are far from
realizing our avowed democratic ideals’, we should not confuse the legitimate use of
force  in  democratic  societies  ‘with  the  worst  practices  of  totalitarian  or  repressive
systems’ (Spitz 1970: 33): the fact that all forms of government depend on the use of
repression does not mean that they are all equal. In democratic systems, the repressive
force of the state must be redressed by a sense of justice (by which Spitz seems to mean
a sense of proportionality):
we cannot seem to do without force,  and in this respect every society runs the risk of  being
oppressive; but we cannot do without justice, and in this respect force becomes not an end but a
means, an instrument in the service of right (Spitz 1970: 32).
For Spitz, therefore, Golding’s aspiration is to demonstrate that too little violence (in
the form of a lack of adequate legal repression) can be just as bad as — and indeed
result in — too much violence.
James Gindin and Kathleen Woodward also read Golding’s works as advocating a a
repressive use of force. The former holds that, despite depicting humans as ‘evil and …
not  socially  perfectible  … by  any  of  the  measures  taken  by  or  the  illusions  of  the
conscious  and rational  society’,  Golding  tries  ‘to  use  his  fiction  to  suggest  possible
counterweights to the human condition’ (Gindin 1988: 15). In the latter’s opinion, if
there is as lesson to be learned from  Lord of the Flies, it can only be ‘that the sweet
persuasions of democracy must be sharpened by force’ (Woodward 1997: 93). Ralph’s
democracy is ‘naive and innocent’, for real-world experience has repeatedly taught us
that ‘democracy in its  “pure” form is not hardy enough to contain aggression’  (93).
When the  democratic  consensus  breaks  down or  is  under  attack  from outside,  the
recourse to dialogue can be useful, but only to a certain extent; once a certain limit has
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been reached, a stricter policy of controlled violence must be adopted: ‘One must fight
back. Aggression requires aggression. … Institutions of discipline and punishment must
be erected’ (94). Thus Golding’s book can be read as ‘an argument for strict law and
order  within  the  democratic  system’  (93).  In  the  summary  of  her  interpretation,
Woodward connects Golding’s defence of repression with a certain political attitude:
Realism and maturity might help one to see clearly, diplomacy might work. And we add, if they
don’t, institutions of  punishment exist to repress undesirable behaviour. It is in this sense that
the political implications of Lord of the Flies are conservative (Woodward 1997: 95).
With this conclusion, Woodward lends support to the view, which other critics such as
Crawford have also expressed, that Golding is a conservative writer.
1.1.3. Types of Characters according to Their Nature
So far the impression may have been given that in Golding’s novels the innate tendency
to  evil  that  allegedly  characterises  the  human  species  knows  neither  degrees  nor
exceptions. Actually, critics have regularly pointed out that the contrary is the case. It is
true that humankind is fatally flawed — so much so that it can be described as diseased.
Yet it is no less true that some humans are — as if by miracle — immune to this disease.
Following Golding’s usage, critics have usually referred to these two types of people in
terms of their egoism and saintliness.
One of the most striking aspects of Golding’s novels is the presence of a series of
characters in whom evil tendencies come hand in hand with what Redpath has called
‘extreme self-centredness’ (1986: 132). What this means is that they manifest an almost
pathological  overvaluation  of  what  separates  them  from  others,  combined  with  an
exclusive  preoccupation  with  their  personal  needs  and desires.  The combination  of
these two features often results in the objectification of others, who are then seen as
obstacles that must be removed or used as instruments that one can use to attain one’s
goals. When one is dominated by egoism, other ‘people become things, objects of use’
(102). According to Redpath, egoists ‘build solipsistic walls around themselves’ (138).
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They  are capable, in Gindin’s words, not only ‘of setting self against community’, but
also ‘of trying to gain power … at the expense of a fellow being’ (1988: 34).
Most critics have realised that, if we want to put the issue into proper perspective,
we must admit that the extreme  depravity of many of Golding’s characters is but the
hyperbolic illustration of a tendency shared by most humans. Some commentators have
added  that  the  effects  that  one’s  selfishness  has  upon  one’s  neighbour  need  to  be
analysed  in  conjunction  with  its  impact  upon  social  life  in  general.  Since  it  is  so
widespread,  what  Mark Kinkead-Weekes  and Ian Gregor  call  ‘loveless  egotism’  will
necessarily  have  extensive  consequences  (2002:  106–7).  The  social  dimension  is
implicit  in Larry L. Dickson’s statement that ‘Golding’s novels deal with the evils of
selfishness and the exploitation of others’ (1991: 130): a society made up of individuals
who are convinced of their self-sufficiency and incapable of love is likely to make selfish
exploitation of one’s neighbour the accepted rule of conduct (unless, we may add, the
search for one’s private benefit is transformed into a means to a collective end, as it
would happen in an ideal bourgeois society).
While most scholars have put the emphasis on Golding’s hints that ‘the self exerted
against  others  is  destructive’  (Redpath  1986:  140), some  have  also  pointed  to  the
occasions, in the novels, on which the assertion of ‘the autonomy of the selfish ego’
meets with opposition (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 107). In a sense, Golding’s
works can be read as so many attacks on the ‘self-enclosed ego’ (367). According to
Redpath,  they  highlight  ‘the  necessity  of  breaking  down  the  wall  of  the  self  and
selflessly extending oneself to others’ (Redpath 1986: 124). In doing so, they ‘reveal the
destructive nature of that “I” and demonstrate the efficacy of selflessness’ (141). Thus,
though the most usual interpretation of Golding’s novels states that most humans are
loveless egoists, and that this is an important source of suffering, it is also recognised
that the amount of pain that humans inflict on each other is somewhat reduced by the
existence  of  a  minority  of  people  who  apart  from  being,  in  Kinkead-Weekes  and
Gregor’s words, ‘humble, unselfish, loving’, are in ‘communion with nature’ as a whole
(2002:  106,  14).  They  are  what  critics,  taking  their  cue  from Golding  himself,  call
saints. According to Redpath, the most salient feature of saintliness is the ‘appeal to
others outside the self’ (1986: 138). Furthermore, it has been stated, again following
Golding, that in the novels the saint acts as a ‘Christ figure’ (Spangler 1988: 232). The
expression serves  to  highlight  the  fact  that  these  characters,  whose ‘compassion’  is
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exemplary (233), risk their lives to increase the others’ self-knowledge — ‘to turn their
sights  inward  upon  their  own  behavior’  (235)  —  and  well-being.  For  many
commentators,  the  existence  of  saints  is  the  only  palliative  to  the  egoism  that
dominates human relationships.
1.2. Varieties of Experience and Uses of Language
In addition to suggesting that the main goal of Golding’s fiction is to draw attention to
humankind’s  evil  nature,  the  dangers  of  legal  leniency and totalitarianism,  and the
clash  between  a  mass  of  selfish  individuals  and  the  odd  loving  saint,  critics  have
identified a recurrent pattern in his novels whereby different varieties of experience,
different planes of existence, and different uses of language enter into conflict with each
other. It is to these issues that I turn now. The first section of this chapter will focus on
the scholarly treatment given to the antagonistic perspectives — basically, rational and
non-rational — that Golding’s characters allegedly have on the world, and to the two
related planes — physical and metaphysical — in which many of Golding’s characters
live their lives. The emphasis will be on the way in which Golding’s critics associate the
rational  with  the  physical  and the  non-rational  with  the  metaphysical.  The  second
section  will  present  Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor’s  joint  exploration  of  the  way  in
which,  in  their  opinion,  Golding’s  characters  pass  from  the  perception  of  physical
objects  to  a  visionary  grasp  of  their  metaphysical  unity.  Insofar  as  it  confuses  the
opposition  between  rational  and  non-rational  experiences  with  the  focus  on  the
physical and metaphysical dimensions, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor’s account of the
progression from physical perception to visionary awareness is exemplary of a mistake
that appears with certain frequency in analyses of Golding’s novels. For this reason, the
model that they propose cannot be adopted without extensive revision. Nevertheless,
their  discussion  of  the  visionary  trajectory  is  still  one  of  the  most  comprehensive
examinations of Golding’s concern with epistemology and ontology, and for this reason
it is  worth reviewing.  The closing section of  this chapter will  examine the two uses
which, according to some critics, Golding makes of language in order to convey the
kinds of experience that his characters have.
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1.2.1. Varieties of Experience
One of the most recurrent concerns in Golding criticism is with the coexistence, in the
novels, of different ways of being in the world. Gindin assures us that Golding likes to
portray  ‘two sides  of  experience  as  identifiably  separate,  as  pressures  that  pull  the
human being in different directions’ (1988: 12–3). The terms that  Redpath uses for
these two pressures are either ‘reason’ and ‘unreason’ or,  alternatively,  ‘rationalism’
and ‘feelings’ (1986: 81, 68); these are all expressions that Redpath, like all the other
critics whose views I am going to review, fails to define in any way. For his part, Storr
adds that  Golding does not only present both kinds of  experience side by side,  but
privileges one over the other: the novelist, he writes, has ‘a profoundly irrational … view
of reality’ (1987: 144). Howard S. Babb presents ‘man’s rationality as the enemy that
Golding takes under attack’ (1970: 94 n. 8). In general, critics have noted that Golding’s
attitude towards the absence or suspension of rationality is ambivalent. Dickson argues
that ‘The neat “answers” the rationalists provide are ultimately not satisfying’ to either
Golding  or  many  of  his  characters  (1991:  135).  In  his  novels,  rationality  is  often
unmasked as mere rationalisation. It is presented as having a limited reach and, in the
most extreme cases, as being useless to achieve lasting happiness or even to secure
one’s health and survival. In the end, the suspicion prevails that reason can be a sort of
blindfold  that  prevents  us  from  truly  understanding  ourselves  and  the  world:  as
McCarron observes, ‘the “real” world is … inexplicable in pure rational terms’ (1995:
52). However, rationality may also have its advantages. Crawford writes that Golding’s
attempt to counter ‘inflexible rationality’ (and the order that it attempts to impose on
life)  may  lead  to  ‘chaos  and  irrationality’  (Crawford  2002:  192).  Thus,  though
Crawford’s  discussion  puts  the  accent  on  ‘the  limitations  of  rationality’  (192),  the
unexpected reference to chaos suggests that, in Golding’s fiction, reason may also be
presented as an asset which ought to be acknowledged and exploited.
Clements has linked Golding’s concern with non-rational experience to the fact that
in the second half of the twentieth-century ‘confidence in rational forms of knowing
had been eroded by recent historical events’ (2012: 7). Paramount among these events
was, of course, the Second World War, in which Golding took part, and whose ‘absurd
horrors’ had proved that ‘the cult of rational thinking was no longer beyond reproach’,
because  it  led  ‘not  to  enlightenment  but  to  moral  …  confusion’  (10,  8).  Clements
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concludes that ‘The technological  advances made during the Second World War,  in
particular, felt like not advancement but regression’ (8), an opinion that in his view
informs  not  only  Golding’s  novels  but  the  works  of  other  mid-twentieth-century
English-language authors: Iris Murdoch, Patrick White and Saul Bellow.
In addition, it has been suggested that the reliance on one perspective, be it rational
or non-rational, at the expense of the other results in the opposition between science
and the arts (particularly religion). Stephen J. Boyd notes that virtually all of Golding’s
works are organised round the tension between these ‘warring ways of looking at the
world’ or ‘contrasting world-views’ (1988: 15). Virginia Tiger is of the same opinion.
According to her, Golding’s favourite narrative strategies include ‘offering two contrary
views’ held by antagonistic characters (2003: 186). Dickson explains that ‘the conflicts
between  the  humanistic  and  the  scientific’  stances  are  always  central  to  Golding’s
narratives (1991: 135). Finally, Boyd adds that this tension usually adopts the shape of a
debate ‘between a  rational or  scientific  view of  the world and a  more  intuitive and
generally religious attitude’ (1988: 72–3).
Boyd’s reference to intuition takes us back to the figure of the saint. According to
James  R.  Baker,  saints  are  separated  from  the  rest  of  humans  not  only  by  their
resistance to egoism, but also by their ‘unique intuitions’, presumably of a non-rational
kind, by virtue of which they are both ‘blessed and cursed’ (1965: 14). Actually, there
seems to be some kind of relationship between the saints’ lack of egoism and their non-
rational discernment. Kinkead-Weekes declares, without giving further details, that the
saint’s peculiar views remain ‘undistorted by our fallen nature’ and are ‘non-egotistic’
(1987: 67). The tragedy of saints is that their ability to see what others cannot (whatever
it is — no critic seems able to provide a clear answer) has catastrophic consequences.
Though saints are free from the lures of the egoistic self, and thus they are deemed to
have an incomparable redeeming power, their enhanced awareness poses a threat to
held beliefs, and brings them into conflict with society. In many cases, the saint meets
— like Jesus Christ — a violent death at the hands of those who they are trying to save.
In addition to separating rational from non-rational experience,  Golding’s critics
usually connect  this  dichotomy with his supposed ontological  dualism. In Golding’s
writings, they suggest, the rational perspective is tied to the physical plane of existence,
whereas  the  non-rational  perspective  is  tied  to  the  metaphysical  plane.  Thus,
McCarron’s position is unusual insofar as he is content to acknowledge that most of
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Golding’s novels concern themselves ‘with the … numinous force that Golding perceives
at the centre of existence’ (2007: 192). More typically, Gindin identifies that centre with
a plane beyond the physical: ‘Golding thinks we live in “two worlds”, one physical and
the  other  spiritual’  (1988:  13).  For  this  critic,  in  Golding’s  works  ‘the  “physical”  is
equated with the rational’, while the other dimension is identified with ‘the irrational,
the mysterious’ (13). Other authors have couched this ontological opposition in slightly
different terms, and as a rule they have also linked it to the distinction between the
rational and the non-rational. On the one hand, Redpath refers to ‘the spirit world’ as
‘the  metaphysical  realm’,  a  sphere  ‘of  experience  and  being’  that  ‘cannot  …  be
conceptualized by the rational intelligence’  (1986: 12). On the other hand, Crawford
states that in Golding’s novels there exists an irresolvable tension between ‘the body’
and ‘the soul’, which are respectively linked to the ‘natural and supernatural’ realms
(2002: 99, 28). As with the dichotomy between rational and non-rational experience,
none of these critics makes any effort to give these terms — physical,  metaphysical,
spiritual; body, soul; natural, supernatural — a precise definition.
What Crawford calls the supernatural realm reappears in Carey as ‘a reality beyond
the rational’ which can only be grasped thanks to ‘the visionary … revelations’ that are
rooted in  ‘the  miraculous’  (2009:  45,  347,  2).  In Carey’s  opinion,  the  two kinds of
experience are  associated with the approaches  of  science,  on the one hand,  and of
religion  and  art,  on  the  other  (see  272,  278,  412,  420).  While  Clements  explains
Golding’s  promotion of  non-rational  modes of  awareness as  typical  of  the  post-war
climate,  Carey prefers  to  offer  a  biographical  explanation.  Being just  a  baby,  Carey
informs us,  Golding saw ‘something … like a small  cockerel’  that strutted along the
curtain pole and that flaunted ‘an indistinct and indescribable white’ before vanishing
(1). Though Golding remained forever uncertain whether the episode had really been
‘an exercise of clairvoyance before growing up into a rationalist world stifled it’,  he
nevertheless hoarded this memory as a refuge from ‘the bloody cold daylight I’ve spent
my life in, except when drunk’ (cited in Carey 2009: 2). A few years after the cockerel
episode,  during  a  walk  through  the  woods  with  his  parents,  young  Golding  saw  a
mysterious stag’s head, with antlers, appearing behind the bracken. In Carey’s words,
Golding had the impression that the stag was a creature ‘from another world’ (25). The
encounters with these mysterious animals were only the first of a series of events that,
in Golding’s opinion, put him into contact with a dimension beyond the physical.
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In the light  of  the preceding,  I  see  no reason to  reject  Redpath’s  assertion that
Golding’s novels ‘are unquestionably concerned with ways of seeing’  (1986: 214), as
long as we add that this is part and parcel of a general concern with the varieties of
human experience. This concern finds its embodiment in Golding’s presentation of the
process  whereby  several  of  his  characters  come  to  understand  themselves  and  the
world in which they live:
Much of the genius of Golding’s fiction lies in the power of his language to render the immediate
experience of  the perceiving  mind as  it  moves  through the  various  phases  of  its  struggle  to
impose one pattern or another on a cosmos that cannot be reduced to human proportions (Baker
1965: 89).
Two of the critics that have thrown greater light on this trajectory are Mark Kinkead-
Weekes  and  Ian  Gregor.  The  account  that  they  put  forward,  both  together  and
separately, aspires  to  elucidate  the  process  that,  going  from physical  perception  to
metaphysical  vision,  informs  Golding’s  novels.  In  their  view,  among  the  most
distinctive traits of any Golding novel stands out the fact that ‘from the singular it keeps
opening out into greater and greater multiplicity and suggestiveness and growth, yet
keeps us no less contracting back triumphantly into one’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor
2002: 273). What this means, as we are about to see, is that the attention of Golding’s
characters  shifts  from the  physical  perception  of  particular  objects  (sight),  through
their grasp from several perspectives at one and the same time (insight), and finally to
the apprehension of the common metaphysical realm in which those objects are rooted
(vision).  Kinkead-Weekes  and Gregor  calls  this  a  ‘threefold  process  of  focusing’  by
means of sight, insight and vision (241), which they describe as follows:
first … concrete perception; then through perception to insight, fusing darkness and brightness;
then through insight to revelation of ‘the nature of things’, the existence of a terrifying field of
force … to which our normal experience is a concealing screen (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor
2002: 241).
In these critics’ view, Golding’s novels include a presentation of concrete perceptions in
their  irreducible singularity,  in  other  words,  a  presentation of  the characters’  sight.
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When we begin to read Golding’s novels it  is  often ‘the accuracy of the seeing’ that
strikes us most (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002:  362).  In this  respect,  Kinkead-
Weekes states that Golding conceives of ‘no true seeing that is not primarily and simply
visual’  (Kinkead-Weekes  1987:  67).  However,  it  soon  becomes  clear  that  physical
perception is not the most accurate way of looking at the world. Due to ‘the falsifying
power of the human ego’, when one concentrates on the physical features of things one
is able ‘to see only what one wants to see’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 371, 173).
This is  ‘an evil  kind of seeing’,  anchored in humankind’s diseased nature (Kinkead-
Weekes  1987:  73).  Apart  from  the  fact  that  it  is  normally  conditioned  by  egoism,
physical perception has another shortcoming. If it is not abandoned in favour of other
types of awareness, it runs the risk of turning into a physical dead end: ‘concrete seeing
in itself is always blind at a deeper level, because unaware of the nature of things’ (67).
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor’s description of physical sight does not explain why it
is connected with egoism. The account of the second mode of awareness, which they
usually call insight, is even more problematic. Though Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor say
that it emerges from sight, they do not explain if it arises as an overcoming of egoistic
perception or for some other reason. Apparently, insight thrives on the ‘contradictions’
created by the ‘multiplicity’ of existing world views — scientific, religious, artistic, etc.
(Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 273). Thus insight ‘fuses opposites into inclusive
acceptance’ (372). As regards this second stage, there is considerable critical agreement
that  Golding’s method consists in ‘setting up a tension between two contradictory …
patterns’ (Tiger 2003: 119). Without calling the outcome insight, Gindin explains that
Golding likes to bring together competing stances because he ‘never allows a falsifying
and abstract  consistency to distort  the complexity of  experience’  (Gindin 1988: 14).
Even if the novelist cannot hide his sympathy for the non-rational perspectives, he ‘is at
pains to be fair to and make a strong case for the scientific … side’ (15). For Tiger, one of
the most interesting things about Golding is  that ‘he expects readers to … reconcile
apparently  opposite  points  of  view’  (Tiger  1988:  304).  McCarron  also  speaks  of  a
‘reconciliation  of  ostensibly  antithetical  positions’  that  results  in  what  he  calls  a
coincidence of opposites, ‘a denial of distinctions’ or, alternatively, ‘a state of synthesis’
(1995: 10). Though they do not explain what this reconciliation or synthesis consists in,
both  Tiger’s  and  McCarron’s  comments  seem  to  point,  tentatively,  to  an  essential
feature  of  Golding’s  narratives:  the eventual  questioning of  the validity  of  whatever
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descriptions  one  may  make  of  the  world.  After  positioning  themselves  as  the
representatives of one of those clashing patterns or world views, insightful characters
realise  that  all  the  perspectives ‘are  true’  to  a  certain  extent,  and that  ‘a  thorough
conviction of the truth of one to the exclusion of the other yields a distorted and narrow
view of  the world’  (Boyd 1988: 73).  It  is  probably for this  reason that,  in Kinkead-
Weekes  and  Gregor’s  opinion,  achieving  insight  brings  about  ‘the  overturning  of
certainties’  (2002:  173).  As  a  result,  one’s  understanding  of  the  world  becomes
incomparably richer.
The  third  and,  for  Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor,  last  stage  in  this  process  of
enhanced awareness corresponds to what they usually call  vision. Their discussion of
this  kind  of  experience  is  the  most  problematic  of  all.  A  number  of  other  critics,
Redpath among them, have stated that Golding tries to ‘make us aware … of the need to
achieve wholeness’ through a kind of experience that takes us beyond all oppositions
(1986: 178). This the novelist does by showing that all attempts to impose meaning on
the world are ‘inadequate’ (119). Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor believe that if ‘Golding
sets a whole series of patterns at war’, and then shows us that all of them are equally
valid (as he does with the incorporation of insight), it is only ‘to convince us that none
will  do’,  and  that  behind the  plurality  of  world  views  we  can  find  unity  (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 2002: 201). Introducing the notion of vision suggests that none of
the  clashing  descriptions  of  the  world  that  can  be  made,  either  separately  or  in
combination, will give us an accurate idea of the whole. Accordingly, Kinkead-Weekes
argues that, at the same time as Golding’s novels emphasise multiplicity, they illustrate
how ‘the many not only come out of, but must be drawn back into, the one’ (Kinkead-
Weekes 1987: 73). Gregor adds that they do so by ‘remorselessly’ disclosing ‘the shape
of life beneath its surfaces, paring everything away to reveal a significant continuity’
among discrete things (Gregor 1987: 99). The moment ‘when all things come together’,
i.e. the moment of vision, is ‘a moment of truth’ (98). According to Kinkead-Weekes
and  Gregor,  it  is  also  a  moment  of  ‘love  and  compassion’;  actually,  these  feelings
‘matter quite as much as seeing, and much more than words’ (Kinkead-Weekes and
Gregor 2002: 377). As usual, the reasons why love and compassion arise from vision,
and why these feelings are so important, are not given.
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1.2.2. Uses of Language
After describing young Golding’s encounter with a mysterious white cockerel,  Carey
mentions the child’s inability to share what he has seen: ‘Struggling to tell his parents
about  it  brings  him  for  the  first  time  up  against  “the  brute  impossibility  of
communicating”’ (2009: 2). For Carey, Golding’s frustration clearly lies at the origin of
his persistent interest in the capabilities of language, particularly in the possibility of
putting non-rational experiences into words.
In the course of his discussion of Golding’s metaphysical concerns, Redpath holds
that  Golding’s  works  can be regarded as  ‘attempts  to  qualify  our  perception  of  the
universe, to make us see a dimension which exists beyond our rational consciousness
and our faith in the empirical world’ (1986: 153). Regardless of their immediate subject
matter, Golding’s novels always try to warn us against limiting human experience to
‘rationalism’ — which for Readpath consists in ‘cause and effect explanations’ — and
therefore to ‘physical life’  (176). At the same time, Redpath continues, Golding uses
language in such a way that it will make his readers aware of ‘areas of being beneath
our rationally ordered and comfortably reductionist lives’ (178).
Redpath is not alone in drawing attention to Golding’s peculiar use of language.
Several  other  commentators  have seen  in  Golding’s  exuberant  prose  the proof  that
language can have a metaphysical orientation. On the whole, what all these critics do is
link the aspiration to communicate the rational grasp of the physical realm to a certain
use  of  language,  and  the  aspiration  to  communicate  the  non-rational  grasp  of  the
metaphysical realm to another.  Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor,  for example, point out
that  the  conflict  between  two  competing  world  views  —  one  non-rational  and
metaphysical, the other rational and physical — finds expression in ‘the languages …
appropriate to each’ (2002: 278). In their opinion, metaphysical experience ‘can never
be fully or satisfactorily expounded, defined, or conceptualized’ (presumably because it
involves a suspension of rationality), and therefore it must be communicated ‘on the
level  of  suggestion  rather  than “explanation”’  (200).  How can language  do  without
concepts, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor do not say.
Redpath begins his discussion of Golding’s style by stating that an important part of
the  meaning  of  the  latter’s  texts  is  that  ‘man’s  inner  nature’  lies  hidden  in  a
metaphysical realm that remains ‘beyond the limits of language’ (1986: 12). Though this
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statement would amount to an a priori dismissal of Golding’s oeuvre as a failure, in
other parts of his discussion Redpath acknowledges, like Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor,
that language can be employed metaphysically. Thus, while he attempts to characterise
the metaphysical sphere,  Redpath states that it  ‘cannot be described or explained …
except  in  indirect  terms’  (32).  From  Golding’s  novels,  he  surmises  that  the  only
recourse we have to express our metaphysical experiences is using a poetic  instead of
an  ordinary style.  Redpath  refers  to  ordinary  language  as  ‘a  veil  of  conventional
meanings spread over and concealing what is … mysterious’ (37); by contrast, poetic
language  can ‘make  us  aware  of  areas  of  existence  which are  beyond the  limits  of
[ordinary]  language’  (14).  If  Golding  is  obscure,  it  is  ‘because  words  [used  in  an
ordinary way] fail to render for him what the truth is’ (35). The problem, as Redpath
admits, is that using poetic language for metaphysical purposes may backfire: as soon
as  ‘language  ceases  to  perform  its  customary  rôle’  of  referring  to  physical  things
rationally grasped, it begins to be regarded as ‘obscure’ (37). This is exactly the way in
which  it  is  seen by Laurence  Lerner,  who condemns  the  ‘obliqueness’  of  Golding’s
narrative method and style as designed ‘to conceal a confusion or a clumsiness rather
than an insight or even a mystery’ (1982: 12, 14). However, if we are to believe Redpath,
the obscurity that characterises many passages of Golding’s is in fact a deliberate effect.
Its purpose is to confront us,  through language,  with regions of experience that are
alien to language:
Golding’s art is an art of discovery, but not an art that seeks to explain. The discovery it makes is
that the universe … cannot be wholly described in words, and yet words are all the novelist has
with which to describe the universe (Redpath 1986: 13).
In  Redpath’s  opinion,  Golding  is  conscious  of  these  difficulties:  ‘The  problem  of
language and its relationship to the physical and metaphysical world is a theme Golding
continually returns to. In fact, we could say that it is what his art is about’ (1986: 13–4).
Indeed, this critic attempts to defend the novelist against the charge of purposeless
obscurity  and even  meaninglessness,  and he  does  so  by  assuring  that  ‘the issue of
Golding’s art’ is that some dimensions of experience are inaccessible to reason and that,
as a consequence, when we come into contact with them and try to communicate them,
the conceptual quality of language is  likely to become an obstacle: ‘there are things
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which  cannot  be  understood  in  rational  and  conceptual  terms,  and  language,  as  a
medium of conceptual understanding, is a very inadequate tool with which to capture
these  areas  of  experience  and  being’  (Redpath  1986:  215).  If  sometimes  ‘obscurity
appears to be the ultimate aim of the exercise’, this should not come as a surprise (179).
When giving  linguistic  shape  to  his  materials,  Golding  has  to  struggle  ‘against  the
constraints of language so that he can make a profound but only intuitively glimpsed
truth clear to us’ (36). For Redpath it is evident that the novelist’s only way to surmount
these difficulties is to embrace obscurity and to use it to his own advantage: ‘Golding
makes us experience mystery in the universe by making us experience mystery in his
work of art’ (53). Thus ‘the fact that Golding’s novels so frequently puzzle us is surely an
indication that he intends us to be puzzled; he wants us to see that certain areas of
experience cannot be reduced to rational formulae’ (25). Far from being an obstacle,
therefore, Golding’s elusive style must be seen as the only way in which the audience’s
comprehension of reality can be increased.
Despite pointing to crucial characteristics of Golding’s style, Redpath’s discussion is
obviously marred by the equation between poetic and metaphysical language. When
establishing the distinction between ordinary and poetic language, Redpath mentions
his  indebtedness  to  the  theories  of  the  Russian  formalists,  in  particular  to  Viktor
Shklovsky.  According to his  description of  Shklovsky’s  theory,  the chief  function of
poetic language consists in showing the world anew: it ‘has the power to make strange,
… to “defamiliarise” the world with which we have grown overly familiar’; in doing so ‘It
forces us to see the world again in a new way and so restores areas of existence to which
we may have grown oblivious. Our perceptions are refreshed and renewed’ (Redpath
1986:  213–4).  So  far  so  good.  The  problem  is  that  Redpath  confuses  poetic
defamiliarisation (which, according to Russian formalism, does break through the veil
of familiarity and custom) with metaphysical reference. Even if we said that the latter
cannot appear without the former, the reverse would not be the case: far from being
tied  to  metaphysical  objects,  poetic  uses  of  language  can  well  be  limited  to  the
presentation of habitual physical realities in an unusual way.1
1 In this respect, it is interesting to recall Andrew Crozier’s objections to ‘Martian’ poetics, whose
name  comes  from  Craig  Raine’s  1979  poem  ‘A  Martian  Sends  a  Postcard  Home’.  In  this
composition, the poetic voice is that of an uncomprehending Martian who must come to terms
with a world — the Earth — and with a species — human beings — which only figurative language
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So far we have seen that, apart from equating rationality with the physical, on the
one hand, and non-rationality with the metaphysical, on the other, most commentators
have linked physics to a certain verbal style and metaphysics to another. To finish this
section, I would like to examine a slightly different account of Golding’s style. In his
recent  Mysticism  and  the  Mid-Century  Novel,  Clements  establishes  an  implicit
distinction between physical awareness and rationality: physical objects can be grasped
in non-rational as well as rational ways (whether metaphysical objects can be grasped
rationally as well as non-rationally is not so clear). If Clements refers to Iris Murdoch,
William Golding, Patrick White and Saul Bellow as ‘mystical’ novelists, it is not because
they focus on the metaphysical but because they focus on how things can be seen if
rationality  is  left  aside.  Admittedly,  Clements’s  focus  is  for  the  most  part  on
metaphysics, but in the chapter devoted to Bellow it becomes clear that his ‘mysticism’
encompasses  all  kinds  of  non-rational  awareness.2 This  allows  him  to  differentiate
denotative uses  of  language,  which serve  to  convey a  rational  view of  things,  from
evocative uses,  which  serve  to  convey  non-rational  views.  According  to  Clements’s
argument, there are fundamental dimensions of human experience to which denotative
language cannot do justice, and which therefore run the risk of being silenced. Our
awareness of these dimensions — which are not only metaphysical but also physical —
is non-rational and can only be shared in a roundabout way. That is why it is necessary
to resort to alternative varieties of linguistic communication that ‘can deal implicitly
with the ineffable without being a description of the ineffable’ (Clements 2012: 17). This
type of communication works by ‘using language … evocatively … in order to challenge
the  reader’s  reliance  on  …  rational  knowledge’  (181).  Though  this  analysis,  unlike
Redpath’s, encompasses not only the object but also the effect of the verbal utterance,
in the end both the object and the effect are of the same kind: whereas denotation
can describe. Despite recognising that Martian style is ‘wonderfully periphrastic’, and that it does
indeed make us look at things in a fresh way, Crozier’s final verdict is that it lacks metaphysical
depth  (2000:  200).  Drawing  a  comparison  between  the  Martians’  metaphoric  style  and
Golding’s, Boyd likewise concludes that the latter’s power ‘is in marked contrast to the mannered
insignificance’ of the former (1988: 32).
2 For this reason, Clements’s use of the term  mysticism is somewhat misleading (see Saavedra-
Carballido 2015).
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refers to and reproduces in the audience a rational view of things, evocation refers to
and reproduces non-rational views.
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2. THE RELEVANCE OF SCHOPENHAUER’S
PHILOSOPHY FOR GOLDING’S NOVELS
The second part of this thesis deals with Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a framework for
the analysis of Golding’s novels. As pointed out in the previous part, the novelist and
the German thinker seem to share a number of major concerns. This coincidence is
evident,  in  the  first  place,  in  their  common foregrounding  of  the  different  ways  of
looking at the world. Both authors are likewise united by their paramount concern with
human aggression, and with the ways in which violence can be prevented. From a social
perspective, both authors pay attention to the varieties of social organisation and the
limits of political action. Unless we overcome the piecemeal manner in which Golding’s
critics have discussed these themes until now, we may lose sight of their interrelations.
Locating these themes within the architecture of Schopenhauer’s thought may bring out
the connection between them. Having made them explicit, it may be easier to identify
similar links in Golding’s works.
Provisionally supposing that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is pertinent to the analysis
of  Golding’s  fiction,  the first  chapter of  this  part  contextualises  the latter’s  work in
relation to some of the most contentious intellectual issues in Western modernity. The
opening section will trace some of the main philosophical theories of cognition leading
up to and including Kant’s momentous separation, from which Schopenhauer takes his
cue,  of  what  can  be  known  and  what  remains  beyond  the  limits  of  legitimate
knowledge.  The second section will  outline the philosophical treatment of suffering,
from  Leibniz’s  vindication  of  divine  justice  in  the  face  of  suffering,  to  Voltaire’s
scepticism about the goodness of our world.
The  second  and  longer  chapter  deals  with  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy,
concentrating on those aspects of it that  throw light on Golding’s views. Despite my
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narrow focus, it will sometimes be seen that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is not without
inconsistencies.1 When necessary,  I  shall  draw attention to the most conspicuous of
these  incoherences,  and sometimes  I  shall  attempt,  with  the  help  of  contemporary
scholarship, to offer solutions that are plausible in Schopenhauer’s terms. As a general
rule, I shall choose those interpretations of his theory that I consider more useful for
the analysis of Golding’s works.
In  the  first  section  of  the  second  chapter  I  shall  introduce  a  number  of  basic
distinctions that Schopenhauer’s readers must bear in mind from the beginning, such
as the one between the world and the thing-in-itself, between the essential will and the
realm of  appearances, and between representation,  knowledge and explanation.  The
first  distinction  is  between  the  world  and  the  thing-in-itself:  the  former  can  be
legitimately known, the latter cannot. This opposition must not be confused with the
contrast, which Schopenhauer presents as equally important, between the essential will
— the  world’s essence — and  the world’s appearances, both of which can be known.
Moreover,  the  field  of  knowledge  cannot  be  confused  with  that  of  conscious
representation:  for  Schopenhauer,  the  things  that  can  be  represented  are  more
numerous than the things that can be legitimately known. Finally, knowledge exceeds
what can be explained.
In the second section I shall present Schopenhauer’s account of the ways in which
the world appears and in which it is subsequently described. I shall begin by examining
his classification of the human approaches to the world. First, he differentiates rational
1 Among these difficulties, those that have a terminological basis may become the biggest obstacle
for the non-specialist reader. Of the terms that he employs with the greatest assiduity,  world,
representation, will, appearance, intellect, metaphysics and thing-in-itself (among others that I
shall not use here) need to be handled with special care. To get an idea of how important it can be
to correctly interpret passages with these expressions, one just needs to recall that the very title
of Schopenhauer’s main book,  The World as Will and Representation, includes three of them.
Since  this  is  not  a  study  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy,  I  shall  pass  over  most  of  his
terminological  inconsistencies  without  further  mention.  On  the  whole,  my  policy  will  be  to
employ only  those meanings,  among the ones  that  he uses,  which can be of  greater  help  in
connection with Golding’s texts.  When the argument requires using a term in more than one
technical sense, as in the case of will, I shall make its meaning clear in every case, for example by
resorting to the labels, not employed by Schopenhauer (nor by his commentators), essential will
— which at its most general can be called the world-will — and individual will.
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— i.e. conceptual — from non-rational approaches. In his view, all animals with a brain
are conscious beings. By default, he contends, both human beings and other animals
are  only  aware  of  the  physical  side  of  things.  In  particular,  physical  perception
establishes a strict separation among individuals, and presents all other objects from
the subject’s angle as potential sources of dissatisfaction. Young, one of Schopenhauer’s
commentators, has called physical perception an ‘egocentric’ variety of consciousness
(Young  2005:  109).  Schopenhauer  locates  physical  perception  at  the  root  of  moral
egoism and malice, and thus, on the one hand, as a source of the anxiety provoked by
the subject’s fear of unpleasurable experiences, and, on the other, of all those forms of
suffering that result from the individualistic struggle for satisfaction.2 Human beings
have other,  non-egocentric  states of consciousness — aesthetic  contemplation, inner
observation, and the saint’s vision and compassion — thanks to which the metaphysical
side of the world — in its aesthetic, moral and ontological dimensions — is revealed,
egoism is avoided, and suffering is prevented; but, originally and by default, conscious
beings  are  egocentric,  and  these  other  states  of  mind  are  exceptional.  Secondly,
Schopenhauer differentiates physical — i.e. material — from metaphysical approaches
to the world. Regardless of their physical or metaphysical character, the ones that we
have seen so far are non-rational. However, it is only starting from them that human
beings can achieve a rational comprehension of things. As I shall show at the end of the
second section,  the reliance on reason is  also what all  the institutionalised ways of
describing the world that Schopenhauer discusses — history, science, art, religion and
philosophy — have in common.
In the third section I shall discuss Schopenhauer’s notion of the essential will and
its relation to cognitive egocentrism, moral egoism and suffering. In the fourth section I
shall  assess  the chances of  moral  and social  regeneration which the individual  and
society as a whole have.
Properly  understanding  Schopenhauer’s  place  in  the  history  of  philosophy  may
contribute  to  situating  Golding’s  world  view  within  the  larger  context  of  modern
Western  thought.  Crucially,  it  will  help  us  to  see  that  Golding’s  outlook  is  not  an
anomaly in the history of our culture. On the one hand, it will prove that Golding is not
2 Both Schopenhauer and most of his commentators refer to this kind of representation as egoistic,
but I prefer, like Young, to reserve this term for the discussion of morality.
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alone in his concern with the powers and limitations of human cognition, nor in his
belief in the existence of an unfathomable dimension beyond human knowledge. On the
other hand, it will show that Golding is not the only author for whom suffering is so
widespread as to belie all optimistic views of the world and of humankind. In addition,
a detailed examination of Schopenhauer’s thought may contribute to a more accurate
interpretation of specific aspects of Golding’s works and their moral and socio-political
implications. It may make it easier to appreciate how Golding’s novels explore the role
of consciousness in the apparition of the knowable world, and how many of his novels
confront us with a realm of appearances that half conceals and half reveals an inner
force which can be identified, with Schopenhauer’s  will.  This will allow us to better
appreciate the connection in Golding’s novels between egoism and suffering, and may
throw light on his moral and socio-political outlook. Finally, the distinction between
the knowable world and the unknowable thing-in-itself may throw light on Golding’s
confession that  he is  both a  pessimist  (about the knowable  world)  and an optimist
(about what lies outside the purview of legitimate knowledge).
2.1. Main Issues of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy
Schopenhauer’s philosophy responds to his interest in the characteristics and limits of
human knowledge and by his concern about the constant suffering that, in his view,
pervades the world.  Considered from the first  angle,  Schopenhauer’s  thought stems
from  Kant’s  and  reacts  against  the  idealism  of  other  philosophers  such  as  Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich  Hegel  and Johann Gottlieb  Fichte,  whose  systems  proclaim ‘the
absolute identity of the ideal and the real’ (Schopenhauer 2000a: 21). By contrast, from
the angle of morality Schopenhauer criticises Kant’s rationalism. Moreover, in line with
thinkers like Voltaire who argue that this is undoubtedly the worst possible world, he
also attacks Leibniz’s optimism.
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2.1.1. Delimiting Human Knowledge
Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  is,  first  of  all,  an  attempt  to  elucidate  the  nature  of
cognition.  This  is  a  problem that  acquired  unprecedented  intensity  at  the  dawn of
modernity with the expansion of scientific enquiry.  Starting with Galileo Galilei,  the
characteristics  of  objects  began  to  be  classified  into  mind-independent  qualities
(shapes, motions and numerical relationships) and mind-dependent qualities (colours,
tastes,  sounds,  smells  and  textures).  Taking  his  cue  from  Galilei,  John  Locke
adumbrated what Robert Wicks calls a ‘representative theory of perception’, according
to which what we perceive immediately is not the mind-independent world outside but
mental images of it (2008: 19). The ‘mathematical and geometrical contours’ of those
mental images — number, extension, figure and motion — are their primary qualities
(18). All other properties that we may ascribe to things are mind-dependent, secondary
qualities.
It is easy to see why Locke’s theory can lead to scepticism about the status and the
very existence of the mind-independent material world, as it is impossible to prove how
it is and even if it exists at all only by inspecting the images that appear in the mind.
From here is but a short step to reduce, as George Berkeley does, the entire world to a
collection of images perceived by finite knowing subjects. The connection among these
mind-dependent images is established by God, who presents perceptions to our minds
in orderly ways which in fact constitute the laws of nature.
David Hume assumes that for our knowledge and communication to have meaning
at all they must be traceable back to basic sensory impressions, but denies that we can
have access to the realm from which those impressions are supposed to come. Unlike
Berkeley,  Hume rejects the idea of God. He also dismisses previous arguments that
defend the objectivity of the connections among sensory impressions; but for him the
connections with which science works reside in our mind. For Hume the events that we
experience are  themselves,  as  Wicks explains,  ‘entirely  loose  and separate’,  and the
associations  that  hold  them  together  —  including  causality  —  are  psychologically
established (2008: 22).
Kant presents his philosophical system as a corrective to both Berkeley’s argument
against the existence of an independent material world and Hume’s undermining of
causal relations. Kant never denies that there is something that exists outside the mind.
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On the contrary, he affirms that there is an unfathomable thing-in-itself lying beyond
the subjects’ capacity for theoretical knowledge (and hence, for example, beyond the
bounds of science). While he sticks to Hume’s claim that the connections among events
are mind-dependent, Kant describes them as  logical instead of merely  psychological;
as Wicks explains, Kant’s position is that ‘we actively constitute events as being related
to each other in terms of necessary connections’ (2008: 23). This idea enables Kant to
preserve the notion of causal necessity, and with it his faith in the scientific enterprise.
As Kant himself explains, ‘all our cognition begins with experience’, though ‘it does not
… all arise from experience’ (1999: 136). The mind is empty not in the sense that it is a
blank slate on which experience is inscribed, as the British empiricists purported, but in
the sense that it is formal, that is, that it originally lacks any particular contents: ‘We
supply the generalized … formats to our experience, and a mind-independent reality
supplies its particular experiential contents’ (Wicks 2008: 27–8).
Schopenhauer is well aware of the place that he and his German contemporaries
occupy in the history of philosophy, particularly in relation to British empiricism and
Kant’s system. In his view, Kant successfully overcomes the rift between rationalists
and  empiricists.  Though  Schopenhauer  does  not  respect  the  distinction  between
theoretical and practical knowledge, which for Kant is related to the postulation of the
theoretically unfathomable thing-in-itself,  he contends that Kant’s ‘greatest merit’  is
the distinction between what can be known and what cannot, which he ‘based on the
proof that between things and us there always stands the  intellect’,  for which reason
‘they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves’ (1969a: 417–8).
For  Kant,  Schopenhauer  reminds  us,  both the secondary  qualities  and the  primary
qualities of things are supplied by ‘our faculty of … apprehension’ (418).
Despite his admiration for Kant, Schopenhauer finds fault with some aspects of his
philosophy. In Schopenhauer’s opinion, it relies on too many redundant categories, and
puts too much emphasis on human rationality; also, it is unable to characterise in any
positive way the essence that constitutes the basis of the world. Though Schopenhauer
follows  Kant  in  maintaining  the  distinction  between  the  knowable  world  and  the
unknowable thing-in-itself, he believes that he can say more than Kant about the latter.
One of the most important things that  separates his philosophy of  knowledge from
Kant’s is the division of the world into the realm of appearances and the essence —
somehow described as will — that underlies them.
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2.1.2. Refusing to Justify Suffering
Schopenhauer  insists  that  Kant’s  moral  philosophy  is  unsatisfactory  because  it
privileges the subject’s abstract rationality at the expense of feeling,  and because its
defence of the dignity of human beings has the perverse effect of setting them apart
from other sentient beings and from the rest of nature. The demotion of rationality also
plays a fundamental part in Schopenhauer’s criticism of Leibniz’s opinion that we live
in the best possible world.
Leibniz’s Theodicy (1710) is one of the landmarks of modern philosophy. He wrote
this  work  in  response  to  Pierre  Bayle’s  contention  that  Manichaeism  is  the  most
reasonable  explanation for  the order  of  the world.  If  for  Bayle  history  is,  as  Susan
Neiman states, nothing but a record of crimes and misfortunes, all ‘attempts to make
sense of it are doomed not just to falsehood but to ridicule’ (Neiman 2002: 10). Neiman
situates  Bayle  among those  who,  in  view of  the  miserable  world  in  which  we  live,
‘denied the reality of  anything beyond brute  appearances’  (11).  By contrast,  Leibniz
ranks among ‘those who seek an order to explain the appearances that overwhelm us’
so as to persuade us that ‘behind all its forms there must be a better and truer reality’
that we do not know but which would ‘redeem or justify our experience’ (xvii, 203).
Bayle contends provocatively that witnessing the world’s strange mixture of happiness
and  virtue  with  pain  and  wickedness  leads  directly  to  the  Manichaean  hypothesis.
According to him, Christian theology is not able to account for people’s misdeeds and
suffering unless it  rejects  God’s  benevolence,  God’s  omnipotence,  or  both.  The only
rational explanation for suffering entails replacing the idea of divine omnipotence with
that of a never-ending struggle between a bad deity that causes all the pain in the world
and a good deity that is perfectly benevolent but too weak to prevail.
The main motivation of Bayle and those who insist that reality is as bad as it seems
is, as Neiman points out, a sense of philosophical responsibility: ‘Keeping faith with the
world,  and  particularly  with  those  who  suffer  miserably  in  it,  seemed  to  require
rejecting every attempt to find meaning that would make appearances seem milder’
(2002: 324–5). For them, the world ‘is so outrageous that no reasonable being would
want credit as its Author’ (112). Leibniz’s response consists in proving, contra Bayle, the
conformity of faith with reason, thus asserting the Creator’s benevolence and, to some
extent, His omnipotence. Leibniz does not defend the absolute goodness of the world,
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yet he does claim that God could not have done the world otherwise and that, ‘all things
considered’, it is ‘the best that could be chosen’ (Leibniz 1990: 67). Leibniz argues that
this  will  only  become  clear  in  the  course  of  time  as  our  knowledge  of  the  world
increases. As Neiman explains, what Leibniz tells us is that ‘if we understood how God
made the world, we could not even wish that anything in it were different’ (2002: 145).
Leibniz’s optimistic rationalisation was put to the test by the 1755 earthquake that
destroyed the city of Lisbon, killing several thousands of its inhabitants. Among the
reactions that followed the catastrophe, one of the best-known is Voltaire’s writing of a
‘Poem on the Lisbon Disaster’ (1756) and of  Candide (1759). Voltaire’s aspiration in
these works is to persuade his contemporaries that Leibniz’s philosophy is not only vain
but cruel, for its attempt to make sense of life mocks human suffering. According to
Neiman,  Voltaire  follows  Bayle  in  suggesting  that  ‘clear-eyed  description  of  reality
should precede any speculation about it’ (2002: 131). Candide’s starry-eyed optimism
derives  from  the  philosophical  teachings  of  his  mentor  Pangloss,  whose  discourse
recalls Leibniz’s. Pangloss’s assurance proves indefensible as soon as his disciple gets a
taste of the real world. Like others who have pointed out that this world cannot be the
best, in the ‘Poem on the Lisbon Disaster’ and in Candide Voltaire wishes, in Neiman’s
words, ‘to acknowledge the pain of others’, even if he is well aware that very little can be
done to alleviate it (136).
In addition to attacking Leibniz’s optimism, Voltaire criticises his rationalism. In
Neiman’s summary, Voltaire thinks that in Leibniz’s hands reason does not serve as an
instrument of truth because it is ‘inattentive to the claims of the world’, and neither
does it  serve as an instrument of  action because ‘it  is  too weak to move anyone to
anything’  and  ‘leads  us  nowhere’  (2002:  147).  In  sum,  Voltaire’s  position  is  that
Leibniz’s rationalism ‘can’t explain the world, and … can’t help us to navigate it’ (147). A
few decades later, Schopenhauer adopts a similar stance, attacking all philosophies that
are reductively rationalistic and that do not prove their solidarity with sufferers. In his
opinion  true  philosophers,  like  religious  believers,  are  spurred  by  a  sense  of
astonishment stemming from a ‘consideration of the suffering and misery of life’, often
due to human ‘wickedness’, and from the confrontation ‘with death, … the finiteness of
all existence, the vanity and fruitlessness of all effort’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 161, 171,
160). In his opinion, this is a panorama to which philosophy cannot turn a blind eye. As
he remarks towards the end of his life: ‘A philosophy in between the pages of which one
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does not  hear  the tears,  the  weeping and gnashing of  teeth and the terrible  din  of
mutual universal murder is no philosophy’ (cited in Safranski 1991: 2). In the following
pages  we  shall  see  Schopenhauer’s  philosophical  framework,  which  includes  his
conceptualisation of the world’s essence as the source of all pain and his description of
the remedies for suffering.
2.2. Schopenhauer’s Model
In the first part of this study I pointed out that critics have interpreted Golding’s novels
as dominated by a series of recurring themes. On the one hand, there is the assumption
that  people’s  evil  nature  predisposes  them to  cause  suffering,  and the  root  of  that
behaviour can be found in egoism. The existence of saints is posited as undeniable but
exceptional. For this reason, the most effective solution to  human destructiveness is
penal restraint. On the other hand, human beings experience things both rationally and
non-rationally,  and can appreciate both the physical  and the metaphysical  facets of
existence.  Reason is  generally  tied to the physical  (whose grasp,  according to some
commentators, is usually tinged with egoism), and the suspension of reason is often
tied to  the metaphysical.  Also,  while  some uses  of  language can only  communicate
rationally,  and their  contents  are  predominantly  physical,  there  are  other  uses that
work in a non-rational way and whose contents are mostly metaphysical.
The overview  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  that  I  am  going  to  provide  in  this
chapter shows how the German philosopher deals with all the aforementioned themes
in a more nuanced way than Golding’s critics; he establishes, for example, a clear-cut
distinction between egoistic and malignant attitudes, the egocentric perspective from
which they arise (as both the desire for one’s well-being and the desire for the others’
woe  only  makes  sense  if  one  establishes  an  egocentric  differentiation  among
individuals),  and  the  evil  actions  — actions  that  inflict  suffering  — in  which  these
attitudes result. Moreover, when Schopenhauer discusses these issues he does not keep
them separated, as Golding’s critics normally do, but connects them with each other; he
speaks, for example, of the origin of the state’s penal system as an attempt to make the
most of the majority’s egoism.
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My survey will put the emphasis on both the richness of Schopenhauer’s conceptual
equipment and the system it forms. It will do so in the belief that, since Schopenhauer
touches on the same themes as Golding but in a more ordered way, the philosopher’s
definitions as well as the organisation and explanatory power of his model can help us
better to understand both the novelist’s diverse concerns and the way in which they are
interrelated.
The  cornerstone  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  is  the  opposition,  adapted  from
Kantian philosophy, between the knowable world and the unknowable thing-in-itself.
Owing  to  the  a  priori  separation  between  what  can  and  what  cannot  be  known,  a
separation  that  he  derives  from  his  theory  of  the  working  of  the  intellect,
Schopenhauer’s philosophy presents all kinds of knowledge as incomplete. At the same
time, however, Schopenhauer regards his metaphysics of the world’s knowable essence
— the essential will — as an improvement over Kant’s theory.
Schopenhauer  derives  his  conception  of  the  world’s  inner  essence  from  the
individual acts of will that one can glimpse through inner observation. In his view, one
of the most important differences between the realm of appearances (whose existence
presupposes the presence of a conscious subject) and the world’s kernel (the essential
will  whose  existence  is  posited  as  independent  from  —  indeed  as  preceding  the
apparition of — the subject) has to do with freedom. The essential will is posited as pre-
existing consciousness, therefore as self-sufficient and free, while every object in the
realm of appearances is dependent on something else (at its most basic, it is dependent
on the subject in whose consciousness it appears). Moreover, the things and beings,
including humans, that make up the realm of appearances are all rooted in the free
kernel of the world, yet they cannot choose what to will.
The myriad beings that make up the world as appearance are not an effect but the
manifestation  of  the  essential  will,  the  most  general  aspect  of  which  is  a  free  but
purposeless and unquenchable craving. The essential will freely manifests itself in the
creation and destruction of countless individuals. At the same time, the essential will is
a will to life that manifests itself in the tendency of all living beings to self-preservation
and reproduction.
The will  to  life  avails  itself  of  powerful  intellectual  tools,  both non-rational  and
rational.  I  have  already  noted  that  Schopenhauer’s  theory  expands  the  limits  of
consciousness beyond the purview of reason: for him, not only humans but also non-
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rational animals are conscious beings. The difference is that, in the latter, the intellect’s
sole purpose is to keep the organism alive and to help it reproduce itself, something
that it can do without the aid of reason and without going beyond the physical sphere.
Only in humans, and for reasons that Schopenhauer does not make entirely clear, does
the  intellect  function  rationally  and  is  capable  of  reaching  metaphysical  depths.
Consequently, it is only humans that can know the essential will. This does not mean
that humans are the only beings that will or the only beings whose essence is the will,
but simply that they are the only ones that are aware of its existence.
The primary function of the intellect is to serve the will to life, thus securing the
individual’s  well-being  and  facilitating  its  reproduction.  The  attempts  of  conscious
beings, both human and non-human, to satisfy their needs and desires are linked to
their  egocentrism  and  their  egoism:  an  animal  generally  sees  everything  from  its
unique point of view, and tends to seek its own well-being above everything else. The
individual,  human and non-human alike,  not  only  tries  to  satisfy  its  appetites  but,
unwittingly, the essential will to life at whose disposal egocentrism and egoism are. As a
result,  beings enter into conflict and transform the world into the stage of a never-
ending tragedy of cosmic dimensions. The only remedy for so much suffering is a non-
egocentric  perspective.  Being linked to  metaphysical  consciousness,  this  recourse  is
available  to  humans alone.  Thanks  to it,  a  person’s  intellect  can cease  to  serve  the
purposes of the essential will to life.
The  sorts  of  non-egocentric  consciousness  to  which  Schopenhauer  draws  most
attention for their liberating power are, on the one hand, aesthetic contemplation, and,
on the other,  the  saintly  visions  that  lead either  to  compassionate  altruism or  to  a
resigned withdrawal from worldly pursuits.  These are both varieties  of non-rational
consciousness; for Schopenhauer rationality is always at the service of the essential will
to life (see Young 2005: 34–5): individuals always use it as a means to avoid suffering
and  attain  satisfaction  (in  the  form  of  better  material  living  conditions  or  of
professional prestige, for example). Egocentrism is not only avoided through aesthetics
and saintly vision, it is also transcended by death, a phenomenon that puts an end to all
modes  of  consciousness.  Though  Schopenhauer  is  positive  that  the  rejection  of
egocentrism, and with it of egoism, is possible at an individual level, he never fails to
express his conviction that no comparable solution is feasible for society as a whole.
What  society  needs is  to take advantage of  the egoism of  the majority  establishing
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adequate moral and legal measures based on the threat to diminish the offender’s well-
being.
Like Schopenhauer’s, Golding’s works are concerned with the limits of knowledge,
the characteristics  of  consciousness,  the  source  of  evil,  and the origin  and possible
remedies for suffering. In the third part of this study, I shall try to show how the world
view that  transpires  from Golding’s  writings  can be clarified with the assistance of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As we shall see,  Schopenhauer’s thought can help us to
appreciate the ways in which Golding’s earlier novels explore the role of consciousness,
first non-rational and then rational, in the production of a human world. Sometimes
Golding contrasts,  like Schopenhauer,  the knowable world with another region that
escapes cognition — a region where, as one of his essays suggests, other possible worlds
may  exist  (and  whose  possible  existence,  despite  being  only  a  matter  of  faith,  he
announces  with  surprising  optimism).  In  general,  Golding  thinks,  again  like
Schopenhauer, that life is usually spent in a realm of appearances that half-conceal and
half-reveal  the  essence behind them.  He also  likes  to  remind us  that  knowledge is
always  partial  and  usually  concerned  with  egoistic  interests;  as  a  consequence,  he
suggests that the view that the individual has of the world is always in danger of either
being reduced to solipsism or collapsing. Schopenhauer teaches us that it is the world’s
essence that has availed itself of consciousness, putting it at its service; Golding limits
himself  to  mentioning  the  world’s  movement  from  unconscious  existence  towards
consciousness. However, Schopenhauer’s idea throws light on Golding’s presentation of
the realm of appearances as pervaded by dissatisfaction and conflict, in other words, by
suffering. This does not mean that for Golding suffering cannot be alleviated in any
way. At the individual level, the most important solutions that Golding contemplates
are, as in Schopenhauer, aesthetic contemplation, compassionate altruism and death
(resigned detachment, which is so important for Schopenhauer, seems to play no role
in  Golding’s  works).  At  the  collective  level,  Golding  earlier  novels  reject,  like
Schopenhauer’s  works,  all  utopian  hopes,  suggesting  that  the  only  solution  is  legal
repression
Useful  as  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  may  be  to  analyse  Golding’s  metaphysical
concerns, it does not serve to provide a complete explanation of this topic in all of his
novels.  At  the  very  end of  this  study I  shall  try to show that Golding’s  later  works
contain important elements that go against the view of the world so far presented. To
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begin with, there is a clear endorsement of free choice (understood as the individual’s
freedom to choose what to will). Moreover, there is an implicit criticism of the belief
that the metaphysical building can be founded on the contents of inner observation.
According  to  Golding,  if  we  derive  our  notion  of  the  world’s  essence  from  inner
observation we run the risk of making the world resemble whatever we think we are
like. Finally, Golding’s later novels contemplate an utopian kind of social organisation
where competition and repression have been replaced by collaboration.
2.2.1. Preliminary Considerations
Judging from some interpretations of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it would appear that
he does little  more than adopt Kant’s  distinction between the knowable phenomena
and the unknowable noumenon or thing-in-itself, renaming the latter the essential will.
Schopenhauer certainly adapts the Kantian distinction, referring to the former element
as the knowable  world  and to the latter as the unknowable  thing-in-itself. However,
Schopenhauer separates from Kant in holding that the knowable world has two sides —
an indivisible  essence (the  essential  will)  and  countless  appearances (the  essential
will’s  manifestations).  Confusing the essential  will  and the thing-in-itself  prevents  a
proper  understanding  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy,  though  he  himself  often
designates the former by the latter’s name. The interpretation that I offer here is more
accurate  and  tallies  well  with  the  interpretation  of  the  world  offered  in  Golding’s
writings as made up of a realm of appearances underlain by a single driving force. It
also tallies well with Golding’s recognition that the knowable world may not be all that
there is.
According to a widespread interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, when he
adapts  the  Kantian  distinction  between  the  thing-in-itself  and the  phenomena,  his
aspiration  is  to  improve  on  it  by  doing  more  than  declaring  the  former’s
unfathomableness. Schopenhauer’s suggestion, this interpretation goes on, is that we
can get a pretty accurate idea of what the thing-in-itself might be through the inner
observation of one’s appetites and desires, that is, of the motions of one’s individual
will. When I observe myself from within, I cannot but realise that this is the window to
the usually  hidden thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer  privileges  the inner  observation  of
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one’s individual will because it is the only access to the essential will. Inner observation
allows him to complete the picture of a world that otherwise could only be grasped from
without. While the rest of the world can only be grasped from without (as a collection of
physical  surfaces  without  depth),  I  can  grasp  myself  not  only  from  without  (as  a
physical body among other physical bodies) but also from within (as the inner working
of my body).
The foregoing interpretation must be rejected because it does not take into account
that in Schopenhauer the thing-in-itself is different from the essential will. The cause of
the  conventional  identification  between  both  can  be  found  in  Schopenhauer
himself,who used the expression thing-in-itself  with two meanings. One of the senses
coincides  with  Kant’s  unfathomable  dimension  beyond  human  knowledge,  but  this
seldom appears in Schopenhauer; the other sense deviates from Kant and denotes the
essence  of  the  world  which,  together  with  the  countless  appearances  that  are  its
manifestation, makes up the knowable world.
2.2.1.1.1. The Thing-in-Itself, the Essential Will and Appearances
The  conventional  interpretation  passes  over  one  essential  point  of  Schopenhauer’s
philosophy:  his  recognition  that  the  characterisation  of  the  world’s  kernel  as  the
essential will implies that this kernel is knowable, while the thing-in-itself is not. As
Schopenhauer says, ‘being-known of itself  contradicts  being-in-itself’  (Schopenhauer
1969b: 198). In his opinion, the ‘world as we know it does not belong to the true being
of things-in-themselves’ (1969a: 421).
By definition, the will — whether observed in its individuality, as it appears inside
each  of  us,  or  conceptualised  as  essential  and  world-pervading  —  is  knowable,
therefore it cannot be equated with Kant’s  unknowable  thing-in-itself. This being so,
the  influence  of  the  conventional  interpretation  can  only  be  explained  because
sometimes Schopenhauer does not limit himself to speaking of the essential will as ‘the
inner nature of the world’ or ‘its innermost being, its kernel’; he also asserts that ‘the
[essential]  will  is  the  thing-in-itself’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  31,  170).  As  Wicks’s
acknowledges, ‘Schopenhauer … offers what appear to be conflicting remarks, often in
the same text’ (2008: 68).
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Along with other scholars, Christopher Janaway correctly argues that the best way
to solve this contradiction is by assuming that in Schopenhauer’s writings ‘there are two
senses  of  “thing  in  itself”  at  play’  (1999:  163).  According  to  Janaway’s  reading,
Schopenhauer normally employs the expression thing-in-itself in a different way from
Kant: not in the sense of an absolute and ultimate reality ‘lying implacably  detached
from  the  knowable  world’,  but  as  ‘another  aspect  of  the  knowable  world’  that  is
‘revealed … to philosophical reflection’ (164). Janaway argues that this aspect is ‘the
essence of  the  world’  (166).  Schopenhauer  himself  calls  it  the  undifferentiated  and
‘innermost  essence,  the  kernel,  of  every  particular  thing  and  also  of  the  whole’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 110).  The essential  will  is  the deepest that we can get in our
knowledge  of  the  world, and this  is  why  Schopenhauer  sometimes  feels  entitled  to
speak of the essential ‘will as thing-in-itself’ in this second, non-Kantian sense (1969a:
112).
In  sum,  Schopenhauer  takes  his  cue  from  Kant  and  declares  the  thing-in-itself
unknowable,  distinguishing  it  from  the  knowable  world.  Unlike  Kant,  however,
Schopenhauer holds that the knowable world has two sides — an indivisible  essence
(the essential will) and countless appearances (the essential will’s manifestations). On
this view, the realm of appearances acts as a ‘veil’ that half conceals and half reveals the
essence  behind  them  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  253).  Despite  the  bold  claims  that
Schopenhauer sometimes makes, the opposition between appearance and essence does
not  reproduce  the  contrast  between  Kant’s  unknowable  noumenon and  knowable
phenomena (see  Schopenhauer  1969a:  419).3 That  of  the  essential  will  is  the  most
general  metaphysical concept to which philosophical  enquiry can arrive through the
‘application of [rational] reflection’ (110). As an arch-concept this  will is intended to
cover the whole of the known and knowable world.  However,  insofar as it  does not
cover  the  unknowable  thing-it-itself,  the  concept  of  the  essential  will  ‘characterises
penultimate, not ultimate reality’ (Young 2005: 98).
Schopenhauer argues that it is only the inner observation of his individual will that
can give the philosopher indirect access to the essential will: ‘Here only, therefore, can
3 Schopenhauer’s opposition between the knowledge of the world’s essence and of its appearances
(Erscheinungen)  has been  traditionally  obscured  by  the  usual  English  (mis-)translation  of
Erscheinung as  phenomenon.  (The  Payne  translations  that  I  follow  are  a  good  example.)
Schopenhauer never uses phenomenon in a technical sense, nor does he use noumenon at all.
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he hope to find the key to the riddle of the world, and obtain a clue to the inner nature
of all things’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 179). From a philosophical point of view, grasping
one’s individual will is the privileged modality of consciousness because it is the only
one whose object is within ourselves: ‘the concept of will is of all possible concepts the
only one that … comes from within’ (1969a: 112). The word will thus serves to ‘express
anything but an unknown  x’; on the contrary, it serves to ‘express that which, at any
rate from one side [i.e. from within], is infinitely better known and more intimate than
anything else’ (1969b: 318). As a result of treating the individual acts of will as the inner
manifestation of the single essence that underlies the entire world (an idea for which he
finds  confirmation  in  the  behaviour  of  both  lifeless  matter  and  living  beings),
Schopenhauer  reaches  the  conclusion  that  ‘it  must  not  be  assumed  that  man  is
specifically, toto genere, and radically different from the rest of the beings and things in
nature, but rather that he is different only in degree’ (174).
This account of the essential will as the knowable kernel of the world does not mean
that Schopenhauer finds no use for the unknowable thing-in-itself. In fact, he is well
aware that cognition is by definition limited by the conditions that make it possible,
that is, by the subject–object polarity and the intellect’s forms: time, space, causality
and, in the case of  humans, rational abstraction. Therefore he maintains that beyond
the world that we know and that his philosophy seeks to describe lies an unfathomable
dimension about which no legitimate knowledge can be acquired, and which therefore
remains out of philosophy’s reach. I shall only speak of the thing-in-itself when I refer
to this latter dimension.4
4 According to Schopenhauer, no mode of consciousness can ever shed all the forms that conceal
the thing-in-itself. During inward observation two of these forms are still present: the polarity
between the conscious subject and the object, and the additional form of time.  Schopenhauer
writes: ‘even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any means furnish
an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself.  It … falls apart into subject and
object’; thus ‘there still remains the form of time, as well as that of being known and of knowing
in general’, and therefore ‘in this inner knowledge the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent
cast  off  its  veils,  but  still  does  not  appear  quite  naked’  (Schopenhauer  1969b:  196–7).  As  is
happens, grasping one’s individual will is not the modality of consciousness that comes under the
fewest veils.  This merit is allotted to aesthetic contemplation, to which only the division into
subject  and  object  applies  (in  comparison  with  inner  observation,  the  only  shortcoming  of
aesthetic contemplation is that its focus is without not within).
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2.2.1.1.2. Representation, Knowledge and Explanation
So far I have spoken of the limits of legitimate knowledge without saying what this
knowledge consists in. In this section I shall try to distinguish this notion from those of
conscious  representation  and  valid  explanation.  In  the  next  section,  I  shall  try  to
elucidate the exact relationship between representation and the essential will.
Schopenhauer normally uses the terms representation (Vorstellung), consciousness
and  knowledge without  spelling  out  the  differences  between  them.  He  frequently
employs all three terms interchangeably, but this is only because most of what he says
has to do not with what humans can be conscious of, in general, but just with what can
be known. It is clear that representation and consciousness can be used as synonyms.
Schopenhauer  writes:  ‘the  concept  of  consciousness  coincides  with  that  of
representation in general, of whatever kind it may be’, that is, rational as well as non-
rational  (1969a:  51).  According  to  Schopenhauer,  conscious  representation  is  the
product of the mind or intellect, which is itself the function of the brain. However, the
scope  of  the  expression  conscious  representation is  wider  than  that  of  legitimate
knowledge: thanks to their unique imaginative powers, human beings can represent —
be conscious of — states of affairs that do not correspond to the facts of the knowable
world (this is what happens, for example, when a person envisages the divinity to be a
bearded old man).
The term  knowledge,  for  its  part,  has a wider scope than  explanation,  of  which
Schopenhauer  admits  three  different  types:  causal,  mathematical  (geometrical  or
arithmetic) and logical explanation (see Schopenhauer 1969a: 463). In Schopenhauer’s
opinion  the  knowable  world  contains  things  that  are  inexplicable.  Legitimate
knowledge is a belief resting on good grounds, not to be confused with mere hopes or
guesses. Now what can be known includes not only the things that are amenable to
explanation, but also those things that are presupposed by that explanation, and — in
Schopenhauer’s view — the one thing that can serve to draw all the relations between
the  others,  that  is,  to  offer  a  unifying  account  of  them.  Indeed,  Schopenhauer
acknowledges that his own philosophy, which aspires to throw light on a world that
strikes him as mysterious, includes two things that are ‘absolutely inexplicable’ (1969a:
81): the very criteria by which he judges something to be a valid explanation and the
essential will that he locates at the centre of the world. These two things he can describe
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but not explain.  Even so,  he believes that they are part and parcel  of the knowable
world, while all other things that cannot be explained belong in the unknowable thing-
in-itself.
2.2.1.1.3. The Essential Will and Representation
Schopenhauer  believes,  in  Brian  Magee’s  words,  that  thanks  to  the  concept  of  the
essential will his philosophy ‘makes … manifestly coherent sense of the enigma of the
world in all its details and through all their interrelationships’, and that, therefore, ‘it is
reasonable to accept and unreasonable not to accept’ the unifying account that ensues,
even if it is impossible to explain all of its elements in a causal, mathematical or logical
way (1997: 38, 37). The fact that the essential will can be known means that it is some
kind of representation;  Schopenhauer himself  writes that  the essential  will  must be
‘treated as a special class of representations’ (1969a: 102).
This  explanation  obscures  the  opposition  between  will and  representation that
figures in the very title of his main work, The World as Will and Representation; but
this  distinction  only  makes  sense  because  Schopenhauer  often  limits  the  term
representation to the essential will’s manifestations, that is, to everything that can be
known save the essential will. This use of representation is inconsistent with the rest of
Schopenhauer’s  model,  and therefore  it  is  preferable  to  treat  the  term as  a  perfect
synonym  for  consciousness.  In  the  light  of  this  use  of  representation,  and  of  the
previous clarification of the terms will and world, a plausible rendering of the title The
World as Will and Representation would be: the knowable world as the essential will
and its manifestations (see Schopenhauer 1969a: 119).
2.2.2. Varieties of Consciousness and Knowledge of the World
We have just seen that, in order to have a correct understanding of  Schopenhauer’s
thought, it is necessary to establish a preliminary distinction between the unknowable
thing-in-itself and the knowable world. We have also seen that both the essential will
(the knowable kernel of the world) and its manifestations (the world as appearance)
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belong to the field of representation. Having established this, let us now examine the
characteristics of representation in more detail.
Like the critical examinations of Golding’s works that I surveyed in the first part of
this study, Schopenhauer’s analysis of representation highlights the existence of several
modes of awareness. The first step that he takes in the exposition of his philosophy is to
separate the kinds of conscious representation that are non-rational (which he calls
feelings) from those that are rational (concepts), and those that have a physical focus
from those whose focus is metaphysical. In addition, he also mentions the existence of
imaginative  kinds  of  representation.  Though he fails  to  develop his  casual  remarks
about the imagination into a full-fledged theory, what he says is suggestive enough to
merit some consideration.
After discussing the features of the world’s apparition, Schopenhauer examines the
institutionalised descriptions of the world that humans build from rational concepts.
These conceptions are classified according to the characteristics of their objects: either
physical (as in history and science) or metaphysical (as in art, religion and philosophy).
Schopenhauer gives metaphysical approaches, especially those that make reference to
the essential will (i.e. religion and philosophy), precedence over physical approaches.
The characterisation of these institutions of knowledge is completed by a consideration
of  their  proper  effects: while  history,  science  and  philosophy  aspire  to  produce  a
rational response in the form of concepts, art and religion aspire to produce a non-
rational  response  in  the  form  of  feelings.  (Of  course,  nothing  prevents  these
descriptions from having other subsidiary effects.) Given that religion and philosophy
have the same object, the concept of the essential will, they are only distinguished from
each other by the effect that they intend to achieve: that of religion is non-rational,
while that of philosophy is rational.
On  the  whole,  the  image  that  transpires  from  Schopenhauer’s  account  of
representation is not one of wholesale irrationalism, as is often claimed. It is true that
he  suggests  that  rationality  depends  on  and  coexists  with  non-rational  kinds  of
knowledge; but it is equally true, as we shall see, that he acknowledges the important
part that rational concepts play in social life, and that he defends the philosophical
appeal to reason against religious dogma.
As  regards  Golding’s  work,  Schopenhauer’s  explanation  of  the  transition  from
feelings to concepts may illuminate, in the first place, the way in which a recognisable
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human world emerges in Lord of the Flies and in Pincher Martin; my analysis will put
the accent on the movement from a non-rational to a rational view of the world at the
beginning of both narratives. Secondly, Schopenhauer’s references to the imagination
may throw light on the creation of a private world by the main character of  Pincher
Martin.  Thirdly,  Schopenhauer’s  account  of  consciousness may explain  the ways  in
which time and space  are  grasped respectively  in  Free  Fall and the  Sea  Trilogy (a
sequence also known as To the Ends of the Earth which comprises the novels: Rites of
Passage,  1980;  Close  Quarters,  1987;  Fire  Down  Below,  1988).  Fourthly,  his
distinction  between  physical  and  metaphysical  cognition  may  be  relevant  to  my
analysis  of  the  conflict  between  Nick  Shales  and Rowena Pringle  in  Free  Fall and
between Dean Jocelin and Roger Mason in  The Spire, and of the opposition between
physical and metaphysical representation as it appears in such later works as Darkness
Visible,  The  Paper  Men and  the  essay  ‘Utopias  and  Antiutopias’.  Finally,
Schopenhauer’s  classification  of  the  institutionalised  descriptions  of  the  world  may
help  us  to  understand  Golding’s  interventions  on  the  two  cultures  debate  and  his
lifelong defence of the metaphysical import of the arts.
2.2.2.1. Human Consciousness and the Apparition of the World
In Schopenhauer’s conception, conscious representation does not mean awareness of
previously  existing  objects.  The  sphere  of  representation,  including  the  knowable
world, makes its appearance only with the first conscious being: ‘the world … begins
only with the opening of the first eye, and without this medium … it cannot be, and
hence before this it did not exist’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 30, 31). The active role of the
conscious subject in the apparition of the world and the objects that make it up does
not mean that the subject has priority over the object: both are mutually dependent.
2.2.2.1.1. From Non-Rational Feelings to Rational Concepts
Schopenhauer identifies a series of factors that intervene in representation.  First, for
there  to  be  consciousness  of  an  object  there  has  to  be  a  conscious  subject.  Every
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representation ‘is only object in relation to the subject’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 3). When
we speak about an object, he adds, we must bear in mind that it ‘exists only for the
subject’ (5). Before the emergence of subjectivity there are no objects. This should not
mislead  us  into  thinking  that  the  conscious  subject  precedes  the emergence  of  the
object. Neither subject nor object can exist without the other: ‘the Object is at once
posited with the Subject (for the word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and
conversely, … the Subject is at once posited with the Object’ (1903: 167). The most basic
condition of  representation is  therefore  the polarity  that  separates  the representing
subject  and  the  represented  object,  this  being  ‘that  form  under  which  alone  any
representation … is generally possible and conceivable’ (1969a: 3). The same happens
with  knowledge  proper:  ‘knowing  requires  a  knower  and  a  known’  (1969b:  202),
because in the field of knowledge, as in the field of representation as a whole, ‘being the
Subject means exactly as much as having an Object, and being an Object means the
same thing as being known by the Subject’ (1903: 167).
At this stage, neither the subject nor the object have yet been individuated. For this
reason Schopenhauer refers to both as universal. However, it must be borne in mind
that representation is only possible because the subject has a mind. For Schopenhauer,
as for Kant, the mind has a series of faculties,  and when they are operative — as is
usually the case, according to Schopenhauer — each of them imposes a different form
on  the  represented  object.  It  is  by  virtue  of  these  forms  that  the  object  becomes
individuated in the subject’s mind. On this view, the conscious subject and the object
are not only interdependent but strictly correlative. Therefore, the characteristics of the
represented  object  are  in  exact  correspondence  with  the  subject’s  modes  of
representation,  and vice  versa.  Speaking  of  knowledge  proper,  Schopenhauer  states
that ‘when an Object is assumed as being determined in any particular way, … we also
assume that the Subject knows precisely in that particular way’ (Schopenhauer 1903:
167). This  is  because  ‘as  the  object  in  general  exists  only  for  the  subject  as  the
representation thereof, so does every special class of representations exist only for an
equally  special  disposition  in  the  subject,  which  is  called  a  faculty’  of  the  intellect
(1969a:  11).  In  other  words,  that  which  is  conscious  (and  the  way  in  which  it  is
conscious)  is  the  ‘subjective  correlative’  of  the  object  (11),  and  that  which  one  is
conscious of (and the way in which one is conscious of it) is the objective correlative of
the subject (this idea of correlation is criticised by Young 2005: 146–7). The following
59
Golding’s Metaphysics
table, which condenses the contents of the rest of this and the next section, gives a
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Table 1: Main Types of Non-Rational and Rational Representation in Schopenhauer
Once the subject–object polarity has been established, the subject’s inner sensibility
applies the form of time to the object, thus starting its individuation. Having placed the
object in time, the subject’s outer sensibility can apply the form of space to it. After
placing the object in time and in space, the subject’s understanding can apply the form
of  causality  to it,  thus  completing  its  individuation. Time,  space  and causality  are,
therefore,  the  forms  which separate  one  object  from another  by placing  them in  a
5 Owing of the difficulties to accommodate them in a suitable place, the table does not include
three kinds of representation whose importance Schopenhauer insists on (and whose relevance
for Golding cannot be ignored), but which he fails to associate with the forms of the intellect: the
saint’s vision and compassion, and imaginative representation. Additionally, one must bear in
mind that the possibility of sensation in time and space but without the intervention of causality
is only  a theoretical  possibility;  in practice  Schopenhauer always links space to causality.  As
regards insight, Schopenhauer’s use of the term strikes me as easier to understand than Kinkead-
Weekes  and  Gregor’s.  I  also  find  Schopenhauer’s  use  of  insight as  less  problematic  than
Clements’s use of  mysticism with the same meaning, that is, to refer to the grasp of the object
prior to the formation of concepts.
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specific temporal, spatial and causal location. The result is ‘a plurality of coexistent and
successive things’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 113).
Since all cognition starts with the division of the subject from the object, and all
minds, whether human or not, apply the three forms of the intellect — time, space and
causality  —  in  the  same  way,  the  knowable  world  that  arises  from  these  forms  is
accessible  to  and  shared  by  all  conscious  beings.  This  does  not  mean  that  human
cognition is exactly the same as that of other species. Schopenhauer argues that non-
human  animals  can  only  grasp  objects  affected  by  time,  space  and  causality.  In
comparison, human beings have more types of non-rational representations (feelings)
than other  animals  and they are  the only  beings  that  have rational  representations
(concepts).
Schopenhauer defines feelings as mental ‘pictures or images’ (Schopenhauer 1969b:
72). In his model, the notion of feeling occupies an ‘immeasurably wide sphere’ capable
of accommodating ‘the most varied, indeed the most hostile, elements’ (1969a: 52). A
feeling is not only an emotion, as in the ordinary use of the term, but anything ‘present
in consciousness that is  not a concept’,  that is, any non-rational representation (51).
This definition covers non only feelings that are common to all animals, like the ‘feeling
of sensual pleasure, … bodily feeling such as touch, pain, feeling for colours, for sounds
…  [and  the]  feeling  of  …  weakness,  health’,  but  also  feelings  that  are peculiar  to
humans, like ‘religious feeling, … moral feeling, … aesthetic feeling, … and so on’ (52).
The most basic feeling in human beings has an aesthetic nature, and involves the
representation of an object without the intervention of any of the intellect’s forms, that
is,  without  being discriminated or individualised in any spatial,  temporal,  causal  or
abstract manner. Schopenhauer considers that this state of consciousness reveals the
universal  dimension  of  the  object,  its  beauty,  and  regards  both  the  state  and  the
universal dimension revealed by it as peculiar to the aesthetic field.
When humans add the intellectual form of time to the subject–object opposition,
they focus on the inner workings of their own body. This is what Schopenhauer calls
‘inner apprehension’  or  ‘inward  observation’  (Schopenhauer  1969b:  36,  196).  When
looking inside,  the subject apprehends the succession of  ‘the individual acts of will’
(2000b: 46). The object that one grasps is  the individual will,  the inner working of
one’s body. For Schopenhauer, therefore, the individual will comprises not only ‘willed
action or behaviour’ (Magee 1997: 131), but also — and this is the philosopher’s peculiar
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extension of willing beyond its usual purview — the ‘movements of the human heart’
(Schopenhauer 1969b: 451),  that  is,  ‘all  affects  and passions’  (2009: 38).  The latter
amount ‘in all cases’ to ‘bodily sensations’ of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of pleasure
and  displeasure,  ‘and  all  those  countless  sensations  that  lie  between  these  two
extremes’, which enter consciousness as something in accordance with one’s desires or
as something contrary to them (38–9).6
As regards representations in space,  humans — like all other conscious animals —
have  perceptions.  In  perception  the  understanding  imparts  to  the  external  objects
‘extension,  form,  impenetrability,  mobility,  and  so  on,  in  short,  all  that  can  be
represented … only by means of time, space, and causality’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 20).
The aesthetic contemplation of the object, inner observation and perception are all
kinds  of  non-rational  representation  or  feeling,  whose  subjective  pole  is  the  non-
rational subject. When humans give those feelings an abstract shape, they transform
them into rational representations or concepts, whose combination gives rise to logical
propositions.  Schopenhauer  defines  concepts  as  abstract  ‘representations  of
representations’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 40). They are a ‘quite special class of general,
non-perceptible  representations’  (518).  These  definitions  are  rather  vague,  and
Schopenhauer’s  whole  account  of  concepts  has  been described as  ‘hopeless’  (Young
2005: 44, 49); but for our purposes here it will suffice to remember that the examples
that Schopenhauer gives of  conceptual constructs  include the discursive contents  of
linguistic and scientific representation.
Concepts are formed, through a process of rational abstraction, upon the concrete
feelings that the non-rational intellect supplies: ‘The concept … is the unity … produced
out of plurality by means of abstraction through our faculty of reason’ (Schopenhauer
1969a: 235).  Thus seen, conceptualisation can be described as a rational reduction of
the complex to the simple. Here lie many of its strong and weak points.
6 What one’s inwardly contemplated will does not comprise is what Kant calls the power of free
choice (Willkür). Since this power is precisely what Western thought has usually identified as the
defining trait of the faculty of volition, it is difficult to understand why Schopenhauer refers to his
inner being as  will, and not as  force or  energy,  if not to distance himself from the prevailing
understanding of those terms in the natural sciences, and to underline that the individual will is a
manifestation of the essential will.
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For Schopenhauer feelings are more important than concepts, and this for several
reasons. To begin with, inner observation relies on this kind of representation, and it is
this state of consciousness that gives us access to the will  which, in its most general
dimension,  Schopenhauer  identifies  with  the  world’s  innermost  kernel. Moreover,
conceptual  representations  are  unable  to  add  new  content  to  the  non-conceptual
representations from which they derive: ‘the abstract representation … has all content
and meaning only through its relation to the representation of [such kinds of feeling as]
perception, without which it would be worthless and empty’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 95).
The concept is  crippled by its  poverty of  detail,  which contrasts  with the wealth  of
concrete features afforded by feelings: ‘the concept … never descends to the particular
case, and its universality and rigid definiteness can never accurately apply to reality’s
fine shades of difference and its innumerable modifications’ (61). The abstract content
of  concepts  is  related to concrete feeling ‘as  a  mosaic  is  to  a  picture’,  or  as  ‘as  the
shadow is to real objects’ (57, 481–2).
Schopenhauer also defends the prevalence of feeling over conceptual demonstration
— ‘a directly established truth is … preferable to a truth established by a proof’ — and
reverses the empirical  claim that only  what has been proven is  entirely true:  ‘every
proof or demonstration requires an undemonstrated truth’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 64).
Conceptual knowledge ‘is merely knowing in the abstract what everyone knows in the
concrete’  (45).  The  only  thing  that  reason  can  do  is  to  confirm  the  information
conveyed by the non-rational intellect through feelings. For this reason, he concludes,
making a use of the term insight that I shall adopt, only feeling ‘imparts insight proper’
(1969b: 77). Last, but not least, feelings prevail over concepts in both the aesthetic and
the moral  fields,  where the things that really  matter are the feeling of the aesthetic
dimension of the object (e.g. of the work of art), and the malignant and compassionate
feelings that prompt a person to act. Schopenhauer is adamant that ‘the mere concept
is as unfruitful for genuine virtue as it is for genuine art’ (1969a: 376). It would ‘be just
as foolish to expect that our moral systems … would create virtuous, noble, and holy
men,  as  that  our  aesthetics  would produce poets,  painters’  who can appreciate  and
transmit the aesthetic dimension of objects (271).
If abstract concepts can be judged too schematic in comparison with feelings, their
simplicity  can  be  an  advantage.  Owing  to  their  lack  of  detail  they  are  easier  to
communicate and store, in one’s mind as well as externally. Moreover, the truths that
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are established through the combination of concepts are ‘perfectly safe’ and ‘valid once
for all’  (Schopenhauer 1969a: 46, 45). Because they are communicable,  storable and
safe, concepts have, for human beings living together, considerable advantages. Only
thanks to concepts are humans capable of cooperation, planned action and sustained
enquiry. What explains the existence of social institutions that preserve past customs,
regulate present affairs and make arrangements for the future is therefore the power to
have, store and exchange rational thoughts. Actually,  Schopenhauer argues that ‘Past
and future are added only in the case of man, and indeed only in the concept; they are
known in abstracto’ (1969b: 572). Non-rational animals ‘live in the present alone’; the
human being, besides living in the present, ‘lives at the same time in the future and the
past’  (1969a:  36).  Because  they  make  possible  to  go  beyond  one’s  immediate
experience, and thus to be aware of past mistakes and to prepare for the future (even
after one’s death), the use of concepts distinguishes man from other animals, ‘and gives
him the mastery of the earth’ (1969b: 518).
Despite their differences in other respects, most feelings and concepts share one
fundamental  disadvantage.  Schopenhauer’s  theory  presents  all  kinds  of  knowledge,
whether rational or non-rational, as incomplete. Moreover, feelings and concepts often
share  another  feature:  they  tend  to  be  self-centred.  In  order  to  understand  this
characteristic, it will be necessary to establish another distinction, now between those
kinds  of  representation  that  are  physical  (and  egocentric)  and  those  that  are
metaphysical.
2.2.2.1.2. From Physical to Metaphysical Consciousness
Apart  from  the  distinction  between  non-rational  feelings  and  rational  concepts,
Schopenhauer’s  theory  of  consciousness  establishes  a  different  distinction  between
physical and metaphysical representation. For Schopenhauer, physical representation
includes perceptual  feelings  and the concepts  derived therefrom.  The imposition of
causality  in  perception  completes  the  individuation  of  external  objects.  As  regards
metaphysical representation, it includes all kinds of non-perceptual feelings — among
them, that of one’s individual will in time, that of the aesthetic dimension of the object,
and that of compassion (the empathy with the other’s pain that sometimes results from
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the vision of the essential unity of the world) —  together with the concepts built on
them.  Accordingly,  Schopenhauer  divides  his  metaphysics  into  three  parts:
‘Metaphysics of Nature’ (i.e. metaphysics ‘in the narrower sense’), ‘Metaphysics of the
Beautiful’ (i.e. aesthetics), ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ (Schopenhauer 2000b: 18–9).
Schopenhauer believes, as Young explains, that for both humans and non-human
animals, ‘the entire rich fabric or the world of [physical] objects is constructed … by the
understanding, entirely without the aid of concepts’ (2005: 39). Let us take a cat, for
instance: it is capable of gauging the distance to the mouse, the time that it would take
to  approach  and  capture  the  prey,  and  the  effects  that  those  actions  would  have.
Schopenhauer  himself  gives  a  different  example:  an  experienced  billiard-player  is
aware  ‘of  the  laws  of  impact  of  elastic  bodies  on  one  another,  merely  in  the
understanding, merely for … perception, and with this he manages perfectly’, without
having ‘a … rational knowledge of those laws … in the abstract’ (Schopenhauer 1969a:
56). As his example indicates, Schopenhauer believes that rationality does not come
into play unless a person reflects on what he or she feels (which is something that a cat,
for instance, cannot do).7
By virtue of  the necessary correlation  between the subject  and the object,  when
physical objects are individualised by the imposition of causality, the subject in whose
consciousness they appear  is  also individualised.  Insofar  as  it  is  conditioned by the
individual’s  position  in  time,  in  space  and  in  the  chain  of  causes  and  effects,  the
representation of physical objects is always an  egocentric kind of representation. The
cat perceives the mouse in relation to the spatial, temporal and causal position that the
7 Schopenhauer further believes that most of those feelings are of physical things. Together, these
beliefs would explain why some scholars have referred to physical perception as  ordinary or
everyday consciousness (e.g. Young 2005: 107–8). Given the amount of time that people spend
reflecting on their feelings, and the way in which specialised concepts — for example from science
— have increasingly impinged on their views of the world, it is arguable, to say the least, whether
the  term  ordinary is  the  one  that  best  fits  unaided  physical  perception.  Let  us  recall  that
Clements calls this perception  mystical,  which, leaving aside the questionable accuracy of the
adjective,  is  a  good  indication  of  its  extraordinary  character.  At  most,  it  could  be  said  that
ordinary consciousness comprises physical perception together with those concepts that are built
on them and do not proceed directly from any specialised field of knowledge. This is what Magee




cat itself occupies. The same goes for the billiard player and any other sentient being.
Schopenhauer  believes  that  during  physical  perception I  establish  a  complete
separation  among  all  the  individual  things  and  beings,  which  I  perceive  from  my
unique perspective. Young explains that during physical perception I become ‘the focal
point’ of the world: ‘all lines of direction, as it were, radiate out from myself’ (2005:
108–9). Thus I am that ‘to which all others are related as the world’s “centre”’ (111).
Unlike  physical  representation,  metaphysical  representation  is  non-egocentric.
However, not all kinds of metaphysical representation can escape individualisation to
the same degree. As far as the apprehension of the inner will in time is concerned, for
example, the will that I grasp as the inner dimension of my body is not the essential will
but my individual will as it presents itself at the moment of observation. This inner
observation  amounts  to  self-conscious  representation.  This  is  ‘the  fullest
consciousness’, because it allows us to have a look inside ourselves and to recognise
ourselves as willing creatures (Schopenhauer 1969a: 309). This is not only the first step
towards seeing ourselves as manifestations of the essential will; it is also the moment
when the essential will that manifests itself in us begins to become ‘conscious of itself’
(1969b: 195).8
In order to get a full grasp of Schopenhauer’s explanation of self-consciousness, it is
necessary to bear in mind that for him, at the level of feeling, the conscious subject and
the  object  cannot  be  identical,  therefore  inner  observation  involves  the  notion  of
oneself  as  object.  This  principle  prevents  Schopenhauer  from  explaining  self-
consciousness  in  the  same manner  as,  for  example,  René  Descartes  does,  in  other
words, as the thinking subject’s specular self-apprehension. In terms of knowledge, for
Schopenhauer ‘there can be … no knower without something different from this that is
known’  (1969b:  202).  The  knowing  subject  is  ‘that  which  knows  wherever  there  is
knowledge’ but that ‘is never known’ to itself through feeling (1969a: 5, 20). Since the
conscious subject cannot apprehend itself directly, Schopenhauer believes that ‘as the
8 Alex  Neill  claims  that  ‘in  Schopenhauer’s  view  the  [world-]Will  is  striving  to  make  itself
increasingly  visible  to  itself’  (2009:  36).  He  concedes  that  this  reading  of  Schopenhauer’s
metaphysics might sound ‘thoroughly (and as he would have seen it, horribly) Hegelian’ (35), but
is confident that the emphasis on the world-will’s lack of specific purpose suffices to prevent this
charge. This means that the tendency of the world-will towards increasing visibility should not be
seen as exclusive or even predominant.
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known in self-consciousness we find exclusively the will’  (1969b: 202).  Even so, the
subject must be presupposed as the basis of all consciousness and thus ‘can be known …
indirectly, through [rational] reflection’ (278).
For Schopenhauer the subject of consciousness is not exactly the same as the I. As
he understands it, the word I designates the conjunction of the mind and of the body —
i.e. of the subject of consciousness and the individual will — as felt from inside. Inner
observation makes it possible for human beings to think of themselves as  I. The self-
conscious  subject  not  only  feels  the  individual  will  in  time;  it  also  realises  its  own
connection with that individual will. Thus the subject gives way to ‘the I’ only when the
former ‘apprehends itself as identical  with … what wills’  (Schopenhauer 1969b:  491,
277). Schopenhauer regards this conjunction between consciousness and will  as ‘the
miracle’ par excellence, and acknowledges that it is impossible to explain (1969a: 102,
251). In recognising this conjunction, he breaks with a long tradition that sees the I as
indivisible and original.
Inner observation does away with causality and time, therefore it is not a type of
egocentric consciousness (in the precise sense in which I am using the term). In this
respect  at  least,  it  is  like  aesthetic  contemplation,  which also does away with time.
Young says that ‘In the moment of aesthetic entrancement … the usual “egocentricity”
of consciousness disappears. The [egocentric] “I” vanishes from the scene’ (2005: 111).9
This statement can be applied to all  kinds of metaphysical consciousness: insofar as
they break with  egocentric atomisation, they can be independent of the aspiration to
satisfy one’s individual desires. The  subject’s movement away from egocentrism and
towards  universality  has  enormous  implications  for  Schopenhauer’s  theory  of  the
liberation from suffering, which he discusses in connection with art and morality.
9 The terminological distinction between the self-conscious I and the egocentric I or ego, which I
have introduced to separate the individual subjects of consciousness that direct their attention
inside from those that direct it outside, is not present in neither Schopenhauer nor Young (the
latter of whom nevertheless introduces, as we have seen, a useful distinction between cognitive
egocentrism and moral egoism).
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2.2.2.1.3. Unexplained Varieties of Consciousness: The Saint’s Vision and 
Compassion; Imaginative Representation
Before  proceeding  to  the  artistic,  historical,  scientific,  religious  and  philosophical
descriptions of the world that derive from the kinds of consciousness so far examined,
it is worth pausing for a moment on the role that Schopenhauer allots to other kinds of
representation whose origin  and connection with the subject’s  intellect  he does  not
explain.  These  are  saintly  vision,  the  compassion  that  may  result  from  it  and
imaginative representation.
We have seen that the key to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of nature is the inner
feeling  of  one’s  individual  will  and  the  philosophical  conceptualisation  of  that
individual will as the essential will. Additionally, the essential will can be spontaneously
grasped as the kernel of the world through what Schopenhauer calls a saintly vision of
external  reality.  Likewise,  the  compassion  that  the  saint  may  feel,  and  which
Schopenhauer  places  at  the  centre  of  his  metaphysics  of  morals,  results  from  the
spontaneous realisation that, as all the lifeless objects and living beings in the world
share the same essence, the neighbour’s suffering his not alien to me. Though saintly
vision and compassion occupy prominent positions within Schopenhauer’s philosophy,
he never specifies their exact relation to the theory of the intellectual faculties. The only
thing that is clear is that they are non-egocentric kinds of representation, because they
do away with the complete separation among individual things and beings.
As  regards  imaginative  representations,  Schopenhauer  calls  them  ‘pictures’  of
absent objects,  thus implying that  they are  non-rational  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  39).
Apart from this and other passing comments, however, he does not expound a complete
theory of  the imagination.  This  is  surprising,  because Schopenhauer’s  philosophical
model appears in an era that values the imagination more than ever before. What is
clear  is  that  for  him  the  imagination  functions  differently  in  humans  and  in  non-
rational  animals.  In the latter,  its  only  purpose is  to reproduce past  perceptions —
perceptions and memories  being the only  kinds of  representation that  non-rational
minds can handle — but without indicating that these reproductions are recollections
of the past. Persons can also use the imaginative in a reproductive manner. But if they
realise that their memories refer to something that is not happening now, it is because
they can relate them to the abstract concept of the past. Furthermore, only man can use
68
The Relevance of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy
his imagination productively to anticipate what may happen in the future, to conjure up
alternative states of affairs, and to think of what lies outside the knowable world. Non-
rational animals are only allowed to ‘satisfy the need of the moment’; but man ‘provides
by the most ingenious preparations for his future, nay, even for times that he cannot
live to see’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 36). Thanks to the productive imagination, a man can
therefore ‘extend his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal experience’ (186).
Though Schopenhauer is not explicit about this, it is reasonable to suppose that, if
the only intellectual difference between humans and other animals is the possession of
reason, then there must be some relationship between rationality  and the ability  to
grasp objects in other ways than as physical perceptions. This applies not only to the
productive  imagination  but  to  aesthetic  contemplation,  inner  observation,  and  the
saint’s vision and compassion. For some reason they are only possible when rationality
is present. However, we must not forget that the activity of the productive imagination,
aesthetic  contemplation,  inner  observation,  and  the  saint’s  vision  and  compassion
always  result  in  feeling,  not  in  rational  concepts.  For  Schopenhauer  aesthetic
contemplation, for example, cannot have as its object a rational concept: while the use
of concepts is always at the service of the essential will, that is, always subordinate to
the  satisfaction  of  one’s  desires,  the  main  value  of  aesthetic  contemplation  lies  in
setting the observer free from the servitude of those desires. These are important points
to which I shall return after examining the ways in which people describe the world.
2.2.2.2. Institutions of Knowledge and the Superiority of Metaphysical 
Descriptions of the World
The  necessary  incompleteness  or  partiality  of  all  consciousness,  together  with  the
existence of several kinds of representation, open the door to the existence of more
than  one  way  of  describing  and  making  sense  of  the  world.  Schopenhauer
acknowledges  this  plurality  of  approaches,  some  of  which  have  become
institutionalised in the course of time. Five of these institutions of knowledge receive
considerable  attention  on  his  part:  history,  science,  art,  religion  and  philosophy.
Though Schopenhauer never explicitly makes the point, it is reasonable to assume that
all  of  these  approaches  use  rational  concepts  as  their  vehicle.  Regardless  of  this
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common feature, the list can be hierarchically arranged according to the merits that
Schopenhauer discerns in each approach. He lends more importance to art,  religion
and philosophy (whose main part he identifies as the metaphysics of nature) than to
history and science, because the former focus on metaphysical objects and may even
deal with the essential, imperishable side of the world, while the latter describe physical
particulars alone. Moreover, he asserts that religion and philosophy — the approaches
that  refer  to  the  essential  will  —  are  superior  to  art.  This  is  because  art  remains
confined to the representation of the external dimension of things (their aesthetic side),
while religion and philosophy follow the inner path, the only one that enables us to
grasp the kernel of the world and to describe it in its entirety. Apart from their object,
there is another variable that we need to bear in mind to understand Schopenhauer’s
characterisation of these approaches and their relevance for Golding: their intended
effect  upon  the  receiver.  History,  science  and  philosophy  appeal  mostly  to  the
audience’s rational intellect, thus they give rise to concepts; by contrast, art and religion
appeal more to the non-rational intellect and excite the audience’s feelings. As it is, the
bottom of Schopenhauer’s hierarchy is occupied by history and science, with art in the
middle,  and religion and philosophy at the top. The following table repeats Table 1,
which includes the main varieties of representation, and incorporates the approaches
that carry out institutionalised description of the world:
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to non-rational feelings
Table 2: The Apparition and Description of the Knowable World in Schopenhauer
Some comments about the contents of the table are in order. Owing of the difficulties to
accommodate them in a suitable place, the table does not contain the two branches of
philosophical  metaphysics  that  accompany  the  metaphysics  of  nature:  aesthetic
metaphysics, whose focus is on the aesthetic experience, whether artistic or not (and
which, unlike art, elicits rational concepts from the audience), and moral metaphysics,
which hinges upon the agent’s  desires.  Of course,  Schopenhauer’s understanding of
philosophy  as  an  all-encompassing form of  enquiry  means  that  all  the  branches  of
philosophy spring from a common trunk — natural metaphysics — whose discovery of
the essential will  is  then applied to other areas.  Thus,  once he has put forward the
notion of the inner kernel of the world,  Schopenhauer uses it to throw light on the
findings of the physical sciences, to criticise the view of history as a teleologial process,
to redefine the principles of  morals, to separate good religions – those that put the
accent on suffering — from bad religions, and to explain what are the desires that we
become oblivious of when we contemplate the aesthetic dimension of objects.
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2.2.2.2.1. The Physical Approaches of History and Science: Partial 
Descriptions of the World
According to Schopenhauer’s most habitual account of the relations between history
and science, both start from physical feelings and appeal to reason. Though he argues
that both aim at conceptual knowledge, they differ in the generality of their concepts. In
his opinion, scientists work by subsuming the physical particulars with which they work
into ever wider concepts, taking them to the highest possible level of generality, while
historians simply coordinate the events of the past and give them a narrative shape. As
a  mode  of  enquiry,  history  is  inferior  to  science:  whereas  history  concentrates  on
unrepeatable  singularities,  science  centres  on  constantly  appearing  regularities.
Schopenhauer  writes  that  the ‘legitimate  working’  of  reason ‘always  forms a  higher
generic concept by placing several specific concepts side by side’;  thus, ‘by omitting
their differences and retaining the qualities in which they agree’, science ‘obtains the
generic concept that includes them all, but contains less’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 491).
This subordinating procedure also appears in philosophy, though there the triggering
feeling is metaphysical rather than physical.
Schopenhauer sometimes  states  that  history  is  the  collective  equivalent  of
individual self-consciousness, thus implying that it also deals with the manifestation of
the  will  in  time  (obviously,  on  a  longer  temporal  scale  than  in  the  case  of  inner
observation).  For  Schopenhauer,  historians  deal  with  collective  behaviour  and  its
motives. Therefore, he thinks that for historians ‘the inner nature, the significance of
phenomena [i.e. appearances], the kernel of all those shells, can never be entirely lost’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 245). After acknowledging that historians can get some grasp of
the inner processes of history, Schopenhauer places historiography side by side with
moral philosophy: both deal with the motives behind the actions, from a collective and
individual point of view respectively. From this he concludes that ‘Only through history
does  a  nation  become  completely  conscious  of  itself.  Accordingly,  history  is  to  be
regarded as the … self-consciousness of the human race’ (1969b: 445).  If this is the
case, then it could be argued that there is a metaphysical aspect to historiography, and
that it therefore affords a deeper kind of knowledge than science. This interpretation
may be pertinent in connection with Golding’s statement that education should put less
emphasis on science than on such other disciplines as art, philosophy and history.
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Despite relying on conceptual subordination, science remains within the confines of
physical  representation.10 Schopenhauer  does  not  share  the  scorn  for  science  that
transpires in the works of many of his contemporaries, and he thinks that science must
provide philosophy with reliable data about physical events. But neither does he believe
that scientific reflection is capable of solving the riddle of world. Science, like physical
perception (from which it  derives,  according to  Schopenhauer),  can only  show ‘the
relation of one representation to another’ within the physical realm, and can never get
to ‘the inmost nature of the world’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 28). As Magee points out, for
Schopenhauer the only difference with physical perception is that scientific knowledge
is ‘more critically self-aware and raised to the level of generality’ (Magee 1997: 167).
This means that in Schopenhauer’s conception there is no real break, no discontinuity,
between physical perception and the scientific description of the world: like the former,
science remains tied to causality and therefore oblivious of the metaphysical side of the
world. The explanation of physical particulars that it provides always ends when it can
find no more causes, and therefore no more physical reasons why something happens.
Scientific explanation comes to a halt precisely at the point where the true essence of
the world is to be found. Therefore, scientific explanation ‘is unable to stand on its own
feet’,  and  must  be  supplemented  by  the  metaphysical  discoveries  made  by  other
approaches (Schopenhauer 1969b: 172).
2.2.2.2.2. The Metaphysical Approaches of Art, Religion and Philosophy: 
Towards a Total Description of the World
Art, religion and philosophy grant access to the realm beyond causality. Unlike science,
they do not ‘consider … the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the
what’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 178).  By addressing this latter question, art, religion and
philosophy provide a more accurate description of the world and of humankind’s place
in it.
10 Though this contradicts the rest of his theory, Schopenhauer occasionally identifies the feeling
that gives rise to science (and even to philosophy) with the metaphysical feeling of the universal
dimension  of  the  aesthetic  object  (see  Schopenhauer  2000b:  4).  Sometimes  Golding  does
something similar, also contradicting the view of science that appears in the rest of his works.
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According  to Schopenhauer,  all  metaphysical  approaches  attempt  to  satisfy  our
need for metaphysics. Human beings are metaphysical animals that wonder about the
world and their  own existence.  The wonder  that  spurs  art,  religion and philosophy
stems from the misery, pain and death which permeate the world and whose ultimate
origin can only be metaphysical. While the absence of concepts in other animals spare
them the consciousness of their own mortality, man ‘carries about with him in abstract
concepts the certainty of his own death’, which ‘can frighten him … when some occasion
calls  it  up to  the imagination’  (Schopenhauer 1969a:  281).  The non-rational animal
‘lives without any real knowledge of death’, and ‘is neither in need of nor capable of’
metaphysical  enquiry  (1969b:  463).  The  human  species  is  not  only  conscious  of
suffering and mortality but helpless against them; this is what makes  metaphysics so
necessary.  Metaphysics shows us why it is that suffering pervades the world, why all
living beings must die, and how people’s conduct can be changed so to prevent them
from causing even more suffering and from killing each other. Moreover, metaphysics
serves to counteract ‘the terrifying certainty of death’ which ‘necessarily appeared along
with  the  faculty  of  reason’,  because  it  reveals  that,  beyond  the  sphere  of  physical
individuality, we are part and parcel of something greater, something that is timeless
and therefore imperishable; this knowledge acts as ‘a compensation’ or ‘antidote to the
certainty of death’ (463).
According  to  Schopenhauer,  the  metaphysical  dimension  of  art  involves  the
apprehension, first by the author and then by the audience, of the aesthetic universality
of an object, ‘not its relations to other [physical] things’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 188).
This universal aspect is the beauty of the object as seen from outside. It is  ‘permanent,
unchangeable’,  because  it  is  ‘independent  of  the  temporal  existence  of  individual
beings’  (1969b:  364).  For  Schopenhauer,  all  genuine  art  proceeds  from the  artist’s
feeling of this aesthetic dimension, ‘never from the concept’ (1969a: 57). In addition,
the work of art serves to convey this feeling to the audience’s non-rational intellect.11
11 This  account  of  Schopenhauer’s  aesthetic  theory  requires  some  comment.  First,  it  omits
Schopenhauer’s characterisation of music, whose incomparable power he believes to reside in
being the direct expression of the metaphysical will. Despite its centrality in the philosopher’s
model — he locates it at the top of the artistic hierarchy — the presence of music in Golding’s
works (where it appears to be related to the notion that this world is the worst possible world) is
fairly limited. Secondly, according to Schopenhauer, everything has an aesthetic dimension, and
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As  the  aesthetic  dimension  of  the  work  of  art  depends  on  the  subject–object
division,  its  contemplation  still  leaves  us  on  the  side  of  representation.  Moreover,
aesthetic feelings do not touch on the essence of the world (i.e. on the essential will).
Nevertheless, thanks to its  independence from the temporal, spatial and causal forms
that give rise to individuation, aesthetics can take us very close to the contemplation of
that essence: the aesthetic dimension of things, writes Schopenhauer, ‘is, of course, not
as yet the essence’ of the thing, but ‘the complete expression of the essence that exhibits
itself’ to contemplation from without (1969b: 364).
One  interesting  question  that  arises  in  connection  with  art  is  the  possibility  of
communicating aesthetic feelings through a conceptual vehicle. For Schopenhauer, the
task of artists  is  to translate their  aesthetic  feelings into conceptual works of art,  a
process  that  the  audience  reverses  in  order  to  grasp  the  artists’  aesthetic  feelings.
Schopenhauer’s discussion of this phenomenon can be useful to understand the uses of
language  that,  according  to  some  of  his  commentators,  Golding  makes.  As
Schopenhauer  notes,  the  difficulty  resides  in  explaining  how  the  process  of
conceptualisation, whereby a feeling is put into words, can be reversed. A great deal of
communication ‘is reason speaking to reason’, so it ‘keeps within its province, and what
it  communicates and receives are abstract concepts’  (Schopenhauer 1969a: 40).  The
meaning of words is immediately understood and accurately grasped without, as a rule,
being mixed up with any feelings. However, there are certain occasions on which we
in order to contemplate it the subject only needs to strip the object from its particularity. Thirdly,
Schopenhauer’s  account of  the universality of  the aesthetic object  raises  some doubts.  If  the
aesthetic feeling arises when the individuating forms of time, space and causality are suspended,
then all  objects  without  exception must  elicit  the same aesthetic  feeling,  which is  debatable.
Magee is not convinced that this account of aesthetics is ‘necessary to Schopenhauer’s philosophy
at all’  (1997: 239). Wicks notes the impossibility of ‘a timeless experience’ (2008: 98); Young
makes a similar point, adding that no object can exist outside space (see Young 2005: 147–8).
What really matters for us about Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory is that the feeling of beauty
transports the subject into a state of mind where pain fades away. Wicks states that ‘no one can …
be released from all  pain’  by beauty (2008: 98);  yet  I  should argue that this is  indeed what
happens in Golding’s novels. Finally, Schopenhauer states that the aesthetic dimension of some
objects does not lie in their beauty but in their sublimity. Indeed, the sublime may have a place in
Golding’s novels, though not from the viewpoint of his characters. In general, I shall only focus
on beauty; I shall deal with the sublime in the Conclusion. 
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pass from concepts to feelings, and then we are forced to produce, as in all  cases in
which the object that we apprehend is not present, imaginative pictures as non-rational
representatives of those concepts:  ‘While  another  person is speaking,  … we at  once
translate his speech into pictures of the imagination that instantaneously flash upon us
and are arranged,  linked,  formed, and coloured according to the words that stream
forth’  (39).  As  Schopenhauer  explains,  the  same  phenomenon  takes  place  in  art.
Literature,  for  example,  makes  the  receiver  feel  the  aesthetic  universality  of  the
represented object through the pictures into which the concepts are translated, but ‘this
can take place only by the assistance of his own imagination’ (243). For this to happen,
that is, ‘in order to set this imagination in motion, in accordance with the end in view’,
so that a non-rational representative will be formed in the receiver’s mind, there are
several strategies. One of them is to arrange abstract concepts in such a way that ‘none
can continue in its abstract universality’ (243). Schopenhauer, who conceives of each
concept  as  a  sphere,  points  out  that  the  abstract  concepts  used  by  literature,  for
example, are ‘so arranged that their spheres intersect one another’ (243). One way in
which  this  can  be  done,  he  says,  is  by  using  ‘figurative  expression’,  in  particular
‘metaphor,  simile,  parable,  and allegory,  all  of  which differ  only  by  the length  and
completeness of their expression’ (240). Resorting to these tropes, and thus blurring
the conceptual  boundaries  of  words,  artists  can appeal  to  the non-rational  intellect
rather  than  to  reason.  Actually,  metaphor  does  not  serve  only  to  convey  aesthetic
feelings;  it  is  well  adapted  to  the  transmission  of  all  metaphysical  feelings.
Schopenhauer claims that ‘metaphorical language … is the only language’ which can do
justice  to  them (1969b:  326).  Though  Schopenhauer’s  focus  on its  connection  with
metaphysical  experience  does  not  necessarily  prevent  metaphorical  language  from
conveying physical feelings too, in Golding metaphor is clearly tied to the opening up of
a metaphysical dimension.
Unlike those put forward by Golding’s commentators, this classification of linguistic
uses — into those that are intended to excite concepts and those that are intended to
excite  feelings  —  does  not  presuppose  any  direct  relationship  between  the  objects
referred to and the effects of words. There may be uses of language — such as the ones
exploited by Schopenhauer’s  philosophical discourse — that refer to the metaphysical
side of the world but appeal to reason; conversely, there may be uses of language that
refer to the physical side of the world but excite feelings. This explains the difference
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between philosophy and religion, both of which refer to the same object: on the whole,
the latter excites metaphysical feelings in the audience, whereas the former obtains a
rational response.12
The metaphysical  institutions of  religion  and  philosophy  are  the  ones  to  which
Schopenhauer  attributes  the  greatest  importance.  Like  that  of  art,  the  focus  of
philosophy and religion is metaphysical, beyond causality. Also like art, they provide
two  kinds  of  consolation  in  the  face  of  death.  One  consists  in  overcoming  our
individuality; when this happens we realise that the death of our individual selves may
not  be  so  terrible  after  all.  Another  is  the  assurance  of  some kind  of  immortality,
attainable  through  the  participation  in  what  is  timeless because  unaffected  by  the
intellect’s imposition of time. The difference between the metaphysical approach of art
and that  of religion and philosophy is  that art only reaches,  as noted,  the aesthetic
universality of things,  whereas religion and philosophy concern themselves with the
very kernel of the world, the essential will.
The translation of feelings into concepts and back into feelings (by the addresser
and the addressee,  respectively)  appears  not  only  in  art  but also  in religion,  which
conveys  its  insight  into the metaphysical  will  to  the  non-rational  intellect. Without
being a believer, Schopenhauer does not hesitate to acknowledge the great power of
religion (especially  of  Buddhism, Brahmanism and Catholicism, whose emphasis  on
suffering, compassion and withdrawal he finds fully congruent with his own views). In
his view, philosophers must follow the example of  religious leaders,  who take upon
themselves  the  task  of  shaking  their  fellow human  beings  from their  metaphysical
‘lethargy’ (Schopenhauer 2000b: 325). Religion provides a ‘metaphysics for the people’,
because its myths and allegories offer the uneducated masses ‘an interpretation of life’
that speaks of the world’s essence yet is, unlike that of philosophy, ‘appropriate to their
powers  of  comprehension’  (325).  While  philosophy  appeals  to  reason  and  can  be
understood only after great study, religious myths and parables appeal to feelings that
12 The  skilful  manipulation  of  language  offers  even  more  possibilities  than  the  ones  that
Schopenhauer explores. One that Golding exploits in a number of novels — though not always on
purpose — is to refer to the physical objects that attract the characters’ attention in such a way
that the narrator’s words produce a metaphysical effect on the reader. As we shall see in the third
part of this study, this makes the reader aware of the metaphysical dimension of the world even
when the characters are not conscious of it.
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even the uncultured majority of believers can appreciate.  Apart from its metaphysical
acumen, Schopenhauer acknowledges the capacity of religion ‘to restrain the rough …
dispositions of the masses’, that is, its effectiveness ‘in practical affairs … as a guide to
conduct’ (2000b: 325, 330–1). These ‘practical aims in every respect take precedence of
theoretical’  aims  (331).  For  this  reason,  he  states  that  his  favourite  religions  ‘are
necessary for the people, and are an inestimable benefit to them’ (1969a: 168).13
For  Schopenhauer,  the  main  problem with  religion  is  its  dogmatism.  As  Magee
explains,  he  thinks  that  philosophical  theories  appeal  to  reason  and  ‘try  to  justify
themselves in terms of observation and argument’,  whereas religions usually rest on
some authority and ‘demand our credence on other than rational grounds’ (1997: 54).
In Schopenhauer’s words, the arguments of religion ‘are mainly threats of eternal, and
indeed  also  temporal  evils,  directed  against  unbelievers,  and  even  against  mere
doubters’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 165).
Like science and history, philosophy appeals to reason. And like science, it proceeds
by  means  of  conceptual  subordination:  ‘starting  from  the  particular’,  philosophical
knowledge ‘is extended to the general’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 508). The difference with
science  is  that  in  philosophy  this  process  ‘can  be  continued  right  up  to  the  most
universal of all concepts, which then includes everything under it’ (508). On this view,
‘The task of philosophy is’ to provide ‘a statement in the abstract of the nature of the
whole world, of the whole as well as of all the parts’ (82). As a result, ‘philosophy will be
a sum of very universal judgements, whose ground of knowledge is … the world itself in
its entirety, without excluding anything, and hence everything to be found in human
consciousness’  (82–3).  Starting  from  the  feeling  of  one’s  individual  will,
Schopenhauer’s philosophy reaches the concept of the essential will, which corresponds
to the world’s inner kernel. This is something that science, like history and art, would
never be able to do, simply because it starts from the feeling of outer objects and fails to
13 Sometimes Schopenhauer goes as far as to suggest that religious leaders have a greater practical
power than philosophers, whose goals are ‘always theoretical’ and who cannot change people’s
conduct  (1969a:  271).  Insofar  as  practical  considerations  are  always  more  important  that
theoretical considerations, religion would be more important than philosophy. The problem with
this conclusion is that does not correspond to Schopenhauer’s general opinion about the relative
merits of philosophy and religion. In principle, philosophy must be just as capable as religion of
acting as a practical guide to conduct (see Young 2005: 165–8).
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take  the  feeling  of  one’s  individual  will  into  consideration.  The  given  material  of
philosophy is no other than the entire domain of feeling, which includes the feeling of
one’s  body from within as  well  as  the consciousness  of  all  things  from without. In
comparison with science, its most prestigious rival, which in Schopenhauer’s times had
ended up with two complementary yet irreconcilable concepts (those of matter and of
energy), Schopenhauer’s philosophy purports to provide a single overarching concept
(that of the essential will) which is located in a privileged position as the hidden essence
of the world — hence also of matter and of energy.
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the privileged position that Schopenhauer assigns
to philosophy can be explained in part by the intellectual climate of his age.  Kant had
set strict limits to theoretical knowledge, arguing that the knowledge of the essence of
things is beyond those limits. One important characteristic of Schopenhauer’s project is
the ambition not only to establish — like Kant — the limits of cognition, but — unlike
Kant  —  to  take  knowledge  beyond  physical  facts,  and  thus  to  offer  a  thorough
description of the world (one which includes aspects that for Kant would pertain to the
unknowable  thing-in-itself).  Behind this  departure  from Kant  lies  the  aspiration  to
restore  the  theoretical  hegemony  of  philosophy  against  the  growing  influence  of
science. Schopenhauer states that, by virtue of the kind of metaphysical focus that is
peculiar to it, philosophy surpasses both history and science. ‘Whereas history teaches
us that at each time something different has been, philosophy endeavours to assist us to
the insight that at all times exactly the same was, is, and will be’ (Schopenhauer 1969b:
441). Regarding science, its toughest theoretical contender, philosophy surpasses it ‘as
the most universal, and thus more important, knowledge, promising information for
which the others have only prepared the way’ (439).
2.2.3. The Primacy of the Essential Will as the Origin of 
Suffering
We  have  seen  that  among  all  the  kinds  of  representation  of  which  Schopenhauer
speaks, there is a metaphysical feeling, of one’s individual will, which stands out as the
only  one  that  comes  from  within.  We  have  also  seen  that  this  peculiar  kind  of
metaphysical  knowledge is  privileged by Schopenhauer  and also,  in his  opinion,  by
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certain  religious creeds.  It  is  along this  inner  route  that  both the religious and the
philosophical approaches arrive at a view of the world as permeated by the essential
will of which everything else is a manifestation.
Now it is time to explain the two arguments — one based on analogy, the other
based on abstraction — that allow Schopenhauer to come up with the concept of the
essential will. After this I shall offer a more detailed characterisation of the essential
will  as  restless  activity  originally  devoid of  consciousness,  hence of  purpose,  whose
quasi-divine power not only lies beyond good and evil but preexists all the conceptual
oppositions that are customarily imposed on the world. Moreover, I shall review the
way in which Schopenhauer tries to combine the unity of the essential will with the
multiplicity of its manifestations. This involves examining Schopenhauer’s description
of  the  essential  will  at  different  levels  of  generality:  as  the  will  to  life  and  as  the
individual’s innate character, in other words, as the tendency that all living beings have
towards reproduction and self-preservation,  and, simultaneously,  as  the unique and
unchangeable tenor of each individual’s appetites. I shall also examine Schopenhauer’s
weakening of the notion of individual freedom as a result of his emphasis on causal
determinism and the innateness of character. Then I shall deal with suffering in terms
of the need to satisfy the desires dictated by the essential  will  individualised in the
innate  character.  Finally,  I  shall  examine  how  the  theme  of  suffering  leads
Schopenhauer to condemn our world as the worst possible world,  an indictment with
which Golding concurs.
In the third part of this study, I shall show the pertinence of all these aspects of
Schopenhauer’s model to a correct understanding of Golding’s novels. I shall explore
the way in which Golding’s  The Spire deals directly with Dean Jocelin’s obedience to
the will with which he becomes acquainted through a feeling rising inside him. Though
Jocelin identifies it with God’s, this will is gradually revealed to be an obscene force
more related to the Dean’s  sexuality  than to  Christian piety.  In  Pincher Martin we
again find the emphasis  on willing  and on sexual  desire,  here  accompanied by the
obsession with self-preservation. The presence and primacy of the will  in these two
novels has received little critical attention; Schopenhauer’s philosophy may help us to
better understand the attitudes and behaviour of their main characters, most notably
their fixation with sex and survival. Schopenhauer’s claim that the individual’s essential
character is inborn and unalterable may also throw light on Pincher Martin — whose
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connection  with  the  allegorical  figure  of  Greed  is  pointed  out  in  the course  of  the
narrative  —  and  on  several  other  characters  who  seem  dominated  by  one  single
passion.  In  general,  Golding’s  earlier  novels  argue  for  the  innateness  and
unchangeability of one’s character; together with a belief in causal determinism, this
results, as in Schopenhauer, in a diminution of individual freedom. Given that the view
of life that Golding’s novels offer is as much dominated as Schopenhauer’s by insatiable
appetites that frequently lead to aggression and which always result in pain and death,
it is reasonable to assume that understanding why the latter compares the world to hell
will  clarify  Golding’s  reasons  to  voice  a  similar  opinion.  On  a  different  note,
Schopenhauer’s account of the feelings that a means of conceptual communication like
language can elicit may serve to explain some striking features of Golding’s style, in
particular  his  use  of  figurative  descriptions  portraying  a  force  which  underlies  the
whole world and whose primacy explains so much suffering.
2.2.3.1. The Underlying Unity of the Essential Will: Cognition and 
Characterisation of the World-Will
According to Schopenhauer, the realm of appearances  is merely the ‘external side’ or
husk of the world; it is founded on ‘an entirely different side which is its innermost
being, its kernel’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 30–1). At its most general level, the innermost
essence of the world can be conceptualised as the single world-will; the entire realm of
appearances is nothing but its manifestation. What follows is a summary of the ways in
which  Schopenhauer  comes  to  know  the  undifferentiated  world-will,  and  of  its
characterisation  as  originally  devoid  of  consciousness,  insatiable,  groundless,  free,
almighty and omnipresent.
Schopenhauer  describes  the  realm  of  appearances  as  the  ‘manifestation’  or
‘visibility’ of the underlying essence of the world, the world-will (Schopenhauer 1969a:
100, 110). As Magee notes,  Schopenhauer believes that the world-will ‘is not directly
accessible  to  our  knowledge’  but  ‘knowable  by  us  only  through  its  manifestations’
(1997:  444–5).  Of  all  the  ways  in  which the manifestations  of  the  world-will  enter
consciousness in the form of feeling — among them, the contemplation of the aesthetic
dimension of the object, the inner observation of the individual will, and the perception
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of physical objects — Schopenhauer singles out the observation of one’s individual will
as the only kind of knowledge through which we can obtain some clue about the inner
essence of the world.
Schopenhauer  recognises  that  ‘the  knowledge  I  have  of  my  will  …  cannot  be
separated  from that  of  my body’,  and that  ‘I  know my will  not  as  a  whole,  … not
completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, and hence in time’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 101). Nevertheless, he claims that it is this inner manifestation
that allows him to get a rational idea of what the common essence of the world is at
bottom. Philosophy can then proceed from the feeling of  one’s individual will  to the
concept of  the world-will  as  the knowable  essence of  the whole  world by means of
rational reflection. Thus ‘it becomes possible … by means of widely pursued reflection
and by the ingenious connexion of outwardly directed … knowledge with the data of
self-consciousness, to arrive at a certain understanding of … the inner essence of things’
(1969b: 288).
Schopenhauer refers on two separate occasions to the dual way in which we can
reason our way from the individual will to the world-will. The first time he bases his
argument on analogy; the second time he bases it on abstraction. The two arguments,
which complement each other, are based on ‘The double knowledge which we have of
the nature and action of our own body, and which is given in two completely different
ways’, i.e. from without and from within (Schopenhauer 1969a: 104).  Thanks to self-
consciousness, Schopenhauer argues, we apprehend the inner working of our body, in
other words, the individual will. When this happens we go beyond ‘what is given only …
from outside’, focusing instead on the only object that is ‘accessible to us from within’,
the individual will (1969b: 494). This gesture allows us to discover ‘the ultimate thing
and the kernel of reality’ (494).
Let us begin with the argument from analogy.  Of the two sources of cognition —
corresponding to the two ways in which one can come to know one’s own body — the
only possible source of insight into the inner essence of the world is not outward but
inward consciousness. Schopenhauer states that the double knowledge of our own body
must be used ‘as a key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature’, and that ‘We
shall judge all objects which are not our own body’, and which therefore are given to
our  consciousness  only  from  without,  ‘according  to  the  analogy  of  this  body’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 105). Thus ‘the apprehension in which we know the stirrings and
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acts of our own will’ must be ‘the interpreter’ of all other things (197). The subject must
avoid  assuming  that  his  body  ‘is  essentially  different  from  all  others’  (104).
Consequently, it must be assumed that behind the surface all other physical objects are
‘the same as what in ourselves we call will’ (105).
The other argument that Schopenhauer puts forward makes use of abstraction. The
‘way from within’ is like ‘a subterranean passage’ which ‘stands open to us to that real
inner nature of things which we cannot penetrate from without’ (Schopenhauer 1969b:
195).  As  one’s  individual  will  is  the  inner  dimension  of  one’s  body,  it  is  always
entangled  in  the  circumstances  of  one’s  individual  existence.  Now  if  I  strip  the
individual  will  of  all  circumstantial  particularity  (all  particular  object,  direction,
causation), what remains is pure willing, that is, a ceaseless inner activity independent
of causality (hence of materiality), spatiality and temporality (hence of individuality),
and posited as  beyond  subjectivity and objectivity.  It  is  thus  that  the  distance that
separates one’s individual will from the world-will can be bridged by the application of
reason.
Schopenhauer is aware that the insight of ‘The identity of the will and of the body’
that opens the door to these two arguments is ‘a knowledge of quite a peculiar nature’
in that ‘it can never be demonstrated’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 102); neither can there be
proof of the subsequent analogical and abstractive arguments that try to establish a
metaphysical connection between oneself and the rest of the world. In Schopenhauer’s
opinion, discovering that the key to the world’s essence lies in the individual will is
immensely more important than the fact that this discovery is impossible to prove. He
regards as his main contribution to philosophy ‘the insight that what acts and drives in
nature,  and manifests  itself  … after  getting as  far  as  the  state  or condition of  self-
consciousness — now stands out as …  will’  (1969b: 294).  In his opinion, this is  the
solution to the riddle of the world and of human existence. Janaway explains:
If the world and my place in it can be intelligible to me only if I interpret the world as having the
same  inner  nature  as  myself,  and  if  a  unifying  metaphysical  account  is  what  the  necessary
limitation of scientific explanation leaves us crying out for, then it would be irresponsible not to




Illuminating or preposterous as Schopenhauer’s discovery may be thought to be, what
is clear is that this is the only way that he finds, starting from a Kant-inspired account
of knowledge, to proceed beyond Kantism and scientific knowledge. What matters to
him is that, after the insight has been gained and the rational arguments have been
developed (and accepted), self-consciousness holds ‘the key to everything else’: what is
known from within ‘must give us the explanation’ of what is known from without; for
this reason, ‘we must learn to understand nature from ourselves, not ourselves from
nature’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 196).
The world-will is the result of abstracting one’s individual will from the intellectual
forms that individualise its motions in time, and of conceptualising it as preceding not
only  the  subject–object  rift  (and  therefore  conscious  representation)  but  also  the
apparition of life. Schopenhauer defines this world-will as ‘a constant striving without
aim’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  311).  It  is  ‘a  ceaseless  activity’  originally  devoid  of
consciousness, hence of rationality; it is ‘blind’ (309, 149).  The most that we can say
about it is, in Janaway’s aptly general expression, that it ‘strives, or tends somewhere’
(Janaway 1999: 144). Schopenhauer is nevertheless convinced that the activity of the
world-will  ‘springs  from  lack,  from  deficiency’,  and  that  this  is  ‘never  fulfilled  or
satisfied’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 196, 164). That is why the world-will ‘goes on for ever’
(308).
While the world as we usually know it is made up of countless appearances, the
world-will provides them with unity: ‘plurality and difference belongs solely to mere
appearance’, beyond which there is ‘one and the same essence that presents itself in
everything’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 253). The abstract image of the essential will at which
Schopenhauer arrives has little  to do with its manifestation as a person’s individual
will.  The external point of view to which physical consciousness is limited prevents us
from seeing the world-will  for what it  is,  but Schopenhauer has no doubts that this
world-will  is embodied not only in human beings but, more generally,  in the ‘blind,
impetuous, destructive force of nature’ that stands in opposition to human aspirations
(1969b: 402). The world-will, he says, ‘proclaims itself just as directly in the fall of a
stone as in the action of man’ (299). In Magee’s words, for Schopenhauer the world-will
‘is in us only because it is in everything. It  constitutes us as it constitutes everything’
(1997: 444).
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Despite his scorn for theism (the belief in the existence of a divinity or divinities),
Schopenhauer  often  refers  to  the  world-will  in  quasi-theological  terms.  All  objects
within the realm of appearances are subject to the forms of causality, spatiality, and
temporality,  as  well  as  to  the  subject–object  division;  they  are,  therefore,  wholly
‘dependent and relative’ vis-à-vis something else that causes them, something that is
contiguous in space or in time, and a subject that is  aware of them; by contrast, in
Schopenhauer’s conceptualisation the world-will is not supposed by any of those forms:
it  is  ‘groundless’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  32,  106).  Apart  from  this ‘aseity’  or  self-
sufficiency, the world-will possesses other qualities that are usually associated with the
divinity (1969b: 320); it is blind, but also ‘independent, free, and indeed almighty’, to
which we may add that, as far as we can know, it is omnipresent (1969a: 503).
2.2.3.2. Plurality within the Essential Will: The Will to Life and the 
Individual’s Innate Character
When  Schopenhauer  describes  the  world-will  as  a  constant  striving  that  can  exist
independently of the forms of representation, he faces the difficulty of explaining how
this  single  and  undifferentiated urge  can  end  up  manifesting  itself  as  countless
appearances which seem to be involved in a constant struggle with each other. In order
to solve this problem, he offers a layered description of the essential will that includes,
on a less general level than the world-will, the will to life, and, on the level of greatest
individuality, the individual’s innate character. The will to life is the essential tendency
of living beings to perpetuate themselves;  it  is  characteristically  associated with the
reproductive instinct, to which all  other instincts, even that of self-preservation, are
subordinated,  and which  is  linked  to  the  emergence  of  consciousness.  The  innate
character is the unalterable way in which an individual is bound to will until the very
moment of death.
The introduction of these multiple layers in the sphere of the world’s essence allows
Schopenhauer to proceed from the world-will to its manifestations, and thus from the
general lack of purpose to the specific ways in which individuals try to secure their well-
being. This layered account it is one of the most problematic aspects of Schopenhauer
philosophy;  but  it  is  as  relevant  in  relation  to  Golding  as  it  is  in  relation  to
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Schopenhauer.  The  existence  of  innate  characters  that  are  different  from  human
individual to human individual in inconsistent with other aspects of Schopenhauer’s
model, according to which multiplicity does not affect the essence of the world and only
arises with temporal appearances. Despite its difficulties, Schopenhauer thinks that this
layered account of the essential will is necessary to give a complete picture of all living
beings as dominated by reproductive impulses and of each human being as possessing
their own distinct and unchangeable personality,  and consequently their own moral
disposition. As regards Golding, Schopenhauer’s introduction of the will to life and the
individual’s innate character may illuminate fundamental aspects of his novels, namely,
his emphasis on the constant presence of sexual desire in human affairs, and on the
innate moral disposition of many of his characters.
Observing the behaviour of living creatures convinces Schopenhauer that ‘what the
[essential] will wills is always life’; because of this, he states that instead of speaking of
the essential will we can speak of the will to life (Schopenhauer 1969a: 275). This will to
life  is,  in  Janaway’s  words,  a  ‘blind  striving  for  existence  and  reproduction  that
manifests itself as organic body’ (1999: 149). The energies released by the will to life
push every individual to reproduce itself, and to preserve its life in order to do so. In
many living beings, humans among them, the will to life fuels the sexual instincts. This
leads Schopenhauer to put sex at the centre of existence, describing it as ‘the invisible
central point of all action and conduct’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 513). All the remaining
goals, beginning with survival, must be regarded as collaborating with sexuality in an
unconscious manner.14
14 Plainly enough, Schopenhauer’s will to life is the predecessor of Sigmund Freud’s libido. As first
conceived, libido — literally wish or desire — is ‘the energy of the sexual instincts’ (Freud 1995:
22).  As such,  it  ‘stands opposed to the instincts  of  self-preservation’  (Laplanche and Pontalis
2006:  239;  see  Freud  1995:  240).  Since  in  Freud’s  final  account  these  latter  instincts  are
themselves taken to be ‘libidinal in nature’, all the life instincts are ‘now opposed to the death
instincts’ (239). Jacques Lacan goes one step further, at least in Slavoj Žižek’s reading, and by
doing so he comes even closer to Schopenhauer’s notion of the will to life. Lacan presents libido —
or the  lamella,  as he sometimes calls it — not merely as ‘the palpitation of the life substance’
(Žižek 2006: 65), but as an energy whose ‘blind, indestructible insistence’ amounts to ‘the “death
drive”’,  this  being ‘the Freudian name for  its  very  opposite,  for  the way immortality  appears
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The the will to life does not only require the individual to protect its lives in order to
procreate,  but also to sacrifice it  when necessary.  The pursuit  of  sexual  satisfaction
involves  feeding  on,  defending  oneself  from,  attacking  and  subjugating  other
individuals of the same or a different species. As the order of nature proves, the need
for nourishment, for protection and, ultimately, for reproduction is often met by violent
means.  A ‘ceaseless struggle for existence itself’  in which ‘the individual life is … at
every  step  …  threatened  with  destruction’ can  be  seen  at  all  levels  (Schopenhauer
1969b:  584),  since  in  the realm of  appearances ‘the  will-to-live  generally  feasts  on
itself’, and every being ‘can maintain its own existence only by the incessant elimination
of another’s’ (1969a: 147). In view of this, the will to life appears as insensitive to moral
considerations.  Furthermore,  a  brief  look  at  the  way  in  which  nature  functions  is
enough to convince Schopenhauer that the Saturnian essence of the world does not care
for its children, as not a single minute passes without its disposing of scores of them in
order to make room and provide food for others. Only the will to life itself achieves self-
perpetuation. By contrast, the species, the individual organisms and their component
parts are all sacrificed for the will to life’s sake.
In the permanent  war of all against all  in which every living creature is involved,
being endowed with consciousness is as necessary as having thorns, teeth or claws. Just
as the entire body is ‘nothing but my will become visible’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 107),
and thus the ‘function’ of the will to life, so the intellect, far from having anything to do
with the soul, is ‘nothing more than the physiological function of an internal organ, the
brain’ (1969b: 214, 273). Now the brain and the intellect, Schopenhauer says, are the
‘one  great  tool’  whereby  the  animal  secures  its  ‘existence,  well-being  …  and
propagation’, thus fulfilling the supra-individual will to life  (280, 204). In the belief
that ‘knowledge is merely added’ to the will ‘as an instrument’, Schopenhauer reverses
the relation that the prevailing philosophical tradition had established between will and
cognition, stating that man ‘knows himself in consequence of, and in accordance with,
within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny excess of life, an “undead” urge that persists beyond the
(biological) cycle of life and death, generation and corruption’, in other words, for ‘the so-called
“compulsion-to-repeat”, an uncanny urge … that seems to outgrow the natural limitations of the
organism affected by it and to persist even beyond the organism’s death’ (62–3).
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the  nature  of  his  will,  instead  of  willing in  consequence  of,  and  according  to,  his
knowing’ (1969a: 292–3).
The force of sexuality is — like everything that has to do with the essential will —
largely  unconscious.15 Schopenhauer  says  of  the  will  to  life  that  it  never  gives  up
pursuing its ends ‘in the dark with extreme certainty and infallibility’ (Schopenhauer
1969a: 150). Individuals, though, hold their sexual desire — like all other desires — to
be  theirs  alone.  This  opinion  springs  from  their  egocentrism,  that  is,  from  their
unquestioning reliance on the individualising forms of cognition, which foreground the
subject’s separation from the rest of the world. However, one’s sexual desire is actually
serving the will to life’s unconscious tendency towards perpetuation: at first, the subject
believes that  it  ‘is  pursuing individual  ends,  whereas  in  truth it  is  pursuing merely
general ends’ (1969b: 538). Upon reflection, it becomes clear that life in general ‘has a
closer and prior right to us than has the individual; hence its affairs take precedence’
(556). The deluded individual is ‘the dupe of the will’ to life (557).
If it is hard to accept that the pursuit of our ambitions and the satisfaction of  our
desires are both subordinated to the perpetuation of life, it is equally difficult to admit
that one’s individual survival is a matter of indifference to the world as a whole.  Much
to our desperation, the world does not grieve over the destruction of any particular part
of itself, and continues to exist even without us. The fact that ‘the individual must come
into being and pass away’ does not disturb the essential will to life any more than ‘the
death of an individual [can] injure the whole of nature’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 276). In
truth, what is at stake here is not the maintenance or multiplication of the will to life’s
individual manifestations, but the perpetuation of life itself.
15 Schopenhauer’s  unconscious  encompasses  a  number  of  different  areas.  To  begin  with,  the
unconscious encompasses the original lack of  consciousness  of  the world-will  that permeates
both living beings and lifeless matter. Concerning the will to life, unconsciousness encompasses
the physiological unconscious, which controls a number of somatic operations, such as digestion,
but is ultimately dominated by the sexual instincts. Finally, the innate character determines the
individual’s  unconscious  desires.  As  we  proceed  from  concrete  desires  through  the  innate
character to the will to life and finally the world-will, the degree of unconsciousness increases,
such that the self-conscious subject can feel his or her desires directly, but the innate character,
the will to life and the world-will can only be known as increasingly abstract concepts.
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Once he has introduced the notion of the will  to life  as a way of explaining the
existence of living creatures, Schopenhauer must still face the objection that there exist
innumerable species, each possessing characteristics that distinguish it from the others
and composed of innumerable members which, in some cases, may even have their own
peculiar characters. To solve this problem, he modifies Kant’s notion of the intelligible
character, which belongs in the unknowable thing-in-itself, placing it in the essential
will. In Schopenhauer’s version, all members of a given non-human species share the
same innate character, while among humans the innate character of a given individual
may be very different from the others’. Since the focus of Golding’s novels is on human
beings, I shall only draw attention to the main features of people’s characters.
According to Schopenhauer,  the individuals’  innate  character  is  ‘the individually
modified will’, which guides them and determines with strict necessity what they will
(Schopenhauer  1969a:  108).  The  innate  character  ‘is  no  work  of  …  circumstances
subject to chance, but rather the work of nature itself’; it ‘is inborn’ and ‘reveals itself
already in the child’ (2009: 72). In addition, the innate character is ‘impossible’ to alter,
as it ‘lies outside time and change’ (1969a: 296). Despite its individuality, it is still one’s
‘inner  being’,  therefore  one  ‘cannot  decide  to  be  this  or  that’  and  ‘cannot  become
another person’, but ‘is once for all’ (292–3).
Schopenhauer claims that the reason why someone has this or that innate character
is a mystery. So is the fact that the innate character of some people, who care more
about  the others’  well-being than about  their  own,  seems to  contradict  the  general
functioning of the will to life. The innate character precedes all forms of representation,
and therefore it  is  jut  as ‘groundless’  and free as the world-will  and the will  to life
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 124). In the last analysis, when we are faced with the fact that
two persons have conflicting personalities, our reaction has to be the same as when we
ask why the world’s essence consists in willing: for Schopenhauer these questions are
‘absolutely  inexplicable’  (138).  Even  so,  we  cannot  forget  that  with  Schopenhauer
lacking an explanation does not mean being unable to know. Just as I can conceptualise
the world-will starting from the feeling of my individual will, so I can conceptualise my
innate  character  starting form its  inner and outer  manifestations.  Thus I can get  a
pretty accurate idea of my personality by studying my affects and actions.
Even though a person’s behaviour might seem to contradict the general will to life,
we should not be misled by appearances. Whenever we act in an egocentric manner (i.e.
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pitting all individual things and beings against each other, and putting ourselves at the
centre  of  this  atomised  world),  all  our  actions  are  intended  to  fulfil  our  innate
characters; furthermore, both these actions and the innate character that they serve are
in harmony with the will to life. Thus, for example, a person’s suicide is not at odds with
the will to life, but rather is an unworthy ‘affirmation’ thereof (Schopenhauer 1969a:
398).  As David E. Cartwright notes,  Schopenhauer thinks that ‘the suicide does not
reject life … but only the form in which one lives. He or she rejects the suffering and
misery of his or her life, but not the will to life itself’ (2005: 168). Schopenhauer claims
that ‘whoever loves life and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and in particular can no
longer  endure  the  hard  lot  that  has  fallen  to  just  him’  might  commit  suicide
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 280–1). Willed annihilation, then, is typical of egoists. Indeed,
self-murder is the last recourse of those who try to escape pain but do not realise that
they  can  do  so  by  other  means.  These  involve  renouncing  all  kinds  of  egocentric
satisfaction; only thus can we shake off the shackles of the will to life. Once we have
avoided  egocentrism,  Schopenhauer contends,  we shall  be  able  to  endure  life  until
death arrives on its own to free us from suffering for good.
2.2.3.3. The Weakening of Individual Freedom
The fact that people have different innate characters is enough to explain why they act
differently to the same object. If we knew thoroughly every person’s innate character
and the objects on which they focus their attention, we could predict all their actions:
by virtue of the innate character, with one given object ‘only  one decision is possible,
which  is  accordingly  a  necessary  decision’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  290).  This  claim,
together  with  the  assertion  that  our  innate  character  is  impossible  to  modify,  has
important implications for Schopenhauer’s understanding of freedom.
To begin with, the essential will is free at all levels (qua world-will, qua will to life
and  qua  innate  character).  The  freedom  of  the  essential  will  does  not  occur  ‘in
appearance’, but is ‘present only in so far as we abstract from appearance and all its
forms’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 108). What a person wills is, in Schopenhauer’s opinion,
the expression of his or her innate character, which, like the world-will and the will to
life, is posited not only as groundless but as impossible to alter. Those animals that are
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endowed with consciousness can choose among the objects that satisfy their desires; by
contrast, living beings without a brain resemble inanimate objects in that they cannot
even make this choice. What no animal can choose is what to will, let alone whether to
will.  Schopenhauer contends that no amount of instruction will  ever teach us to will
what goes against our innate character. He is clear in this respect: ‘every particular act
of will on the part of a knowing individual’ necessarily has an object, ‘without which
that act would never take place’,  but the object ‘determines only the act of will  of a
knowing being, at such a time, in such a place, and in such and such circumstances, as
something quite individual’, without determining ‘that that being wills in general and
wills in this way’ (1969a: 163).
Within Schopenhauer’s model an individual is only free to choose among the objects
that can satisfy the appetites determined by his or her innate character, but never to act
against this character. In other words, conscious beings can only be intellectually free.
Obviously, this freedom appears differently in humans than and non-human animals,
since the former can make this choice not only without the aid of reason but rationally.
It is only through this selection of objects that the intellect can ‘illuminate’ the will,
giving  some  direction  to  its  obstinate  thrust  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  293).  The
implication  is  that  the  intellect  can  guide  one’s  innate  character  while  remaining
faithful to it.  By deliberately picking the objects to which we necessarily respond in a
certain way, we can change our conduct within certain limits. Thus ‘a man’s manner of
acting can be noticeably changed without our being justified in inferring from this a
change in his [innate] character’ (294).
If, on the one hand, all the actions of conscious beings are internally determined by
the  combination  of  their  innate  characters  and  the  intellectual  direction  to  choose
satisfying  objects,  on  the  other  hand,  all  physical  events  without  exception  are
externally  determined by causal  connection.  (With  those things and beings without
consciousness, the intellectual factor is obviously absent.) Schopenhauer thinks that the
results of both kinds of determination coincide at every moment. Though he does not
explain why this is the case, Schopenhauer contends, for example, that ‘all the events in
a man’s life are connected in two fundamentally different ways’  — internally by the
combination of the innate character and the intellect,  and externally by causality  —
such that ‘those two kinds of connection exist simultaneously and yet the same event,
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as a link in two quite different chains, exactly fits them both’ (Schopenhauer 2000a:
220).
2.2.3.4. The Origin of Suffering
While  at  the  level  of  appearances  our  wishes  find satisfaction  in  particular  objects
which are frequently attainable, in truth the essential will is impossible to fulfil. Though
our particular desire for this or that object is a product of the essential will — of our
innate  character  and,  indirectly,  of  the  will  to  life  and  of  the  world-will  —  the
satisfaction of  our  desires  does not imply  the fulfilment of  the essential  will,  as  its
yearning stems from a perennial lack. The conjunction of a striving that is insatiable
and  its  manifestation  in  the  guise  of  numberless  individuals  capable  of  conscious
cognition results in a panorama of constant suffering. For one thing, the individual’s
attempts  at  satisfaction  are  often  unsuccessful.  For  another  thing,  the  attempts  to
satisfy their needs make individuals clash with each other, thus increasing the others’
suffering, while the prevalence of egocentrism leads them to disregard the pain that
others may feel.
For Schopenhauer,  the intellect  ‘is  a mere accident of our being’  (Schopenhauer
1969b: 201), and consciousness is ‘originally and by its nature … completely the servant
of the [essential] will’ (1969a: 176). As a rule, therefore, consciousness is will-coloured,
because it ‘apprehends originally in things nothing but their relations to the [essential]
will, the direct, the indirect, the possible’ (1969b: 376). The will that the latter quotation
refers to is the innate character (and indirectly, the will to life and the world-will). Due
to its influence, physical consciousness, which is always egocentric, presents to us only
what  bears  on  our  well-being  (and,  indirectly,  on  the  well-being  of  the  species).
Schopenhauer  claims  that  all  physical  consciousness  without  exception  ‘must  be  a
purpose of the [essential] will’, i.e. a means for the fulfilment of the desires dictated by
one’s innate character (and, indirectly, by one’s will to life), and that ‘the more eagerly
this  aspires  to  it,  the  sooner  will  it  be  attained’  (2000b:  417).  In  principle,  then,
egocentric consciousness shows physical things ‘always in relation to me, a being in the
world as its spatio-temporal “centre”’, and it shows them ‘in their utility’ (Young 2005:
127).  This  means  that  the  I–here–now  viewpoint,  which  always  includes  a
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consideration of causes and effects, establishes a causal connection between my body —
therefore between my desires — and external objects, such that the latter are inevitably
judged  according  to  their  potential  effects  on  me.  Under  these  circumstances,
egocentric  consciousness  cannot  but  be  full  of  ‘anxiety’  about  the  possible
dissatisfaction  of  the  subject’s  appetites,  therefore  it  is  inextricably  linked  to
‘unhappiness’ and suffering (127).16 It is thus that egocentrism, the built-in cognitive
mechanism  in  charge  of  sustaining  animal  life,  makes  this  selfsame  life  almost
unbearable.
For Schopenhauer, all egocentric pleasure  is transient. Forgetting that there is an
obvious difference between not feeling pain and feeling pleasure, Schopenhauer usually
defines the latter as ‘a painless state’ resulting from the satisfaction of the aspirations
and  needs  arising  from our  innate  character  (Schopenhauer  2000b:  287).  He  also
states  that  a pleasurable object  ‘delivers  us  only from a pain or  want  that  must be
followed either by a new pain or by languor,  empty longing,  and boredom’ (1969a:
320). Owing to the constant pressure of the essential will, egocentric beings ‘pass their
existence in anxiety and want’, that is, in suffering (1969b: 349). From the individual’s
point  of  view,  the  final  outcome  of  willing  is,  regardless  of  the  circumstances,
frustration;  even  if  one  does  get  ‘momentary  gratification’,  it  soon  gives  way  to
boredom and the need to pursue new objects (1969a: 353).  Every conscious subject
thus ‘swings like a pendulum’ (312). This oscillation is not only between pleasure and
unpleasure, but also between the painful states of ‘want and boredom’ (1969b: 359).
Since  the  only  will  that  I  know  about  directly  is  my  own,  the  only  goals  and
aspirations that exist are my own, a fact that explains the natural disposition to treat
others as mere things — as means not ends — that can be manipulated without scruple
in  whatever  way  suits  my  wishes.  The  consequence  is  that,  in  their  vain  hope  of
16 According to Bernard Reginster, Schopenhauer’s theory is marred by ‘a certain lack of clarity’
concerning ‘the relation between willing and knowing’ (2009: 115). In particular, Schopenhauer
confuses being interested in an object — in the sense of focusing on it in order to satisfy one’s
desires — and having a biased knowledge of if. It may well be the case — with philosophy, for
example — that ‘my practical interests are presumably better served if [my mind] represents the
relevant features of the surrounding world accurately’ (115).  What Reginster does not deny is
that, even if we admit that for Schopenhauer not all knowledge is biased, it is clear that for him
most knowledge is the slave of one’s appetites.
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achieving their aspirations, individuals enter into conflict with each other. This conflict
leads to ‘much and long suffering, constant struggle,  bellum omnium’, a state of cut-
throat  competitiveness,  violence  and  exploitation,  which  ‘goes  on  in  saecula
saeculorum, or until once again the crust of the planet breaks’, and in which everything
is ‘a hunter’ and simultaneously runs the risk of being ‘hunted’ (Schopenhauer 1969b:
354). A large part of Schopenhauer’s work is devoted to describing how, once it has
manifested itself as the realm of appearances — that is, once consciousness has arisen
—  the  world  appears  as  involved  in  a  ‘never-ending  war  of  extermination  of  the
individuals … and in the constant struggle … with one another’ (1969a: 161). This war of
all against all is the means that the essential will has to find fulfilment. Since, as far as
we can discern, ‘nothing exists besides it’, we can resort to metaphor and say that the
‘hungry’  essence  of  the  world  ‘must  live  on  itself’  (154). From  this  Schopenhauer
concludes that existence can but be ‘a constant suffering, and is partly woeful, partly
fearful’ (267), a condition to which human life is no exception.
2.2.3.5. The Knowable World as the Worst Possible World
One of Schopenhauer’s main themes is ‘the obvious misery of existence’ (Schopenhauer
1969a: 184). In his view, if the world is ‘the battle-ground of tormented and agonized
beings who continue to exist only by each devouring the other’, it is due of the primacy
of the essential  will (1969b: 581).  Though ‘the attempt has been made to adapt the
system of  optimism’  to this world in order to demonstrate ‘that it  is  the best of all
possible worlds’, for Schopenhauer the ‘absurdity’ of this enterprise is ‘glaring’ (581).
In Schopenhauer’s view, it is evident that ‘this world is arranged as it had to be if it
were to be capable of continuing with great difficulty to exist; if it were a little worse, it
would  be  no  longer  capable  of  continuing  to  exist’  (Schopenhauer  1969b:  583).
Consequently it ‘is the worst of all possible worlds’ capable of sustained existence (583).
From this perspective, the philosopher’s fondness for tragedy is easy to understand, as
it comes over as the most realistic of all artistic genres, the only one that at its best
makes us ‘feel ourselves already in the midst of hell’ (1969a: 255).
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2.2.4. Remedies for Suffering in the Individual and Collective 
Spheres
Though Schopenhauer envisages the world as inevitably pervaded by suffering, there is
more to his  philosophy than this.  Despite his indictment of our world as the worst
possible, he makes allowances for a number of ways in which suffering can be alleviated
on the individual and collective levels. I shall conclude this overview of Schopenhauer’s
thought by focusing on these remedies.
Even if we are able to fence off the others’ aggressions, suffering is part and parcel
of our lives. Though he seldom misses an opportunity to emphasise the unhappy tenor
of egocentric representation, Schopenhauer also draws attention to a series of possible
solutions. Among those that work on an individual level, he mentions three which are
tied to non-egocentric feelings and which temporarily spare us the pain associated with
want  and  boredom:  one  is  aesthetic  tranquillity;  the  others,  which  are  related  to
different  kinds of  saintliness,  are  compassionate  altruism (whose effects  are  felt  by
their neighbours) and resigned detachment. Furthermore, Schopenhauer adds another
remedy that involves leaving behind, this time permanently, not only egocentrism but
all kinds of consciousness: death. At a collective level, Schopenhauer’s remedies only
protect  us  from the  kinds  of  suffering  that  arise  from  external  aggression.  In  this
respect,  he  points  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  moral  principles,  which  need  to  be
supplemented by adequate penal measures. History, he concludes, repeats itself and no
utopian solutions are possible.
As  far  as  the  individual  remedies  for  suffering  are  concerned,  Schopenhauer’s
discussion of the non-egocentric modalities of consciousness covers the same ground as
Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor’s  examination  of  the  visionary  trajectory  in  Golding’s
novels. Compared with these critics, Schopenhauer offers a more nuanced account of
the ways in which the individual can go beyond his or her individual perspective. Apart
from  this,  there  is  a  striking  terminological  similarity  between  Schopenhauer  and
Golding, who also refers, for example in connection with Lord of the Flies, to the figure
of the saint. According to his commentators, in Golding’s novels this type of character is
associated  with  certain  kinds  of  non-rational  feelings.  The  difference  between
Schopenhauer’s  and Golding’s  saints  is  that  in  Golding  their  insight  never  leads  to
passive  detachment  but  only  to  palliative  action.  Despite  this  difference,
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Schopenhauer’s notion of compassionate altruism may improve our understanding of
the  cognitive  peculiarities  and  moral  importance  of  Golding’s  saints.  As  regards
aesthetic tranquillity, Schopenhauer’s comments may likewise help us to understand
the ending of  The Spire,  which Golding  discusses  in  terms of  the  main character’s
contemplation of  beauty,  and one of the central episodes of  Darkness Visible.  With
respect  to  death,  the number of  characters  that  die  in  Golding’s  novels  is  certainly
striking.  It  will  be interesting to see whether their  deaths can be interpreted as  an
involuntary liberation from egocentrism, and hence from suffering, or as the egocentric
individual’s  attempt  to  avoid  pain.  As  to  the  collective  remedies  for  suffering,
Schopenhauer’s defence of the desirability of moral repression may cast a new light on
the contrast between the meek People and the vicious New People in  The Inheritors
(the contrast has been usually analysed as resulting from the qualitative intellectual
differences  between  two  species,  only  one  of  which  is  held  capable  of  rational
reflection). Finally, Schopenhauer’s claim that moral restraints are hardly sufficient to
curb human desires, and that morals need to be supplemented by the legal recourse to
force seems to explain not only the collapse of the children’s society in Lord of the Flies,
but also Golding’s  early  denial  of  historical  progress  and his  concomitant  rejection,
until late in his career, of utopia.
2.2.4.1. Individual Remedies for Suffering
The first individual remedies for suffering that Schopenhauer introduces are related to
kinds of knowledge that fall outside the scope of physical consciousness. In many cases,
these varieties of knowledge are characterised by their non-rational nature, and by their
suspension  of  egocentrism,  i.e.  of  atomising  individualisation  and  self-centredness.
When egocentrism is shunned, one is elevated above the concern about one’s desires,
and  for  this  very  reason  above  one  important  source  of  suffering,  the  fact  that
egocentrism can only be avoided thanks to certain varieties of feeling must serve as a
reminder that, according to Schopenhauer, rational enquiry is never independent of the
egocentric  pursuit  of  one’s  goals.  This  means  that  only  a  feeling  can  avoid  being
anxiety-ridden, and only insofar as it is metaphysical, because only thus can the subject
avoid  imposing  a  causal  connection  between external  things  and his  or  her  bodily
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appetites, that is, seeing all things as potential means for the attainment of individual
ends. Whether elicited directly or through the mediation of a rational description, this
absolutely placid and painless kind of feeling is, quite simply, what Schopenhauer calls
a  better consciousness liberated from one’s egocentrism and hence from the concern
about one’s desires (see Young 2005: 7).
The manners in which this liberation takes place are manifold.  It  can occur,  for
example, in the course of aesthetic contemplation, when the observer suddenly feels the
aesthetic universality of things independently of their bearing on his or her individual
appetites.  It  can  also  come about  as  saintly  visions  that  penetrate  into  the  world’s
hidden essence; this leads either to the saint’s compassion towards sufferers, and then
to altruistic action, or to a resigned withdrawal from worldly affairs. Unusual as these
kinds  of  insight  are  in  comparison  with  physical  consciousness,  in  Schopenhauer’s
opinion they are not the most extraordinary ways of breaking free from one’s needs and
aspirations. In a sense, the place of honour in his model is reserved for a phenomenon
that eliminates not only egocentric consciousness but consciousness in general. This
phenomenon encompasses all kinds of death except egoistic suicide.
2.2.4.1.1. Aesthetic Contemplation
Schopenhauer’s discussion of better consciousness starts with aesthetic contemplation.
The apprehension of the universal dimension of the object, which is thereby located
beyond time,  space  and  causality,  affords  the  subject  a  temporary  relief  from  the
suffering associated with egocentric consciousness.  In addition to foregrounding the
impact  that  this  experience  has  on  the  subject,  Schopenhauer  maintains  that  the
aesthetic effect does not involve concepts; moreover, he emphasises both the negative
character of aesthetic pleasure (defined as the mere absence of pain), and the fact that
the source of that pleasure is to be found not in the object’s form but in its content.
When  the  aesthetic  effect  takes  place,  the  subject  temporarily  transcends
egocentrism and,  more generally,  individuality.  Though still  a  subject  looking at  an
object, the spectator ceases to be an individual and reaches, together with the object, a
liberating universality: ‘The particular thing and the knowing individual are abolished’
so that nothing remains but a ‘pure subject’ and the aesthetic dimension of the object
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that ‘is released not only from time but also from space’ and causality (Schopenhauer
1969a: 209). The aesthetic dimension that the object exhibits to the beholder is the
ideal  nature  of  which  particular  things  are  necessarily  incomplete  or  inadequate
expressions. This dimension is still on the side of representation, for its contemplation
depends of the subject–object opposition, yet it achieves the highest possible degree of
universality within that sphere.
Schopenhauer is insistent that aesthetic cognition allows individuals to reach a state
in which they become a pure subject ‘free from individuality and from servitude to the
[essential] will’, i.e. from all concern about the satisfaction of the desires dictated by
their  innate character (Schopenhauer 1969a: 180). When ‘the entire consciousness is
filled  and  occupied  by  a  single  image’,  we  become  universal  subjects  of  aesthetic
contemplation, thus breaking free from egocentrism (177). When the egocentric subject
disappears from the scene,  external objects are no longer judged according to their
potential effects on one’s desires. As soon as this happens, the subject ceases to feel
anxiety. The grasp of the aesthetic dimension of things thus brings out a subject that is
‘a  pure  intelligence’  without  ‘sorrows  and  sufferings’;  what  remains  is  a  ‘state  of
pleasure, in other words absence of all pain’ (2000b: 415–6).
Schopenhauer writes that the brain and the intellect are not ‘designed’ for knowing
the  unity  that  underlies  the  world  and  of  which  they  are  part,  but  only  ‘for
comprehending those ends on the attainment of which depend individual life and its
propagation’  (Schopenhauer 1969b:  284).  They  are  designed,  in  other  words,  for
egocentric consciousness, the default mode of consciousness, which is at the service of
one’s appetites (and, ultimately, of the essential will to life). Non-egocentric modes of
consciousness are only a fortunate accident. In order to understand their existence, we
must admit that ‘a measure of the power of knowledge’ exceeds that required for the
service of the essential will, and that ‘this superfluity of knowledge’ can become free or
‘purified’  of  desire  (1969a:  186).  For  Neill,  this  cognitive  excess,  ‘not  in  itself
necessitated by the survival needs of the individual’ and apparently present in humans
alone, can be compared to the human capacity for song, which is ‘a by-product of the
emergence of the physiology of the larynx, vocal cords, etc.,  which is determined by
(what  is  at  least  arguably)  the  survival  need  of  the  individual  human  will  for  the
capacity for verbal communication’ (Neill 2009: 33). The intellectual capacity for non-
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egocentric representation would then be a a fortunate by-product of the emergence of
consciousness, which itself performs an important survival function.
For Schopenhauer aesthetic contemplation does not afford ‘a lasting emancipation,
but  merely  … an  exceptional,  and  in  fact  only  momentary,  release’  (Schopenhauer
1969b: 363).  Obviously,  this  brief  relief  is  itself  a  valuable experience.  The value of
aesthetic contemplation does not end here, because the painless state out of ourselves
to which it transports us is a good preparation for death. On the one hand, the aesthetic
state offers a fleeting glimpse of the permanent freedom from anxiety that comes from
the definitive abolition of egocentrism that takes place when we die. On the other hand,
aesthetic  contemplation  shows  us  what  lies  beyond individuality,  revealing  that  we
share in something that is larger than ourselves, something that will not perish when
we pass away.
The aesthetic experience can result from the contemplation of nature and from the
contemplation of a work of art. As far as art is concerned, Schopenhauer maintains that
the task of the artist is to extend the receiver’s mind beyond the surface of concrete
perceptions  to  the  universal  dimension  of  the  object.  Artistic  feelings  make  the
represented object’s universal character accessible to the observer, in much the same
way as aesthetic inspiration — the feeling of the aesthetic dimension of real objects —
made it  accessible to the author.  Unlike aesthetic  inspiration and artistic  reception,
artistic execution is driven by the subject’s desire. As it is intended to materialise, ‘by
deliberate art’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 186), the artist’s aesthetic feelings and to produce
an equivalent effect upon the audience, the work of art can only aspire to be the fittest
technical  means  to  those  ends  — little  more  than  a  necessary  prop.  Schopenhauer
believes that the fabrication of these artistic props requires strong willpower; moreover,
he thinks they are not possible without the aid of reason, whose instrumental nature, as
a means to the end of personal satisfaction, Schopenhauer never fails to highlight.
It is noteworthy that the philosopher’s view of artistic production also extends to
history,  science,  religion  and  philosophy,  whose  non-rational  object  must  be
communicated with the help of reason. As regards the feelings that trigger them, these
approaches may be, just like art, alien to the satisfaction of individual desires; but when
these feelings are transformed into concepts the resulting historical, scientific, religious
and  philosophical  theories  become  a  vehicle  of  its  practitioners’  desires  and  grow
bellicose with their competitors. In this respect, Schopenhauer puts forward the view
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that  ‘hardly  has  any  philosophical  system  come  into  the  world  when  it  already
contemplates  the  destruction  of  all  its  brothers’,  a  statement  that  highlights  ‘this
essentially  polemical  nature,  this  bellum  omnium  contra  omnes of  philosophical
systems’ (Schopenhauer 2000b: 5). In philosophy — as in the other spheres of life —
the  rational  search  for  personal  satisfaction  leads  to  fierce  competition.  This
competition among proposals made within the same area of enquiry compounds the
rivalry  between rational  and non-rational  kinds  of  cognition,  between the focus  on
physical  and  metaphysical  objects,  and  between  the  historical,  scientific,  artistic,
religious and philosophical descriptions of the world.
2.2.4.1.2. Saintly Vision and Its Consequences: Compassionate Altruism 
and Resigned Withdrawal
For Schopenhauer, the saint is a person who has a spontaneous feeling of the essential
unity of the world. The saint’s vision is the only source of saintliness, but it may have
two possible outcomes: either the compassionate identification with other sufferers and
the  altruistic  attempt  to  palliate  their  suffering,  or  the  resigned  withdrawal  from
worldly competition. While compassionate saints are regarded by Schopenhauer as the
paradigm of moral virtue, resigned saints are beyond moral considerations.
To be a saint one has to recognise ‘without reasons or arguments’ that the essential
will ‘constitutes the inner nature of everything, and lives in all … the animals and … the
whole of nature’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 372).  Saintly vision is, like aesthetic rest, an
involuntary feeling: it is ‘not to be forcibly arrived at by intention or design, but comes
… suddenly, as if flying in from without’, that is, as if produced by some kind of ‘grace’
(404). Also like aesthetic rest, saintliness makes egocentrism disappear. The saint ‘lives
in an external world homogeneous with his essence: others for him are not not-I, but
are “I once more”’ (2009: 254). The saint has no problem to recognise that ‘My true,
inner essence exists in every living [and inanimate] thing as immediately as it reveals
itself in my self-consciousness to myself alone’, an insight traditionally expressed by
Hinduism with ‘the formula tat-twam-asi, i.e. “You are that”’ (254).
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Saintly vision sometimes translates into the compassionate identification with those
that  suffer  and  into  the  desire  to  help  them.17 This  type  of  saintliness situates  us
squarely within the realm of  morality.  As is clear from his references to the positive
effects  of  the  moral  appeals  to  conscience  made,  for  example,  by  religion  (see
Schopenhauer 1969a: 168; 2009: 188), in Schopenhauer there is an implicit distinction
between the  theoretical  description  of  people’s  desires,  which  are  dictated  by  their
innate characters, and the practical prescription of certain courses of action (see Magee
1997:  203).  In  spite  of  this,  the  usual  focus  of  his  moral  theory is  not  on people’s
conduct but on their appetites (see Jordan 2009: 172). Morally speaking, the principal
desires that Schopenhauer identifies are three, according as they seek ‘one’s own weal’,
‘another’s weal’ or ‘another’s woe’ (Schopenhauer  1969b: 607 n. 6). These he names
egoism,  compassion and  malice.18 In his view, egoism — the name that our desires
17 Schopenhauer’s theory of metaphysical identification is somewhat problematic. He contends that
compassion does not really make us see the neighbour’s suffering as ours: ‘it remains clear and
present to us at every single moment that he is the sufferer, not us’ and though ‘We suffer with
him, … we feel his pain as his’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 203). At the same time, though he asserts
that  when  we  identify  with  the  neighbour’s  suffering  we  ‘do  not  imagine that  it  is  ours’
(Schopenhauer 2009: 203), it is not entirely clear if his disagreement here is with the idea that
our identification is imaginative or with the idea that identification makes us imagine the other’s
pain as ours. Cartwright suggests that the problems with Schopenhauer’s notion of compassion
would  be  solved  if  we  interpreted  it  as  ‘the  imaginative  participation  in  another’s  suffering’
(Cartwright 2009: 150), but acknowledges that this is not exactly the philosopher’s intention.
18 Schopenhauer sometimes refers to a fourth type of desire, linked to asceticism, which is also
morally indifferent because it seeks ‘one’s own woe’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 607 n. 6), and whose
most relevant characteristic is its association with saintly vision and with the withdrawal to which
it  sometimes  leads.  Golding’s  novels  include  a  few characters  that  might  be  termed ascetic,
among them Matty in  Darkness Visible.  Matty’s voluntary chastity, fasting, prolonged silence,
self-castigation,  poverty  and obedience  certainly  echo Schopenhauer’s  characterisation  of  the
ascetic’s life. In addition, Golding links his ascetics to sainthood (in his own understanding of the
phenomenon,  that  is,  exclusively  as  compassionate  altruism).  Nevertheless,  my discussion of
Golding’s novels will not deal with asceticism, as I do not find Schopenhauer’s account of the
relation  between asceticism and saintliness  especially  illuminating.  Schopenhauer  states  that
saintly vision is an involuntary product of grace; but this rules out the possibility of becoming a
saint through voluntary asceticism. He also states that asceticism is aimed at the prolongation of
the saintly withdrawal that may follow vision; but the saintly attitude of detachment includes the
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deserve  whenever  they  are  neither  compassionate  nor  malignant  —  is  morally
indifferent, because it does not aim at the other’s weal or woe. By contrast, compassion
deserves to be called virtuous, and malice is reprehensible. The ‘meritorious element’ of
compassion is ‘not the deed, but the willingness to do it, the love from which it results,
and without which it is a dead work’ (1969a: 526). This does not mean that the actions
issuing from compassion are not important. Schopenhauer calls them altruistic. As for
the actions that,  being associated with egoism and malice,  inflict pain on the other,
Schopenhauer calls them evil; these are the ones that prescriptive morality condemns
and legal systems try to minimise.
As far as a person’s desires are concerned, Schopenhauer sees any consideration of
moral  worth  as  concerned  with  feelings  rather  than  with  concepts:  the  basis  of
compassion is always a feeling. Since only conceptual representations can be reliably
communicated and taught, this amounts to saying that virtue, like aesthetic receptivity,
cannot be the goal of education: ‘Virtue is as little taught as is genius’ (Schopenhauer
1969a:  271).  In  both  aesthetics  and  morality  the  concept  ‘can  be  used  only  as  an
instrument’  (271).  The  concept,  then,  can  serve  to  speak about  aesthetics,  to  teach
people the techniques used by artists, to judge the merit of a work of art, and even to
elicit  an  aesthetic  feeling  in  the audience.  Likewise,  it  can be used  to  speak about
morality, to teach how to judge people’s intentions in terms of virtue or vice, and even
— going from description to prescription — to guide people’s conduct so as to prevent
the infliction of avoidable pain. However, the concept can produce neither artists nor
virtuous  people.  As  in  other  cases,  Schopenhauer’s  moral  stance  involves  a  firm
rejection of Kant’s rationalism. This is confirmed by Schopenhauer’s assertion that the
absence of rationality and moral worth are perfectly compatible, and by the association
that he establishes between rationality and iniquity: ‘Rational and vicious can combine
very  well,  and  indeed it  is  only  through  their  combination  that  great,  far-reaching
crimes are possible.  Irrational and noble-minded likewise co-exist very well’  (2009:
151).
indifference  to  one’s  individual  desires  and  intentions,  whereas ascetic  actions  are  intended.
Schopenhauer’s  concern  with  the  problematic  link  between  ascesis,  on  the  one  hand,  and
saintliness and vision, on the other, must be understood in the context of  a long tradition in
Western thought. It could be argued that this definition of extreme asceticism has as much to do
with a self-destructive character as with the saint.
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Schopenhauer believes that everyone is morally capable of egoistic, compassionate
and malignant desires,  which are nevertheless ‘present in each one in different and
incredibly  diverse  proportions’  depending  on  one’s  innate  character  (Schopenhauer
2009:  238).  However,  since  the essential  will  makes  use of  egocentrism to its  own
advantage — that is, to achieve indirect satisfaction through the individual — egoism
naturally  prevails.  Malice  is  also  linked  to  egocentrism,  because  it  presupposes  an
individual subject that establishes a complete separation between the I and the others,
but compassion is not.  This being so, in the course of our life we are likely to come
across very many indifferent characters, now and again a character that is malignant,
and only as the rarest exception one that is moved by compassion.
The difference between egoism and malice can be measured in the distance between
conditional and unconditional harm. With the former, the harm intended ‘is merely a
means  for  egoism,  not  an  end,  and thus  occurs  only  accidentally’;  with  malice,  by
contrast, ‘the sufferings and pains of others are an end in themselves and achieving
them is a pleasure’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 194). While the maxim of egoism is ‘Help no
one; rather harm everyone if it brings you advantage’, that of malice is ‘Harm everyone
to the extent that you can’ (194). Given its prevalence among humans, egoism can lead
‘to crimes and misdeeds of all kinds’ (194). In theory, these are merely a side-effect of
egoism, not a necessary outcome. Yet egoism becomes dangerous as soon as it becomes
indifference to others, so, in practice, its evil consequences are often indistinguishable
from those of malice.  As a result,  some confusion may arise when judging people’s
desires — and their innate character — from their acts.
As  regards  compassion,  it  is  based  on  the  identification  with  sufferers.
Schopenhauer roots this identification in saintly vision, that is, on the feeling that there
are no essential differences among conscious beings. This extension of compassion to
all conscious beings, whether human or not, is a fundamental aspect of his philosophy.
Schopenhauer is revolted by Kant’s notion of the intrinsic dignity and incomparable
value of humans, which leads to the idea that only they must be treated as ends in
themselves. Other species,  he complains, are supposed by Kant to lack such dignity
solely because they lack reason. The unfortunate consequence is that they are treated as
‘mere “things”, mere means to whatever ends you like’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 162). For
Schopenhauer, the compassionate person refrains from doing harm ‘even to an animal’,
regardless of its lack of rationality (1969a: 372).
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Thanks to compassion, writes Schopenhauer, ‘the heart feels itself enlarged, just as
by egoism it feels contracted’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 373).  While  egoistic individuals
concentrate solely on their own well-being and feel themselves ‘surrounded by strange
and hostile phenomena’, compassionate people live ‘in a world of friendly phenomena’
whose essence they are somehow aware of sharing and with whose pain they identify
(374). In theory, even a person dominated by egoism may comply with the first part of
Schopenhauer’s principle to ‘Harm no one; rather help everyone to the extent that you
can’ (2009: 140). But the latter part is only satisfied by the compassionate person’s
altruistic  behaviour.  As  it  turns  out,  though  Schopenhauer  is  clear  that  seeing  the
surrounding world as full  of enemies or of friends is a function of being egoistic or
compassionate, since his emphasis falls on how one sees the world, it would be more
accurate to say that it depends on being tied to an egocentric (i.e. physical) perspective
or being able to escape it (adopting a metaphysical perspective). In these terms, it is not
only egoistic individuals but also malignant ones that see the world as an inhospitable
place, and it is for this reason they are opposed to compassionate beings in the first
place.  Plainly  enough,  then,  when Schopenhauer  refers  to  the world as  hellish  it  is
surely because he is describing it from the point of view from which most conscious
beings see it, that is, from an egocentric point of view.
While some saints carry out altruistic actions that seek to palliate the other’s pain,
others realise that for conscious beings ‘all life is suffering’,  and that the ‘efforts to
banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its form’ (Schopenhauer 1969a:
310, 315). In the wake of this realisation, this kind of saint develops a ‘strong aversion’
to the world, from which he or she ‘withdraws’ or ‘turns away’; this saint thus ceases to
pay  attention  to  his  or  her  desires,  including  the  compassionate  impulse  to  act
altruistically  (379–80).  With  the  insight  into  the  world’s  common essence  and the
disregard of the demands of one’s innate character and the will to life, ‘the individuality
is really abolished also, and with it its suffering and sorrow’ (371). Saintly withdrawal
opens the door to a better life in which egocentrism is overcome and the demands of
the innate character and of the will to life are ‘silenced’, as it were, and ‘not for a few
moments … but for ever, … except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the
body and is extinguished with it’ (390). Unlike the imperfect respites afforded by other
kinds of involuntary cognition, this is genuine ‘peace and bliss’ (391).
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The saints’ ‘denial’ of the essential will is the ‘highest good, summum bonum’, and
can be compared to a veritable ‘new birth or regeneration’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 285,
362, 403). It is obvious that, insofar as Schopenhauer posits the essential will as ‘all-
permeating’,  his  notion of  the denial  of the essential  will  is  not without difficulties
(Wicks  2008:  128).  Perhaps  these  could  be  avoided  by  making  the  saint  deny  the
essential will only at its two intermediary levels (qua innate character and qua will to
life), and only in the sense of not heeding the aspirations and needs rooted in them.
Consequently, saintly denial can be understood as indifference to the demands made by
their  innate character  and indirectly  by  the  will  to  life.  This  interpretation  has  the
problem of diminishing the distance between saintly detachment and the other kinds of
metaphysical consciousness; perhaps a better alternative would be to regard the saint’s
resignation,  like  the  vision  that  precedes  it,  as  the  inexplicable  product  of  grace.
Schopenhauer states that  the saint’s  indifference proceeds from a ‘changed form’ of
consciousness (Schopenhauer 1969a: 403). As a result of saintly vision, a person ‘knows
the  whole,  comprehends  its  inner  nature’  (379).  This  knowledge  eliminates
egocentrism, and  the objects that had incited us to act in a certain way — always in
accordance with our  innate character — ‘become ineffective’: they no longer have any
power over us (403). However, what is peculiar to saintly resignation is not only that it
follows on from a view of the world’s essence but, above all, that it changes the saint’s
life for ever.  While aesthetic contemplation, for example,  only affords a momentary
respite, saintly vision rids us of anxiety for good.
Saintly detachment is closely connected with quietism, and does not correspond to
any  of  Schopenhauer’s  moral categories.  The  main  differences  between  the
compassionate and the resigned saints are that the former’s compassion for those that
suffer only encompasses conscious beings and leads to altruistic action, whereas the
latter’s  aversion  is  to  the  whole  world  and  leads  to  resignation.  In  other  words,
compassion  entails  love  for  the  suffering  neighbour  while  resignation  situates  one
beyond love and hate.  This distinction is at odds with the compassion and altruism
that, according to his commentators, Golding attributes to all of his saints, because for
Golding, as we shall see, the resigned detachment from the rest of the world is never the
goal of the saint.
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2.2.4.1.3. Death as a Definitive Liberation from Suffering
All experiences of better consciousness — aesthetic contemplation, saintly vision — are
a good preparation for death, because they involve an escape from egocentrism and
egoism.  This  is  most  clear  in  the  case  of  saints.  According  to  Schopenhauer,  the
resigned saint who ‘no longer takes any interest in his individual phenomenon’ because
there is no longer ‘any keen desire for individual existence, left in him’, undoubtedly
‘will be least afraid of becoming nothing in death’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 609). With
compassionate saints, death may be a consequence of extreme altruism. Schopenhauer
states  that  ‘the  character  that  has  reached  the  highest  goodness  and  perfect
magnanimity will sacrifice its well-being and its life completely for the well-being of …
others’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 375). As a rule, however, people would never risk their
lives as saints do: most people are egocentric subjects that fear death precisely because
it entails their annihilation.
Though Schopenhauer believes that dying means ‘a deliverance from a world whose
whole existence presented itself to us as suffering’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 408–9), most
individuals  fail  to  recognise  the  liberating  power  of  death,  and  they  usually  revolt
against it. Schopenhauer interprets this strong attachment to life as evidence of the will
to life’s ascendancy over the subject: ‘it is not really this  knowing part … that fears
death, but  fuga mortis comes simply and solely from the blind  will’ of the individual
(468), a will that is, at a deeper level, just a will to life, i.e. to perpetuation.
For Schopenhauer, who defends the acceptance of death as a token of wisdom, it is
‘only small, narrow minds’ that ‘are unable to transcend the particular’ and ‘fear death
as  their  annihilation’  (Schopenhauer  1969b:  475).  Though  conscious  beings  are
programmed  for  egocentric  awareness  alone,  which  effectively  prevents  their
knowledge of the unity of the world, and of the common essence that goes on existing
after their death. Those that are unable to transcend egocentrism cannot but fear death
as the disappearance of the egocentric I. But to those who have momentarily become a
universal subject while contemplating the aesthetic dimension of objects, or who, like
saints, have attained the ‘higher standpoint’ beyond appearances and are sufficiently
familiar with the woes of existence, ‘it remains at least doubtful whether existence is to
be preferred to  non-existence’;  this  view explains  Schopenhauer’s  contempt  for  the
individual  who  ‘clings  unconditionally  to  life,  struggles  to  the  utmost  against
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approaching  death,  and  receives  it  with  despair’  (464–6).  Indeed,  those  who  have
achieved aesthetic tranquillity for a while, or who have withdrawn from the world, are
compelled to acknowledge that ‘death is the great opportunity no longer to be I’,  in
other  words,  to  break  with  ‘the  one-sidedness  of  an  individuality  which  does  not
constitute the innermost kernel of our true being, but is … a kind of aberration thereof’
(507,  508).  The  individual  that  has  been  fortunate  enough  to  gain  non-egocentric
insight into the metaphysical unity of the world, or at least to be told about it by those
who have, does not need to be afraid of dying any more, and ‘may certainly and justly
console himself for his own death and for that of his friends by looking back on the
immortal life of nature, which he himself is’ (1969a: 276). It is therefore necessary to
realise that man as appearance ‘is certainly perishable, yet his true inner being is not
affected by this’ (1969b: 493–4).
Not all  kinds of death will  do though. Despite his commendation of natural and
accidental death, Schopenhauer warns us that suicide generally results from the ‘strong
affirmation’ of one’s desires (hence of the will to life) and not from indifference to their
satisfaction (Schopenhauer 1969a: 398). This is so because the suicide usually wishes to
shun  the  ‘sorrows’  of  the  world  instead  of  its  ‘pleasures’  (398).  Having  said  this,
Schopenhauer contemplates the possibility of an exceptional kind of suicide that results
from absolute detachment: ‘death by starvation’ proves that the complete indifference
to one’s needs can surpass one’s desire ‘to maintain the vegetative life of the body, by
the assimilation of nourishment’ (401). This second kind of suicide is ‘far from being
the result of the will-to-live’; it only takes place after the ‘completely resigned’ saint has
ceased to be concerned with the satisfaction of his or her desires (401).19
19 In spite of his youthful admiration for Schopenhauer, Friedrich W. Nietzsche pointed out that
there is a certain incongruity in saying that the essential will is characterised by restless striving
while simultaneously asserting that our reunion with it must be welcome as our true salvation.
The problem only arises if we take death to involve a literal  rest in peace, because it is evident
that being reabsorbed by the essential will, that is, by the ceaseless activity that manifests itself in
the realm of appearances, does not afford this kind of rest.  Obviously Schopenhauer’s theory
would be somewhat easier to accept if  we acknowledge the existence of  a region beyond the
essential  will  —  the  unknowable  thing-in-itself  —  to  which  we  would  return  after  death.
Nevertheless, Schopenhauer only says that when we die we leave suffering behind (because only
conscious beings can suffer,  and death puts an end to consciousness),  not  that  we leave the
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2.2.4.2. Collective Remedies for Suffering
Schopenhauer envisages a series of solutions to suffering at the individual level which
involve bypassing egocentric atomisation. However, he refuses to give any chances to a
similar solution at the collective level. In his view, the state’s legal system is based on
egocentrism, more precisely  on the egoistic  avoidance of  pain.  That  is  why the law
always includes the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment, even by force.
Given that individuals are mostly egoistic and sometimes malignant,  however much
society may improve, neither the eradication of pain nor historical progress are really
possible.
2.2.4.2.1. The Weakness of Morality and the Need for Legal Restraints
For Schopenhauer, moral theory is anterior to legal theory, and the concepts originally
applied to  moral concerns must be taken into account by legal regulations. Like his
moral classification  of  people’s  desires,  his  treatment  of  the  law involves  using the
notions of weal and woe. Nevertheless, both areas of thought approach these concepts
from different angles: while moral classifications are concerned with a person’s desires,
laws  are  concerned  with  a  person’s  actions.  In  Schopenhauer’s  opinion,  moral
descriptions only serve to identify a person’s ruling passions, describing the malignant
desire to increase the other’s suffering as reprehensible and the compassionate desire
to increase the other’s well-being as virtuous; but those desires depend on the person’s
innate character, and morality cannot change them. This does not mean that certain
forms  of  morality  (for  example  those  associated  with  religion)  cannot  have  a
prescriptive function. Indeed, morals can condemn evil actions — those that cause the
other  to  suffer  —  and  change  people’s  conduct  by  teaching  them  to  choose  more
carefully among the objects that satisfy their desires. Ideally, this would lead people to
find fulfilment in ways that do not harm the others. However, Schopenhauer believes
that the practical norms laid out by morals are too weak to be entirely reliable. That is
why, he says, we need the law, which does not limit itself to practical regulations but
essential will behind.
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accompanies them with the threat to enforce them. In this view, the law can only fight
evil with evil, threatening to inflict a certain amount of pain to prevent even greater
suffering.
One’s  innate  character  cannot  be  altered,  holds  Schopenhauer,  and compassion
cannot  be  taught.  Society  needs  a  repressive  legal  system  not  only  because  ‘the
boundless egoism of almost all’ and ‘the malice of many’ cause an outrageous amount
of mutual aggression (Schopenhauer 2009: 188), but also because this is a situation
that the weak restraining power of morality cannot prevent (see Jordan 2009: 176).
This explanation seems to me to throw light on the conclusion, reached by some of
Golding’s commentators, that there are occasions on which democratic societies need
to make a repressive use of force. Though the state can certainly alter the behaviour of
individuals, it cannot do so by transforming the citizens’ innate egoism and malice into
compassion (see Schopenhauer 1969b: 597).  In Schopenhauer’s conception, the state
exists basically ‘for compelling’ the majority not to harm each other (2009: 208). This
can only be done through hope for recompense or fear of the penalty, by dint of which
everyone will be careful not to cause suffering to anyone. Schopenhauer believes that
every successful state relies on and promotes whatever  egoism there might be in its
members. To  the  extent  that  the  state ‘has  placed  the  protection  of  the  rights  of
everyone  in  the  hands  of  a  force  which,  infinitely  superior  to  the  power  of  each
individual,  compels  him to respect  the rights  of  all  others’,  it  can be regarded as  a
collective ‘masterpiece’ resulting from ‘the self-comprehending, rational, accumulated
egoism of all’ (188). The protection that the state offers ‘is by no means directed against
egoism,  but  only  against  the  injurious  consequences  of  egoism  arising  out  of  the
plurality of egoistic individuals, reciprocally affecting them, and disturbing their well-
being’ (1969a: 345).20
The way in which society can make the most of the majority’s innate egoism and of
the  malignant  dispositions  of  a  few,  is  by  threatening  them  and  by  offering  them
20 There is an important point that Schopenhauer does not make.  While egoists can be prevented
from  harming  their  neighbours,  the  solution  for  malignant  individuals  has  to  be  different.
Arguably,  even  their  malice  can  be  channelled  in  a  profitable  way,  by  allowing  them  to  do
violence to others when that behaviour is socially desirable (for example in the exercise of lawful
repression and punishment). Schopenhauer does not contemplate this possibility, but Golding
does when he discusses Jack’s violent conduct in Lord of the Flies.
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suitable objects through which they can realise their aspirations without causing their
neighbours any harm. For Schopenhauer, a just law is a law that takes advantage of (the
fear  of)  suffering  in  order  to  minimise  suffering.  By  doing  this,  society  achieves  a
semblance of virtue without ever altering the inner source of moral behaviour. Even if
the state succeeds in channelling its members’ passions so that they will not threaten
each other’s weal, this achievement would not increase the number of compassionate
citizens. In one of his most memorable passages, Schopenhauer compares the effect to
‘a carnivorous animal with a muzzle’, which ‘is as harmless as a grass-eating animal’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 346).
2.2.4.2.2. Anti-Utopianism and the Impossibility of Historical Progress
Having  examined  Schopenhauer’s  conception  of  the  state’s  origin  and  function,  it
remains to discuss his views of the shape that the state can adopt and of historical
progress. Schopenhauer’s premise is that the value of any social organisation depends
on its success in preventing mutual harm irrespective of each of its members’ individual
desires; because he sees repression as unavoidable, he dismisses utopian projects as
unrealistic.
It  would  indeed  be  ‘a  great  thing’,  writes  Schopenhauer,  if  social  organisation
managed  to  reduce  mutual  harm  to  a  minimum  (2000b:  251).  Reducing  is  not
eliminating,  though,  and he  insists  that  egoism and  malice  are  so  ‘deep-rooted’  in
human nature as to be impossible to eradicate (251). The ideal state’s aim of getting rid
of mutual harm ‘entirely without leaving a trace’ can only be reached ‘approximately’,
because when it is ‘cast out in one direction’, it will ‘creep back in another’ (251). All
feasible societies share this basic defect, which prevents utopian dreams from being
realised.
Given  the  dependence  of  social  organisations  on  human  nature,  this  situation
cannot be changed. As Terry Eagleton says, Schopenhauer’s most important lesson in
history is that ‘There is no grand telos’ (Eagleton 1990: 156). As the main enlightened
representative  of  a  tradition  later  kept  alive  by  Karl  Marx  and  his  followers,
Schopenhauer reaches the conclusion,  again in Eagleton’s words,  that  the ‘dramatic
mutations’, the ‘epochal ruptures and upheavals’ of human history, are ‘mere variations
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on a consistent theme of exploitation and oppression’ (158). The difference between
Schopenhauer and Marx is that, as we have just seen, the former never gives any credit
to  the  idea  of  a  revolution  that  would  eventually  put  an  end  to  this  situation.  In
Schopenhauer’s own words, given that the human species does not change, and that
egoistic  and  malignant  characters  invariably  outnumber  virtuous  characters,  it  is
necessary to ‘recognize the identical in all events, of ancient as of modern times, of the
East as of the West’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 444). What the past continuously reveals, he
argues,  is  an  invariable,  immoral reality  under  different  names  and  in  a  slightly
different  guise.  Thus  he  recommends  that  the  motto  for  human  history  should  be
‘Eadem, sed aliter’, the same but otherwise (444).
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3. AN INTERPRETATION OF GOLDING’S
METAPHYSICS
In the preceding part I  examined the difference,  which Schopenhauer inherits from
Kant, between the knowable world and the unknowable thing-in-itself, together with
his vindication of a metaphysics of nature resting on the distinction between knowledge
of the realm of appearances and knowledge of the world’s essence. I have also surveyed
the varieties of cognition — non-rational feelings and rational concepts, both of which
can be physical as well as metaphysical. The transition from feelings to concepts, and
from physical matter to metaphysical objects, marks the evolution from non-human to
human consciousness, and explains the emergence of the recognisable world that we
inhabit.  I  have paid special attention to both the physical descriptions of the world
furnished by history  and science,  and the metaphysical  descriptions  offered  by art,
religion and philosophy.  After  explaining how the essential  will  can be known and
conceptualised according to several degrees of generality — as the world-will, the will to
life and one’s innate character — I have given an account of its insatiability and of its
primacy in all human affairs. As a result of this primacy, of the limitations which it
imposes on individual freedom, of the prevalence of egocentric types of knowledge, and
of the conflict among individuals that ensues from all these, Schopenhauer envisages
the world as inevitably pervaded by suffering. Despite his indictment of our world as
the worst possible, he makes allowances for a number of situations in which suffering
can be alleviated on the individual and the collective levels. As far as the individual is
concerned, the remedies on which he puts the greatest stress are aesthetic tranquillity,
saintly  vision  (leading  to  compassionate  altruism  or  resigned  detachment)  and
involuntary death. As regards collective life, he tacitly admits that morality is to a large
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extent  ineffective.  At  the  same  time  as  he  points  to  the  need  for  suitable  legal
repression, he declares that utopia is unattainable.
The general characteristics of Schopenhauer’s model coincide with the world view
expressed, in a fragmentary and indirect way, in most of Golding’s novels, especially the
earlier.  Due  to  this  fragmentariness  and  indirectness,  this  world  view  must  be
reconstructed by the reader; this reconstruction can be carried out with the assistance
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The world view thus recovered can be regarded as an
ideal starting point from which Golding’s novels proceed, each in its own peculiar way
and with its own peculiar emphases, but almost always treating the same fundamental
topics and often doing so from a similar standpoint. It is by virtue of these implicit and
explicit connections that the novels possess a clear family resemblance.
Particularly in his earlier novels, Golding traces the role of consciousness, first non-
rational and then rational, in the apparition of the human world. In parallel, there is a
similar transition from the consciousness of physical matter to the contact with the
metaphysical  sphere.  In the belief  that everyday existence takes place in a realm of
appearances that half-conceals and half-reveals the essence of the world, Golding sees
it  as  his  duty  to  remind  the  readers  of  the  importance  of  those  metaphysical
conceptions of the world — those provided by religion and art,  in particular — that
gesture towards what is beyond appearances. He also reminds us that, from the very
beginning, the harmonious arrangement of these appearances is disrupted not only by
the  inherent  limitations  of  knowledge  (as  a  result  of  which  the  knowable  world  is
always on the verge of collapsing) but also by the unruly essence behind them. Because
of the nature of  the world’s essence,  everyday existence is  pervaded by conflict and
dissatisfaction that engender suffering.  This does not mean that suffering cannot be
alleviated in any way. At the individual level, the most important solutions are some
kinds of consciousness like aesthetic contemplation and compassionate altruism, and
death  (other  remedies  such  as  resigned  detachment,  which  is  so  important  for
Schopenhauer, plays no role in the novelist’s works). At the collective level,  Golding
earlier novels suggest that, given the weakness of moral restraints, the solution is legal
repression.
Though the existence of this thematic foundation is clear, it must not be thought
that,  as  Golding’s  career  unfolds,  his  works  offer  mere  variations  on  the  same  old
themes. On the contrary, it is not very long before a different approach to these basic
114
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
concerns begins to slip in. In fact, even as he is attempting to flesh out his initial world
view, elements that are extraneous to that world view gradually find their way into his
novels. This is the case, most notably, in reference to the possibility of knowing the
essence of the world, which Golding soon starts to challenge. This new position has an
important bearing on the recognition of free choice in the Kantian sense (a position
that is already hinted at, though not substantiated, at the end of Golding’s third novel,
Pincher Martin), and of the chances of socio-political alternatives to a repressive state.
Obviously,  there is  no sharp thematic  break but a piecemeal  transition between the
earlier and the later novels. This means that the introduction of alien premises into a
basic framework that by and large coincides with Schopenhauer’s is neither smooth nor
linear. While Golding’s fourth published novel,  Free Fall reaches a conclusion whose
socio-political relevance will only be apparent in the Sea Trilogy, the novel that follows
Free Fall, The Spire, still offers information concerning the essence of the world that is
crucial for an accurate understanding of Golding’s first three novels. What is clear is
that the starting point is close to Schopenhauer, and that as early as  Free Fall other
elements begin to be introduced. It is also clear that all these gradual modifications can
be  located  and  understood  by  reference  to  Golding’s  basic  stance.  This  thematic
evolution is an aspect of Golding’s oeuvre that cannot escape the attention of anyone
that reads his fiction and non-fiction chronologically.
First I shall discuss those aspects that are congruent with the model elaborated by
Schopenhauer, and whose full implications the philosopher’s thought can help to work
out.  The categories  that  Golding  uses  do not  always  fit  neatly  into  Schopenhauer’s
classification (a case in point is the novelist’s opposition between matter and spirit); yet
the latter’s theory provides a compass to navigate the latter’s works without repeating
the conceptual mistakes made by previous critics. Despite Golding’s references to the
spirit and its presentation as a different world from that of matter, in his works the
metaphysical sphere functions as the other side of physical objects. Likewise, despite
Golding’s occasional talk of the soul, the essential force that appears in his works can in
some of  them be  interpreted  as  the  essential  will,  and  in  none  does  it  have  to  be
regarded as  a different  substance from the body;  on the contrary,  the body can be
considered  its  manifestation.  This  analysis  contradicts  the  ontological  dualism that
other critics have taken for granted. Sometimes I shall refer to the almighty will as that
of the divinity that, in Golding’s view, presides over the aforementioned realm of spirit;
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yet these references must in all cases be interpreted as reflecting the theistic beliefs in a
divinity or divinities held by Golding and by some of his characters, not as part of my
explanation of the essential will.
The  discussion  of  the  points  where  Golding’s  and  Schopenhauer’s  world  views
coincide will be followed by an analysis of some aspects of the novelist’s later work —
particularly from Free Fall onwards — that contrast with Schopenhauer’s positions. On
these  occasions  —  when  he  deals  with  crucial  issues  like  human  freedom,  our
knowledge of  the world’s essence,  and humankind’s moral  dispositions — Golding’s
fiction  ends  up  questioning  the  very  assumptions  that  form  the  backbone  of
Schopenhauer’s thought. This happens, above all, when he problematises the possibility
of knowing the world’s essence, when he asserts individual freedom as consisting in the
free choice of one’s moral norms, and when he concedes that utopia might be feasible
after all.
Finally, I shall offer a chronological overview of the changing treatment that the
divinity receives in Golding’s works, where the belief  in the existence of at least one
deity is a recurrent topic. Schopenhauer rejects the existence of the divinity, and its
presence  in  Golding’s  works  would  seem  to  go  against  all  my  efforts  to  link  their
contents to the German philosopher’s thought. However, Golding’s doubts and changes
of opinion prevent his vague theistic beliefs from playing any significant role except as a
token of his lifelong personal struggle against scepticism. My claim finds support in the
fact that all the important elements for which the deity could be made responsible in
Golding’s works, beginning with human freedom or the lack thereof, are accounted for
in secular terms by Schopenhauer.
3.1. Golding’s Basic Stance: From Feeling to Cosmic 
Optimism
This chapter reconstructs Golding’s initial stance. While the focus is in his novels, his
non-fictional  writings  and interviews are  also discussed in  some detail.  In  the first
sections I examine Golding’s view of the knowable world. To begin with, I study the
process whereby the a person’s intellect humanises the world. Next I analyse the way in
which metaphysical cognition allows humans to posit the essential will as the world’s
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inner kernel, the way in which the primacy of the will fills the world with suffering, and
the way  in  which  Golding’s  moral view of  history  as  resistant  to  progress  leads  to
pessimism.  In  the  last  section  of  this  chapter  I  explain  how  Golding  directs  our
attention to unknowable regions outside this world, and why, thanks to this move, he
feels entitled to present himself as an optimist.
3.1.1. The Humanisation of the World
In this section I shall concentrate on Golding’s depiction of the humanisation of the
world through the application of those modes of cognition that are peculiar to humans.
These are, on the one hand, rational forms of knowledge that produce and operate with
concepts, and, on the other, forms of knowledge whose object is not the physical realm
of  material  objects.  This  is  the  knowledge  of  what  Golding  and  his  commentators
generally call  the spirit  (a realm which certainly includes,  but is  not limited to,  the
dimension  that  Schopenhauer  links  to  metaphysical  knowledge).  In  addition  to
discussing the emergence of rational and metaphysical forms of knowledge in Golding’s
novels, in this section I shall discuss his subordination of physical science to the arts.
First I shall deal with the gradual addition of rational concepts — and with them, of
cultural values — to the non-rational feelings through which characters initially locate
themselves in the world. This accretion makes possible the passage from life in nature
to cultural forms of communication, collaboration and organisation; moreover, the use
of concepts in combination with the objects of the imagination gives rise to distinctive
human ways of  living in  time and space.  Secondly  I  shall  focus  on the addition of
metaphysical forms of knowledge — those which start from feelings of objects that are
not material, including the essence of the world — to physical cognition. Thirdly I shall
address Golding’s intervention in the two cultures controversy as an advocate of the
arts, which he takes to be capable of describing the metaphysical side of the world and
which, thanks to this, is more beneficial to the audience than the physical sciences.
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3.1.1.1. Feelings, Concepts and the Order of Culture
From the very first pages of his first published novel, Lord of the Flies, Golding’s fiction
concerns  itself  with  the  process  whereby  physical  perceptions,  a  variety  of  what
Schopenhauer  calls  non-rational feelings,  give way to rational  concepts  and thus to
language and,  more generally,  to all  kinds of  cultural  meaning.  For Golding,  as  for
Schopenhauer,  concepts  endow with social  utility  the objects  that  we initially  grasp
through feelings. Through rational agreement and coordinated work, the inhospitable
world becomes a more or less comfortable home for humankind. In Lord of the Flies, a
group of castaway boys try to mimic the rational ways which — they naively believe —
govern adult society. In Pincher Martin the socialised individual is left alone, and the
world  and  its  subsequent  domestication  are  only  a  figment  of  the  title  character’s
imagination. In this novel, one of the first things that attracts the reader’s attention is
the sensuous quality of Golding’s writing. Adapting the terminology used by Clements
in  his  analysis  of  the  style  employed  by  Golding’s  narrators  (and  by  some  of  his
characters),  and  explaining  it  with  the  help  of  Schopenhauer’s  theory  of  language
(according to which the conceptual resources of language, which always make reference
to feelings,  can certainly  trigger  concepts  in  the  addressee’s  minds  but  also  trigger
feelings  that  to  some  extent  reproduce  the  original  ones),  I  shall  examine  the
sensuousness of the narrator’s style at the beginning of  Pincher Martin in terms of
linguistic evocation, that is, as a manipulation of language that makes readers share the
characters’ feelings and even have feelings that are unavailable to the characters.
From  Schopenhauer’s  perspective,  what  separates  those  uses  of  language  that
Clements calls  evocative from those that  are  denotative is  neither  the medium (all
language  is  conceptual)  nor  the object  that  one conveys  (language always  refers  to
feelings, or to concepts derived from them), but exclusively their effect on the audience,
that  is,  whether  they  appeal  to  the  rational  or  to  the  non-rational  intellect.  The
difference, in other words, is whether words excite concepts or feelings in the receiver.
According to Schopenhauer, what separates philosophy from religion is precisely the
different ways in which they use words to convey the same object: the metaphysical
concept — often presented in a theistic guise — of the essential will. (Of course, nothing
prevents an exact correspondence between the object and the effect of words; actually
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this is the norm when conveying the state of consciousness of a character, as in those
modernist works where a feeling is both the source and the goal.)
As far as Golding’s style is concerned, I shall focus mostly on his narrators, but with
occasional references to his characters’ language. I shall argue that they use words in a
denotative way when they limit themselves to choosing the exact literal word to the
exclusion of figurative expressions, and in particular when they refer to abstract ideas;
by contrast, I shall say that they use language evocatively when they favour indirection,
and even figurative expression, especially to refer to concrete realities. Evocation tends
to have a defamiliarising power that puts readers in contact with parts of the world that
are  normally  subordinated  to  what  can  be  rationally  comprehended.  Despite  this
common purpose to render the world less familiar, it is possible to identify two varieties
of evocation, according as they elicit physical or metaphysical feelings. To reflect this
difference,  I  shall  introduce  two  further  labels  —  impressionistic and  symbolic1 —
which  Ian  Watt  employs  in  his  discussion  of  Joseph  Conrad’s  prose  (1980).2 The
evocative uses of language with which Golding’s narrators and characters arouse the
readers’ physical feelings — i.e. those that are impressionistic — tend to shun an intense
exploitation  of  metaphor;  by  contrast,  the  evocative  uses  of  language  that  trigger
metaphysical  feelings  —  i.e.  those  that  are  symbolic  —  usually  veer  towards  the
metaphoric.  These  stylistic  distinctions  are  not  a  question  of  mutually  exclusive
qualities,  but  of  dominance  of  one  quality  over  another;  further,  having  the
aforementioned  effects  does  not  prevent  denotation  and  evocation  form  producing
1 This definition of symbolism as metaphysical is a historical oversimplification, and fits romantic
and post-romantic symbolism better than the emblematic symbolism from which it deviates (see
Watt 1980: 181–2). However, it must be borne in mind that the kind of symbolism which Watt
discusses in Conrad’s works and which interests me most in Golding’s novels — though not the
only one that they contain — is metaphysical symbolism (I refer to emblematic symbols such as
the conch in Lord of the Flies as emblems).
2 Clements also speaks of impressionism, but only in passing and seemingly without realising the
full  implications  of  the  idea.  Of  the  two  occasions  on  which  he  mentions  it,  the  first  is  a
description  of  Patrick  White’s  style  as  ‘impressionistic  and  painterly’  yet  ultimately  full  of
metaphysical resonance (Clements 2012: 103). Here physical impressionism only seems to serve
to usher in metaphysical symbolism. The second is a description of Saul Bellow’s style in terms
borrowed from discussions of  Conrad’s  prose;  for  Clements,  Bellow’s  concern is  always with
physical surfaces rather that with metaphysical depths (167–8).
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other, subordinated effects.  To recapitulate, when dealing with Golding’s style I shall
describe as  denotative those uses of language that name objects as directly, precisely,
unequivocally  and  concisely  as  possible  and  that  excite  rational  concepts,  and  as
evocative those that suggest objects in an imprecise or roundabout way (for example,
by naming other objects, often figuratively) and that excite non-rational feelings. When
the  effect  of  evocation is  a  physical  feeling,  I  shall  speak  of  impressionism;  when
evocation causes a metaphysical feeling, I shall speak of symbolism.3
Though this does not always need to be the case (as we saw in connection with Craig
Raine’s  poem  ‘A  Martian  Sends  a  Postcard  Home’),  with  Golding  metaphoric
concentration tends to make the reader adopt a metaphysical state of mind. The more
language  employs  metaphors  to  fuse  one  concept  into  another,  thus  blurring,  for
example, the limits between the human and the non-human, between the living and the
animate and the inanimate, the greater the chances that language will be interpreted
symbolically,  that  is,  as  reflecting  the  fact  that  the  differences  among  discrete
individuals are superficial and that the metaphysical essence of all things and beings is
the same.  In  the  particular  case  of  Pincher  Martin,  evocation  serves  first  of  all  to
convey the character’s feeling of the physical world. The striking use of impressionism
at  the  beginning  of  this  novel  suggests  that,  once  he  has  set  the  stage  for  a  full
deployment  of  all  the  modalities  of  human  cognition,  Golding,  like  Schopenhauer,
treats concepts, whose role in human consciousness he does not deny or belittle, as
subsidiary to feelings. Whether it be impressionistic or symbolic, Golding’s reliance on
evocation reduces the concept to a mere means whereby feelings are aroused. Even
3 Actually, it is possible to distinguish not one but al least two varieties of metaphysical evocation.
One of them is symbolic or, as Clements calls it, ‘kataphatic’; Watt does not mention the other,
which Clements calls ‘apophatic’ and which, according to his definition, turns on negation — for
example,  saying that something is not good — and even on the negation of  contraries — for
example,  saying  that  something is  neither  good not  bad (Clements  2012:  20).  In Clements’s
opinion, Golding’s novels go from apophasis to kataphasis in their attempt to present what the
metaphysical dimension might be like. Actually, the movement is in the opposite direction: in
their attempt to describe the essence of the world and the divinity (which, as I shall show in the
last  chapter,  they  present  as  the  same  thing),  Golding’s  novels  go  from  symbolism
(metaphorically speaking, the essence of the world and the divinity are like this) to the negation
of contraries (the essence of the world and the divinity are neither like this nor like that).
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more  clearly  than  for  Schopenhauer  (whose  philosophy  aspired  to  be  rationally
understood), for Golding  the denotative use of words does not do justice to the full
being of things. Evocative words do not usually refer to objects directly — denotatively
—  and  do  not  refer  to  them  as  something  that  can  be  contained  or  exhausted  by
conceptual meaning. In view of Golding’s prose, this indirection is not something to be
regretted. His handling of language cannot be fully understood unless we accept his
implicit conviction that words need to be deployed evocatively so that the object that
has been felt can shine through them.
3.1.1.1.1. The Return to Culture in Lord of the Flies and Pincher Martin
The plot of Golding’s first published novel is well-known, and can be summarised in a
few lines. The story is set on an unnamed tropical island, and until the last pages the
only characters in it are a bunch of British boys aged between six and twelve. The world
is at war, and the plane that is evacuating the boys from Britain crashes, leaving them
stranded without adult supervision in an alien environment. They elect a leader, Ralph,
who is assisted by a responsible but unattractive boy called Piggy. One of Ralph’s first
decisions is to appoint a group of hunters under the leadership of Jack Merridew, a
former choir head. Soon habituated to the shedding of animal blood, the hunters begin
to recede from the standards of civilisation which Ralph and Piggy strive to preserve,
and before long they become vicious outlaws with rituals of their own. In the course of
one of their dance-feasts, they kill the only boy who has a real insight into the nature of
their problems, a shy boy called Simon. After the killing the hunters lose all sense of
restraint and become a threat to everyone outside their group. Piggy is murdered by
their self-constituted torturer, Roger, and Ralph is chased like one of the pigs that they
are  accustomed  to  hunt  down.  Before  they  can  kill  him,  however,  a  British  naval
detachment arrives and takes charge of the survivors.
The first two boys that make their apparition in the novel are Ralph, whom Golding
describes  elsewhere  as  ‘the  average,  rather  more  than  average,  man of  … common
sense’  (Golding  1965:  89),  and  Piggy,  a  precocious  representative  of  ‘rational
humanism’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 6). Their encounter starts a process
whereby  the  children  gather  and  organise  themselves  in  ways  that  reflect  their
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understanding of adult behaviour. The island is explored, its natural resources taken
stock of and exploited, and a sort of rudimentary democracy is established. The quick
introduction of collaboration and democracy reproduces on a small temporal scale the
emergence  of  human  forms  of  communication,  collective  work  and  political
organisation,  a  process  that  in  evolutionary  and  historical  terms  took  hundreds  of
thousands of years.4 Just as quick as the establishment of democracy on the island is its
degradation, which is another accelerated re-enactment of what has happened in the
adult world.
It has been said that ‘Lord of the Flies furnishes evidence of … the cognitive flow
through which … objects turn into meaningful signs in a newly conquered environment’
(Cmeciu and Cmeciu 2010: 129). The novel begins with the boys’ attempt to come to
terms with the desert island through what Schopenhauer calls feelings, a notion that in
the philosopher’s works encompasses an extremely vast range of elements (from bodily
sensations — including those of pleasure and pain — through emotions to aesthetic and
moral  experiences)  but  which on the  opening pages  of  Golding’s  novel  covers  only
physical  perceptions.  The  very  first  paragraph  of  the  novel  focuses  on  Ralph’s
awareness that ‘his grey shirt stuck to him’, that ‘his hair was plastered to his forehead’,
that the jungle was ‘a bath of heat’; at this early stage, what the narrator calls a bird is
not yet identified by Ralph as such, but is reduced in his consciousness to ‘a vision of
red  and  yellow’  (Golding  1954:  5).  When  he  comes  across  Piggy,  hidden  by  the
undergrowth, at first Ralph only hears the other boy’s shout as an echo of the bird’s cry
4 Implicitly, Golding’s works draw attention to how the movement from feelings to concepts takes
place phylogenetically (in the course of the development of animal species) and ontogenetically
(in the course of the development of every human individual). As regards the latter, for example,
The Double Tongue opens with its character-narrator’s remembrance of her birth: ‘Blazing light
and warmth,  undifferentiated’,  and ‘No words,  … not even I’  (let  us recall  that,  according to
Schopenhauer, the sense of the I is not original, but arises the moment one becomes aware of the
motions of the will within); her next memory is of a kind of ‘knowledge that we bring with us
instantly; knowledge of what anger is, pain is, pleasure is, love’, and for which there is no need of
words (Golding 1995: 3). Similarly, Golding’s private journals describe what might be a memory
of his own birth: ‘His earliest memory was of a colour, “red mostly, but everywhere, and a sense
of wind blowing, buffeting, and there was much light”’ (Carey 2009: 1). The next thing that he
remembers, and to which I have already made reference, is the feeling of a sort of white cockerel
strutting along the curtain pole, and the impossibility of telling his parents about the experience.
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(5).  Until  this  moment,  Ralph  grasp  of  his  surroundings  is  by  way  of  physical
perceptions. This means that, before he identifies the mysterious shout as another boy’s
greeting — ‘“Hi!” it said, “Wait a minute!”’ (5) — his consciousness only contains the
same kinds of feelings that, according to Schopenhauer, non-human animals living in a
state of nature also possess.  This initial  glimpse of natural  experience does not last
though.  As  soon  as  Ralph  grasps  the  conceptual  content  of  Piggy’s  words,  he  is
momentarily reminded not only of the language in which they are inserted but also of
the culture of which that language is part. As the narrator tells us, Ralph ‘stopped and
jerked his stockings with an automatic gesture that made the jungle seem for a moment
like the Home Counties’ (5). Piggy’s influence on Ralph is one of the main thematic
lines  in  the  novel.  Under  his  guidance,  Ralph  gradually  becomes  ‘a  specialist  in
[rational]  thought’, and recognises it as ‘a valuable thing’ that gets ‘results’ (78). It is
also in Piggy’s rationalism that Ralph’s leadership finds its  strongest ally.  Together,
both persuade the other children to attract a rescue ship and, meanwhile, to recreate
‘the northern European tradition of work, play, and food right through the day’  (58).
Both goals are forgotten as soon as the boys surrender to ‘the slow swing from dawn to
quick dusk’ and accept ‘the pleasures of morning, the bright sun, the overwhelming sea
and sweet air’ (57). Politically speaking, this trajectory is mirrored by the establishment
of a democracy of sorts and its sudden disintegration. Jack, who will soon become a
petty tyrant, argues for the necessity to lay down rules, ‘“Lots of rules”’, a need with
which the other boys concur,  but apart from a few excited shouts of agreement his
threat to inflict severe physical punishments ‘“when anyone breaks ’em”’ does not find
much support (32). What does strike a chord among the other boys is Jack’s insistence
that they have ‘“to do the right things”’, because they are ‘“not savages”’ but ‘“English,
and the English are best at everything”’ (42).5 This means, as the beginning of the novel
5 In view of what happens later on,  the fact that it  is Jack who argues for physical repression
cannot be accidental. The connection between viciousness and Englishness in Lord of the Flies —
and later in Pincher Martin — has not escaped critical notice. The focus of this study prevents a
detailed examination of what is at stake in these novels from this point of view; but the reader
can compare Golding’s statement that his intention in Lord of the Flies is to ‘condemn’ English
people’s belief ‘that evil is somewhere else and inherent in another nation’, while they alone ‘are
naturally  kind  and  decent’  (Golding  1965:  89;  see  also  Biles  1970:  3–4,  35–6),  with  Stefan
Hawlin’s  misplaced  accusation  that  the  novel  contains  a  racist  message  (2008).  For  a  good
123
Golding’s Metaphysics
makes clear, setting up a rational system of norms that will ensure the boys’ rescue and,
while they are waiting for this to happen, the peaceful  enjoyment of  an unexpected
holiday in an earthly paradise. When these rules are nor obeyed, the lack of repressive
measures — not necessarily the vicious beating to which Jack’s threat points, but forms
of physical restraint more fitting of the democratic system that Ralph and Piggy aspire
to  erect  — results  in  something  worse  than  a  mere return  to  early  childhood.  The
‘understandable and lawful world’  slips away (91),  and there follows an outbreak of
uncontrolled violence that soon claims the lives of Simon, Piggy and an indeterminate
number of other children, eventually endangering even its instigators, Jack, Roger and
the other hunters, when they set the entire island on fire.
The collapse of cultural and political order is indicative of Golding’s view that the
world’s  essence  — ‘something  … not  external  to  man  but  present  deep  in  himself’
(Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 20) — cannot be controlled by reason alone and is
at the root of suffering. I shall return to this essential dimension of human nature, and
to the need for repression to keep it in check, later on. For the moment I am going to
concentrate  on  the  movement  from  the  boys’  non-rational  feelings  of  the  physical
surroundings to the rational concepts that they build thereupon, and on the parallel
movement that takes them from a state of nature to a rudimentary form of democratic
government. Both processes can be best understood if we examine the treatment that
their common emblem, the conch, receives as the novel unfolds. After they have met on
the beach and are still getting to know each other, Ralph sees ‘Something creamy’ at the
bottom of a lagoon, ‘a thing seen’ but not yet identified (Golding 1954: 13, 14). At first
Piggy confuses the thing with a stone. Then, at Ralph’s suggestion that it might be a
shell, he recalls seeing a similar one on a boy’s ‘garden wall’, and refers to it as a conch.
Piggy, in whom the physical attraction that the ‘interesting and pretty’ object exerts
upon Ralph soon recedes before the idea of the uses that it might have, points out that
the owner of the one that he has seen at home, before the war,  ‘used to blow it’  to
summon his mum (14). So far the presentation of the conch has been carried out so that
its presence ‘is  made real  to the senses’  of  the reader (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor
2002: 4). Now, wrenched from its natural environment, ‘the unliving thing is … given a
summary of Golding’s attacks on English chauvinism in these and his other novels, starting with
The Inheritors, see Crawford (2002: 12–5, 21–3).
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new social purpose’ (3). For a while the physical feeling that the boys have of the shiny
conch  alternates  with  the  consideration  of  its  possible  service  as  a  means  of
communication. When they get the conch out of the water, Ralph still sees it in non-
utilitarian terms, as a ‘deep cream’ object, ‘touched here and there with fading pink’: all
that matters to him is that the shell has ‘a slight spiral twist’ and is ‘covered with a
delicate, embossed pattern’ (Golding 1954: 14). Inattentive to the conch’s shape, Piggy
insists on the use that can be made of it, an insistence that is indicative of his general
frame of mind. He is convinced that ‘“Life … is scientific”’ and that reason can find a
convenient use for every object (84), and for a moment Ralph joins in his enthusiasm.
Thinking that  the conch could be even more useful  on the island than in the back
garden where Piggy had first seen it, the boys decide to employ it ‘“to call the others”’
that may have survived the plane crash and to organise a meeting (15). From this point
onwards, the conch becomes one of the keystones of the boys’ government.
The only people that are brought to the beach by the sound of the shell are children.
Realising that no grown-up remains alive, they decide to tell each other their names.
Once ‘the naming’ has finished, they agree that a chief should be chosen (Golding 1954:
20).  Despite the protestations of  Jack Merridew,  the authoritarian choir  head,  they
decide to have a vote. Ralph is elected, apparently for no other good reason than his
being the bearer of the conch. To appease Jack, Ralph puts him in control of the choir.
When Ralph lays out the rule that the conch should grant the person holding it the right
to  speak  at  the  assemblies  without  being  interrupted,  he  endows  it  with  political
significance; this new use of the conch make the children forget that it was first used to
gather them. Until it is destroyed by Jack’s party, the shiny conch represents the system
of  norms  that  the  young  castaways  impose  upon themselves;  transformed  into  the
emblem  of  the  assembly,  the  conch  ‘becomes  identified  with  its  procedure,  with
democracy  and  the  right  to  free  speech’  (Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor  2002:  4).
Immediately after its identification with democracy, recognised by those that want to
preserve the political values that it stands for as well as by those that want to destroy
them, the conch acquires a new significance as the emblem of colonial power. Under its
influence, the children explore the island; convinced that it now ‘“belongs”’ to them,
they take possession of it, identifying and naming its different parts (Golding 1954: 27).
They find the area by the beach the perfect place for the huts that they plan to build, the
nearby rocky platform becomes the site where the assemblies will take place, the salt
125
Golding’s Metaphysics
water lagoon is for swimming and playing, the mountain is for the signal fire, and the
forest is for hunting and collecting fruit.6
It is not long before it occurs to the young castaways, beginning with Ralph and
Piggy, that everyone should know at all times what to do. It is thus that Jack and the
other members of the choir become hunters. After a fire that they kindle gets out of
control and kills one of the little ones without giving off any smoke, Ralph proposes
that they should also have ‘“special people for looking after the fire”’ (Golding 1954: 41).
Piggy, who expresses the need to ‘“put first things first and act proper”’ if they want to
be rescued, reminds them of the need to make ‘“shelters down there by the beach”’, a
task to which Ralph and Simon devote themselves without much success (44).
With the help of rational concepts, the children in Lord of the Flies transform the
natural  setting that  they perceive  round them into  a  cultural  location.  Reason also
allows them to name the objects that they come across, and to put them to good use. It
6 Though the analysis of the negative light in which Lord of the Flies presents colonialist ideologies
exceeds the purpose of this study, it  is nevertheless convenient to say a few words about the
operation whereby Western novels have often turned exotic territories into the perfect backdrop
for the white man’s  exploits.  The order  that,  inspired by the conch,  the boys impose on the
natural  setting transforms the uninhabited island into a culturally meaningful  location. These
two terms come from  Lennard J.  Davis’s  examination of  the mechanisms whereby novelistic
space,  character,  dialogue  and  plot  collaborate  in  conferring  ideological  value  upon  extra-
fictional reality. As regards space, his classification is actually threefold: extra-fictional terrains
are  imported into  fictional  narratives  as  general  settings (mere  backgrounds  for  action)  and
subsequently transformed into ideological locations: ‘A “terrain” is an actual place in the world; a
“setting”  on  the  other  hand  is  a  terrain  incorporated  into  a  story  which  serves  as  a  very
generalized backdrop to the action which will occur. … And … locations are ideological precisely
because they delimit  action and enclose meaning while  appearing only  to describe neutrally’
(Davis  1987:  61).  The  first  novel  that  Davis’s  discusses  in  detail  is  Daniel  Defoe’s  Robinson
Crusoe. The critic’s argument is that the modern interest in location is connected with property
relations and imperial ambitions: ‘Robinson Crusoe is largely about the claiming of an island that
does not belong to Crusoe except in the sense that he is a European and builds something there.
But Crusoe’s claiming is not simply the manifestation of a military might, … but of establishing
an ideological  right  to  the  island’  (62).  Defoe’s  heady  mixture  of  imperialistic  and  religious
ideology reappears in such later works as Robert M. Ballantyne’s The Coral Island (1858), whose
optimistic smugness Golding criticises in  Lord of the Flies (see Golding 1965: 88–9).  Pincher
Martin reiterates Golding’s stance.
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also makes it possible for them to establish not only a series of social duties and roles,
but even a series of political procedures. Though Schopenhauer may not be the only
thinker that has drawn attention to this kind of trajectory, the attention to the passage
from concrete  physical  feelings  to  abstract  concepts,  and the stress  on  language as
necessary for social and political life, is certainly congruent with his theory that feelings
precede concepts (indeed, that meaningful concepts are based on feelings), that, as he
contends,  feeling  ‘is  capable  of  being  communicated  only  after  he  has  fixed  it  in
concepts’ — ‘communicable by words’, for example — and that, because of this, only
reason can bring about ‘the harmonious and consistent action of several individuals, …
planned cooperation … [and] civilization, the State’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 56, 234, 37).
On an  even smaller  scale,  the  trajectory  from feelings  through concepts  and to
culture  can also be  appreciated in  the first  half  of  Pincher  Martin,  Golding’s  third
novel. As in Lord of the Flies, the pattern that emerges here is not strictly linear, but it
remains unequivocal. One difference is this: whereas in Lord of the Flies the transition
is  from  feelings  to  concepts,  and  from  nature  to  culture,  in  Pincher  Martin  the
trajectory goes from concepts to feelings and back to concepts, from culture to nature
and back to culture. Another difference is that, whereas the castaway children in Lord
of the Flies attempt a real-life  reproduction of  the movement away from individual
feelings to a social existence dominated by concepts, here the transition from concepts
to feelings and from culture to nature takes place twice, first before Pincher Martin’s
drowning and then after it, in his imagination, and that the eventual reproduction of
the large-scale shift from non-rational to rational consciousness, and hence from the
transformation  of  a  purely  natural  setting  into  a  humanised  location,  takes  place
entirely in Pincher Martin’s imagination. Only when we realise that the world that he
inhabits for most of the narrative is an autonomous creation whose laws do not exactly
conform to those of nature can we appreciate, in Stuart Laing’s words, ‘the central role
of consciousness and language in Martin’s construction and sustaining of his world’
(Laing 1983: 242).
At first sight the novel’s plot is, as in Lord of the Flies, simple enough. Lieutenant
Christopher Hadley Martin, a former stage actor nicknamed Pincher during his service
in the Royal Navy, is precariously afloat in the sea after his destroyer, on convoy duty in
the North Atlantic during the Second World War, has been struck in the middle of the
night by an enemy torpedo. Having been flung from the bridge into the water, Pincher
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kicks off  his sea-boots and comes up for air.  As daylight breaks on the horizon, he
manages to reach and clamber up a barren rock that he makes out in the middle of the
ocean.7 The rest of the novel is mostly concerned with his tooth-and-claw attempt to
survive on the island. There he keeps himself alive for what seem to be six days, while
delirium gradually undermines his grip on reality. He finally dies during an apocalyptic
storm. In the last chapter we find out that Pincher has been dead all along: ‘He didn’t
even have time to kick off his seaboots’ (Golding 1956: 208).  Apart from its first and
last  pages,  what  the  whole  novel  actually  relates  is  the  construction  and  eventual
disintegration of a man’s fantasy world in the face of death.8
Even before Pincher’s imaginary surrogate climbs onto the rock that will apparently
save  him  from  drowning,  ‘the  awareness  is  mainly,  even  obsessively,  physical;  an
experience  through  the  senses  of  man’s  subjection  to  his  environment’  (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 2002: 102). The first page of the novel tells us how a yet unnamed
man  is  thrown  overboard  into  the  water.  Here  feelings  and  concepts  —  the  latter
embodied in cries for help — collaborate to help Pincher cope with what is happening
inside and outside (extensive quotation from the novel’s first two chapters is essential
to give a full impression of his mental process):
7 In the North Atlantic there is a real uninhabited islet called Rockall. According to Jack I. Biles,
this is ‘a tiny point of rock seventy feet high located approximately 184 miles nearly due west of St
Kilda, the remotest of the Hebrides’, and 267 miles north-west of Donegal in Ireland; despite
agreeing that in real life this would be ‘the only sensible rock that Pincher could possibly find
himself on’, Golding reminds Biles that the point of the novel is that Pincher’s island ‘does not
exist’ (in Biles 1970: 73). It is not a real place, but rather an imaginary location. If anything, it is
based on a conflation of what knowledge Pincher might have of Rockall and the memories of an
aching tooth of his.
8 Understanding the relationship between, on the one hand, the mind of the Pincher Martin that is
drowning and, on the other, the Pincher Martin that inhabits the private world conjured up by
that mind is of the utmost importance to understand what is going on in the novel (though in his
comments about it Golding does make any distinction between them). I shall refer to the latter
Pincher Martin as an imaginary surrogate. As regards the third-person narrator, its role is not
always limited to presenting the experiences of Pincher’s surrogate as exactly as possible, but
sometimes  goes  beyond them.  Thus,  though Pincher’s  surrogate  inhabits  a  world  exclusively
made  up  of  physical  surfaces,  the  narrator’s  symbolic  descriptions  of  that  world  point  to  a
metaphysical dimension that both Pincher and his surrogate are blind to.
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There was no up or down, no light and no air. He felt his mouth open of itself and the shrieked
word burst out.
‘Help!’
When the air had gone with the shriek, and water came in to fill its place — burning water,
hard in the throat and mouth as stones that hurt. … Then for a moment there was air like a cold
mask against his face and he bit into it. Air and water mixed, dragged down into his body like




The throat … vomited water and drew it in again. The hard lumps of water no longer hurt
(Golding 1956: 7–8; my italics).
These are the last instants of Pincher’s waking life. At the beginning of the quotation,
the  narrator’s  focus  is  on  the  character’s  spatial  (dis)orientation,  which,  in
Schopenhauer’s theory, is a question of feeling alone (therefore shared by human and
non-human animals  alike).  In  the following  sentences,  as  the  expressions  in  italics
show, the narrator puts the emphasis on the feeling that Pincher has of the parts of his
body moving, of the cold air briefly pressing against his face and the salt water that he
swallows, first burning his throat and then hurting him as if it was as hard as a lump of
rock or as a handful of gravel. By the last sentence, Pincher’s mind is no longer capable
of  reacting  to  any  physical  stimulus.  In  the  nearly  two hundred  pages  that  follow,
Pincher will be poised between life and death, living a kind of dream conjured up by his
unrelenting mind, ‘a little world’ over which he can exert his mental control, and which
resembles  in  most  respects  the  one  that  Pincher’s  consciousness  has  abandoned
(Golding 1956: 8).
During the very first  moments that  Pincher’s  surrogate  spends in his  imaginary
world, his consciousness goes through the same stages as before drowning: while the
emphasis  initially  falls  on  his  rational  grasp  of  the  situation,  the  place  of  rational
concepts is soon occupied by non-rational feelings.  The temporary predominance of
rational  thought  is  clear  in  the following passage,  where Pincher  imagines  that  his
surrogate takes off his boots, blows up his lifebelt, cries for help once more and reflects
on what has happened:
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His mouth slopped full and he choked. … He felt a weight pulling him down. … He got his right
leg across his left thigh and heaved with sodden hands. The seaboot slipped down his calf and he
kicked it free. … He forced his left leg up, wrestled with the second boot and got it free. Both
boots had left him. … He began to think in gulps as he swallowed the air. …
He could feel the slack and uninflated rubber that was so nearly not holding him up. He got
the tit of the tube between his teeth and unscrewed with two fingers while the others sealed the
tube. He won a little air from between swells and fuffed it through the rubber tube. … He blew
deeply and regularly into the tube until the lifebelt rose and strained at his clothing. …
He took his mouth from the tube.
‘Help! Help!’
The air escaped from the tube and he struggled with it. He twisted the tit until the air was safe.
…
Think. My last chance. Think what can be done.
She sank out in the Atlantic. Hundreds of miles from land. She was alone, sent north-east from
the convoy … The U-boat may be hanging around to pick up a survivor or two for questioning. Or
to pick off any ship that comes to rescue survivors. … Survivors, a raft, … the dinghy, wreckage
may be … only a swell or two away hidden in the mist and waiting for rescue … (Golding 1956:
10–18).
While in this quotation physical perceptions and rational thoughts overlap, it is clear
that the main concern of Pincher’s surrogate is not with what he feels but with the
clear-headed use of reason. Indeed, this obsession with rationality as the only thing
that can guarantee survival, and the simultaneous neglect of the feelings that actually
furnish reason with the raw materials that are transformed into concepts and words,
will recur in the course of the narrative. However, the reason why the pages that this
excerpt  covers  are  memorable  is  not  because  they  record  the  surrogate’s  rational
process.  Actually,  before he reaches dry land his musings are gradually replaced by
another, more basic kind of consciousness, and when this happens what impresses the
reader  is  the  breathtaking  vividness  of  the  surrogate’s  feelings  in  the  water  as  the
darkness of the night is followed by daylight. The following quotation covers the same
pages as the preceding, but insofar as it brings together some of the perceptions, in
time and space, of temperature and of objects in movement that occupy the mind of
Pincher’s surrogate (here in italics), it gives a better impression of the overall effect on
the reader:
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He  felt his heart  thumping and  for a while it was  the only point of reference in the formless
darkness. … His mouth opened and closed for the air and against the water. …
He stared at the  darkness as he turned but … everywhere the  darkness was  grainless and
alike.  There  …  was  only  darkness lying  close  against  the  balls  of  the  eyes.  There  was  the
movement of water. …
His teeth were chattering … and sometimes this  vibration would spread till it  included his
whole body. His legs below him were not cold so much as pressed, squeezed mercilessly by the
sea so that the feeling in them was not a response to temperature but to weight that would crush
and burst them. …
Then he was jerking and splashing and looking up. There was a difference in the texture of the
darkness; there were  smears and patches that were not in the eye itself. … He bent his head
forward and saw, fainter than an afterimage, the scalloped and changing shape of a swell as his
body was lifted in it. For a moment he caught the inconstant outline against the sky, then he was
floating up and seeing dimly the black top of the next swell as it swept towards him. …
The grain of the sky was  more distinct. There were  vaporous changes of tone from dark to
gloom, to grey. Near at hand the individual hillocks of the surface were visible. …
The day was inexorably present in green and grey. The seas … smoked. When he swung up a
broad, hilly crest he could see two other  smoking crests then nothing but  a vague circle that
might be mist or fine spray or rain. …
One side of the circle was lighter than the other. …
The light made the seasmoke seem solid. It penetrated the water so that between him and the
very tops of the restless hillocks it was  bottle green. … There was also the  noise of … tripped
ripples running tinkling by the ear like miniatures of surf on a flat beach (Golding 1956: 10–19;
my italics).
Before  the  end  of  the  novel’s  first  chapter,  where  Pincher’s  surrogate  reaches  the
imaginary rock that he will never leave, we see how all rational processes disappear
again, and for a time the focus is only on his feeling of the onslaught of cold water and
foam; the painful hardness of stone; the animal fear that makes him scream; the smell
of salty water as he climbs up the rock; the stillness of his body as he rests on solid
ground just before fainting:
He heard through the rasp and thump of his works the sounds of waves breaking. He lifted his
head and there was rock stuck up in the sky with a sea-gull poised before it. … He … saw without
comprehension that the green water was no longer empty. There was yellow and brown. … Then
he went under  … and there were … sudden notable details close to of intricate rock and weed.
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Brown tendrils slashed across his face, then with a destroying shock he hit solidity. It was utter
difference, it was under his body, against his knees and face, he could close fingers on it, for an
instant he could even hold on. … He felt himself … thrust down into weed and darkness.  … He
saw light, got a mouthful of air and foam. He glimpsed a riven rock face … and the sight of this
rock … was so dreadful that he wasted his air by screaming as if it had been a wild beast. He went
under a green calm, then up and was thrust sideways. … Hard things touched him about the feet
and knees. … There were hard things touching his face and chest, the side of his forehead. … Each
wave and each movement moved him forward.  … There was a pattern in front of him that …
meant nothing. …
He lay still (Golding 1956: 21–3).
This excerpt conveys what Pincher’s surrogate feels without comprehending: formless
objects, things for which no exact name exists and patterns to which the rational mind
cannot attach any meaning. These paragraphs are dominated by the sheer concreteness
of the  visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, kinetic and thermal feelings that overwhelm
Pincher’s surrogate as he tries not to drown again. These feelings are all that is left
when a person, left at the mercy of the elements, is reduced to confusion and stripped
of everything but animal consciousness.
It could be argued that the passages that I have reproduced are full of concepts —
those of direction, light, sea, water, etc.; but this objection rests on a basic confusion
between the character’s  focalising consciousness and the narrator’s  words.9 Leaving
9 Golding’s exploitation of the dissonance between character and narrator features prominently in
The  Inheritors,  where  the the  third-person  narrative  voice  even  compares  Lok,  one  of  the
members of the primitive People, to an athlete reacting to the starting signal: ‘Lok slept, balanced
on his hams. A hint of danger would have sent him flying along the terrace like a sprinter from
his mark’ (Golding 1955: 43). It is evident that the comparison is not Lok’s but the narrator’s.
Apart from conveying to contemporary readers Lok’s feeling of the tension of the moment, the
simile serves to remind us that, however long the time elapsed since other human species became
extinct, the Lok’s feeling is not so different from our own — let alone from the more advanced
New People’s that in the novel invade their territory. The idea may be that the People, the New
People and ourselves often need to run away from danger in order to preserve our well-being and
even  our  lives  (perhaps  even  that  contemporary  sports  have  their  ritualistic  origins  in  that
perennial need). Furthermore, the comparison of Lok to an athlete reminds us that the narrator’s
task of putting the characters’ feelings into words is never straightforward, because for some of
them there is no exact word in either the character’s or the narrator’s vocabulary, and that the
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arise the first two pages and the last  chapter of the novel,  everything that  we read
corresponds to the contents of Pincher’s mind. In the last two quotations we have seen
that, as the character loses rational touch with reality, he stops thinking in concepts and
only has a vague feeling of what is happening to and about him. Meanwhile, the third-
person narrator cannot but convey his feelings in the conceptual medium of language.
And since many of  the things that  he feels  are  so exceptional  or  imprecise that  no
conventional  words  have  been  coined  to  express  them,  the  narrator  must  choose
between  remaining  silent  or  resorting  over  and  over  again  to  such  imprecise
expressions as things, patterns and details.
Golding has commented on several occasions on the process whereby non-rational
feelings  are  put  into  words,  insinuating  that  its  success  depends  on  avoiding  the
precision of conventional language. Speaking of literature, for instance, he states that
his  ‘job  is  to  scrape the labels  off  things,  to  take nothing for  granted,  to  show the
irrational  where  it  exists’  (cited  in  Laing  1983:  242).  By  doing  this  he,  who  is
‘passionately  interested  in  description’ (cited  in  Tiger  2003:  64),  not  only  of  what
happens outside but also of what happens inside, can reawaken the reader’s faculty of
wonder: ‘I don’t simply describe something. I lead the reader round to discovering it
anew’ (cited in Boyd 1988: 32).
In  order  to  refer  to  this  way  of  communicating  the  characters’  feelings,  I  have
borrowed Clements’s term evocation. According to Schopenhauer, the nature of verbal
messages  is  intrinsically  conceptual;  however,  he  also  asserts  that  all  meaningful
concepts  are  based  on  feelings.  In  the  last  instance,  all  language  is  a  conceptual
medium that refers back to feelings. What allows us to identify two opposed uses of
words is whether or not they appeal to the receiver’s reason. The evocation of feelings is
more likely to occur when figurative expressions are employed that endow an utterance
with a defamiliarising quality (and even more when those figurative expressions blur,
as happens with metaphor, the limits of the conceptual spheres of words). When they
function evocatively, words can, as Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor have argued in relation
to Golding’s style, ‘bring us to the point where we ourselves can “see”, for a moment,
only way in which it can be done is indirectly, that is, through figurative language (notice that in
the last quotation from Pincher Martin the description of sea as a gigantic animal that plays with
the body of Pincher’s imaginary surrogate obeys the same logic).
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something  opening  through  them,  in  the  space  beyond  them’  where  only  the
incomparable power of inchoate feelings can take us (2002: 290).
Though the two varieties  of  evocation that  I  have identified,  impressionism and
symbolism, have different fields of reference (physical and metaphysical, respectively),
they have a common purpose: ‘to describe the indescribable’, as Golding puts it (1984a:
202).  Insofar  as  the  evocative  use  that  they  make  of  language  is  at  the  service  of
physical  reference,  the  descriptions  that  we  have  seen  at  the  beginning  of  Pincher
Martin are impressionistic rather than symbolic. According to Watt, the ambition of
pictorial impressionism — with which Conrad’s style has a strong affinity — is ‘to give a
pictorial equivalent of the visual sensations of a particular individual at a particular
time and place’ (Watt 1980: 170). To some extent, and leaving aside that the nature of
the linguistic signifier is not that same as the one used in painting, this is also the effect
intended by Conrad’s prose. Though not limited to visual perception, the most striking
component of Conrad’s impressionism is visual: it suggests ‘a field of vision which is
not  merely  limited  to  the  individual  observer,  but  is  also  controlled  by  whatever
conditions — internal and external — prevail at the moment of observation’ (178). In
Golding’s hands, impressionism likewise amounts to a recreation in the receiver’s mind
of what  Schopenhauer would call  the  individual’s  egocentric feeling of  the  physical
world,  that  is,  of  the  individual’s  perceptions,  whether  visual  of  not,  of  what  is
happening. In the passages from Pincher Martin that I have just quoted, the outcome
of  this  strategy  is  to  heighten  our  response  to  the  description  of  the  (imaginary)
physical world at whose centre has placed a copy of himself. By making us share this
surrogate’s perspective and feel like him, we understand the plight in which he is, and
realise the tremendous power of the elements against which he struggles.10
10 In  order  to  bring  out  the  impressionistic  tenor  of  the  narration,  I  have  left  out  from  the
quotations some cases  of  denotation and symbolism. Impressionism clearly dominates,  while
denotation and symbolism are subordinated to it. However, the passages in which symbolism
makes its appearance are worth commenting.
When  writing  evocatively,  Golding  often  takes  advantage  of  the  figurative  resources  that
language puts at his disposal, assigning new, unpredictable labels to objects in order to excite
certain feelings, which may coincide or not with the ones that his characters have. For instance,
the consciousness of Pincher’s surrogate at the end of the first chapter is always of a physical,
egocentric kind; but as exhaustion threatens to make him faint,  the narrator  gradually takes
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At  the  beginning  of  the  second  chapter  the  style  is  dominated  again  by  an
impressionistic vein, with feelings prevailing over rational thought, a fact that prevents
Pincher’s surrogate from uttering any words (the pattern that he sees is a seagull):
The pattern was white and black but mostly white. It existed in two layers, one behind the other,
one for each eye. He thought nothing, did nothing while the pattern changed a trifle and made
little noises. The hardnesses under his cheek began to insist. They passed through pressure to a
burning without heat, to a localized pain (Golding 1956: 24).
readers beyond the character’s conscious experience, plunging them into a metaphysical plane
that Pincher’s surrogate is not completely aware of. Through exuberant metaphors, the narrator
describes the noises made by the waves and the wind as ‘sudden hisses and spats, roars and
incompleted  syllables’  (Golding  1956:  19),  then  refers  to  ‘the  formless  mad  talking  of
uncontrolled water’ (21). As he swims towards the islet, Pincher’s surrogate sees how ‘each swell
dipped for a moment, flung up a white hand of foam and then disappeared as if the rock had
swallowed it’ (21). Pulled underwater once more, he discovers what the narrator calls ‘a singing
world’ where the ‘hairy shapes’ of seaweed flit and twist past his face (21). The narrator also tells
us  how,  just  before  touching  the  rock,  Pincher’s  surrogate  feels  himself  ‘picked  up  and  …
reversed, tugged’ by the gigantic force of the sea (22). The next thing that Pincher’s surrogate sees
when he raises his head is the rock face and what the narrator calls the ‘trees of spray growing up
it’ (22). After telling us that ‘The sea no longer played with him’, but ‘held him gently, carried him
with delicate and careful motion like a retriever with a bird’, then ‘laid him down gently and
retreated’, the narrator describes us how, during the climb of Pincher’s surrogate to the top of the
islet, ‘The sea came back and fawned round his face, licked him’, and how Pincher felt ‘the sea
run down to smell at his feet then come back and nuzzle under his arm’ (22). Likewise, at the
beginning of the second chapter, we read this brief description of the sea and the wind: ‘Though
the sea had treated him so carefully, elsewhere it continued to roar and thump and collapse on
itself. The wind too, given something to fight with other than obsequious water was hissing round
the rock and breathing gustily in crevices’ (24).
These passages convey the feelings of Pincher’s surrogate, yet with metaphorical expressions
that  are  not  his  and  that  obliterate  the  conceptual  borders  between  the  animate  and  the
inanimate, the human and the non-human. They are examples of a symbolic style that depicts a
whole world stirred by the same life force. Later in this chapter I shall devote a separate section
to offering an in-depth analysis of the metaphysical import of this kind of figurative description
of things and beings in motion.
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No sooner  has Pincher’s  surrogate  come to,  there are hints  that  his  rational  self  is
starting to recover too. To begin with, the hardnesses that he feels under his cheek, the
white and black pattern in front of his eyes and, above all, the noises round him begin
‘to pull him back into himself and organize him again as a single being’ controlled by an
identifiable centre of consciousness (Golding 1956: 24). This point of awareness does
not take long to realise that it is situated in a recognisable physical environment:
All these noises made a language that forced itself into the dark, passionless head and assured it
that the head was som[e]where, somewhere — and then finally with the flourish of a gull’s cry
over the sound of the wind and water, declared to the groping consciousness: wherever you are,
you are here! (Golding 1956: 24).
Once assured that he is still alive,  not only somewhere but  here, that is, once that he
has set himself up as the deictic centre of the world, Pincher’s surrogate begins not only
to make purposeful efforts to move but also to reason, thus getting a more or less clear
picture of who he is and where exactly here is. At the same time, he recovers the faculty
to speak:
He began to experiment. He found that he could haul the weight of one leg up and then the other.
His hand crawled round above his head. He reasoned deeply that there was another hand on the
other side somewhere and sent a message out to it. … He moved his four limbs in close … He had
a valuable thought, not because it was of immediate physical value but because it gave him back a
bit  of  his personality.  He made words to express this thought,  though they did not pass the
barrier of his teeth.
…
At once he was master. He knew that his body … was exhausted, that he was trying to crawl up
a little pebble slope. …
He began to turn on the pebbles, working his back against the rock and drawing up his feet. He
saw them now for the first  time,  distant  projections,  made thick and bear-like by the white,
seaboot stockings. The gave him back a little more of himself. …
The formal words and the pictures evolved themselves. …
‘Where the hell am I?’
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A single point of rock, peak of a mountain range, one tooth set in the ancient jaw of a sunken
world, projecting through the inconceivable vastness of the whole ocean — and how many miles
from dry land? (Golding 1956: 26–30).
Confident about his ‘education and intelligence and will’, Pincher’s surrogate wastes no
time  to  turn  the  barren  surroundings  into  a  modest  home  away  from  home,  a
gentleman’s ‘“estate”’ (Golding 1956: 80, 77). In order to do so he resorts not only to his
previous acquaintance with marine environments, which he recreates with a profusion
of physical detail, but also to familiar concepts and words from his past life in England.
After availing himself of food (mostly in the form of molluscs), drink (the rainwater
accumulated in ponds) and shelter (a crevice that protects him against the weather),
one of the first things that he does is naming the parts of the rock where he has landed.
The following quotation shows that the purpose of this routine is to impose human
control over the rock, to tame it and appropriate it, making it ‘rationally coherent and,
in his terms, civilized’ (Tiger 2003: 100), with the hope of turning it into a hospitable
place (notice the way in which he refers to the spot where he eats his food as if it were
an English pub — the Red Lion):
‘I call this place the Look-out. That is the Dwarf. The rock out there under the sun where I came
swimming is Safety Rock. The place where I get mussels and stuff is Food Cliff. Where I eat them
is — The Red Lion. On the South side where the strap-weed is, I call Prospect Cliff. This Cliff here




‘And I must have a name for this habitual clamber of mine between the Look-out and the Red
Lion. I shall call it the High Street.
…
‘I name you three rocks — Oxford Circus, Piccadilly and Leicester Square’ (Golding 1956: 84–
6).
And so on. Here ‘language is seen as the central mechanism: naming the parts of the
rock is a necessary precondition of controlling it’ (Laing 1983: 242). Pincher’s surrogate
has no doubts about his immediate goal:
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‘I am busy surviving. I am netting down this rock with names and taming it. … What is given a
name is given a seal, a chain. If this rock tries to adapt me to its ways I will refuse and adapt it to
mine. I will impose my routine on it, my geography. I will tie it down with names’ (Golding 1956:
86–7).
In Schopenhauer’s terms, which link rationality to the use of language, this obsession
with  labelling  reveals  him  not  only  as  an  obstinate  survivor  and  a  homesick
Englishman, but also as a rationalist.  He is a familiar figure in Golding’s fiction: the
rational man that remains confident, even after his consciousness has begun to fill with
strange images, that ‘“All [can be] explained and known”’ (Golding 1956: 146), in other
words, that ‘his thought … can name and master the conditions of the universe’ (Gindin
1988: 41). Michael Quinn states that for Pincher’s  surrogate rational ‘intelligence can
explain everything that happens to a man and so strip the world of mystery; as long as
things are explicable, they are not beyond man and he remains master’ (Quinn 1962:
251–2). But the concern with naming and mastering the parts of the island is not an
end in itself. It is simply a means to achieve his main objectives — sanity, survival and
rescue. ‘“Think, you bloody fool, think”’ (Golding 1956: 30), he exclaims as he discovers
that, in order to survive and to secure his rescue, he must make use of all of his rational
powers. Reason is the main tool that he has for ‘imposing purpose on the senseless
rock’ (129).
Like the children in Lord of the Flies, Pincher’s surrogate sets survival and rescue as
his priorities. Even more clearly than the children in  Lord of the Flies, he aspires to
achieve them being, like Robinson Crusoe, the perfect homo economicus. For the homo
economicus, reason is reduced to its instrumental dimension, and is useful only insofar
as  it  produces  the  desired  results.  This  ideological  conception  of  reason,  which
Schopenhauer and Golding assert only to repudiate it,  is  crucial  to understand this
mentality. The economic man that he exemplifies  embodies the masculine ideal of a
self-reliant, autonomous individual who, in the free pursuit of his or her aspirations,
employs  rational  calculation  as  an  instrument  to  rank  them  and  orchestrate  their
achievement with the most efficient means, minimising the costs and maximising the
benefits.  Diana  Meyers’s  succinct  description  of  this  frame  of  mind  is  difficult  to
surpass:
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To achieve  maximal  fulfillment,  homo economicus must  organize  his  chosen pursuits  into  a
rational life plan. He must decide which desires are most urgent; he must ensure that his desires
are co-satisfiable;  and he must  ascertain the most efficient way to satisfy this set  of  desires.
Madcap spontaneity and … improvisation are registered as defeat (Meyers 2010).
The description fits Pincher’s surrogate like a glove.11 He is convinced that the only way
to maximise the satisfaction of his wishes is by planning a rational course of action. He
11 The terms  master and  will, and the relationship between willing and the position of Pincher’s
surrogate as a Robinson Crusoe-like homo economicus, need commenting. Both Lord of the Flies
and  Pincher Martin  link the characters’ violence  and chauvinism to the exploration, conquest
and exploitation of new territories. Insofar as they are involved in these activities — justified by
an ideology according to which the white male becomes, by virtue of his use of reason, not only
the master of his own body and passions but also the rightful possessor of the whole physical
world  —  Golding’s  characters,  all  of  whom  are  British,  become  fervent  colonisers  and  even
unwitting  imperialists.  It  could  be  argued  that,  for  Golding,  British  imperialism  consists
exclusively in the conquerors’  imposing their will  on exotic lands and human beings.  In this
reading,  will would not be the aseptic, value-free concept that Schopenhauer wanted to turn it
into, but a highly charged term functioning, alongside the notion of  character (which Victorian
propagandists liked to subordinate to patriotic and even philanthropic duty), as one of the pillars
in the complex ideological framework supporting the edifice of the empire. Though he does not
believe in any duty except towards himself,  Pincher’s surrogate certainly sees his will and his
right to turn the island into his estate in the terms that Victorian ideology saw them; but he does
not realise the true nature of his wishes. In Golding’s later novels the will is certainly exposed as
an ideological reification of social realities that are neither universal nor impossible to change,
but this unmasking does not takes place in Pincher Martin (let alone in The Inheritors, an earlier
work concerned with conquest and extermination, and in Lord of the Flies). In this novel the will
is not directly linked to the imperial enterprise (which is only one of the possible activities in
which the will can occupy itself), but amounts to the irrepressible wish to stay alive regardless of
the circumstances; likewise, character here is just the innate way in which that wish is acted out.
This view of the will explains why, in  The Spire and  Darkness Visible, the latter of which was
published after Golding had already begun to question the possibility of ever getting to know the
essence of the world, Dean Jocelin and Sophy continue to impose on the other characters their
individual  wills,  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  colonisers’  or  imperialists’  domination.
Conversely, in Golding’s very last novels, the Sea Trilogy and  The Double Tongue, imperialism
still features prominently, but now dissociated from the will.
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insists on the necessity to put first things first, and makes a list of priorities that centres
on rescue: ‘“The end to be desired is rescue”’ (Golding 1956: 81). But rescue will only
arrive if he takes a series of indispensable precautions. The most basic is to go on living:
‘“the bare minimum necessary is survival. I must keep my body going. I must give it
drink and food and shelter. … Point one’” (81). The next item is physical health: ‘“Point
two. I must expect myself to fall sick. … I must watch for signs of sickness and doctor
myself’” (81). This is followed closely by mental health: ‘“Point three. I must watch my
mind. I must not let madness steal up on me and take me by surprise”’ (81). The last
item is  a kind of summary of  the preceding: ‘“Point four.  I  must help myself  to be
rescued”’  (81).  All  of  these  points,  together  with  the  fact  that  they  are  arranged
according to a hierarchy of means to the desired end, reveal  Pincher’s  surrogate to
believe that rational calculation is the single most valuable ability that a castaway can
have.
As in Lord of the Flies, the ‘economic’ aspect of the character’s mentality reminds us
— and serves as an indirect indictment — of Robinson Crusoe, who also has a penchant
for  lists  and  who  is  still  the  paramount  literary  example  of  economic  man.  What
Pincher’s  surrogate fails  to  realise  is  that  in  his  case,  in  contrast  to  Defoe’s  novel,
staying  alive  is  necessary  not  for  his  rescue,  which  is  impossible,  but  for  the
preservation of his individual identity. He likewise fails to see that no form of thought,
whether rational or non-rational, can help him to succeed. If his efforts end in complete
failure it is simply because of Golding’s belief that the order imposed upon existence by
feeling and reason is insufficient to sustain representation — and hence the world —
indefinitely:  given  the  limitations  of  the  intellect,  both  in  human  and  non-human
animals, the sphere of representation is bound to break down. The problem of how this
happens leads us to a consideration of the differences between the depictions of the
world in Lord of the Flies and Pincher Martin.
3.1.1.1.2. Solipsism in Pincher Martin
The first pages of  Pincher Martin chart the loss of rational and cultural coordinates,
followed by their painstaking restoration. By dint of the latter process, the novel is a
reflection on the humanisation of the environment. In this  Pincher Martin resembles
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Lord  of  the  Flies.  Despite  the  similarity,  we  should  not  forget  that  the  islands
represented in the two novels are not exactly of the same kind.
The island in Lord of the Flies belongs to a public world populated not only by the
castaway children but also by the pilots that fight above their heads while they sleep at
night, the parents and grown-ups whose memories console and haunt them, and the
navy crew that see the island burning and come to the children’s rescue at the end of
the narrative. Regardless of the different angles from which every characters might see
it, this world always contains the same objects and persons, and obeys the same laws.
By contrast, Pincher Martin contains not one but two concentric worlds: the public
world from which Pincher comes (as seen in the first two pages of the novel) and where
his dead body stays (as revealed in the last chapter), and a private domain — from
Schopenhauer’s perspective, a world only in a loose sense, as it cannot be the object of
knowledge proper — in which his mind takes refuge when confronted with death. As in
Lord of the Flies, the first domain is very much like our own: though the very first thing
that the novel tells us about Pincher is that his consciousness is an egocentric ‘centre’
whose attention extends ‘in every direction’ (Golding 1956: 7), this domain is populated
by  a  number  of  different  people  who,  despite  seeing  things  from  a  number  of
perspectives that are not the same as Pincher’s, have a sense of being there together.
The way in which events take place in this world is designed to convince the readers
that  the  same  events  could  occur  in  the  world  where  they  and  the  novelist  live.
Similarly, what is said about its setting and its inhabitants is undoubtedly intended to
have a direct bearing on the readers’ view of their world. The second domain presented
in  Pincher  Martin is  quite  another  matter.  To  begin  with,  it  is  only  accessible  to
Pincher’s mind, which has created it. Both Pincher Martin that inhabits it and all the
other inanimate objects and living beings that he interacts with (the rock and the sea,
the gulls, the shellfish, the weeds) are creations of that mind. Inside this world, the
centre of consciousness of Pincher’s surrogate does not content itself with its position
‘inside his head, looking out through the arches of his skull’ as if it were sitting ‘in the
middle of the globe’ (15, 83). This description of egocentrism would be just as accurate
in the public world that Pincher’s mind has left behind as in the private world that it
has  conjured  up.  This  is,  after  all,  ‘“the  ordinary  experience  of  living”  (82).  The
experiences that Pincher’s surrogate has are extraordinary because it is Pincher’s mind,
which, like his surrogate’s, is ‘active and tireless’ while his body is at the mercy of the
141
Golding’s Metaphysics
waves,  is  the  sole  responsible  for  this  parallel  world at  whose  centre  the surrogate
stands (83) As a result, the functioning of this private world is not exactly the same as
our own world’s. Nevertheless, the ordeal that Pincher’s surrogate undergoes is clearly
symptomatic of two common enough features of real human beings — the egocentric
nature of the most frequent varieties of consciousness, and the ensuing fear of death —
what  is  said  in  the narrative  about  the world that  he  builds,  including its  eventual
destruction,  has  a  clear  relation  to  the  novelist  and  the  audience’s  world.  The
comparison with Lord of the Flies is instructive.
In comparison with that of Pincher’s surrogate, the egocentrism of the children in
Lord of the Flies does not pose a threat to the shared status of the public world. In the
following extract, Piggy and Ralph play by the lagoon, and from the former’s position
the shadows and lights are inoffensively reversed due to the reflection of light in the
water: ‘Piggy looked up at Ralph. All the shadows on Ralph’s face were reversed: green
above, bright below from the lagoon’ (Golding 1954: 13). In Pincher Martin we find this
passage where the exhausted surrogate, still lying on the rock, manages to focus his
eyes and obtains a more usual sense of perspective:
He remembered how eyes should be used and brought the two lines of sight together so that
patterns fused and made a distance. The pebbles were close to his face, pressing against his cheek
and jaw. … He did not move his head but followed the line of the hand back to an oilskin sleeve,
the beginnings of a shoulder. His eyes returned to the pebbles and watched them … while the
water came back and this time the last touch of the sea lopped into his open mouth. Without
change of expression he began to shake, a deep shake that included the whole of his body. Inside
his  head it  seemed that  the pebbles  were shaking because the movement  of  the white  hand
forward and back was matched by the movement of his body (Golding 1956: 25).
Both passages appear early in their respective stories, when the rational regulation of
life has not been completely re-established yet. However, as the two narratives in which
they are embedded unfold, they take on very different connotations. The position of the
shadow in Lord of the Flies does not alter the shape of the face in which it appears, nor
does it cast doubts on the face’s ontological status. By contrast, there is a good reason
why it seems to Pincher’s surrogate that it is him that causes the pebbles to shake; and
the reason is that this is indeed the case. Pincher does not move them with his body,
but with his mind. Despite his initial denial, by the end of the novel he acknowledges
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that everything in and round the island, including his own body and the pebbles on
which it has lain, are a construction of his own mind. It is true that he survives death
for a while, but only in an ‘“invented”’ or ‘“created”’ world, quite apart from the other
characters’ (Golding 1956: 194, 196). Pincher has been described as ‘a man who can
only  think,  whose existence is  predicated on thought’  (Raine 1987:  108).  The same
dependence on his thought affects the island which he has created, and which is just an
‘I/land’ (Tiger 2003: 100).
The egocentrism of Pincher’s surrogate is an aberration, an apotheosis of solipsism.
This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  way  in  which  his  mind  handles  meteorological
phenomena.  Initially,  while he is  still  swimming about,  his attention is  occupied by
feelings of two different kinds. On the one hand there are inner sensations and outer
perceptions whose content escapes precise conceptualisation. On the other hand there
are a series of ‘Pictures [that] invaded his mind’; some of the images — flashes from the
past — are of things and people ‘not seen … for so many years’, while the content of
others is much more recent, but they all serve to remind the reader of the normal life
that Pincher had before falling into the ocean (Golding 1956: 16, 8). Their origin lies in
the  reproductive  imagination  which  in  both  humans  and  other  animals  fills  the
subject’s consciousness with perceptions from the past as if they were being produced
now. Though its  importance in human consciousness cannot be underestimated,  its
products pale in comparison with the contents of the productive imagination, of which
Pincher makes extensive use in the rest of the novel.
This second sort of imaginative representation functions to satisfy the individual’s
egoism. According to Schopenhauer, sometimes ‘the person … imagines what does not
exist’ (1969b: 401). This happens, for example, when the imagination ‘is used to build
castles  in  the  air,  congenial  to  selfishness  and  to  one’s  own  whim,  which  for  the
moment delude and delight’  (1969a: 187).  This is  what happens in  Pincher Martin.
When Pincher’s surrogate reaches the rock which he will never abandon, there is no
indication that it  may be something other that an actual place located in the North
Atlantic. At this point, Pincher’s mind still tries to maintain the verisimilitude of the
world that it has created. The idea is that, if he can make the imagined world function
in the same way as the real world does, then Pincher’s surrogate can go on deluding
himself. This is why he insists on asserting his sanity. ‘“I must keep my grip on reality”’
(Golding 1956: 82), he says without realising that, in fact, he has already lost it. As the
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suspicion  begins  to  creep  in  that  neither  survival  nor  rescue  might  be  guaranteed,
Pincher’s efforts to reproduce the natural order of things start to show their limitations.
It is at this moment that he begins to suspect that he cannot succeed unless he ‘imposes
his own laws on the universe so that it will conform to his own sense of order’ (Baker
1965: 43). This is the point when he accepts that not all of his wishes, modest as they
are, can be fulfilled on the rock: ‘“I should like a bed with sheets. I should like a pint or
two and a hot meal. I should like a hot bath”’ (Golding 1956: 83). Later, his wishes
become  more  ambitious,  and  he  does  not  refrain  from  satisfying  them.  When,
tormented  by thirst  and by the scorching  sun,  he  protests:  ‘“I  said  there  would  be
rain!”’, the narrator simply adds: ‘and there was rain’ (170, 171), and the reader is left in
no doubt that Pincher’s power is not related to the informed prediction but rather to
the creation of meteorological phenomena. Strong as it is, this mental power cannot be
sufficient to sustain a world of fantasy indefinitely. When the familiar coherence of the
world  begins  to  vanish,  and  he  begins  to  lose  control  of  the  situation,  Pincher’s
surrogate realises that he is in ‘a world where hard facts go limp’ (Whitehead 1971: 19);
a  world in  which,  for instance,  the rock seems to  move and,  simultaneously,  to  be
excessively hard, in which guano is insoluble, and in which live lobsters are as red as if
they had been cooked.
Painfully  aware  that  these  factual  mistakes  make  no  sense,  at  first  Pincher’s
surrogate pretends that he is dreaming. Having made sure that he is awake, he goes on
to hypothesise that he is suffering from food poisoning. After purging himself he puts
everything down to the fact that the sunlight’s reflection causes optical illusions, and
finally he decides that, if being sane involves admitting that he is on the verge of death,
then  sanity  is  ‘Worse  than  madness’  (Golding  1956:  169).  However,  not  even  the
declaration  that  he  is  ‘“raving  mad”’  will  save  him  (190).  Little  by  little,  the
‘amphitheatre’ that the former actor’s mind has conjured up is ‘destroyed, erased like
an error’, as if it had been ‘painted on … paper’ (79, 201, 200).
When  this  happens,  it  is  presumably  because  of  Pincher’s  cerebral  death.
Schopenhauer writes: ‘With the brain the intellect perishes, and with the intellect the
objective world, this intellect’s mere representation’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 500), and
this is exactly what happens in Golding’s novel: the moment that Pincher’s brain stops
working,  the  environment  that  the  imaginary castaway has colonised implodes and
disappears.  In  an  attempt  to bring  home  the  way  in  which  the  mental  sphere  of
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representation  becomes  the  world,  Schopenhauer  points  out  that  in  fact  the  latter
‘resides inside our head, for there is its whole scene of action’, comparing the effect to
what happens when ‘in the theatre we see mountains, forest, and sea, yet everything
remains within the house’ (22). Apart from throwing light on the status of Pincher’s
little  world  as  a  mental  representation,  and  on  its  description  as  a  stage  set,
Schopenhauer’s comments can help us to see its relation to the public world where the
other characters live on. He adds: ‘The fact that in other brains a similar world lives and
moves, now as before, is a matter of indifference with reference to the intellect that is
perishing’ (500). By the same token, it could be argued that the fact that one subject’s
intellect perishes is a matter of indifference as long as the world continues to exist in
other brains. This is the really relevant point in connection with Golding’s novel: the
juxtaposition of the last two chapters of Pincher Martin (one dominated by the lonely
castaway’s perspective, the other centred on other characters and told from a detached
point  of  view)  serves  to  highlight  how  Pincher’s  whole  world  qua  imaginary
representation  disappears,  as  if  erased out  of  existence,  with his  decease,  and how
another world, sustained by other characters, survives his death.
As soon as Pincher’s  surrogate dies, it becomes obvious that his private world ‘of
papery stuff’ is not the public world that the rest of conscious beings share (Golding
1956:  201); when Pincher’s consciousness is definitively extinguished and this world
disappears into ‘the pit of nothing’  (200),  there still  remains that  other world.  This
public world is the setting of the novel’s last chapter, where the living gather the ‘“sad
harvest”’ of dead bodies — Pincher’s among them — which the war deposits on the
beach (203). However, we should not be misled by the discrepancies between these two
worlds inside the novel. Despite not being absolutely identical, Pincher’s private world
and the world in which the rest of characters live are not so different: the public world
in which the last chapter takes place also disappears, only a little later than Pincher’s,
when the narrative ends and we readers close the book. In addition, there are clear
links between between the fictional  world and the factual  world.  On the one hand,
Pincher’s private world functions to a large extent according to the way in which the
mind that has conjured it up sees the public world in the novel, and since this way of
seeing the world — this ideology that puts the rational efficiency, the optimisation of
effort, the mastery over the body and the rest of the world at the service of individual
self-sufficiency — is also present in the world that Golding shares with his audience,
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shaping their lives in the same way as it  shaped the imaginary castaway’s efforts to
survive, the disappearance of Pincher’s private world is not as complete as it  would
seem.  On the  other  hand,  and from  Schopenhauer’s  perspective,  even  if  the  world
outside the novel does not disappear at the same time as we close Golding’s book, we
can be sure that it  will  not last for ever. Schopenhauer’s claim that the represented
world  that  we  inhabit  appeared  with  the  first  conscious  animal  suggests  that  the
condition of this world is precarious. The fate of Pincher’s private world is indicative of
the fate of the public world within the book; it is also a reminder of the fate that awaits
the world outside the book. Golding’s novel thus suggests that even this world will be,
like  Pincher’s,  ultimately  reduced to  ‘absolute  nothingness’  when the last  conscious
being perishes (Golding 1956: 201).
3.1.1.1.3. Modes of Temporal Awareness in Free Fall
We  have  seen  that,  at  a  very  basic  level,  Golding’s  novel  illustrate  the  opposition
between non-rational feelings and rational concepts as well as the transition from a
natural world that humans share with other animals to forms of cultural organisation
that rest on the human ability to reason, and thus to act — and to interact with other
people — in unprecedentedly complex ways. We have also seen that human imagination
does not only have a reproductive function but can also be instrumental in picturing
states of affairs that do not correspond to the public world. In this and the following
sections I am going to focus on  Free Fall  and the Sea Trilogy in order to explore the
three kinds of temporal and spatial awareness — felt space and time, conceptualised
space and time,  and the sense of space that  results from the marriage between the
imagination and reason — that they bring to our attention.
In Free Fall we meet, for the first time in Golding, with a first-person character-
narrator called Sammy Mountjoy.  Sammy is a prestigious painter that  hangs in the
Tate, but if he tells us the story of his own life, from early childhood to adult age, it is
not with the sole intention to trace his development as an artist, but mostly to provide a
confession of his moral corruption and of his subsequent regeneration. To begin with,
Sammy recalls  his  childhood:  his  relationship  with his  mother,  his  early  life  in  the
absence  of  his  father,  and  his  upbringing  in  the  slum  of  Rotten  Row;  then  his
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attendance to infant school, and his adoption — the beginning of his social ascent — by
the rector, Father Watts Watt. Sammy also recalls the figures that influenced him at the
local grammar school, most notably two of his teachers, a kind yet priggish scientist
called Nick Shales  and the cruel  religious  bigot  Rowena Pringle.  He reflects  on his
uncompromising pursuit  of the beautiful  Beatrice Ifor,  and on his determination to
possess  her  both  artistically  and  sexually,  without  omitting  how  his  insistence  on
painting  her  nude  and on  making  love  to  her,  her  reluctant  submission,  and their
engagement,  was immediately followed by his  infidelity with a  girl  called Taffy.  He
pauses to discuss his generation’s moral and political commitment and scepticism, and
his own attitude to the extremes of right and left politics prior to the Second World
War.  He  looks  back  at  his  confinement  in  a  prisoner-of-war  camp  and  at  his
psychological torture by the Nazis, an incident that shows him the cruelty of his own
torture and abandonment of Beatrice. In the last two chapters, Sammy tells us about
his visit,  after the war,  to the mental hospital where Beatrice has been incarcerated
since his desertion, and to his former teachers. Chronologically, the final event in the
novel is the narration of his story as he ‘fumbles at the typewriter’ and speculates about
the moral meaning of his life, especially about the events that led to his mistreatment
Beatrice and about his later moral conversion in the Nazi camp (Golding 1959: 8).
As befits a painter, many of Sammy’s recollections are purely visual. Despite the
mixed  nature  of  Sammy’s  consciousness,  there  are  certain  occasions  on  which  the
disparity  between  the  felt  and  conceptual  modalities  of  representation  is  easily
discernible in his narrative. The most striking case is his recollection of a moonlit tree
whose majesty impresses Sammy as a child. Having trespassed into a private garden
with  his  friend Johnny Spragg,  Sammy is  left  speechless  by  the  sight  of  a  natural
wonder that his childish words cannot describe and that even the mature narrator can
only depict indirectly, by means of figurative imagery:
We were eyes.
…
I can remember this. … The moon was flowering. She had a kind of sanctuary of light round
her, sapphire. All the garden was black and white. There was one tree between me and the lawns,
the stillest tree that ever grew … The tree was huge and each branch splayed up to a given level;
and there, the black leaves floated like a level of oil on water. Level after horizontal level these
leaves cut across the splaying branches and there was a crumpled, silver-aper depth, an ivory
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quiet beyond them. Later, I should have called the tree a cedar and passed on, but then, it was an
apocalypse (Golding 1959: 45–6).
Interestingly, the last quoted sentence can be read as suggesting that children may be
more awake to fresh feelings than adults are. It also indicates that the reason for this
may be found in the latter’s  greater reliance on the abstractive power of conceptual
consciousness,  which  has  many advantages  but  also  renders  all  objects  familiar  or
ordinary, depriving them of their freshness and mystery.
In his  reading of  Golding’s  earlier  novels,  Clements  makes  reference to  another
scene  in  Free  Fall that  is revelatory  of  the  distance  that  separates  feelings  from
concepts, the world as ‘seen’ and the world as described through concepts. In the course
of Sammy’s confinement in the German camp, Dr Halde, his interrogator, asks him if
he  possesses  any  information  about  a  possible  prison  break.  As  Clements  notes,
‘Sammy insists that he knows nothing, believing this to be the truth’ (2012: 83). Even
when Halde offers to give whatever it is that Sammy ‘“want[s] most in the world”’, the
prisoner confesses that, being ‘“no hero”’, he rejects the offer only because he does not
know anything (Golding 1959: 146, 147). Yet the point is that he does know something,
in  fact  that  he  knows  everything  that  Halde  might  want  to  find  out.  In  hindsight,
Sammy realises that, though no one had told him anything about the escape, he ‘had
known something for more than a year. … I could have said at any time that out of the
hundreds of us there were perhaps twenty-five who might actually try to escape’ (149).
The  problem is  the  information  that  he  has  is  an  intuition  — a  feeling  — without
rational support; and if he does not think it worth providing during the interrogation it
is because he cannot back it up with rational argument:
Day after day a complex of tiny indications had added up and now presented me with a picture. I
was an expert.  Who else  had lived as  visually  and professionally  with these faces  and taken
knowledge of them in through the pores. Who else had that puzzled curiosity about man, that
photographic apprehension …?
…
I could say to him quite simply; I do not know when or where the escape organization operates
now — but take these twenty men into your trawl and there will be no escapes (Golding 1959:
149).
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Sammy’s knowledge of the escape is not rational, but remains stored (indelibly, as his
account of it proves) without aid from reason. Schopenhauer teaches us that the insight
gained through feeling does not need to be rationally proved, and indeed that some of
the  most  important  kinds  of  knowledge  are  not  amenable  to  that  kind  of
demonstration; but Sammy dismisses his own insight beforehand as lacking credibility,
and  precisely  because  of  its  non-rational  character.  What  this  shows  is  both  the
importance  of  feelings  and  how  even  a  person  like  Sammy,  whose  keen  eye  for
perceptual detail should have taught him to trust what his eyes have seen even in the
absence of rational evidence, can be tempted, under certain circumstances at least, to
dismiss them as not worth sharing or as not furnishing a valid kind of knowledge.
Apart from showing that feelings are often stifled and outshined by the concepts
that we superimpose on them, Free Fall shows how the interplay of feelings, concepts
and  the  imaginative  counterparts  of  feelings  shapes  a  person’s  experience  of  time.
Humans, in contrast to other animals, possess a rational — i.e. abstract — awareness of
the  pastness  of  our  recollections  and  of  the  futureness  of  our  predictions.  This  is
combined  with  the  possibility  of  seeing  the  future  in  the  light  of  the  past,  and  of
rectifying our lives to give them a better shape before we die. These potentialities are
the basis of Sammy’s temporal awareness, which we can begin two understand through
the analysis of these two excerpts (the second is a reflection on the cedar tree episode):
time is not to be laid out endlessly like a row of bricks. That straight line … is a dead thing. Time
is two modes. The one is an effortless perception native to us as water to the mackerel. The other
is  a  memory,  a  sense  of  shuffle  fold  and  coil,  of  that  day  nearer  than  that  because  more
important,  of  that  event  mirroring  this,  or  those  three  set  apart,  exceptional  and  out  of  the
straight line altogether.
…
I am not a man who was a boy looking at a tree. I am a man who remembers being a boy
looking at a tree. It is the difference between time, the endless row of dead bricks, and time, the
retake and coil (Golding 1959: 6, 46).
Clements  takes  Sammy  at  his  word,  arguing  that  Free  Fall confronts  us  with  two
different  temporal  modes.  According  to  this  critic,  if  we  speak  about  ‘time-as-
experienced’ (the metaphorical row of bricks of irreversible, chronological time), then
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we cannot  but admit  that  Sammy’s  past  ‘is  lost  to  him’  and impossible  to  recover;
alternatively, if we speak about ‘time-as-recalled’ (the  retake and coil), we can admit
the possibility of moving back and forth along the line of one’s life (Clements 2012: 81–
2).  However,  regardless  of  Sammy’s  own view of  the issue,  if  we look at  these two
excerpts  through  the  prism  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  it  is  clear  that  Sammy
describes not  two but three temporal  modes:  the constant present of  felt  time,  the
chronological line of conceptual time, and the combination of conceptual time and the
imagination.
The first mode, which Sammy calls an effortless perception native to us as water to
the mackerel,  corresponds to what Schopenhauer calls feeling. Like all  feelings, this
experience of time is bound to the immediacy of the present.  Schopenhauer writes:
‘only in the present … are there real objects’, because ‘the form of life or of reality, is
really only the present, not the future or the past’;  this constant now ‘is  that which
always exists  and stands firm and immovable’,  but also,  paradoxically,  ‘That which,
empirically apprehended, is the most fleeting of all’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 278, 279).
The present is also the dimension of the imaginative reproductions of past events.
The second mode, chronological time, is a straight line that is laid out endlessly like
a row of bricks;  this  endless row of red bricks is  a dead thing which corresponds to
Schopenhauer’s conceptual time. About the distinction between the first and the second
kinds of temporal experience, Schopenhauer says this:
We can conjure up in our minds through perception only particular scenes of the past, but of the
time that has since elapsed and of its content we are conscious only  in abstracto by means of
concepts of things and of numbers that now represent days and years, together with the content
thereof (Schopenhauer 1969b: 60).
Conceptualised time is abstract, linear time; it can be measured and calculated. These
measurements and calculations adopt different forms, which explains why there exist
different ways of dividing the day and a number of calendars (of course there is also the
possibility of rational translation among them). For Schopenhauer, past and future are
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‘mere concepts’, never feelings, and as such these notions correspond to abstract time
too (1969a: 279).12
The third mode of time is a sense of shuffle fold and coil, and this retake and coil
corresponds to an alliance between reason and the imagination. This is different from
the other animals’ imaginative repetition of past feelings without any awareness of their
being  past.  In  human  beings  the  memories  conjured  up  by  the  reproductive
imagination are accompanied by reason, and because of this the experience that people
have of time may include the realisation that what one is aware of does not correspond
to now but to then. This then is located in the past or in the future. Realising the impact
that the memory of the past has on him, Sammy states that he is ‘not a man who was a
boy’, but ‘a man who remembers being a boy’ (Golding 1959: 46). He is ‘the sum’ of
those memories (46). Actually, the images that Sammy associates with the concept of
the past are not limited to memories of real events in which he was involved, but also
include  pictures  created  by  his  productive  imagination.  Though  Sammy  is  mostly
recalling things that occurred in his past, this is not always the case, as evidenced by his
reference to the ‘victories and defeats’ (in the First World War) and the ‘revolution’ (in
Russian) that took place in 1917, the year when he was born, and by his speculations
not only about his mother’s relationship with his father, whom he ‘never knew’, but also
about  his  ‘inscrutable’  ancestry  in  general  (9).  Alternatively,  then can be projected,
again thanks to the productive imagination, into the future. As we are about to see, the
possibility  of  locating  imagined events  in  the past  and in  the future  has  enormous
implications for an accurate comprehension of  Sammy’s narrative.  They have to do
with the narrative form given to Sammy’s message, whose very organisation — its plot
— endows the character-narrator’s life-course with moral significance.
The narrative emplotment that Sammy carries out takes advantage of the treatment
given  to  time  by  the  combination  of  reason  and  the  imagination.  Conversely,  this
treatment  finds  its  privileged  mode  of  expression  in  narrative;  for  this  reason
12 My interpretation of these two modes of time follows Magee (1997: 214) and Wicks (2008: 73–5).
According to Wicks’s account, for Kant ‘time is given to us as … a line that extends infinitely
forward and backward, where all points are of the same qualitative value’ (Wicks 2008: 73). By
contrast, Schopenhauer usually ‘states … that only the present is the true temporal reality’ (74).
According to Magee, Schopenhauer’s point is that the contents of non-rational consciousness,
‘being not abstract, can exist in a present only’ (Magee 1997: 214).
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narratologists refer as narrative time to that kind of temporal awareness that can only
be human. H. Porter Abbott states that  narrative, not necessarily continuous, ‘is the
principal way in which our species organizes its understanding of time ’ (2008: 3).13
Narrative  is  certainly  the way in which Sammy understands and communicates  the
events that make up his life as it unfolds in time from childhood to adulthood.
Though Schopenhauer does not examine this possibility, once one’s life has been
organised  into  a  narrative  the  temporal  distance  does  not  only  translate  into  a
psychological  distance,  but also into a narratological  distance between the character
and the narrator, and a moral distance between the sinner and the saint. In this respect,
Sammy’s confession follows the model of Augustine’s  Confessions. According to John
Freccero, after Augustine every first-person narrative, whether factual or fictional, can
be read as ‘the story of a conversion’ (1986: 17). This conversion must be understood in
psychological  terms, as a ‘myth of … maturation’  (19).  It  can also be understood in
moral terms, as ‘a separation between the sinner and the saint who tells the story’ (19).
Finally,  it  can  be  understood  in  narratological  terms,  as  ‘the  death  of  the  self  as
character and the resurrection of the self as narrator’ (16–7). In this sense, Sammy’s
narrative depicts, as every autobiography does, ‘the self aware of itself, sometimes as
totally  other’  in three dimensions apart from the temporal  one (22). From all these
perspectives,  Sammy’s  autobiography  prompts  the  following  questions:  how  can  a
person undergo such radical psychological  change?, how can one leave behind all the
sins committed?, and how can the character cross the diegetic boundary and become a
narrator?
As it turns out, the way in which the main character is portrayed in Free Fall adds a
further complication to the structure that Freccero identifies, because to the distance
between the narrator and the adult character that took advantage of Beatrice, Sammy
adds  the  distance  between  the  sinning  adult  and  the  child.  Indeed,  old  Sammy  is
13 The most detailed philosophical discussion of narrative time is probably Paul Ricoeur’s three-
volume Time and Narrative, according to which it is not that human time enables a person to
make events into narrative sequences but that ‘time becomes human time to the extent that it is
organized after the manner of a narrative’ (1984: 3). From Schopenhauer’s perspective, however,
it is important to remember that conceptual time (without the need for narrative elaboration) is
also human time. Abbott’s statement is sufficient to highlight the privileged position of narrative
in the context of human time, and tallies better than Ricoeur’s with Schopenhauer’s views.
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insistent that (despite all  appearances to the contrary) the child that lived in Rotten
Row is not the same person as the adult. As he ponders on the pictures that he is about
to bring back for our benefit, he makes the following remark:
I have no responsibility for some of the pictures. I can remember myself as I was when I was a
child. But even if I had committed murder then, I should no longer feel responsible for it. There
is a threshold here … beyond which what I did was done by someone else. Yet I was there. …
Perhaps reading my story through again I shall see the connection between the little boy, clear as
spring water, and the man like a stagnant pool. Somehow, the one became the other (Golding
1959: 9).
Later he adds: ‘he is not I’, and, conversely: ‘I am not he’ (Golding 1959: 46, 78). This
emphasis on the separation between the child and the adult — ‘He is no more a part of
me than any other child. I simply have better access to him’ (70) — adds an interesting
twist  to  the  structure  that,  according  to  Freccero,  characterises  the  confession.
Moreover,  it  represents  a  departure  from  Schopenhauer’s  understanding  of  the
conditions  under  which  a  person  can  examine  his  or  her  past  life.  According  to
Schopenhauer, human beings lead a ‘double life’ — a ‘life in the concrete’, i.e. according
to feeling, and a ‘life in the abstract’, i.e. according to reason (Schopenhauer 1969a: 86).
In his view, it is reason that allows a man to carry out a panoramic ‘survey of [his] life
as  a  whole’,  whereby  ‘what  previously  possessed  him  completely  and  moved  him
intensely appears to him cold, colourless, and, for the moment, foreign and strange; he
is a mere spectator and observer’ (86). In  Free Fall, the temporal distance certainly
involves  this  psychological  distance  to  young  Sammy,  to  whom  old  Sammy  has
‘objective  …  access’  and  over  whom  he  ‘sits  in  judgment  as  over  a  strange  being’
(Golding 1959: 78). However, when old Sammy describes young Sammy as ‘some other
person’ (78), he establishes a more radical separation between past and present than
Schopenhauer.14
14 Ricoeur also links  narrative  time to narrative  identity.  In his  view,  human identity  does not
consist in ‘being the same (idem)’ but in being ‘oneself as self-same (ipse)’, in other words, not in
‘a substantial or formal identity’ but in ‘a narrative identity’ (1988: 246). The latter ‘can escape
the dilemma of the Same and the Other’ because it relies on ‘a temporal structure’ conforming to
the ‘dynamic’ model of ‘poetic composition’ (246). As it rests on memory, narrative self-sameness
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The  discrepancy  between  Sammy  and  Schopenhauer  has  to  do  with  the
understanding of freedom that Golding introduces in  Free Fall. While Schopenhauer
thinks  that  one  cannot  become  a  different  person  because  the  innateness  of  one’s
character  prevents  such a  radical  break with one’s  past,  Sammy’s  enquiry  puts  the
emphasis — as the title of the novel indicates — on the free choice that transforms the
child into the adult sinner. It is true that Sammy’s later transformation into a saint,
which does not result from another free choice but from a sudden vision, tallies better
with  Schopenhauer’s  theory.  However,  if  Sammy’s  narrative  bears  witness  to  the
changes that took place in his life, it is surely because he expects it to serve — apart
from the aesthetic effects that the literary artist’s work may have — as a moral model
for  the  readers.  These  can,  thanks  to  Sammy’s  example,  use  their  own  productive
is  ‘constitutive  of  self-constancy’;  but,  unlike  abstract  sameness,  it  ‘can  include  change,
mutability, within the cohesion of one’s lifetime’ (246). Grasping one’s life as a narrative helps to
understand oneself, for the ‘writer’ is at the same time the ‘reader’ of one’s life (246).
Sammy Mountjoy is convinced that the reason why ‘all patterns’ that he has tried to impose on
life ‘have broken one after another’ is ‘that life is random’ (Golding 1959: 25); but the attempt to
understand how the child turned into the adult narrator by imposing a narrative pattern on his
life brings him close to Ricoeur’s understanding of identity as ‘the discordant concordance that
constitutes the cohesiveness of a life’ (Ricoeur 1988: 140). Nevertheless, there might be a crucial
difference  between Sammy’s  and  Ricoeur’s  uses  of  narrative.  Though Ricoeur  sees  narrative
identity as including the possibility of  revision — ‘the story of  a life comes to be constituted
through  a  series  of  rectifications  applied  to  previous  narratives’  (247)  —  and  of  initiating
something new, there are limits to the changes than one can introduce, as the principle of self-
constancy, and thus of responsibility, ‘is the highest factor’ in narrative self-fashioning (249). If
Ricoeur’s theory is interpreted as stating that, while all actions for which one feels responsible
must be included in one’s life story, the latter may also include events for which one does not feel
responsible, then Sammy’s autobiography is of a piece with that theory. If, however, the theory is
interpreted as stating that one’s responsibility must extend to all the events included in one’s life
story,  regardless of  how one feels about them, then Sammy’s autobiography goes against the
theory, as Sammy denies all responsibility for the earliest events of his life: they can be included
in  his  life  story,  but  not  morally  integrated.  Sammy’s  position  might  contradict  Ricoeur’s
understanding  of  narrative  identity;  and  though  it  tallies  with  the  opinion,  voiced  by  a
philosopher  like Galen Strawson,  that some people  see their lives  as episodic  rather  than as
continuous narratives, it also contradicts Strawson’s view that in the episodic life the present is
no ‘less informed by or responsible to the past’ than in the continuous life (Strawson 2004: 432).
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imagination to anticipate how their decisions would change their future, and thus take
the appropriate actions. And if the readers can follow Sammy into a better life, it is not
because of his vision (let us recall that Schopenhauer describes it as a consequence of
grace rather than of a voluntary effort), but because the freedom of choice — which is,
the novel implies, available to everybody — can not only lead to sin but also lead away
from it. In other parts of this study I shall examine, on the one hand, the life-changing
insight  that  comes  from saintly  vision  and the  other  kinds  of  metaphysical  insight
identified by Schopenhauer, and, on the other, Sammy’s free embrace of evil, which can
only be understood in the context of the increasing differences between Golding’s and
Schopenhauer’s  world views. Before that,  however,  it  is  necessary  to examine other
aspects of Golding’s novels, beginning with his characters’ experience of space and the
modes  of  consciousness  by  means  of  which  they  go beyond the  physical  sphere  of
matter.
3.1.1.1.4. Modes of Spatial Awareness in the Sea Trilogy
A similar interpretation to the one given for time in Free Fall can be offered regarding
the  treatment  of  space  in  the  Sea  Trilogy.  Here  it  is  Reverend  Colley’s  diary  that
includes the three varieties of representation that I have brought up in relation to time.
Though the comments that Schopenhauer makes about the human experience of space
are by no means as suggestive as those about time, it is easy to identify the three kinds
of spatial awareness that Colley speaks of as felt space, conceptualised space and the
sense of space that results from the marriage between the imagination and reason.
The  main  character  and  narrator  of  the  trilogy  is  Edmund  Talbot,  a  young
gentleman who has been forced to learn his way into adulthood during a year-long
voyage to Australia in the earlier nineteenth-century. The first book of the trilogy, Rites
of Passage, begins as a journal that Talbot keeps during the voyage for his godfather,
who has found him a post in the administration of the Australian colony. When Colley
dies,  apparently of unbearable shame after being humiliated in an Equator-crossing
ceremony, Talbot appropriates the diary that the parson has been keeping for his sister
and inserts it into his own.
155
Golding’s Metaphysics
Though Colley’s  diary will  soon acquire  more sombre overtones,  at  first  it  is  an
innocent record of his reflections about the voyage on which he has embarked and the
people with whom he will have to live for several months. Not long after the ship has set
sail, the cleric confesses to his sister the ‘curious feelings about the strangeness of the
world’ that have seized him on the open sea (Golding 1991: 173). His first thoughts draw
attention to  the surprising fact  that  the dark surface  of  the sea prevents  him from
appreciating its depth:
I went to the side of the vessel and leaned against the railings … and looked down where the
timbers of our enormous vessel bulge out past her closed gunports. Her slight progress made a
tiny ripple in that sea which I made myself to inspect coldly, as it were. My sense of its depth —
but how am I to say this? I have seen many a millpond or corner of a river seem as deep! (Golding
1991: 173).
This quotation refers to an object located immediately before the observer in space as
he can feel it  from outside without having any possibility of penetrating beneath its
surface. When one looks in this way at the ‘material nature of the globe’, as Colley says
(Golding 1991: 173), one can only perceive the outer physical appearances that are in
sight.
From this feeling of the space that extends right before his eyes, Colley moves on,
pushed by his incipient homesickness, to how, in order ‘to calculate that segment of
water and earth and  terrible deep rock’ that separates him from their village, he will
have  to  ask  a  shipman,  ‘who  will  be  well  enough  acquainted  with  the  angles  and
appropriate mathematics of the case’  (Golding 1991: 174).15 Here we are confronted
with abstract geometrical space, which can be measured and calculated. This procedure
allows  the  subject  to  get  an  objective  impression  of  distance  without  moving  from
where he or she is. (As with time, space can be conceptualised in different ways.)
After  this  reflection  on  how  the  conceptualisation  of  space  and  its  rational
calculation can give him a pretty accurate idea of his current position in the world,
Colley realises that his imagination is beginning to run wild. Though he manages to
15 A similar instance of conceptualised space appears in Pincher Martin, where Pincher’s imaginary
surrogate uses a primitive diagram, made with his knife, to calculate in inches, and then mentally
in miles, the distance at which he can be seen from passing ships (see Golding 1956: 106).
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restrain himself from ‘looking … over the horizon (in [the] imagination, of course)’ in
his sister’s direction (Golding 1991: 174), he cannot help wondering if everything will be
upside down in Australia:
How immeasurably  strange it  will  be  at  the Antipodes to stare  (near  enough I think)  at  the
buckles of my shoes and suppose you — forgive me, I am off in a fantasy again! Do but think that
there the very stars will be unfamiliar and the moon stood on her head? (Golding 1991: 174)
This is the experience of space that arises from the alliance between the imagination
and reason.  In the above passages imaginatively reproduced space includes Colley’s
remembrance of different English settings, always with the awareness that he is not
there,  and  the  image  of  Australia,  another  there,  this  time  productively  imagined,
where he has never been and where he will never be.
3.1.1.2. The Grasp of the Physical and Metaphysical Sides of the World
Golding’s views on the different dimensions of what there is both within and without
the  field  of  human  knowledge  are,  like  Schopenhauer’s,  quite  complex.  As  in  the
philosopher’s  works,  in  Golding’s  the  distinction between non-rational  and rational
knowledge is cross-cut by another, to which he often refers as the distinction between
the dimensions of matter and spirit. Matter — which the novelist sometimes calls the
universe — corresponds to what in my discussion of Schopenhauer I identified as the
physical  realm.  Spirit  includes  Schopenhauer’s  metaphysical  realm,  which  can  be
known, as well as the unknowable thing-in-itself. For Golding, the physical dimension
and  the  spiritual  dimension  make  up  the  entire  cosmos.  I  shall  deal  with  the
unknowable thing-in-itself at the end of this chapter. In this and the following sections
I shall stick to those characteristics of the spiritual plane that can be known, that is, to
what Schopenhauer designates the metaphysical field of knowledge. The following table
summarises  the  correspondences  between  Golding’s  and  Schopenhauer’s















Table 3: Planes of Human Existence in Schopenhauer and Golding
For Golding, as for Schopenhauer, appreciating the aesthetic, moral, epistemological
and ontological significance of what lies beyond physical appearances is a fundamental
aspect of being human. In Golding, as in Schopenhauer, both physical matter and those
aspects of spirit that we can know are initially accessible to the non-rational intellect in
the form of feelings, and only then converted into abstract concepts. Cognition of the
world’s  metaphysical  plane  seldom  goes  beyond  inchoate  feelings;  when  people
verbalise their conceptions of the world they usually refer to its physical side (usually by
using language denotatively), and, with the exception of philosophers, when people try
to  convey  their  awareness  of  its  metaphysical  side  they  seldom  appeal  to  their
audience’s rational intellect (most frequently by using language in an evocative way).
This may explain why, as we saw in the first part of this study, Golding’s critics have
tended  to  identify  physical  representation  with  reason  and  denotation,  on  the  one
hand, and metaphysical representation with feeling and evocation, on the other. I shall
try not to make the same mistake, keeping the three pairs separated (if only because, as
I have shown, Golding’s characters come into contact with physical objects as much
through non-rational feelings as through the rational concepts that derive from them,
and because his narrators use evocation not only to arouse metaphysical feelings but
also physical feelings). Moreover, given the presence in Golding’s novels of aesthetic
contemplation  and  of  inward  observation  (both  of  which  refer,  according  to
Schopenhauer,  to  metaphysical  appearances),  we  must  also  bear  in  mind  that  in
Golding the distinction between physical matter and metaphysical spirit  may not be
exactly the same as the opposition between appearance and essence.
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Golding’s position, repeated in most of his writings, is that human experience would
be greatly impoverished if we could not step out, a least occasionally, from the physical
boundaries of the world. To him, human life takes place simultaneously in two different
but  complementary  dimensions.  In  the  following  passage,  from  the  essay  entitled
‘Utopias and Antiutopias’, he labels one of the dimensions spiritual, and notes that it
coexists  with  another  dimension  —  here  unnamed  yet  easy  to  identify  as  that  of
physical events — to which an everyday experiences like riding a bicycle are usually
reduced:
Consider a man riding a bicycle. … We know he got on the bicycle and started to move. We know
that at some point he will stop and get off. … That is the metaphor for the journey through life of
any living thing … To confuse the issue I  might  add in parenthesis that I  believe in another
spiritual dimension which crosses that journey at right angles, so to speak (Golding 1984a: 178).16
In two other pieces published in the same volume, ‘Belief and Creativity’ and the Nobel
lecture given in 1983, Golding is more explicit. Side by side with the dimension which
‘we know through our eyes at the telescope and microscope and open for daily use’,
Golding places another dimension which scientists ‘ignore’ (Golding 1984a: 201, 204).
The first is the physical side of the world, while the latter — which he again defines as
‘spiritual’ (204) — comprises the immanent metaphysical side of the knowable world
plus ‘everything else that is in every state and level of being’, that is, whatever may exist
in a transcendent sphere beyond our knowledge, making up ‘a whole which is quite
unimaginable’ (201). Establishing an ad hoc distinction, Golding says that for him the
physical side is  the ‘universe’,  while the spiritual side is  the ‘cosmos’ (201). When I
discuss Golding’s faith in the existence of other, parallel worlds of which we can have
no real  knowledge,  I  shall  deal  directly  with the unfathomable  thing-in-itself.  Until
then, my focus will continue to be only on the knowable world. Thus my argument will
provisionally  develop  as  if  Schopenhauer’s  metaphysics  and  Golding’s  spirit  were
perfectly synonymous.
16 At  the  same time as  it  serves  Golding  to  illustrate  the  interpenetration  of  the  physical  and




Having introduced the distinction between the physical universe and the spiritual
side of the cosmos, the Nobel lecture refers to an earlier attempt to bring these two
planes together. This attempt is not in the form of an essay, but of a novel,  Free Fall,
where he couches the distinction (somewhat confusingly) in terms of complementary
worlds. Towards the end of his self-examination, in the course of which he recalls the
role played in his upbringing by Nick Shales (the science teacher) and Rowena Pringle
(the religion teacher), Sammy reaches the conclusion that people ‘live in two worlds at
once’, both of which ‘are real’ (Golding 1959: 251, 253). There is a kind of explanation,
of  the  kind  epitomised  by  science,  that  throws  light  on  the  world  and  makes  the
advances of modern life possible; but it also makes the world seem less mysterious than
it actually is, and separates it from human subjectivity and motivation:
All day long the trains run on rails. Eclipses are predictable. Penicillin cures pneumonia and the
atom splits to order. All  day long,  year in,  year out, the daylight explanation drives back the
mystery and reveals a reality usable, understandable and detached (Golding 1959: 252).
There are occasions, however, when ‘The scalpel and the microscope fail’; one of these
occasions is when it is necessary to investigate human behaviour (Golding 1959: 252).
What Golding calls  daylight explanation cannot go beyond our external actions. For
this reason, it  can neither describe the sources of human conduct nor attach  moral
value to  it.  If  we want  to  overcome the limitations of  the  ‘materialistic’ perspective
(226), we must resort to alternative descriptions. In doing so we enter the metaphysical
realm of spirit, the only one in which morals make sense: ‘All day long action is weighed
in the balance and found not opportune nor fortunate or ill-advised, but good or evil.
For this mode which we must call the spirit breathes through the universe and does not
touch it’ (252–3).
In  Free Fall, physical and metaphysical cognition are associated with Nick Shales
and Rowena Pringle,  respectively.  Sammy’s  relationship  to  the two teachers  proves
crucial in his intellectual development. So potent is their influence that Sammy calls
them his second ‘parents’, stating that ‘if anyone had made me, they made me’ (Golding
1959: 194).  In Miss Pringle’s  classroom he discovers the mysteries of the Bible,  the
majesty of the metaphysical dimension, and the need for moral judgement. In another
classroom,  Mr  Shales  speaks  of  an  entirely  different  dimension,  dominated  by  the
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‘mechanics of cause and effect’ (5). From Nick’s perspective, the physical outlook seems
‘impregnable  plate-armour’;  from the perspective of  spirit,  Nick’s  beliefs  seem ‘very
formal, very complete, very ignorant’ (6).
A similar opinion about physical knowledge is voiced by Dean Jocelin in The Spire,
Golding’s following novel, where the opposition between the two complementary sides
of experience leads to the same conclusion as in Free Fall.17 The narrative recounts the
construction of a four-hundred-foot spire in mediaeval England. The action of the novel
is triggered by an episode during which, in his own account, Dean Jocelin understands
God’s will to be that a great spire be added to the existing cathedral. On the basis of this
alleged revelation, the Dean drives the master builder Roger Mason to carry out the
project despite the temple’s marshy foundations. The narrator abstains from giving us
clear evidence to decide whether or not Jocelin is a true visionary; but at the same time
the text also undermines the scepticism of Jocelin’s opponents. The story begins many
years after Jocelin had is revelation, when the construction of the spire has already
started. Even before the builders begin to experience any serious difficulties, Jocelin
reveals that his memory of his vision is as faint as that of ‘a dream remembered from
childhood’ (Golding 1964: 67). The only proof that the construction of the spire is in
response  to  God’s  intention  is  Jocelin’s  word,  but  frequent  doubts  are  cast  on  his
sanctity and his very sanity. However, it soon becomes clear that those who criticise the
Dean’s unquestioning religiosity — beginning with Roger — are motivated by a short-
sighted  perspective  based  on  rational  calculation.  Even  the  other  priests  are  too
concerned  with  worldly  business  to  pay  attention  to  the  manifestations  of  the
supernatural. The building work destroys the normal fabric of cathedral life and ruins
the lives of all involved. No longer blinded by the intensity of the revelation, Jocelin
eventually  sees  so  much  destruction  that  he  is  forced  to  recognise  his  own  secret
motivations — the hitherto unconscious sexual desire for Goody Pangall that he has
been sublimating — as well as those of the people round him. After the work has been
brought to completion,  Jocelin’s  life  ends in puzzlement as he observes the soaring
pinnacle.
Throughout the novel  Jocelin speaks about the material  and the spiritual  — the
latter  being  the  origin  of  his  conception  of  the  soaring  spire  —  as  two  distinct
17 I have discussed The Spire elsewhere (Saavedra-Carballido 2014).
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dimensions of experience. While he is firmly positioned in the latter, which he equates
with his own religious faith, the former is occupied by Roger Mason. While Jocelin is
certain that ‘The spiritual is to the material three times real’ (Golding 1964: 193), he is
not so stupid as to interfere with the business of building the new steeple, and leaves it
to Roger Mason to work out the means to build a durable structure. The master builder
tries to convince him that it is madness to continue building without consideration of
the physical laws that the materials with which he works obey. As the two characters
soon realise, in the absence of any common intellectual ground they can only share the
same perspective  if  one  succeeds  in  forcing his  own point  of  view upon the other.
Jocelin tries to convince Roger and his army of workers that the spire’s erection has
been ordained by God Himself, while the master builder reacts by exposing the Dean’s
folly. When Roger attempts to persuade Jocelin to stop building, he emphasises the
physical characteristics of stone and glass:
‘Look down, Father — right over the parapet, all the way down …’.
‘I see’
‘Let your eye crawl down like an insect … You think these walls are strong because they’re
stone; but I know better. We’ve nothing but a skin of glass and stone stretched between four
stone rods, one at each corner. D’you understand that? … Look down, Father … I’ve clamped the
stones together but still  I can’t make them stronger than stone. Stone snaps, crumbles, tears’
(Golding 1964: 117).
Even so, Jocelin remains blind to all  considerations of feasibility and insists on the
need to ‘build in faith, against advice’ (Golding 1964: 108). Apparently, the foundations
are not strong enough, and neither are the four central pillars that have to bear the new
steeple:  under  its  weight,  they  start  to  bend.  And  yet,  in  the  end,  the  pinnacle  is
finished,  and the cathedral  does  not  collapse.  As  Lerner  puts  it:  ‘When building is
concerned, Roger … understands what he is saying; and he is shown wrong. Jocelin, in
his ignorance succeeds: for all his corrupt motives, for all his defeat as a human being,
he built the spire’ (Lerner 1981: 7). In the world that the novel depicts, spirit triumphs
162
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
over matter.18 Even if it is Roger Mason who, being force to translate spiritual insight
into technical solutions, invents the steel bands that bind the tower together, the fact is
that, were it not for Jocelin’s spiritual certainty, nobody would have had the idea of
building the spire in the first place: ‘The function of a Jocelin is not to brush aside the
master builder, it is to recognise Roger’s genius, and to drive him to do what he would
not otherwise have managed’  (Lerner 1981:  7).  Whether this  means or not that  the
dimension of the spirit makes miracles possible — not only in this novel, but also in
other books of Golding’s, and by extension in the real world — is a moot point (it could
be argued that not knowing the reasons why something happens does not mean that
those reasons do not exist). Despite Sammy Mountjoy’s talk of ‘a world of miracle’ in
Free Fall (Golding 1959: 189),  Golding’s novels always leave us in doubt whether a
materialistic interpretation suffices. The fact that Jocelin’s pinnacle eventually stands
might be ‘“a miracle”’, as Jocelin believes, or a tribute to Roger Mason’s expertise, or
sheer luck (1964: 38).
The two dimensions — the physical surface and the metaphysical underpinnings —
reappear in later novels, published after Golding had begun to question the possibility
of metaphysics. Thus,  Darkness Visible and  The Paper Men go as far as to centre on
characters who believe that the metaphysical side of the opposition is the place where
the essence of the world — and hence of human begins — can be found.
Darkness Visible is divided into three parts. The first part of the novel centres on a
boy  called  Matty.  The  opening  chapter  describes  him  as  a  naked,  half-burnt  child
emerging from a bomb explosion during the London Blitz.  After his discharge from
hospital, he becomes a ward of the state and is put into a boarding school, where he is
shunned by the other children and rejected by one of his teachers,  the homosexual
paedophile Mr Pedigree. The second part of the novel focuses on two twin girls, Toni
and Sophy Stanhope.  Their  story starts  in their  childhood and continues until  they
18 The real-life model of the novel’s cathedral lies in Salisbury cathedral, with which Golding was
familiar  (see Biles  1970:  96 ff.;  Carey 2009:  128–9).  His  essay ‘An Affection  for  Cathedrals’
contains a description of how Salisbury cathedral stands ‘in the middle of a swamp’ and ‘with
complete indifference to such things as health, foundations … and general practicability’ (Golding
1984: 17). Golding insinuates that there may be ‘a weight-bearing stratum in the swamp’ about
which ‘the builders could not have known’, so the building ‘does not float by some miracle’ (17);
but The Spire never mentions this bedrock.
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become young adults. The twins are as exquisite as they are loveless. Sophy is presented
as the kind of person that can only experiment a physical orgasm by inflicting pain on
others; Toni ends up becoming an international terrorist. The third part of the novel
brings all four characters together. Sophy and Toni plan to kidnap the son of an oil
sheik from the school where Matty works, but Matty sacrifices his life to foil their plans.
In the final scene of the narrative what seems to be his ghostly apparition causes Mr
Pedigree’s death, liberating the former teacher from the desire that has him ‘wandering
round lavatories and public parks’ in search of possible victims (Golding 1979: 260).
One of  the  novel’s  secondary characters  points  to  the possibility  of  piercing the
physical  surface of  things,  i.e.  of  pulling down the cognitive wall  of  separation that
egocentric consciousness has erected among individuals (and which certain ideologies
can present as impossible to destroy), when he explains that those who gain an insight
beyond the physical dimension are generally seen as ‘“funny”’ for believing that they
‘“could see through a brick wall”’ (Golding 1979: 258).  Darkness Visible does not say
that this is an easy thing to do, yet it does suggest that the goal is feasible, and that once
it has been attained the physical side of the world is revealed, in Baker’s words, as ‘the
facade of a spiritual realm’ that one can access through hidden doors (2000: 325). In
the novel the character with the clearest metaphysical abilities is Matty. As the story
unfolds,  we discover that  his  life  has been marked by his  alertness  to  a dimension
beyond physical surfaces, ‘the world of spirit’  (Golding 1979: 233). In the novel this
metaphysical dimension is presented as the place where the essence of the world can be
found. Pausing to examine the objects displayed in a shop window, Matty sees a glass
ball lying on a wooden stand. When he stares into the ball, he suddenly pierces through
the usual ‘cloth of what had seemed separate’, becoming conscious of what the narrator
calls — using an expression with Melvillian pedigree — ‘the warp and woof from which
events and people get their being’; this is ‘the seamy side, where the connections are’
(48), and whose knowledge — and the conclusions that he draws from it — separates
Matty from most of the characters with which he comes into contact.
Though not as explicitly, The Paper Men also makes reference to the opposition
between the realm of appearances and the essence behind them. The narrative presents
itself as the autobiography of the famous British novelist  Wilf Barclay. Wilf tells the
reader about his declining career and about his frenzied flight from Rick L. Tucker, an
American academic that aspires to be his biographer. Urged by Rick to review his past,
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Wilf reveals his ugly side. Eventually convinced that he is an unredeemable sinner, he
abruptly decides to write his autobiography for Rick. Unaware of this, the latter seeks to
take revenge and kills the subject of his research.
The most important episode for our purposes here is the one in which the novel’s
main characters, the alcoholic writer and the aspiring biographer, go for a walk along a
mountain path. Rick draws Wilf’s attention to the sound of a nearby stream:
The stream, a single skein of falling water … had two voices, not one. There was the cheerful
babble, a kind of frivolity as if  the thing, the Form, enjoyed its bounding passage downward,
through space. Then running under that was a deep, meditative hum as if despite the frivolity and
surface rattle the thing sounded from some deep secret of the mountain itself (Golding 1984b:
83).
Commenting  on  this  passage,  Redpath  persuasively  argues  that  the  two  voices
represent the two sides of experience to which Golding’s writings call attention: ‘The
first voice … is surface existence, the daily life we lead working, sleeping, and forming
relationships with people and things. … Beneath this is … the “deep secret”, and  The
Paper Men treats this as a metaphysical question of being’ (Redpath 1986: 183). As Wilf
puts it, the question of being is that of ‘asisness,  Istigkeit’ or ‘isness’ (Golding 1984b:
161, 176), that is, of the essence of the world in which his own character is rooted. Wilf
refers  to  this  essence  as  ‘inexplicable’  and  ‘indescribable’  (176).  In  Schopenhauer’s
terms, the reason why Wilf finds it impossible to explain the essence of the world is that
it is independent of any of the forms of representation that locate object in time, space,
in the chain of causes and effects, or, at the very least, in relation to a subject, in other
words,  that  this  essence  is  groundless;  as  for  the  impossibility  to  describe  it,  the
problem only arises if language is used denotatively. Using language evocatively — as
Wilf does, without meaning it, when he speaks of the mountain stream with two voices
— makes metaphysical communication easier.
In the beginning, Wilf only pays attention to the sound of the stream because Rick
has prompted him to; but when he loses his footing and falls off the mountain path, he
is overcome by the fear to die, and he realises that the only thing that he can now hear




The deeper voice of the stream had consumed the lighter one. It was as if  the mountain was
speaking with the same deep tone that had been audible and now, in the mind, visible round the
falling lump of rock (Golding 1984b: 89).
Here,  writes  Redpath,  ‘the  stream speaks  in  one  voice,  the  voice  of  the  mountain,
revealing what lies behind day-to-day being’ (1986: 184). This is the voice of the deeper
metaphysical level. When Wilf ‘discovers that he was in no danger of falling down the
mountain, that death and what lies beyond death was, in fact, nowhere near him’ (184),
this single voice undergoes another transformation: ‘I  found myself  listening to the
sound of water. It had only one voice, and this was the light, babbling one’ (Golding
1984b: 135). Redpath describes this ‘surface voice’ as the sound of ‘the “frivolity” of
ordinary life’  (1986: 184).  All  these changes can be interpreted as follows: when he
realises how dangerous the path that he is following may be, and he begins to envisage
the  possibility  of  dying,  Wilf  hears  two  voices  in  the  stream,  one  symbolising  his
everyday concerns and the other symbolising the usually hidden essence of the world
that threatens to swallow him up; when this possibility becomes a certainty, he gets so
frightened  that  he  can  only  hear  the  deeper  voice  that  announces  his  individual
annihilation; and when he discovers that he is sound and safe, he returns to his former
frame of mind dominated by superficial concerns.
Indirectly,  but  also  relating  to  the  opposition  between  physical  surfaces  and
metaphysical depths, the fact that the stream has two voices may be linked to Wilf’s
refusal  to  tell  Tucker  about  his  past,  and  hence  to  disclose  his  real  personality.
According to Redpath, Wilf is intent on hiding ‘the deep hum’ of his memories of lust
and perversion with his lover Lucinda, of pride and obscenity towards his first wife
Margaret, of disloyalty towards his second wife Elizabeth, of his latent homosexuality,
and of his probable killing of a man in a hit and run accident (1986: 188). By contrast,
he has no qualms to accept ‘the surface babble of life’, and even adds to it through a
disconcerting accumulation of erudite quotes and indirect allusions, as if he wanted the
sound of other voices to muffle his own, thus burying his true nature under them (188).
This  means  that  the  deep  and surface  voices  of  the  stream not  only  symbolise  the
essence of the world and the manifestations — here,  the mountain landscape — on
which, as a rule, we put the focus, but also Wilf’s innate character, which is but another
aspect of the world’s essence. Of course,  Wilf’s  strategy fails,  as the world’s essence
166
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
shows its true colours when he least expects it. This resurfacing of his inner being is
embodied in the annoying literary critic that insists on following him wherever he goes:
‘In running from Tucker, Barclay is running from himself’, yet ‘wherever Barclay runs
Tucker seems to be  there too because this inner life accompanies Barclay’ (189). It is
therefore appropriate that it is Tucker, the only person who may uncover Wilf’s darkest
secrets, who draws the novelist’s attention to the double voice of the stream, the thin
superficial voice of everyday life and the deep voice that represents both the writer’s
innate character and the essential kernel of the world.
One of Golding’s recurrent ideas is that we cannot forget that we live simultaneously
in both planes of existence. Doing otherwise, Golding warns us, is not only a mistake
that  distorts  our  knowledge  of  the  world,  but  is  a  kind  of  perversion  that  causes
unnecessary  harm.  For  this  reason,  human beings  need  to  be  aware  that  both  the
physical and the metaphysical perspectives coexist,  and then, as the novelist says to
Biles,  neither  makes sense in isolation: ‘Either,  on its  own,  makes sense,  but when
you’ve got them both there — and this is the situation — neither one taken alone does’
(in Biles 1970: 82). Living as if only one realm were real may make things seem less
messy. The problem is not only that it is an impoverishment of experience, or that it
amounts to self-deception, but that it can be very dangerous. This danger appears in a
number of novels, but here I shall only analyse its manifestations in Free Fall and The
Spire, the two that I have been discussing in greatest detail in this section. Miss Pringle,
Sammy and Jocelin prove that it is just as bad to have an empty, materialistic lifestyle,
as if the world were composed of depthless material objects, as being so enmeshed in
the metaphysical realm as to grow blind to the material exigencies of everyday life.
In  Free Fall,  as  we have seen,  the conflict  between a  concentration on physical
phenomena and the emphasis on the metaphysical realm is embodied in Nick Shales
and Miss Pringle. Poised between Nick’s science lesson and Miss Pringle’s readings of
the Bible, Sammy struggles to bring their stances together. Both teachers present their
systems as complete and orderly, but Miss Pringle’s is more attractive.  The problem
with Miss Pringle is that she has ‘deceived herself completely’; forgetting that she also
has those needs, she acts as if she lived ‘in only one world’, that of spirit (Golding 1959:
252).  At first Sammy presents himself as an ‘earnest metaphysical boy’, for whom his
religion teacher’s ‘stories where the scale is good and evil seemed the hub of life, the
essential business’, and he is convinced that and Miss Pringle are ‘too of a kind’ (196,
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204). Though young Sammy is glad to discover that ‘Watts invented the steam engine’,
he is more interested in the voice that ‘spoke to Moses out of a bush that burned but
was not consumed away’ (196). This flame he finds ‘far more important’ than Nick’s
lessons about the composition of water (197).
In hindsight,  however,  he realises that Miss Pringle is  an expert manipulator,  ‘a
past-master of crowd psychology’ (Golding 1959: 195). Her lesson to her pupils is not
one of sympathy and forgiveness: ‘She ruled, not by love but by fear. Her weapons were
no cane, they were different, subtle and cruel, unfair and vicious. They were teeny, arch
sarcasms that made the other children giggle and tore the flesh’ (195). Miss Pringle is
dangerous because she is oblivious of the everyday needs (mental as well as bodily) of
other people.
After  suffering  the  psychological  consequences  of  her  fanatic  catechism,  Sammy
starts to believe that ‘when she made [him] suffer … the fault was [his]’ (195), and his
admiration turns into dislike for her hypocrisy:
how could she crucify a small boy, tell him that he sat out away from the others because he was
not fit to be with them and then tell the story of that other crucifixion with every evidence in her
voice of sorrow for human cruelty and wickedness? (Golding 1959: 210).
Eventually,  personal  antipathy  for  Miss  Pringle’s  ‘cruelty  and  discipline’  turns  into
distaste for her whole world view, whose recognition of the metaphysical roots of moral
judgement she reduces to a constant threat of punishment (Golding 1959: 197). Nick’s
materialism is not only ‘dull’  but short-sighted (6): being sceptical about everything
other than causally determined events, for him ‘the word freedom is a pious hope for an
illusion’ (191). His materialism may prevent him from realising the metaphysical roots
of human behaviour; but he finds it so ‘easy to be good’ that his pupils adore him (214).
In the end, it is Nick’s personal qualities that prompt Sammy to embrace his outlook:
‘The  beauty  of  Miss  Pringle’s  cosmos  was  vitiated  because  she  was  a  bitch.  Nick’s
stunted universe was irradiated by his love of people’ (226). As a consequence, Sammy
repudiates metaphysics and adopts a purely physical approach to the world. Contrary
to  what  he  thinks,  Sammy’s  conclusion  might  have  little  to  do  with  ‘logical’
considerations  (226).  The  distance  between  Sammy’s  arguments  and  his  true
motivation illustrates his own claim that, however much we try to rationalise them,
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sometimes ‘our decisions are not logical but emotional’, in other words, that ‘We have
reason and are irrational’  (222). Like other Golding novels,  Free Fall is intended to
convey the idea that, though human beings are rational animals, human attitudes and
behaviour normally owe more to feelings than to reason.
Reasoning that ‘There are no morals that can be deduced from natural science’, he
concludes that, without metaphysics, the world is ‘a savage place’ where a man has been
left  alone  to  ‘enjoy  what  he  could  while  it  was  going’  (Golding  1959:  226).  In  the
physical dimension of matter, Sammy thinks, ‘man is the highest’ and ‘right and wrong
[are] nominal and relative’ (226). Not content with stating that ‘good and evil is decided
by majority vote’, it occurs to him that ‘Conduct is not good or bad, but discovered or
got away with’ (218). But then, why should he ‘go with a majority decision? Why should
not Sammy’s good be what Sammy decides?’ (226). The fact that his attitude would
have  revolted  Nick  Shales  does  not  deter  Sammy,  nor  does  he  realise  that  his
conclusion might be simply a way of justifying the satisfaction of his desires (desires of
which he is aware and which he can only have felt inside himself, that is, according to
Schopenhauer, metaphysically). In the end, Sammy’s line of thought makes him the
mirror image of Miss Pringle, and just as dangerous as her. She torments her students
in the name of a badly understood religion; he ends up sliding into a life of depravity,
and abusing his girlfriend Beatrice for the sake of pure physical pleasure.19
Though  in  The  Spire no  one  adopts  the  amoral  materialism  that  Sammy
recommends in  Free Fall  — and which he takes to sanction his  immoralism — the
contrast  between Nick’s  physical  short-sightedness  and Miss  Pringle’s  metaphysical
fanaticism reappears in the relationship between Roger Mason and Dean Jocelin. At
the outset of the novel Jocelin is,  like Miss Pringle, blinded to human needs by the
exclusive concern with metaphysics. As Kinkead-Weekes states, the rest of the novel
19 The characterisation of Sammy as an uber-materialist repeats that of Pincher Martin’s surrogate.
The private  world  that  Pincher  creates  and of  which his  surrogate  is  the centre  is  — as  the
allusions to painted paper and theatrical representation make clear — a world of surfaces without
real  consistency.  His  reliance  on a  materialistic  ideology — whose moral  implications  are  so
graphically couched by Sammy Mountjoy — leads him to replicate the physical aspects of the
public  world without realising that its  metaphysical  aspects are  equally  important.  When his
world has collapsed almost entirely he begins to suspect that, in comparison, the regions that
await him after death are ‘three times real’ (Golding 1956: 200).
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serves ‘to bring home to Jocelin … how blind he has been to physical reality, to people’
(Kinkead-Weekes 1987: 69).
The first scene of the novel shows us Jocelin on a visit to the building works. One of
the workers is  carving a gargoyle in the Dean’s honour.  ‘Nose,  like an eagle’s  beak.
Mouth open wide, lined cheeks, hollow deep under the cheekbone, eyes deep in their
hollows’ (Golding 1964: 23) — this is what the gargoyle looks like,  in the narrator’s
words. But when Jocelin looks at it full of pride, it does not remind him — as it does the
reader — of a stooping bird of prey. What Jocelin sees instead is himself in rapture,
‘Rushing on with the angels, the infinite speed that is stillness, hair blown, torn back,
straightened with the wind of the spirit, mouth open, not for uttering rainwater, but
hosannas  and hallelujahs’  (24).  The  Dean,  however,  is  no  angel.  One  by  one,  four
people  are  sacrificed on the altar  of  his  obsession: Roger Mason,  Pangall  and their
respective  wives.  Far  from  condemning  it,  Jocelin  encourages  and  condones  the
adultery of Roger Mason and Goody Pangall because ‘“She will keep him here”’ (64).
Later on we learn of the Dean’s secret love for her. When Goody gets pregnant and dies
in childbirth,  Roger Mason breaks under the strain and becomes a drunkard; later,
after  a  final  confrontation with Jocelin,  he  tries  to  commit suicide and ends up as
helpless as an infant child, nursed by his cuckolded wife. As for Pangall, he disappears
mysteriously, and when we discover that he has been killed and thrown into the pit
under the crossing as  a  sacrificial  victim,  it  becomes clear  that  Jocelin is  indirectly
responsible for this (and that he has always known, in what he calls the cellarage of his
mind,  how it  happened).  The overall  effect  of  Jocelin’s  madness on the rest  of  the
cathedral’s  community  is  disastrous,  as  the Pope’s  visitor  notes:  the  services  of  the
church have been discontinued, and the burning candles have been replaced by the
tools of the workers, whom the visitor from Rome describes as ‘“Murderers, cutthroats,
rowdies, brawlers, rapers, notorious fornicators, sodomites, atheists, or worse”’ (167).
In  the end,  even Jocelin’s  physical  health  suffers  too.  One day,  when he catches  a
glimpse of himself reflected in a piece of metal sheet at the construction site, the first
thing that attracts his attention is ‘the wild halo of hair, the skinny arms and legs that
stuck out of a girt and dirty robe’ (154). He examines ‘his eyes, deep in sockets over
which the skin was dragged — dragged too over the cheekbones, then sucked in’, and
‘the nose like a beak and now nearly as sharp, the deep grooves in the face, the gleam of
teeth’ (154), and the image of his decrepitude startles him. Realising how much damage
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he  has  done,  as  soon  as  the  works  have  finished  he  approaches  Roger  to  ask  for
forgiveness. ‘“I thought I was doing a great work; and all I was doing was bringing ruin
and breeding hate”’ (209), he confesses, just before the master builder — a broken man
who has found refuge in drink — throws him out of his house.
3.1.1.3. The Two Cultures Debate in Golding’s Novels and Essays
So far,  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy has thrown light  on the oppositions explored in
Golding’s  novels  between  non-rational  feelings  and  rational  concepts,  between  the
focus on physical objects and the focus on metaphysical objects. In Golding these two
oppositions coalesce into a classification of the descriptions of the world that in the
course of history have been established as veritable institutions of knowledge.
For Schopenhauer, some descriptions of the world (such as science) focus on its
physical side and appeal to reason; among the ones that focus on the metaphysical side
of the world, some (art and religion) excite feelings, while others (those of philosophy)
excite rational concepts. Though he usually describes history as focusing on physical
objects and appealing to reason, he sometimes suggests that it may have a metaphysical
focus  on  people’s  inner  motivations.  Schopenhauer  thinks  that,  because  of  its
characteristic  combination  of  the  appeal  to  reason,  its  exclusive  attention  to  the
physicality of objects, and what he typically sees as its emphasis on their utility, the
scientific  description of  the  world is  usually the vehicle  of  egoistic  — perhaps even
malignant — desires,  hence less  valuable than metaphysical  descriptions,  which,  by
contrast, liberate us or else teach us how to break free from those desires.
Though he does not  provide as  many details  as  Schopenhauer,  Golding reaches
similar conclusions. The analysis of and essay that he devoted to Copernicus and of an
apparently trivial episode in the Sea Trilogy, in with the dangers of confusing religious
dogma with scientific data are described in a humorous fashion, will show how Golding
agrees  with  Schopenhauer  that  the  autonomy  of  secular  enquiry  must  be  asserted
against the influence of religion. The analysis of Golding’s essay ‘On the Crest of the
Wave’, originally published in 1960, will then show how Golding, like Schopenhauer,
not only contrasts science — whose utilitarian character he usually highlights too —
with what he calls the arts, but also how he subordinates the undeniable achievements
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of  the  physical  sciences  to  those  of  art,  religion  and  the  other  metaphysical
conceptualisations of the world. As we shall see, Golding’s preference for the arts is in
stark  contrast  with the position of  Charles  P.  Snow, another  contemporary novelist
whose  famous  1959  Rede  Lecture  on  the  two  cultures  extolled  the  revolutionary
potential of science while simultaneously dismissing the arts — epitomised by literary
studies  —  as  backward-looking. Golding’s  reasons  for  privileging  the  arts  coincide
which those given by the literary critic Frank R. Leavis in his angry response to Snow.
Because of this, Golding’s essay — which is not presented as a direct reaction to Snow’s
lecture — can be read as an indirect intervention in the two cultures debate. More to the
point here,  the arguments that Golding employs also coincide  with Schopenhauer’s:
what makes the arts so important, suggests Golding, is that only they can, to different
degrees, describe the world in its entirety, i.e. physically and metaphysically, that only
they can provide people with either aesthetic quietude or compassionate insight, only
they guide the conduct of people, only they teach us how to pass aesthetic and moral
judgements, in fine, that only they can alleviate our suffering and console us for death.
It is precisely the importance that Golding attaches to the arts that justifies discussing
his treatment of the two cultures. Though it amounts to a brief shift of attention away
from the novels (where the opposition between science and the arts is present but not
discussed directly), the discussion of ‘On the Crest of the Wave’ will ease the transition
between the fictional exploration of the varieties of knowledge, which I have already
examined, and the other issues with which his novels are most frequently concerned
(the sources of suffering, the divinity, aesthetics, morality, politics and, increasingly,
the historical evolution of society’s organisation), and which, once introduced, will take
up the rest of this study.
3.1.1.3.1. Golding’s Defence of the Autonomy of Science
Golding’s view of science is very similar to Schopenhauer’s. On the whole, both believe
that rational concepts derive their reliability and utility from the non-rational feelings
on which they are based, and in relation to which they add no new knowledge.  As
regards  scientific  enquiry,  whose  division  into  a  pure  and  an  applied  strand  they
generally  deny,  both usually  state  that  it  starts  with the perception  of  the  physical
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world, and is only as reliable and useful as this perception is accurate. We have seen
how, in  Free Fall,  Sammy Mountjoy’s references to science put the emphasis on the
way in which it reveals a reality usable where trains run on rails and penicillin cures
pneumonia. These utilitarian considerations appear in other novels too, from Lord of
the Flies (where Piggy tries to convince the other children that there are  doctors for
everything, even the inside of your mind and that if there is something wrong, there’s
someone to put it right because life is scientific) to the Sea Trilogy (where Lieutenant
Benét’s impressive inventiveness, thanks to which a broken mast is repaired, ensures
the ship’s arrival in Australia).
However,  this  is  not  the  only  account  of  science  that  appears  in  Golding’s  and
Schopenhauer’s writings. Golding’s essays sometimes offer what, from Schopenhauer’s
perspective, would be a metaphysical account of scientific discoveries, which he links to
the figure of the ‘Natural philosopher’ (Golding 1965: 130), and which has nothing to
with the technological advances that may derive from it. Indeed, this alternative view of
science is not entirely alien to Schopenhauer, who occasionally identifies the true object
of  science  –  and  of  philosophy  —  as  the  metaphysical-aesthetic,  hence  universal,
dimension of the object (see Schopenhauer 2000b: 4). Though as a rule my discussion
of science in Golding’s works will treat it as a rational enterprise whose roots are in
physical  perception  and  whose  purpose  is  necessarily  utilitarian,  this  alternative
account is suggestive enough to deserve some commentary.
In  a  piece  devoted  to  Nicolaus  Copernicus,  Golding  states  that  heliocentrism
involves ‘an imaginative break-away’ from the geocentric system (Golding 1965: 34).
Elsewhere  he  shares  with  Carey  his  belief  that  ‘the  best  kind  of  scientist  works
imaginatively’  (in Carey 1987: 183), and in a piece entitled ‘Belief and Creativity’ he
gives more detail about the role of the imagination. Here he speaks of the ‘geniuses’
that are ‘brave enough or foolish enough’ to hedge their bets on ‘a consuming belief’, a
‘most  passionate  and  unsupported  conviction’  (Golding  1984a:  189,  197).  Though
Golding concedes that ‘the structure built on it’ might well be rational, as in the cases of
science  and  philosophy  (190),  he  makes  it  clear  that  the  ground  of  this  ‘absolute
conviction, a declaration to be held in the face of all the world’ which gives those who
cling to it ‘a voice of authority’ (194, 193), is ‘mysterious’ because it is ‘irrational’ (190).
What is more, he thinks that this non-rational belief connects the work of the scientist
with that of the novelist and ‘the poet at his height’ (192). In all these cases, the ‘rare
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moments of insight’ involve the use of the imagination and are the tokens of ‘genuine
creativity’ (197, 196). On this view, creativity always has to do with aesthetics, in science
as in art. Even the heliocentric hypothesis, says Golding, was ‘aesthetic’ in character,
and Copernicus felt its truth despite being initially unable to prove it mathematically
(Golding 1965: 36). On this account, then, what triggers the scientific enterprise is the
same aesthetic feeling as in art,  and what follows this common apprehension of the
object from an aesthetic perspective is, both for the scientist and the artist, the heroic
attempt  to  convey  an  indescribable  feeling  by  means  of  rational  signs,  be  they
mathematical formulae or words.
As  I  said  before,  this  is  by  no  means  the  view of  science  that  transpires  from
Golding’s novels. On the contrary, they usually put the accent on its physical focus and
its utilitarian character. The focus on perception is what lies behind Schopenhauer’s
comments on Isaac Newton’s theory of gravity and the rest of Golding’s discussion of
Copernicus’s heliocentrism. Schopenhauer tells us that, when Newton understood how
the  system of  gravitation  worked,  and ‘attempted  to  verify  it  by  applying  it  to  the
motion of the moon’, the first results that he obtained ‘did not tally exactly’, because
‘the sole empirical datum’ of the size of the degrees of the earth’s circumference was
wrong  (Schopenhauer  2000b:  146–7).  Golding  tells  a  similar  story  Copernicus’s
heliocentric model, which at first ‘did not allow exact prediction’, among other reasons
because the empirical data recorded in the astronomical tables with which he worked
‘were inaccurate’ (Golding 1965: 37). Though Tycho Brahe, who came after Copernicus,
‘knew  the  value  of  accurate  observations,  and  spent  his  life  compiling  them’,  he
endorsed geocentrism and did not bother to correct Copernicus’s model (39). It was
only when Johannes Kepler combined Copernicus’s ideas with Brahe’s data that the
heliocentric system ‘worked exactly’ (39). What this story shows, according to Golding
(and his opinion here coincides with Schopenhauer’s), is that ‘Reason … has something
to offer but only in terms of itself and depends for its effect and use on the nature of the
premise’ (1984a: 191).
Apart  from agreeing that  scientific  concepts  are  only  as  reliable  as  the  physical
perceptions  from  which  they  derive,  Golding  and  Schopenhauer  reject  the
encroachment of religion upon the secular descriptions of the world (science, history,
art  and  philosophy).  While  Schopenhauer  asserts  the  self-sufficiency  of  philosophy
against  the  interference  of  theology,  Golding  defends  the  autonomy  of  science.
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Schopenhauer contends that ‘every … branch of knowledge is spoilt by an admixture of
theology’  (Schopenhauer 2000a: 187).  This is  particularly true of philosophy. When
religious faith interferes with its rational procedures, philosophical enquiry stops being
the secular enterprise that it should be and is used spuriously to rationalise and justify
the philosopher’s religious beliefs.  According to Schopenhauer,  if  one wants to be a
theologian,  one  ‘must  be  consistent  and  not  abandon  the  foundation  of  authority’
(2000b: 390), but this acceptance of religious dogma is paramount among the things
that one has to avoid to become a true philosopher. As regards Golding the reasons why
he defends the autonomy of science rather than of philosophy may be that religion may
diminish the accuracy of science’s theoretical results, and that science has nothing to
teach from  a practical point of view: scientific theories cannot change the conduct of
people, they cannot prevent them from harming and killing each other. By contrast, the
metaphysical  emphasis that  characterises art  and philosophy allows them to have  a
practical bearing upon their audience. This practical potential is something that these
secular  metaphysical  approaches  have  in  common  with  religion.  Noxious  as  the
influence  of  religious  doctrine  may  be  upon  them,  it  does  not  alter  their  practical
impact.
In  Golding’s  opinion,  then,  as  in  Schopenhauer’s,  among  the  approaches  that
embody secular  conceptions  of  the  world — both mention history,  art,  science and
philosophy — there are some that resent the influence of religion even more than the
others. This endorsement of the independence of secular approaches can be seen as
part  and parcel  of  the broader  process  of  modern differentiation.  According to  the
sociologist Scott Lash, ‘modernization is a process of … differentiation’ (Lash 1990: 2).
The modern period — starting in the early sixteenth century — is characterised by ‘the
development  of  many  separate  institutional,  normative  …  spheres,  each  with  their
specific conventions and modes of evaluation’ (Lash and Urry 1994: 272). It involves
the break  of  each  sphere  with  ‘heteronomous legislation  from another,  universalist
“instance” such as nature, or reason, or the real, or God’ (Lash 1990: 9). In modernity
all the spheres move away from pre-modern heteronomy — a situation in which some
spheres impose their values on the others — and towards full autonomy: they tend to be
self-legislating.  The artistic  sphere,  for  example,  moves towards works of  art  which
make reference to other works within the same field rather than to external objects, and
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which are evaluated on their own artistic merits rather than on such criteria as the non-
artistic function that they fulfil.
Schopenhauer’s rejection of the heteronomous interference of religion was relevant
because  he  was  writing  at  a  time  when  the  process  of  modern  differentiation
(autonomisation) of social spheres was still under way. In Golding’s case, this rejection
may have to do with the fact that his first published novels appear at a time when there
begin  to  be  strong  signals  of  the  reverse  process,  that  is,  of  a  postmodern  de-
differentiation  (de-autonomisation)  of  social  spheres.  In  contrast  to  modernisation,
which lasts until the mid-twentieth-century, ‘postmodernization is a process of … “de-
differentiation”’  (Lash 1990: 2).  On this view,  postmodernity ‘is  a breakdown of the
distinctiveness  of  each  sphere  and  of  the  criteria  which  legislate  within  each  …
dimension’ (Lash and Urry 1994: 272).  Whereas Schopenhauer tries to increase the
independence  of  secular  forms  of  knowledge  vis-à-vis  religious  speculation,  thus
contributing to the project of modernity, Golding sees this project as still incomplete,
and  tries  to  preserve  the  independence  of  secular  descriptions  in  the  face  of
postmodern advances.
The incomplete project that I have mentioned has strong affinities with Habermas’s
unfinished project  of  modernity.  Nevertheless,  the  very  difference  in  wording  is
intended as a hint at the contrasting views that Golding and Habermas may have on the
modern project. Though their defence of modern autonomy may be the same as regards
science, their views of art seem to be very different. In respect of literature, for instance,
Golding  conceives  of  it  as  having  an  essential  heteronomous  component,  while
Habermas  defends  the  full  autonomy  of  artistic  works,  which  are  produced  ‘all  in
accord with their own immanent logic’ (Habermas 1997: 45). For Golding, the design of
a novel,  for  example,  must have effects on the reader’s life  other than the aesthetic
experience. It is true that, for him, ‘The strength, profundity, truth of a novel lies not in
a plausible likeness and rearrangement of the phenomenal world but in a fitness with
itself’ (Golding 1984a: 146). Yet in a very general sense of the adjective — a sense that
does not exclude the ‘desires to inculcate a moral lesson’ — the novel must be ‘didactic’
(1965: 85). In addition, it must ensure a wide readership for the author; otherwise the
didactic impulse would be crippled. The idea is that ‘the novel, if it climbs into an ivory
tower, will find no audience except those with ivory towers of their own’ (1984a: 208).
Habermas also contemplates the possibility of a kind of reception, on the part of ‘the
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general public’, that recuperates the significance of works of art for everyday concerns;
in this way ‘laypeople … are capable of relating their aesthetic experience back to the
problems of their own life’ (Habermas 1997: 48, 51). But he never fails to defend the
subordination of this mode of reception to both the autonomous production and the
autonomous interpretation by ‘experts’, that is, by ‘interpreters who form part of the
process of artistic production itself’ (45, 48). After all, he concludes, ‘artistic production
will inevitably degenerate semantically if it is not pursued as the specialized treatment
of  its  own  immanent  problems,  as  an  object  of  expert  concern  without  regard  for
exoteric needs’ (51). While Golding limits himself to defending the idea that works of
art  should  not  limit  itself  to  obey  the  rules  dictated  from  other  social  spheres,
Habermas’s position comes much closer to defending the autotelism — self-sufficiency
— of the work of art.20
Despite his defence of an impure art, that is, of an art that does not fall in the trap of
autotelic aestheticism and that denies neither its practical dimension nor its ties with
other metaphysical discourses, Golding still asserts the autonomy of science. Earlier we
saw  how  Golding  used  Copernicus’s  experience  to  show  that,  though  rational
knowledge always  derives  perfectly  safe  and valid  truths  if  the  empirical  data  with
which it works are correct, if those data are incorrect the results that reason obtains
from them will be false too. Golding does not conceal the fact that the lack of exactitude
of Copernicus’s calculations was due not only to the astronomical tables with which he
was working, but also to the noxious interference of religious belief with the scientific
method. As ‘a faithful child of the Church’, he ‘still believed the circle to be the perfect
movement;  and no matter how he rearranged the solar  system with the sun at  the
center, still the old system of circles on circles did not allow exact prediction’ (Golding
1965: 37). As with the use of more precise of astronomical tables, Golding explains that
it  was  only  with Kepler  that  science  ‘got  rid  of  the  last  hangover  from the ancient
system’  that  the  Christian  Church  had  inherited  from the  Greeks  —  ‘the  idea  that
movement in  a  circle  is  perfect  and therefore  the one movement  admissible  in  the
heavens’ — and was thus able to prove Copernicus’s theory (39).
20 For the the way in which hermetic autotelism contrasts not only with heteronomy but also with
critical autonomy, see Sacido-Romero (2012: 7–8).
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While in the essay on Copernicus Golding shows how the mistakes that religious
dogma insists on imposing may prevent science from reaching valid conclusions, in the
Sea Trilogy Golding  shows that,  if  one  gives  full  credibility  to  religious  beliefs,  the
reliable conclusions reached through accurate observation and rational calculation run
the risk of being dismissed as if they were a mere fiction. Interestingly, the clearest — if
still indirect — illustration of this position appears in the Sea Trilogy, a sequence of
novels set in the early eighteenth century — Schopenhauer’s own time. Golding thus
performs one of his customary transpositions to other times of issues that he does not
want contemporary readers to overlook. The episode that concerns us here makes fun
of both literal interpretations of the Bible and of the obstacles that religion has often
put to scientific enquiry. We have already seen Reverend Colley’s reflections on time in
the first book of the trilogy,  Rites of Passage. At the end of  Rites of Passage, Talbot
puts an end to the journal that he was writing for his godfather — and in the middle of
which Talbot has inserted Colley’s own journal — and begins another one, this time for
his personal use alone. Needless to say, Talbot’s writings do much more than record
their  author’s  experiences:  much  to  his  surprise,  they  tacitly  testify  to  his  slow
psychological development. In the second book, Close Quarters, Talbot records another
suicide,  that  of  the  ship’s  servant  Wheeler,  and  his  journal  undergoes  one  more
transformation, turning into an autobiographical narrative written many years after the
completion of the voyage.  Thus,  in the third book,  Fire Down Below,  simultaneous
narration gives way to a retrospective account of young Talbot’s rite of passage into an
adult world that at the time he did not understand as well as he thought. At this point
the reader discovers a new intention of Talbot’s writing: the private diary (whose first
part is in fact a letter) eventually reveals itself as part of a travelogue, that is, in a sense,
as a message that its author, now a senior official at the Foreign Office, addresses to his
yet ‘unborn’  great-great-great-great-great grandchildren — who are contemporary of
the reader (Golding 1991: 758).
The shift from simultaneous to retrospective narration allows Talbot to comment on
the voyage from the vantage point  of  old  age.  Moreover,  it  allows him to add new
materials, written by people that did not make the voyage with him, to his narrative.
Fire  Down  Below includes,  for  example,  the  expert  opinion  of  an  acquaintance  of
Talbot’s, a scholar that rejects the existence of Antarctica because the conclusions at
which he arrives through a simple calculation — based on Talbot’s eyewitness account
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— do not tally with the data derived from a literal reading of the Bible. In response to
his first-hand description of an endless wall of ice in the middle of the Antarctic ocean
— actually the cliffs of as yet undiscovered Antarctica — Talbot receives a message from
this  ‘old  and  learned  acquaintance’  who  ‘is  the  final  court  of  appeal  in  matters  of
hydrology  and  associated  -ologies’  (Golding  1991:  700).  Talbot’s  description,  the
scholar says, ‘would be well enough for a fiction’, but cannot be taken seriously by ‘a
respectable  geographer’,  because if  Talbot’s  cliffs  were  ‘a  hundred  feet  high’,  as  he
claims, they would extend ‘seven hundred feet below the surface of the water’; and if
this iceberg ‘was so long, so vast that it even affected the weather’, as Talbot states,
‘then it must have stretched so far south that it would be more like a floating continent
than a patch of ice’, in other words, ‘a whole continent lying over and round the South
Pole!’ (700, 701). As it happens, this scholar has spent the greater part of his adult life
‘perfecting a proof that such a continent is geographically impossible’, so ‘by a simple
calculation of the volume of ice contained’ in Talbot’s cliffs it can be shown ‘that its
formation must date from several thousands of years previous to the creation of the
world in the spring of the year four thousand and four B.C.!’ (701).
As an illustration of how religious prejudice may lead to the rejection of scientific
truth, this comic interlude serves as a reminder of the pressures under which rational
enquiry often worked before its full emancipation from religious doctrine. As Golding
remarks  in  connection  with  Copernicus,  the  Church  to  which  the  father  of
heliocentrism belonged ‘forbade  his  theories  to  be  taught’  (Golding  1965:  40),  and
Martin Luther dismissed them in the following terms: ‘This fool wishes to reverse the
entire science of astronomy; but sacred Scripture tells us that Josua commanded the
sun stand still and not the earth’ (cited in Golding 1965: 39). What Joshua’s miracle
proves, in Luther’s opinion, is that the sun normally moves round the motionless earth.
Of course Luther was wrong; and we know that he was because science has thrown off
the  shackles  of  religion  and  asserted  the  truth  of  heliocentrism.  Defending  the
autonomy of scientific discovery, as Golding does, in no way involves a denigration of
religion. In his view, religion has a legitimate place in society and in the individual’s
life, but this place is not the same as that of science.
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3.1.1.3.2. Golding’s Assertion of the Primacy of the Arts
In his contribution to the two cultures debate, Golding puts the emphasis on science,
art and religion (philosophy and history are classified with the latter two, probably by
virtue of their metaphysical focus, but receive less attention). He argues that the focus
on  the  metaphysical  dimension,  though  often  dismissed  in  our  age,  is  at  least  as
necessary to human life as the focus on the physical dimension. Even more, he writes
that science ‘is not the most important thing. Philosophy is more important … so is
history … so is aesthetic perception’ (Golding 1965: 129).21 The reason is that moral and
aesthetic judgement, not calculation, is what makes us human. In this section I shall
analyse Golding’s position and why it can be better understood if the alleged flaws that
Schopenhauer attributes to science are borne in mind. In particular,  I shall rely on
Schopenhauer’s  suggestion  that  its  physical  object  puts  scientists  in  an  egocentric
position,  and that  the  combination of  this  egocentrism with a  rational  method ties
science to calculation to the detriment of judgement; moreover, since science appeals to
the rational intellect, its effect is to put its audience in an egocentric position too.
The alleged existence of two cultures in Britain began to attract public attention in
the wake of Snow’s 1959 Rede Lectures.22 Snow argues that ‘the intellectual life of the
21 Golding’s praise of history does not tally well with Schopenhauer’s predominant view that it is a
mere description of the events in which the human race has been involved; but it does tally with
Schopenhauer’s  statement  that  history  is  the  collective  equivalent  of  individual  self-
consciousness. Clear-headed historical accounts amount to depictions, from different angles, of
the uniform manifestation of  humankind’s inner tendencies across the ages.  Indeed,  Golding
states that ‘history is a kind of selfknowledge’ which can ‘give us the right clue to our behaviour’,
hence its ‘supreme importance’ (Golding 1965: 91, 90). It is in ‘that attempt to see how things
have become what they are, where they went wrong, and where right, that our only hope lies of
having some control over our own future’ (90–1). If this is the case, then the metaphysical aspect
of  historiography  —  which  must  not  only  study  the  motives  of  people  and  also  pass  moral
judgement on them — makes it more important than science.
22 Snow’s lecture and his 1963 piece entitled ‘The Two Cultures: A Second Look’ can be found in a
single volume (Snow 1993). As the two texts offer the same argument, I shall quote from both.
Since  the  1960s,  the  debate  has  been usually  associated  with  Snow’s  lecture  and  Leavis’s
response.  In  fact,  the  Snow-Leavis  skirmish  repeats  previous  exchanges  —  such  as  the  one
between Thomas H. Huxley and Matthew Arnold — about the alleged split,  in the education
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whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups’ (Snow 1993:
3), those devoted to ‘science’ and those devoted to ‘the arts’ (100), the latter epitomised
by literature, and that between the two there is ‘a gulf of mutual incomprehension —
sometimes … hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding’ (4). This leads
him to state that ‘There seems to be no place where the two cultures meet’ (16).23 In
Snow’s view, the only way in which the rift between them can be bridged is through ‘the
rethinking of our education’ (18).
Snow’s  lecture,  then,  starts  off  as  a  plea  for  what  he  calls  a  ‘common  culture’,
achieved by decreasing the emphasis on specialisation, at least until the last stages of
higher education, a change that  would bring scientific  and non-scientific  knowledge
together (Snow 1993: 60). However, once he has disclosed the humanitarian reason
why this common culture is needed — to raise the ‘material standards of living’ of the
world’s poor (25) — and once he has dismissed any difference in kind between ‘pure’
science and ‘applied’ science (to the detriment of the former), Snow ends up presenting
what he calls the ‘industrial-scientific’ revolution led by engineers as the only possible
hope  for  the  population  of  non-western  countries  (68,  23).  Though  he  does  not
explicitly  deny the importance of  the  arts,  he  does equate  them with a  ‘traditional’
system  and  intellectual  life,  between  the  arts  and  the  sciences.  A  good  introduction  to  the
contemporary history of these discussions can be found in Stefan Collini’s Introduction to the
Snow pieces (see Collini 1993).
23 Snow goes  some way  towards  acknowledging that  perhaps  he  ought  speak of  ‘at  least  three
cultures’ (Snow 1993: 8). This view would result not from the division of science into its applied
and pure varieties, but from the insertion, in between science proper and the arts, of what we
might  call  the  social  sciences,  that  is,  of  the  rising  disciplines  that  ‘are  concerned  with  how
human beings are living or have lived … in terms of … fact’, and which, given his admiration of
engineers, he perhaps sees the social sciences’ reduction of all non-quantifiable aspects of human
life to mere ‘legend’ as paving the way for true social engineering (70). Nevertheless, in the end
Snow prefers to stick to a binary classification on the grounds that, at the moment of writing, it
was ‘probably too early to speak of a third culture already in existence’ (70–1). Golding also sticks
to two broad kinds of knowledge. Like Snow, and like Schopenhauer before him, he generally
conflates the pure strands of science with the applied ones; in general, Golding has a rather old-
fashioned view of science, as is evidenced by the fact that he, like Schopenhauer, does not so
much as mention the social sciences (presumably they would not consider them any different
from the other sciences).
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mindset (11), i.e. a ‘reactionary’ wish (32) — characteristic of ‘natural Luddites’ (22) —
that ‘the future did not exist’ (11). By contrast, he states that scientists ‘have the future
in their bones’ (11), as evidenced by the fact that while many are indeed ‘conservatives’,
but  never  reactionaries,  most  are  political  ‘radicals’  (10).  Further,  he  states  that
scientific  ‘culture  is  in  its  human relations  a  democratic  one.  In  their  own internal
climate,  the  breeze  of  the  equality  of  man  hits  you  in  the  face’  (48).  The  implicit
opposition  between  this  democratic  ethos  and  the  social  prejudice  that  apparently
inheres in the arts leads Snow to remark that ‘there is a moral component right in the
grain of  science itself’  (13),  which thus functions as  a  source of  ‘moral  health’  (71).
Though a professional  novelist,  Snow had actually been trained as  an experimental
scientist, and he does not have much to say about the scientists’ need for non-scientific
education. Thus, despite his theoretical call for a rapprochement between scientific and
non-scientific enquiry, whose division is a ‘practical and intellectual and creative loss’
to  everyone  (11),  in  practice  his  rhetoric  —  which  includes  wielding  the  scientific
method as a yardstick to which the ‘unscientific’ attitudes prevailing in the other fields
of knowledge do not measure up (11) — only contributes to making that division worse.
Indeed, his main concern is not with increasing the cultural level of all students, but
with solving the scientific illiteracy of the elite of non-scientists that in his opinion still
‘manages  the  western  world’  (11),  and  whose  ignorance  of  the  second  law  of
thermodynamics he compares to not having read any Shakespeare (see 14–5). Snow
concedes that non-scientific interests may be a good way ‘to do something worthy and
satisfying with our lives’,  yet  he concludes saying that  they should only be pursued
‘once the elemental needs are satisfied’ (79).
In Golding’s novels, the epitome of Snow’s optimistic confidence in science would
be Nick Shales, one of the secondary characters in Free Fall, were it not for the fact that
the teacher’s moral stature and Sammy Mountjoy’s regard for him has nothing to do
with his devotion to science. From Golding’s perspective, which I take to coincide with
Schopenhauer’s, speaking of science as essential to moral health simply does not make
any sense. As regards the two cultures, Golding’s position in the piece ‘On the Crest of
the Wave’  (originally  published in  1960,  one year  after  Snow’s  famous lecture,  and
perhaps prompted by it) is actually the opposite of Snow’s, and in this sense not only
prefigures the one adopted by the literary scholar Frank R. Leavis in his response to the
latter’s lecture, but does so because it picks up, like Leavis, the criticisms voiced in the
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nineteenth century by Matthew Arnold. Arnold was worried that rational calculation
and measurement generally might be displacing such feelings as compassion. He feared
that the insistence on calculation, together with an undue emphasis on wealth and a
high standard of living, might monopolise all considerations of value, thus leading a
reduction of human experience to what can be quantified and efficiently managed. For
Arnold, the aim of education was not to produce technocrats, but rather to hinder the
advance of philistine industrialism, the vision of human well-being as dependent on the
efficiency  of  the  impersonal  social  machinery  whose  functioning  takes  therefore
priority over people’s weal. While Leavis’s reply to Snow shares all of these elements,
Golding separates from both in rejecting the elitist claim that the expansion of higher
education could only be achieved by lowering the standards (this summary of Arnold’s
position follows the one in Collini 1993). Apart from this, Golding’s essay is of a piece
with Matthew’s and Leavis’s positions.24
Raised in a rationalistic family, Golding’s admittance to Oxford was to train as a
scientist (see Biles 1970: 83–4, 88–90; Carey 2009: 7–14, 41–58).  Though he soon
switched  to  English,  he  knows  enough  about  science  to  meet  Snow’s  requisite  of
knowing  the  second  law  of  thermodynamics,  which  he  summarises  saying  that
‘everything is running down and will finally stop like an unwound clock’ (cited in Tiger
2003: 79), and which he uses in his novel Darkness Visible. However, the argument of
‘On the Crest of the Wave’ is that education should put less emphasis on science and
more  on  the arts.  The  piece  begins  by  explaining  that  in  the  1950s  British society
considers itself to be ‘on the crest of the wave of universal education’ (Golding 1965:
24 This  rejection  of  elitist  notions  of  education  is  no  doubt  grounded  in  Golding’s  ‘own  class
consciousness, dating from his resentment of the privileged young gentlemen at Marlborough
College’, one of the great public schools in Britain (Carey 2009: 395). The house in which the
Goldings lived when he was a child stood near the school, whose sight would fill young William
‘with hatred and envy’ (cited in Carey 2009 17). Carey suggests that it was not only Golding’s
lifelong ‘sense of social inadequacy’ that was rooted in his early memories of the college’s masters
and  pupils,  but  his  writing  ambitions  too  (Carey  2009:  17).  Later,  his  experience  as  an
undergraduate in Oxford only served to make him feel ‘socially and academically inferior’ (62).
On leaving Oxford, he was interviewed by the university’s appointments committee, for careers
advice, and marked down as ‘Not quite a gentleman’ (cited in Carey 2009: 57).  As a literary
author, Golding transformed class issues and the ensuing feeling of resentment into a recurring,
if usually secondary, narrative theme.
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126). In this situation, the accent, which used to fall on the non-scientific disciplines,
has shifted, and all the educative efforts are devoted to teach science (in particular, its
applied varieties). The scientific training provided by contemporary centres no longer
deserves to be called education:
Education … has been brought to see, in a down-to-earth manner, that what we really want is
technicians … and that only she can supply them. She still calls what she is doing ‘education’
because it is a proper, a dignified word — but she should call it ‘training’, as with dogs (Golding
1965: 130).
Golding pits  science against the arts,  that  is,  in Schopenhauer’s  terms,  the physical
conception of the world par excellence against the metaphysical approaches. For him,
as  for  Schopenhauer,  ‘The  heart  of  our  experience  …  is  a  mystery’  that  physical
cognition alone cannot  penetrate  (Golding 1984a: 192).  Not  only  has contemporary
education, with its emphasis on the physical functioning of the world and its appeal to
reason, ‘forgotten that there is a difference between a puzzle and a mystery’ (1965: 72);
in doing so it has turned its back on other, more important issues of a metaphysical
nature.25 Science is ‘busy clearing up the universe’,  but scientists will  always remain
unaware of other areas where darkness is not just the absence of light; the only possible
way to live with plenitude is  to move beyond scientific  description, living up to the
challenge  of  facing  our  ‘looming  terror’  and of  discovering  what  something  is  (as
opposed to why something happens or how something works),  whether an object is
beautiful, when someone’s desires are praiseworthy or reprehensible, how we can act
25 Golding lingers on the effects of  contemporary education in the aesthetic sphere.  Concerning
literature, he remarks that, as a result of the rule of scientific experimentalism, ‘The appreciation
of the power of expression in all its richness is dimmed. The vitality of writing — that energy of
conception and expression which can give passionate significance to an apparent commonplace
— this vitality has to fight another layer of imperception. … In many schools — in most, for all I
know — boys spend a considerable fraction of their time writing up experiments. They are taught
to report the phenomena in a detached way … using their own language with the grey precision of
an electronic computer. Is it any wonder that writers seem to them to use a language they have to
learn all over again?’ (Golding 1965: 131). To translate his comments to the terms adopted in this
study, the dominance of denotative language is making evocative language unintelligible.
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without increasing each other’s suffering (172–3).26 Nowadays the tendency is to back
scientific ‘certainties’ as ‘the obvious winners’ (170), a situation that Golding regrets:
The pendulum has swung too far. There was a time in education — and I can just remember it —
when science fought for its life, bravely and devotedly. … But now the educational world is full of
spectral shapes, bowing acknowledgements to religious instruction and literature but keeping an
eye on the laboratory where is respect, jam tomorrow, power. The arts are becoming the poor
relations (Golding 1965: 130).
Currently it is thought that ‘the good life’ can only be reached through science, because
it is there that ‘the naked power, the prestige’ and the money can be found (Golding
1965: 130). Having thus linked scientific competence to high social standing, Golding
adds that in contemporary society it is better to be ‘well-paid than happy’, ‘successful
than  good’,  or,  in  Shakespearean  terms,  ‘vile  than  vile-[e]steemed’  (130).  Human
nature cannot be confined to the physical dimension alone, but contemporary society
has  forgotten  that  what  is  most  valuable  about  humankind  lies  elsewhere,  not  in
calculation  with  a  view  to  technological  application  but  in  moral  and  aesthetic
judgement  (notice  the  unmistakable  Schopenhauerian  overtones  of  the  expressions
with which Golding refers to the disease that only these value judgements can treat):
Our  humanity,  our  capacity  for  living  together  in  a  full  and  fruitful  life,  does  not  reside  in
knowing things for the sake of knowing them or even in the power to exploit our surroundings …
Our humanity rests in the capacity to make value judgements  … the power to decide that is
right, that is wrong, this ugly that beautiful,  this just,  that unjust.  Yet these are precisely the
questions which ‘Science’ is not qualified to answer with its measurement and analysis. They can
be answered only by the methods of philosophy and the arts.  We are confusing the immense
power  which the scientific  method  gives  us  with  the  all-important  power  to  make the value
26 It is not only in his essays that Golding presents metaphysical insight as opening the door to a
mystery that is radically different from the puzzles that scientific enquiry tries to solve. In the Sea
Trilogy, Mr Prettiman confesses to Talbot his suspicion that ‘at the heart’ of the universe there is
‘a profound mystery’ to which human beings ‘would be admitted’ (Golding 1991: 713). This is the
mystery  of  what  lies  behind the veil  of  physical  appearances.  Mr Pretiman’s  claim that  it  is
possible  to  know  the  mysterious  essence  of  the  world  is  an  exception  to  Golding’s  general
questioning, in his later novels, of the possibility of knowing that essence.
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judgements which are the purpose of human education. … For the arts cannot cure a disease or
increase production or ensure defence. They can only cure or ameliorate sicknesses so deeply
seated that  we begin  to  think  of  them in our  new wealth  as  built-in:  boredom and satiety,
selfishness and fear (Golding 1965: 130; my italics).
The square quotes round the word  science are  a  hint  that  here Golding views true
science as a pure form of enquiry whose basis is metaphysical, distinguishing it from its
utilitarian applications (on which the emphasis usually falls in contemporary society).
When he separates our capacity for knowing things for the sake of knowing them from
the power to exploit our surroundings, Golding acknowledges that science may have a
purely speculative intention; however, he also asserts that today this kind of enquiry
has been replaced by another kind which always aims at controlling the world, that the
natural philosopher has given way to the technician. Nowadays pure science is hardly
valued as it is deemed to be ‘too vast, too remote, too useless on the national scale’
(Golding 1965: 128).
Though this  view also  appears  in  other  essays,  Golding’s  novels  always  present
science as dominated by utilitarian considerations, hence they deny that pure science
can be disengaged from it  applied varieties.  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy helps us to
understand why this is the case. The crucial thing to remember, says Schopenhauer, is
the  physical  focus  that  characterises  all  kinds  of  science.  For  one  thing,  physical
cognition has nothing to do with aesthetics and morality. For another, the egocentric
character  of  the  physical  perceptions  on  which  scientific  concepts  rest  transforms
science  into  a  means  for  attaining  egoistic  and  even  malignant  ends.  In  the  last
instance,  it  is  the  instrumental  character  of  all  rational  knowledge  that  makes  it
impossible to see a clear-cut break between scientific speculation and its technological
materialisation in the ‘inventions’ of which humans avail themselves (Schopenhauer
2000b: 417). At the end of the long quotation above, Golding states that by definition
science is incapable of doing what the arts can do, that is, incapable of judging things in
aesthetic  and  moral  terms.  Even  worse,  Golding  highlights  the  way  in  which  the
prevalence  of  science  has  contributed  not  only  ‘to  enlarge  the  importance  of
measurement’  but also to diminish the capacity to make value judgments’  (Golding
1965: 131). The introduction of measurement and judgement into the discussion points
to the rational nature of science. If Schopenhauer is correct in his characterisation of
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rational concepts,  then the focus on physical objects is  not the only shortcoming of
science: the conceptual vehicle that it employs is always at the service of the essential
will qua innate character of the individual. Though this is true of all institutionalised
descriptions of the world, there is a crucial difference among them: those that excite
feelings  (art  and  religion)  can  avoid  putting  the  audience  in  the  same  egocentric
position as the sender, while those that excite concepts cannot, regardless of whether
their objects are physical (as in science) or metaphysical (as in history and philosophy).
Their  metaphysical  focus  and their  appeal  to  the  non-rational  intellect  may  be the
reasons why Golding’s novels present artistic and religious figures as most distant from
scientists, while historians and philosophers — which in this respect would be closer to
scientists — are conspicuous by their absence.
While  this  section  has  showed  that  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  may  illuminate
Golding’s demotion of science, the following section will examine the role played in the
lives  of  many Golding’s  characters  by their  essential  needs  and desires.  It  will  also
explore the negative consequences of their egocentric efforts to satisfy those appetites
in a predominantly egoistic — and sometimes malignant — way, of the boredom that
overcomes them as soon as they have achieved some satisfaction, and of the constant
fear of death in which many of them live because of their egoism.
3.1.2. The Essential Will and Suffering
We have seen that, for Golding, the specificity of human consciousness allows us to
experience the world in ways that are not available to other animals; these ways are, on
the one hand, rational and, on the other, metaphysical. From the human perspective,
the physical dimension of the world coexists with a deeper, metaphysical dimension;
the human world is a world whose characteristics can be conceptualised along different
lines, as witness the existence of the disparate approaches of science, art and religion.
From now own I shall focus on Golding’s conception of human consciousness as
capable  of  seeing beyond the realm of  appearances — more specifically  beyond the
physical  wall  within  which  scientific  activity  and  daily  routines  take  place  —  thus
gaining some insight into the common essence which underlies the world. Golding’s
earlier novels provide enough clues to legitimate the identification of this kernel as the
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essential  will  that  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  brings  to  our  attention  and  whose
manifestation the realm of appearances is. The influence of the essential will is a crucial
aspect of Golding’s world view, yet it  has never been paid sufficient attention; most
previous commentators do not even mention it, while others such as Kinkead-Weekes
and Gregor, who do introduce it in their discussions, do so from a rationalistic point of
view that misses the point.
Both The Spire and Pincher Martin provide strong evidence that in humans, as in
other  living  beings,  the  essence  of  the  world  operates  as  a  will  to  life  driving  the
individual  to  self-preservation  and  perpetuation. The  Spire places  the  will  of  the
individual as the inner manifestation of the individual’s and the whole world’s essence.
Apart  from  emphasising  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  essential  will  to  life,  Pincher
Martin illustrates the general subordination of knowing to willing. This subordination
can be understood with the help of Schopenhauer’s claims that the essential will is a
constant search for satisfaction, that it can only find satisfaction through its individual
manifestations,  that  its  fulfilment depends on  availing itself  of  powerful  intellectual
tools, and the only kind of consciousness that allows individuals to satisfy their needs
and desires (by preying on their neighbours) is egocentric consciousness. The intellect
is therefore subordinated to the essential will, a characteristic that will become clear
when I focus on the way in which the mind works in Pincher Martin.
Egocentrism is at the root of egoism and malice, the most usual moral categories
that  Schopenhauer  identifies.  Insofar  as  they  cause  pain  to  others,  the  actions
motivated by egoistic and malignant desires are evil. Both egoism and malice appear in
most of Golding’s novels: Pincher Martin is a predominantly egoistic character, and so
is Mr Pedigree, one of the characters in Darkness Visible. Roger in Lord of the Flies and
Sophy in Darkness Visible are malignant.
According  to  Schopenhauer,  the  world’s  essence  is  an  amoral  urge  that  seeks
satisfaction through an egocentric grasp of objects, that is, through the only variety of
consciousness that relates things to the individual and transforms them into potential
sources of fulfilment. Unfortunately, egocentrism also hinders the subject’s escape fom
suffering.  By  transforming  things  into  potential  sources  of  fulfilment,  egocentrism
makes the desiring individual  live  in a  constant  state  of  anxiety  to  attain  them.  In
addition, egocentrism often makes things undergo another transformation, this time
into potential  threats  that  the  subject  is  at  great  pains to avoid or destroy.  Finally,
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egocentrism  not  only  leads  to  these  two  kinds  of  egoistic  behaviour,  but  also  to
malignant actions that aim at destruction for destruction’s sake. Because all of these
factors,  the  manifestations  of  the  world’s  essence  are  permanently  involved  in  a
daunting spectacle of pain and violence. The result is the worst possible world, a world
which Golding labels, like Schopenhauer, as hellish. In Golding’s novels, many of the
physical structures that his characters build serve as diagrams of this world. Just as the
knowable  world  for  which  the  subjects  are  responsible  is  always  on  the  verge  of
destruction, so these constructions, which in Golding’s novels go from the cathedral in
The Spire to the old ship in the Sea Trilogy,  are constantly threatened by ruin and
collapse.
What persuades his readers that all the living beings and inanimate objects in the
world  are  interconnected  as  manifestations  of  the  same essential  will  to  life  is  the
extensive use made in his novels of what I  shall  call  dynamic descriptions,  that  is,
evocative descriptions of events by virtue of which plants acquire animal properties and
inanimate objects are endowed with animal and plant attributes.
3.1.2.1. Inner Feeling and the Essential Will in The Spire
In many of Golding’s novels the realm of appearances is presented as a multiplicity with
an  underlying  essence  that  provides  the  world  with  unity  but  can  only  be  known
through its manifestations. Paramount among these manifestations or appearances is
the individual’s  inner  feeling,  which makes  it  possible  to  identify  the  world’s  inner
essence with will.  This essential  will  is  omnipotent,  amoral and originally devoid of
reason. The most clear illustration of this can be found in The Spire.
The metaphysical insight into the all-powerful will, which Jocelin initially attributes
to the Christian God, originates in his inner feeling (not in something outside himself,
let  alone in  something  beyond his  world).  Jocelin  excludes  from consciousness  the
inner feeling of the will — the essence that he shares with the rest of the world — and
the desires that this feeling reveals because he cannot accept the amoral tenor of what
he has seen. Though the novel does not refer to it by this name, I shall root the Dean’s
desire in the essential will to life.
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What  happens  to  Jocelin  can  be  interpreted,  in  psychoanalytical  terms,  as  an
instance of  repression,  immediately  followed by an attempt at  sublimation and the
uncanny return of the repressed. According to Freud, repression is a psychic operation
that  consists  ‘in  turning  something  away,  and keeping  it  at  a  distance,  from the
conscious’ (Freud 1995: 569–70). The reason for repression is that something is found
disagreeable because incompatible with the ego.27 In Jocelin’s case, what gets repressed
is the inner feeling of an amoral will. The Dean cannot admit that this constant striving
is (also) inside himself. As a consequence, it seems to him that the omnipotent power
only manifests itself in the rest of the world. In the end, however, Jocelin cannot but
acknowledge the uncanny force with which the essential will makes itself felt in him. He
no longer attributes willing to God — or at least not to God alone — but to himself.
Since the tendency of this essential will is basically towards sexual satisfaction, Jocelin
is forced to admit that the pinnacle that he has had built, and which responds to his
own will as much as to God’s, works mainly as a sublimation of his less than divine
sexuality.
The vision that triggers  the construction of the spire is strikingly absent from the
main storyline, and is only described in some detail towards the end of the novel. The
allusions to the episode,  which occurred when Jocelin was still young, are scant and
difficult to interpret. The longest reference is the Dean’s own record in an old notebook:
One evening … a feeling rose from my heart. It grew stronger, reached up until at the utmost tip
it burst into a living fire … which passed away, but left me now transfixed. For … a fountain burst
up from me, up, out, through … an implacable, unstoppable, glorious fountain … The vision left
me at last; and the memory of it … shaped itself to the spire (Golding 1964: 191–3; my italics).
27 Sometimes a  difference is  established in Freud’s  works between repression and suppression.
Repression  is  an  unconscious  operation  that  expels  the  representatives  of  affects  into  the
unconscious. Suppression is a conscious operation whereby the affect itself, which by definition
‘cannot  become unconscious’,  is  ‘inhibited,  or  even abolished’  (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006:
439, 438). Some other times the terms repression and suppression are used interchangeably with
a  meaning  that  combines  both  senses.  Here  I  shall  only  speak  of  repression,  without
distinguishing the affects from their representatives. As for  suppression,  I shall never use the
word in a technical sense.
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The incident,  which  has  not  received  sufficient  critical  attention,  prompts  Jocelin’s
acquaintance, in his own view, with ‘a Will without limit or end’ which he identifies
with ‘God’s will’ and to which his own individual will is somehow linked (Golding 1964:
84, 40). From what he says, it is nevertheless apparent that the will that urges him to
action is not (only) God’s but (also) his own. In Schopenhauer, the inner feeling of one’s
individual will is the first stage of the conceptualisation of the essential will, which is
later  achieved  through the rational  ‘application of  reflection’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:
110). This feeling allows individuals to grasp the source of their voluntary actions as
well  as  the  site  of  their  emotions  and  passions.  Although  the  Dean  subsequently
attributes  his  vision to God,  the old notebook does not mention the divinity  at  all.
Jocelin’s notes locate the origin of the vision within not without; they describe it as
rising from the heart. This tallies with Schopenhauer’s contention that ‘in the heart of
everyone there actually resides … the will-to-live’ (2000b: 215).  Other passages in the
novel  make  it  equally  clear  that  when  Jocelin  speaks  of  God’s  will  he  might  be
unwittingly referring to his own will.  A case in point  is  his attempt to reassure the
master builder with these words: “You’ll see how I shall thrust you upward by my will.
It’s God’s will in this business” (Golding 1964: 40; my italics).
If  the Dean never fully realises the full  import of his insight, this is  because the
passions that dwell inside him are more carnal than pious and he represses them. The
existence of those passions is something that Jocelin knows deep down in his mind, but
which he can never allow to rise to the surface. In Schopenhauer’s opinion, the inner
insight recorded by Jocelin not only allows to know the almighty force that underlies
the  entire  world.  It  is  also  by  virtue  of  this  inner  insight  that  one  gains  self-
consciousness  and  the  sense  of  the  individual  I arises.  In  Jocelin,  self-conscious
individuality is tainted by egocentrism, by virtue of which Jocelin explicitly dissociates
himself from the rest of the world (non-human animals are also egocentric, but their
separation from the rest of the world is only implicit). What matters to Jocelin is the
distance between himself and the others rather than his metaphysical links with them,
even though the distance is only apparent and the links are essential. If he sees himself
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as free from the amoral yearning that he sees in God and in the rest of the world, it is
because he has somehow come to pit himself against everything else.28
Though the episode recorded in Jocelin’s notebook begins with an explosion that
rises from the heart, it also describes how he is subsequently struck by the idea of a new
spire. The  episode,  therefore,  seems  to  have  consisted  of  two  different  kinds  of
experience:  inward  contemplation  (whose  findings  are  repressed)  combined  with
aesthetic sublimation. By virtue of this second moment, The Spire would be an account
of  the  artistic  process,  which  starts  with  the  work’s  inception,  proceeds  to  its
production by Roger Mason but at Jocelin’s instigation, and ending with its reception
by Jocelin himself on his deathbed. In the rest of this section I shall only focus on the
second stage.
As  far  as  artistic  production  is  concerned,  Schopenhauer  argues  that,  as  it  is
intended to materialise the artist’s aesthetic feeling and to produce a similar effect upon
the audience, the work of art can only aspire to be the most suitable technical means to
the artist’s ends. On this account, the work of art is one of the possible embodiments of
the  artist’s  desires.  In  Schopenhauer’s  opinion  the  disparity  between  the  sudden
inspiration and the planned construction is present in all artistic manifestations, but it
could be argued that it is most evident in the case of architecture. In  The Spire, for
example, Jocelin’s inspiration is in stark contrast with the technical effort that Roger
has to make.  In both cases, it is the satisfaction of their desires that is at stake, but
those desires have little to do with aesthetics. Roger risks his professional prestige and
his very life, and for this reason he is intent on employing rational calculation to perfect
his  building  techniques.  Jocelin’s  obsession  with  finishing  the  pinnacle  does  not
respond to artistic motivations either.  He is  not even aware that he may have been
blessed with artistic inspiration. Consciously, Jocelin justifies the construction as a way
of pleasing the divinity; also, it is a way of proving to himself and others that he had a
genuine vision, that he has been chosen for the task and that his is not a ‘bogus sanctity’
(Golding 1964: 209). At an unconscious level, the spire is a sublimation of his repressed
28 Jocelin’s inner insight is an example of the rise of self-consciousness that we can see in other
Golding characters (most clearly, Sophy in Darkness Visible). Despite this similarity, Jocelin is
different from them, not because of any intrinsic peculiarity of the sense of the I that he gains
from the observation of the force that is active inside him, or because of his egocentrism, but
because of his desperate attempt to repress his dependence on that force.
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sexuality as well a means of asserting his power and the Church’s over the whole region.
The way in which his thirst for power fuses with lust is illustrated in this scene:
He … was looking away from the tower and out into the world … I would like the spire to be a
thousand feet high, he thought, and then I should be able to oversee the whole county … He
examined the strips and patches of cultivation, the rounded downlands that rose to a wooded and
notched edge. They were soft and warm and smooth as a young body. … In a flash of vision he …
understood how the tower was laying a hand on the whole landscape, altering it, dominating it,
enforcing a pattern that reached wherever the tower could be seen, by sheer force of its being
there. … The countryside was shrugging itself obediently into a new shape (Golding 1964: 105–
8).
As the story unfolds, Jocelin becomes progressively aware of these dual motivations.
The discovery shakes his faith as much as the difficulties of construction shake Roger
Mason’s confidence in reason. Whereas the builder can hardly believe that the spire has
not  yet  collapsed  despite  its  possible  lack  of  foundations,  the  cleric  becomes
increasingly suspicious that the pinnacle may be the fulfilment of something other than
the Christian God’s will. At first he simply believes that he is attuned to the omnipotent
divinity. Initially he is adamant that his will ‘is linked to a Will without limit or end’
(Golding  1964:  84).  As  the  story  advances,  and  the  afflictions  caused  by  the
construction multiply, he becomes uncertain whether his illumination is the result of
God’s will, or ‘his [own] will, or whatever will it was’ (150). By the end of his mental and
physical ordeal Jocelin cannot but harbour serious doubts about God’s plans: ‘There is
no innocent work. God knows where God may be’ (222). This is not a questioning of
God’s existence, nor does it have to do with the impossibility of knowing the divinity. It
is simply a questioning of a conception of God that Jocelin has always taken for granted
but  now  reveals  its  inadequacy.  Perhaps  Jocelin  is  correct  in  believing  that  he  is
obeying  an omnipotent will, and perhaps he is entitled to regard this  force as divine;
but in that case, what kind of God is he talking about? Like Schopenhauer’s (see Young
2005: 223), Golding’s image of the force on which the world depends as insensitive to
morality — rather than the source of morality — ‘is more pagan than Christian’ (Baker
1965: 45). Both authors see omnipotence and amorality as defining characteristics of
the awful will beyond the veil of appearances.
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Several critics have linked this amorality to Jocelin’s sexuality.  Carey states  that
‘The  ruthless  willpower  with  which  Jocelin  drives  on  the  spire’s  “erection”  is  …  a
sublimation of his lust as well as — or rather than — an expression of pure faith’ (2009:
272). According to Freudian psychoanalysis, sublimation is the process whereby the
sexual  impulse  ‘is  diverted towards  a  new,  non-sexual  aim’,  one whose ‘objects  are
socially valued ones’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006: 431).  Examples of these objects
include  intellectual  enquiry  and — as  in  The  Spire — artistic  creation.  As  Golding
confesses to Biles, at first he thought that,  in order to make the sexual undertones of
Jocelin’s obsession all the more manifest, the novel ‘ought to be called An Erection at
Barchester’  (in Biles 1970: 100). Though he did not stick to this title, Golding made
sure  that  the  concern  with  sexuality  would  not  escape  the  reader’s  attention.  The
description of the model of the cathedral with the new spire suggests an erect man lying
on his back: ‘The nave was his legs placed together, the transepts on either side were his
arms outspread. The choir was his body; and the Lady Chapel … was his head. And now
also, springing, projecting, bursting, erupting from the heart of the building, there was
its crown and majesty, the new spire’ (Golding 1964: 8). That the spire takes on the
function that  the Dean’s  penis  is  not allowed to  perform is  hinted at when Jocelin
describes an inner feeling ‘rising in him’ that reminds us of the one that led to the
construction of the spire; but rather than comparing this feeling to a clear fountain, as
Jocelin does in his notebook, the third-person narrator now compares it to ‘a level of
dark water’ that rises responding to the demands of the Dean’s ‘unruly member’ (138).
So contaminated  is  Jocelin’s  Christian  love  by  his  unconscious  concupiscence,  that
when he clasps his hands and lifts up his head so as to cheer the workers up with ‘one
tremendous  ejaculation:  “Rejoice,  O  daughters  of  Jerusalem!”’  (71),  it  is  hard  to
suppress a smile of complicity at the mischievous narrator.
Jocelin’s  will  (one of  whose  main components  is  sexual)  is  linked to  the whole
world’s essential will (qua will to life), and that it is embodied in the erect pinnacle.
Even after he has begun to realise that the force that  he locates exclusively outside
himself might be connected with his own inner will, and that both the inner and the
outer will are aspects of the single essential will that underlies the entire world, Jocelin
clings to  the comforting idea that  the  will  that  he  obeys  is,  like  his  own conscious
motivations, morally irreproachable. By refusing to see the obscene drive that propels
him for what it is, he tries to divorce himself from the obscenity. According to Kinkead-
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Weekes and Gregor, Jocelin is ‘seriously ignorant of human nature, priding himself in
his attempt to exclude sexuality in excessive and morbid revulsion’ (2002: 184). When
he affirms that the spire is not so much ‘a diagram’ of ‘Jocelin’s Folly’ — the name given
to the construction by the workers — as of ‘God’s folly’ (Golding 1964: 128, 121), he
seems to ignore the true implications of the words that he has chosen. Admittedly, the
term folly has a long history in Christian literature. At the end of his Praise of Folly, for
example, Desiderius Erasmus reminds us of St Paul’s assertion that ‘God chose what is
foolish in the world…’,  and that ‘God decided to save the world through foolishness
since it couldn’t be renewed through wisdom’ (2008: 106; cited from 1 Corinthians 1:27
and 1:21).  From the  Dean’s  perspective,  his  folly  is  the  token  of  true  faith,  it  is  a
Christlike folly.  As Erasmus recalls,  ‘Christ  himself  clearly  says to  the Father:  “You
know my folly”’ (105; cited from Psalm 69:5). Indeed, it is his folly that sets Jocelin
apart  and  above  most  other  characters  in  the  novel,  who  are  driven  by  worldy
calculation. However, there are reasons to doubt that Jocelin’s passions, and the will
itself to which they are linked, are what he believes them to be. Among the senses of
folly, the  OED records that of ‘lewdness’ or ‘wantonness’ (see Boyd 1988: 93–4). The
very term will, Boyd reminds us, has carnal and genital connotations (1988: 94–5). On
this linguistic evidence, argues this critic, the will ‘that forces the spire upwards’ is more
closely  linked  to  the  pagan  ‘dark  gods’  abhorred  by  Jocelin  than  to  the  Christian
divinity (100).
Speaking  of  the  way  in  which  Schopenhauer’s  will  to  life  dominates  all  living
creatures, Young argues that, if we thought that their destructive behaviour was part of
some kind of conscious plan, then we would be forced to admit that it is the work of ‘a
completely sadistic god, bent on creating beings for the sole purpose of entertaining
itself through the sight of their pain’ (2005: 81). This portrayal comes very close to the
image of God that Jocelin gradually forms in  The Spire. If the Dean has problems to
understand  what  God  wants  from  him,  it  is  because  he  takes  from  granted  His
goodness and rationality.  However,  as McCarron notes,  the novel  suggests  that  ‘the
irrational, numinous force … at the centre of existence … can be apprehended as much,
if not more, by outrage and violence as it can by conventional piety’ (McCarron 2007:
192).  Jocelin’s  view of  the force that  drives  him is  triply  inaccurate:  the  will  is  not
rational (actually, it is not even conscious), it is not good, and it is not divine. Behind
his conscious motives lies a demonic impulse that tends towards excess and disruption,
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an almighty  drive  that  takes  no account  of  human morality  and of  the  individual’s
needs.
Agfter he has repressed it, Jocelin’s repressed desire it returns in an uncanny way.
As Freud explains, ‘the uncanny [unheimlich] is something which is secretly familiar
[heimlich-heimisch],  which  has  undergone  repression  and  then  returned  from  it’
(Freud 1976: 637). He adds that ‘an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile
complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or
when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed’
(639). Thus, uncanny effects are triggered by things that recall ‘repressed desires and
surmounted modes of thinking belonging to the prehistory of the individual and of the
race’ (637). As far as Jocelin is concerned, it is the first source that predominates, but
the second is also present.
Among the exuberant images that  abound in the novel,  two of  them point with
clarity to the way in which the repressed workings of the will returns to haunt Jocelin’s
cloistered consciousness. When the workers start digging a hole at the centre of the
cathedral’s  body,  they  open  the  gates  of  an  uncanny  area  that  Jocelin  would  have
preferred  to  remain  ignorant  of,  something  that,  according  to  Friedrich  Schelling,
‘ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light’ (cited in Freud 1976:
623). From the bottom of the pit arises a force that stirs — as Schopenhauer’s essential
will does — even lifeless matter:
a patch … fell  out of the [pit’s] side below him and struck the bottom with a soft thud.  The
pebbles that fell with it … never settled completely. He saw … that they were all moving more or
less, with a slow stirring, like the stirring of grubs. … Some form of life; that which ought not to
be seen or touched, the darkness under the earth … Perhaps … the living, pagan earth, unbound
at last and waking, Dia Mater (Golding 1964: 79-80).
In this passage, the encroaching powers that come out of the subterranean chambers of
the earth and the unconscious are associated with femininity. In this case the female
figure is Dia Mater or Demeter, the ancient pagan goddess of agriculture who presided
over the fertility of the earth, and whom Jocelin sees as the relentless enemy of ‘God the
Father’  (Golding  1964:  7).  The  cause  of  the  Dean’s  repulsion  is  the  uncanny  re-
emergence of an obscene life force associated not only with repressed contents but also
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with surmounted religious beliefs. What comes out of the open pit is a double threat to
his chastity and to his Christian faith.
This is not the only occasion when the unstoppable energy of plant life is linked to
Jocelin’s  growing awareness  of  a  dimension of  the  world that  he  prefers  to  ignore.
There is another passage in which the narrator tries to convey, in Kinkead-Weekes and
Gregor’s words, ‘the disturbance of a mind unconsciously aware of things it does not
wish  to  know consciously,  things  which  insist  on  intruding’  (2002:  180).  Here  the
image of plant growth conveys the invasion of Jocelin’s mind by a force that exceeds
human control:
he saw there was a twig lying across his shoe, with a rotting berry that clung  obscenely to the
leather. He scuffed his foot irritably … He found himself thinking of the ship that was built of
timber so unseasoned, [that] a twig in her hold put out one green leaf. He had an instant vision of
the spire  warping and  branching and sprouting;  and  the terror  of  that  had him on his  feet
(Golding 1964: 95; my italics).29
29 The expressions through which my argument has been conducted derive from the novel’s own
language, but some of them may no doubt have reminded of Lacan. In a Lacanian interpretation,
the spire would function for Jocelin as the objet petit a, that is, as an objectification of the lost
real  thing  —  in  truth  never  lost  —  which  triggers  his  desire  by  embodying  his  lack  and
simultaneously promising to cover it over, and round which his obsession circles. Instead of that
of Freudian sublimation, then, this reading invokes the Lacanian notion of the sublime ‘“object–
cause” of desire’ as an obscene presence that, as in the canonical discussions of sublimity, both
repels and attracts, and which ‘exerts a power of fascination which leads ultimately to death and
destruction’ (Evans 1996: 125, 199). If I do not pursue this line of interpretation, it is because
Lacanian  theory,  which  is  not  directly  relevant  to  a  discussion  of  The  Spire  based  on
Schopenhauer,  would  obscure  my  use  of  Freud,  which  is  certainly  relevant  here;  more
importantly, because in Lacan it is the subject that transforms an ordinary object into the object
a,  while Jocelin’s spire  is the embodiment of the yearning that he shares with the rest of the
world, not  made to be that embodiment by him: unlike the status as a Lacanian object a, the
status as  a  manifestation  of  the common essence of  the world  is  not  imposed but  gradually
discovered. I shall deal with to the possibilities (and limits) of a Lacanian reading of Golding’s
novels in the Conclusion.
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This is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s description of the essential will  as ‘the inner,
mysterious, sprouting force’ from which appearances grow (Schopenhauer 1969b: 478).
According to Schopenhauer, the whole world palpitates with an inner will to life that
leads first to organic existence, then to consciousness and finally — in humans — to
self-consciousness, which combined with rational reflection amounts to the essential
will’s ‘knowledge of itself’ (1969a: 266). Golding’s journal recounts the first stages of a
similar process: the entire world ‘might … be seen as a … being that becomes conscious
of itself. There are … next-to-infinite pastures for unconscious life as it moves towards
awareness’  (cited  in  Carey  2009:  395).  Apart  from  foreshadowing  the  rise  of
consciousness (whose culmination in self-consciousness may repel a person that is as
trapped in self-delusion as Jocelin), the image of ‘a plant with strange flowers and fruit,
complex,  twining,  engulfing,  destroying,  strangling’  symbolises  the  ‘unlooked-for
things’ that come with the spire, ‘things put aside’ that return to upset Jocelin’s sense of
reality (Golding 1964: 194, 105). In the course of his ruminations about the formidable
force that drives him, Jocelin even compares himself to ‘a flower that is bearing fruit’
and ‘puts all other business by’ to complete his mission regardless of the cost in human
lives (97).
While Jocelin’s dismissal of rationality and the rest of the characters’ calculating
reason is maintained throughout the novel,  other oppositions are gradually blurred:
between consciousness and unconsciousness (hence between appearance and essence),
faith and sexuality, Jocelin’s Christianity and the workers’ pagan rituals, masculinity
and femininity (God the Father and Demeter), the spire and the pit. The aspects of the
essential will that Jocelin considers positive are associated by him with a male God,
while its negative aspects are associated with femininity. In reality, both are attributes
of the same essential force that pre-exists human consciousness and therefore remains
untouched by the moral and generic distinctions superimposed on it. Jocelin gradually
discovers that the first cluster of elements is not opposed to but must be understood as
manifesting or at least depending on the second.
The  obliteration  of  binary  distinctions  in  The  Spire is  a  good  example  of  the
coincidence  of  opposites  to  which,  according  to  McCarron  (1995),  Golding’s  novels
increasingly point, and which can be better understood as the cancellation of binary
contrasts that characterises non-rational cognition and the essence of the world. It is
clear  that  those  oppositions  are  conceptual  constructs  that  humans  impose  on  the
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world, but it is equally clear that the essential will is beyond all such distinctions. This
relative  cancellation  of  contrasts  is  at  work  not  only  in  Golding’s  later  novels,  as
McCarron claims, but in all  of  his works,  insofar as they draw our attention to our
knowledge of the world through feelings and to the very essence of the world. Starting
with  Lord of  the Flies,  all  of  Golding’s  novels  show how human beings ‘attempt  to
impose a rational order or pattern upon the vital chaos of their own nature’, and how
they  fail  (Baker  1965:  9).  This  failure  does  not  necessarily  entail  the  denial  of  the
conceptual distinctions that we employ, or of the descriptive frameworks — scientific,
artistic and religious, for instance — within which those concepts are deployed. Our
metaphysical feelings — and the evocative uses of language that reproduce them in the
audience — certainly put into question those binary oppositions, which have nothing to
do with  the essence of  the  world;  but  the  rational  patterns  by means  of  which we
describe the world are commonly organised round those contrasts,  upon which the
accuracy and effectiveness of the descriptions depend.
A the the same time as he realises that the ground on which the categories that he
uses to describe the world are built is not as stable as he thought, he is forced to admit
the wisdom of Roger Mason’s old master’s words — ‘a spire goes down as far as it goes
up’ (Golding 1964: 43) — not only as an explanation of the fact that the loftier the spire,
the deeper its foundations are bound to be, but as a metaphorical expression of his own
personal  situation:  the  higher  Jocelin  soars,  the  more  clearly  his  unconscious
motivations are exposed. Here again it is easy to see the relevance of Schopenhauer’s
characterisation of the will as ‘the  prius of consciousness, and the root of the tree of
which consciousness is the fruit’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 139). The unconscious essential
will is not opposed to conscious representations, but is rather their source or ‘maternal
soil’ (390). A similar idea lies behind Jocelin’s repeated allusions to the unconscious
motives that thrive, as in a dark pit, ‘in the vaults, the cellarage of [his] mind’ (Golding
1964: 166).
Though  The Spire is,  among Golding’s  novels,  the one in which the individual’s
inner being is most clearly presented as having its roots in the essential will, there are
other works that speak of the way in which the presence of the world’s essence may be
felt.  Though  written  at  a  time  when  Golding  has  already  begun  to  question  the
possibility  of  knowing that  essence,  Darkness Visible still  confronts  us  with certain
moments when ‘the screen that conceals the workings of things’ shudders and the mind
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touches ‘for once on the nature of things’ (Golding 1979: 16). Though this screen usually
blocks our knowledge of the essence of things, it also makes it possible. Bearing this in
mind allows us to make sense of the title Darkness Visible, which Golding takes from
John Milton’s comparison of hell, in Paradise Lost (book 1, lines 62–9), to ‘one great
furnace’ whose ‘flames’ gave ‘No light but rather darkness visible’, and ‘Served only to
discover sights of woe, / Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace / And rest can
never dwell, hope never comes / That comes to all but torture without end / Still urges
and  a  fiery  deluge  fed  /  With  ever-burning  sulfur  unconsumed’  (Milton  2005:  5).
McCarron directs our attention to Golding’s use — which I call symbolic — of such ‘self-
contradictory’  expressions  as  darkness  visible to  convey  metaphysical  experiences
(2007: 187). We have seen that paramount among those experiences is the discovery of
the essential ground on which the realm of appearances stands. In this respect, we must
remember that Schopenhauer often refers to the essential will in terms of its darkness:
he  calls  it,  for  example,  ‘an  obscure,  dull  urge’,  and  also  an  ‘impetuous  and  dark
impulse’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 149, 203); he adds that we can envisage it as ‘originally
without knowledge and working in the dark’ (1969b: 286), at least until it ‘kindled a
light for itself’ in the form of consciousness (1969a: 150). If the notion of the essential
will denotes,  as  he  maintains,  the  amoral  and ‘obscure  depths  of  our  inner  being’
(1969b: 197), and if the whole plane of appearances ‘is only the visibility of the will’
(1969a: 266), then the description of those appearances as  darkness visible  is pretty
accurate.
The link between darkness and an essential dimension recurs in Golding’s writings,
both fictional and non-fictional. In an autobiographical essay entitled ‘The Ladder and
the Tree’, he recalls how his childhood was marked by ‘a shuddering terror that was
incurable  because  it  was  indescribable’,  linking  it  to  the  inchoate  awareness  of  ‘a
central,  non-comprehended  darkness’  both  sitting  at  the  heart  of  human  life  and
spreading  ‘all  around,  inexplicable’  (Golding  1965:  167,  174).  The  existence  of  this
central darkness, which I identify with the essential kernel devoid of consciousness in
which the realm of physical appearances is rooted, is conveyed in topographical terms,
not only in this piece but also in several of his fictions. Originally, the place associated
with it is the cellar of the family home at Marlborough. Since the Goldings’ property
was next to the cemetery, young Billy became afraid that the dead which lay at the other
side of the garden wall could somehow make their way through the ‘dripping’ walls of
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the cellar where the boy’s father had rigged a swing for use in rainy days (166). The only
refuge where Bill could have a respite from his morbid obsession with the skeletons was
a chestnut tree which he used to climb in search of refuge and a privileged outlook on
the world, and which can be interpreted as a symbol of consciousness. (Secondarily, the
essay establishes a connection between the darkness and childhood; the tree is a refuge
against adulthood as well as a symbol of its inevitability and the ladder built  by his
rationalistic father to help Bill to climb the tree is the symbol of his unavoidable but
initially  rejected access to the world of adult  rationality.  Billy  does not take long to
break the ladder: he wants to climb up, but as a child, not using a ladder like an adult.)
In an article devoted to the theme in the novels from  Lord of the Flies to  The Spire,
Jeanne Delbaere analyses how the image of the cellar, ‘so deeply rooted in the novelist’s
personal  experience,  developed  through  his  mature  work’;  though  it  ‘became
increasingly  complex’  (Delbaere  1991:  3),  often  being  replaced  by  the  equivalent
symbols of the deep blue sea, the cave, the pit, the cell — and, I would like to add, the
crevice or crack (in Pincher Martin and The Double Tongue), the bowels of the vessel
where a wave rolls (in the Sea Trilogy), the recesses of the individual’s interior whose
rhythmical motions resemble a wave (in Darkness Visible). What these images have in
common  with  that  of  the  cellar  is  the  emphasis  on  their  concavity,  interiority  or
envelopment,  darkness  and/or  wetness  —  the  last  two  being  associated  with
‘formlessness’ (10). In all cases, Delbaere argues, they represent the realm ‘from which
man comes and to which he must inevitably return’ (3). Opposed to them, there are
those places that replace the original tree and are characterised by their height (the
higher the better), their brightness and/or their dryness: mountains and cliffs, islands,
rocks and ships in the middle of the sea, spires.
If the interpretation of the essential will that I am giving here is correct, the image
that transpires from The Spire is of essential unity or wholeness behind the manifold of
apparent experience. The recognition of this unity depends on the obliteration of all the
boundaries  imposed  by  physical  consciousness.  At  the  level  of  the  world’s  essence,
beings are no longer male or female, rational or non-rational, and their actions are no
longer  moral  or  immoral.  The  essential  will  has  no  sex  and  no  gender,  it  has  no
consciousness,  and it  is  not  restrained by moral  considerations.  And even after  the
emergence of human consciousness, and with it of the categories that we impose on the
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world, the influence of the essential force that underlies the whole world continues to
be felt whether or not we are aware of it.
Outside his fiction, Golding pays homage to this single essence when he shares with
Biles his belief that ‘there  is a unity’,  and his conviction that humanity’s ‘overriding
necessity’ is ‘to bring the whole thing together’ again (in Biles 1970: 102). The adverse
consequences of Jocelin’s blindness to human needs and to the role played by willing in
every human being, prove that our welfare depends on being able to live with one eye
on the realm of  appearances and the other eye on the essence of  the world.  As an
author,  Golding takes on as  his  personal duty  not only ‘to  bring the disparate into
equation’, but to remind his readers that we live on two different planes at one and the
same time, and that an awareness of both is necessary for us to live a full human life
(Golding 1984a: 202).  Pincher Martin,  the novel  that  I  shall  look at  next,  provides
further evidence of the preponderance of the essential will in human life and how the
individuals’ ignorance of that preponderance is partly responsible for their suffering.
3.1.2.2. The Subordination of the Intellect to the Will in Pincher Martin
Apart  from  The  Spire,  the other  book  in  which  the  main  character’s  will  is  most
consistently brought to the fore is  Pincher Martin. The novel narrates the imaginary
misadventures of a solitary castaway on a rocky islet, where his will and reason act in
unison, presumably as  they used to do before he fell  overboard, to ensure survival.
Though the character’s rationality — with which I dealt in relation to the humanisation
of the world — has been stressed by a number of critics, the role of his will has only
been directly commented on by Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor, who subordinate it to his
rational  powers.  I  shall  offer  an  interpretation  that  is  different  from  theirs,  and
compatible with my previous analysis of the will  in  The Spire.  As in  The Spire,  and
despite the contrary impression that  we may get from the relationship between the
intellect and the will inside the main character’s mind, in Pincher Martin the will is the
essential force that comes before knowledge, no matter if this knowledge is rational or
not,  and which not only governs the main character’s  life but also brings about his
death.  Contrary to  The Spire,  however,  Pincher Martin puts  the focus on the main
character’s  physical  feelings  and concepts  rather  than  on his  metaphysical  feelings.
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Another  difference  is  the  characterisation  of  the  essential  will  to  life,  both  inside
Pincher’s imaginary world and outside it. In The Spire, the essential will to life is mostly
linked to sexuality. Though in Pincher Martin the character’s memories reveal that this
was a main driving force of his behaviour in the past, as soon as his life is in danger
sexuality is overridden by the instinct of self-preservation. The eagerness to stay alive at
all  costs  guides the title  character’s  intellectual  efforts,  not  only  at  his  moments of
greatest rational lucidity but also in those of wildest delusion. His struggle reveals how
exceptional he is, not only because his innate character makes him cling to life with
unusual strength, but also because his egocentric intellect is so powerful that, even if it
cannot  secure  his  physical  survival  any  more,  it  creates  a  small  world  where  an
imaginary  version  of  Pincher  can  survive.  As  regards  the  latter  point,  the  novel
illustrates  how,  even  if  the  human  mind  is  designed  to  meet  the  body’s  needs,  as
Schopenhauer says, its capabilities go beyond what is required by the body.  Pincher
Martin allows us to see that this not only happens, as Schopenhauer claims, when the
mind  works  in  a  non-egocentric  way  (for  example,  when  it  engages  in  aesthetic
contemplation), but also when it continues to work egocentrically even if this activity
no longer benefits the body. In the end, however, Pincher’s mind also succumbs to the
essential darkness from which it has risen and to which it is forced to return.
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor’s treatment of Pincher’s will begins by focusing on the
way in which he apparently creates the imaginary world where he stays for what seem
to be six days. Using the same biblical tone as the narrator itself sometimes adopts,
they write: ‘On the first day the Will creates sea and sky around itself, creates day and
night,  creates  the rock’  (Kinkead-Weekes  and Gregor  2002:  112).  Once it  has  been
established that it is Pincher’s god-like intellect that conjures up this private world, it is
obvious that Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor associate the will with consciousness and, in
particular, with the construction and preservation of a private world. In the rest of their
discussion  they  link  the  character’s  will  to  reason,  bodily  control  and  individual
identity. Willing for them is secondary in comparison with the unrelenting deployment
of rationality.  Though this view may be defensible if  we only pay attention to what
happens in Pincher’s imaginary world, the eventual destruction of this mental refuge
under the pressure of the dark force that it tries to keep at bay evidences that Pincher’s
intellect is actually at the service of the essential will.
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While Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor briefly mention the will, Golding’s own account
of the novel leaves it out of the picture. These are the relevant parts of his explanation:
‘Christopher Hadley Martin has no belief in anything but the importance of his own
life’; he is ‘little but greed’, and when his individual existence is in serious danger his
‘greed for life’, which has been ‘the mainspring of his nature’, forces him ‘to refuse the
selfless act of dying’; while ‘His drown body lies rolling in the Atlantic’, his ‘ravenous’
mind ‘invents a rock for him to endure on’ out of ‘the memory of an aching tooth’; even
on the verge of death, Pincher will ‘centre the world on himself’; actually, ‘He is not
fighting for bodily survival but for his continuing identity in the face of what will smash
it  and sweep it  away  — the black lightning’  (cited  in  Baker  1965:  35–6).  Golding’s
comments are certainly illuminating; however, they can also be misleading, because
they refer to the character’s greed for life alone, never to the impersonal will to life at
its  root,  and because they mix this  greed with his  fight for  continuing identity.  To
clarify the role of the will to life in the way in which Pincher’s surrogate attempts to
survive, it is convenient to begin with an analysis of his misapprehension of the will.
As we saw in the section devoted to the humanisation of the imaginary world that
his  mind  has  conjured  up,  even  within  this  world  Pincher’s  surrogate  puts  all  the
emphasis on the power of consciousness to master his surroundings. Very frequently
his  thoughts  are  not  directed  to  the  imaginary  world  outside  but  to  his  own
consciousness. When this happens, he reduces his intellectual existence to a point of
awareness.  This  point,  located  ‘inside  himself  at  the  top  end’,  is,  in  his  egocentric
opinion, ‘at the centre of everything’ (Golding 1956: 82, 45). What is more, this centre is
equated with his whose identity: from the first instants of his ordeal he finds himself
inside his head, looking out. It is obvious that the centre can only be the subject of
consciousness, which for Schopenhauer is the correlative of all representations.
Regarding the egocentric subject of consciousness, that is, the subject the perceives
the physical objects outside, Schopenhauer describes it as ‘the extensionless centre of
the sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it’ (Schopenhauer 1969a:
452).30 He adds that this egocentric subject must be envisaged as ‘the dark point in
30 In Free Fall, Sammy Mountjoy describes the ego as ‘a single point’ that has no ‘shape or size but
only position’; this position stands at the centre of shapes that flee ‘away outwards along the radii
of a globe’ (Golding 1959: 190). Like Pincher Martin’s surrogate, Sammy takes this point to be
related to his ‘own interior identity’ as an individual (190).
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consciousness’, and compares it to the eye, which ‘sees everything except itself’, and
which can only be known indirectly, as a concept (1969b: 491). The way in which the
intellect of Pincher’s surrogate is described in Golding’s narrative is similar: insofar as
Pincher’s surrogate is a subject of consciousness that cannot ‘even examine itself’, he is
called ‘an unexamined centre’ (Golding 1956: 45, 161). As the conscious subject cannot
know itself  directly,  Schopenhauer  argues  that  ‘self-consciousness  could not  exist  if
there were not in it a known opposed to the knower and different therefrom’, and that
otherwise the knower ‘would be the known of another knower’ (Schopenhauer 1969b:
202).  As  we  know,  in  his  understanding  of  self-consciousness  what  the  conscious
subject grasps when it looks inside is not itself but the motions of the individual will
devoid of consciousness. Unlike The Spire, Pincher Martin does not contain any clear
description  of  the  character’s  self-conscious  grasp  of  his  individual  will,  yet  in  an
interview with Biles Golding does refer elsewhere to the latter novel as illustrating the
subject’s impossibility to be conscious of itself: ‘You think about yourself, and no matter
how many layers you strip off, there is always something thinking about yourself. The
thing which is thinking, which is examining, cannot examine itself … because it is the
thing  which  is  examining’;  thus  Golding  believes,  like  Schopenhauer,  that  in  every
conscious  being  there  is  ‘this  one  point  of  awareness  which  cannot  examine  itself,
because it is working when it tries to examine’ (in Biles 1970: 74).
These  comments  go  —  like  Schopenhauer’s  — against  the  kind  of  rational  self-
reflection  captured  by  Descartes’s  cogito,  and  are  consistent  with  Golding’s  overall
suspicion of rationalism. Golding’s criticism of Cartesianism also extends to ontological
dualism. The centre of consciousness of Pincher’s surrogate may be unable to examine
itself, but this does not prevent it from imposing rational ‘patterns’ on the bare rock
(Golding  1956:  108).  During  his  stay  in  the  imaginary  world,  Pincher’s  surrogate
believes that he has put his indomitable will at the service of this rational centre, or at
most that both are on an equal footing: on the one hand, there is ‘Will like a last ditch.
Will  like  a  monolith’;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  ‘invulnerable  centre’  of
representation — and hence of his world — that is ‘certain of its own sufficiency’ (163).
Like Descartes, Pincher’s surrogate thinks that he is two independent ‘things, mind and
body’ (176). He also believes, like the French philosopher, that the mind is ‘sufficient’,
not ‘a slave’ to the body (161–5), ‘self-existent and indestructible’ (45). Convinced that
even ‘Sleep  is  a  condition  to  be  attained  by thought  like  any other’  (87),  Pincher’s
205
Golding’s Metaphysics
surrogate does not realise that his actions betray a force that is even greater than that of
his  mind.  Indirectly,  many  of  his  thoughts,  many  of  the  things  that  he  says,  and
especially his behaviour, betray the existence of this powerful energy that feeds both his
past  sexual  desire  and his  present  attempts  to  survive:  from the  very  beginning,  it
emerges that his conduct in the imaginary world that he has created obeys, as it did in
the world that  he has left  behind, where ‘an ancient’  automatism mentioned by the
third-person narrator drives his body to try to stay afloat (8), a ‘relentless’ force — the
imaginary counterpart of the will to life — that does not fail to ‘use the mechanism’ of
the surrogate’s mind in the same way as it uses that of the body (11). Little by little, the
image of the monolith becomes the perfect way of conveying its strength as well as its
obtuseness and unidirectionality.
The other main clue to a correct appreciation of the influence of the essential will to
life is the surrogate’s alternation between the modal verbs shall and will in conjunction
with  the  first  person.  This  oscillation  is  symptomatic  of  the  occasions  when  his
egocentric intellect  works as if it  were responsible for everything that is  happening,
and, alternatively, of the occasions when it is presented, even in the imaginary world, as
subservient to the will to life that reveals itself through the individual’s speech. In one
case the intellect seems to be in control and takes all the necessary measures to survive.
In the other cases it is clearly the will to life that prevails, and the egocentric intellect is
the  unwitting  servant  through  which  the  essential  will  speaks  like  a  ventriloquist
through a puppet.
In the following quotations Pincher’s surrogate sticks to the traditional British use
of shall with the first-person pronoun. After conjuring up the imaginary sea on which
he floats, and remembering that his ship has been torpedoed by a German submarine,
Pincher’s surrogate concludes: ‘I shall see wreckage’ (Golding 1956: 14); later, when he
has already reached the imaginary rock where he is to spend his last imaginary days, he
announces: ‘“I shall call those three rocks out there the Teeth”’ (90). On both occasions
the  emphasis  is  on  the  certainty  of  what  is  bound  to  happen  and  on  the  rational
determination to tame a hostile environment.
If we compare this with the isolated instances in with Pincher’s surrogate uses will,
we can infer that when  will crops up its modal value is volition. (In British English,
using shall to express certainty and determination is also possible, but if Golding would
have done so it would have ruined the contrast with the expression of volition through
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will.) The first appearance of this use, at a moment when the surrogate’s consciousness
responds to little more than the animal instinct for self-preservation, is to affirm his
will to live: ‘I won’t die’ (Golding 1956: 14). Later on, the almost hysterical surrogate
asserts his will to keep on living:
‘I am busy surviving. … If this rock tries to adapt me to its ways I will refuse and adapt it to mine.
I  will impose my routine on it,  my geography.  I  will tie  it  down with names.  …  I  will trap
rainwater and add it to this pool. I will use my brain as a delicate machine-tool to produce the
results I want’ (Golding 1956: 86–7; my italics).
If  the  surrogate’s  will  is  the  same as  appears  in  The Spire,  then we should not  be
mislead by his insistence, through the use of the first-person singular pronoun, on the
subject’s responsibility for the will. This is an effect of his perspective, which is tainted
by  egocentrism.  Regardless  of  how  Pincher’s  surrogate  may  see  the  issue,  outside
Pincher’s imaginary world it is not the mind that prevails over the will but the other
way round. Passages like the above show that the notion of person includes willing as
well as knowing. Moreover, they can be interpreted as pointing to the way in which,
even within an imaginary world like the one created by Pincher, a person’s innate will
makes use of his or her brain, and hence of his or her mind, as if it were a tool like any
other,  while  simultaneously  allowing  the  egocentric  mind,  which  is  incapable  of
realising its subordination to the will, to think that it is responsible for volition. Other
passages  show,  as  we  are  about  to  see,  how,  once  physical  survival  is  out  of  the
question, the intellect may still function to secure, even within an imaginary world, not
only its own survival but even its individuality.
While he struggles to keep the spark of consciousness alive, Pincher’s surrogate is
assailed by unpleasant memories of Pincher’s previous life. If these scenes from the
past can be said to have some common denominator,  it is  the character’s lust.  This
theme echoes the emphasis, in  The Spire,  on Jocelin’s own sexuality,  the difference
being that Pincher is fully awake to this energy that fuels his conduct and does not
make any effort to keep it in check. Thus, we gradually learn that Pincher has had sex
with both women and men. He has gone to bed with Sybil, the woman whom his friend
Alfred loved; he has slept with his producer’s wife, Helen, whom he remembers as a
mere ‘instrument of pleasure’ (Golding 1956: 95); he has tried to seduce and rape Mary
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Lovell,  the  girlfriend of  his  friend Nathaniel,  whose  ‘eyes’,  ‘silences’,  ‘little  guarded
breasts’ and ‘impregnable virtue’ excites Pincher’s ‘furious musk’ and drives him mad
(95, 148).31
After his ship has sunk, the emphasis changes and it is no longer sex that matters,
but  rather  the  fear  of  death  and  the  wish  to  preserve  egocentric  identity,  at  an
imaginary  level,  when  most  of  Pincher’s  body  is  already  dead.  According  to
Schopenhauer, the human being, unlike other animals that are devoid of reason and
therefore lack the concept of the future and of life’s termination, ‘consciously draws
every hour  nearer  his  death’  (Schopenhauer 1969a:  37),  and knowing that  they are
bound  to  die  fills  him  with  anxiety. So  strong  is  their  fear  of  death  that  it  may
contaminate other aspects of human life. This  is indeed what the surrogate’s fear of
sleep reveals.
Pincher’s surrogate reacts to sleep as if it were a temporary death. His  fear to fall
asleep is actually fear of individual extinction, of what Golding calls, in his summary of
the  novel,  the  selfless  act  of  dying that  involves  welcoming  the  fact  that  one’s
individuality is destroyed.  After trying to think himself into sleep, Pincher’s surrogate
realises that he cannot do it after all. What is more, he discovers that since he is on the
rock he has grown afraid of sleeping, and for several reasons. To begin with, he is aware
that  sleeping  involves  a  loss  of  conscious  control  over  reality,  the  dissolution  of
egocentric subjectivity and the simultaneous obliteration of the rational patterns that
he has so carefully built. Furthermore, he suspects that dreams reveal the nasty truth
about himself and about the reality that he has invented. Finally, he fears sleep as a
prelude to or preparation for death. The following passage condenses all these reasons
and shows the strenuous psychological ordeal undergone by a man who, refusing to die,
cannot afford to lose conscious control over a world of his own creation:
31 Pincher’s obsession with Mary Lovell and the reference to his musky desire announces Sammy’s
seduction and sexual exploitation of Beatrice Ifor in Free Fall. There the power of the sexual and
self-preservative drives acts as the main motive of Sammy’s immoral behaviour: the prospect of
sexual pleasure pushes him towards Beatrice and, when he has obtained it, to Taffy, a sexually
liberated girl that soon becomes his wife; the fear of death tempts Sammy to accuse his fellow
prisoners during the war.
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Sleep is a relaxation of the conscious guard, the sorter. Sleep is when all the unsorted stuff comes
flying out as from a dustbin upset in a high wind. … Or sleep was a consenting to die, to go into
complete unconsciousness, the personality defeated, acknowledging too frankly what is implicit
in mortality that we are temporary structures patched up and unable to stand the pace without a
daily respite from what we most think ours —
…
Sleep is where we touch what is better left unexamined. … There the carefully hoarded and
enjoyed personality, our only treasure and at the same time our only defence must die into the
ultimate  truth  of  things,  the  black  lightning  that  splits  and  destroys  all,  the  positive,
unquestionable nothingness.
…
Why can’t I sleep?
Gripping the lifebelt in two hands, with face lifted, eyes staring straight ahead … he whispered
the answer to his own question in a mixture of astonishment and terror.
‘I am afraid to’ (Golding 1956: 91–2).
As Babb explains, while Pincher’s surrogate seems to rest, his egocentric consciousness
‘sustains  itself,  warding off  nothingness through remembering the past’  (1970:  80).
Pincher’s surrogate is afraid to discover that he is no longer conscious of the public
world that the other characters perceive, and this is a token of Pincher’s own fear of
death. In Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor’s words, Pincher has invented ‘his whole world
by a kind of deliberate dreaming which must always obey every law of being awake so
that he never finds out it is a dream’ (2002: 112). Sleeping and dreaming would perhaps
cause  a  short-circuit  in  the  system  of  representations  that  he  has  so  carefully
constructed and struggles to sustain, and this short-circuit would cause the definitive
blackout of consciousness, thus preventing him from warding off death.
When Pincher’s surrogate finally discovers the truth about the island on which he is
stranded, an island created on the memory of a decayed tooth, he cannot avoid the
uncanny feeling of having discovered something very strange and, at the same time,
scarily familiar:
His tongue felt along the barrier of his teeth. His tongue was remembering. It pried into the gap
between the teeth and re-created the old, aching shape. It touched the rough edge of the cliff,
traced the slope down, trench after aching trench, down towards the smooth surface where the
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Red Lion was, just above the gum — understood what was so hauntingly familiar and painful
about an isolated and decaying rock in the middle of the sea (Golding 1956: 174).
Nevertheless,  not  even this  discovery  of  what  the  islet  really  is  can stop  him from
clinging to a mental life where, as in an imaginary nutshell, he is the sole protagonist
and  the  centre  of  all  action.  In  a  sense,  the  most  illuminating  —  if  indirect  —
presentation of this attitude is the narrator’s description of his snail-like retreat into a
crevice in the rock:
There was a slab of rock that had slipped and fallen sideways from the wall of a trench. This made
a triangular hole between the rock and the side and bottom of the trench. … The hole ran away
and down at an angle following the line of the trench and inside there was darkness. The hole
even looked drier than the rest of the rock. … He began to turn his body in the trench, among a
complication of sodden clothing. … He backed to the triangular opening and put his feet in. He
lay flat on his stomach and began to wriggle weakly like a snake that cannot cast its skin. … The
oilskin was hard and he backed with innumerable separate movements like a lobster backing into
a deep crevice under water. He was in the crack up to his shoulders and rock held him tightly. He
hutched the lifebelt up till the soft rubber was across the upper part of his chest. … His hand
found the tit and he blew again slowly until the rubber was firmed up against his chest. He folded
his arms, a white hand on either side. He let the left side of his face fall on an oilskinned sleeve
and his eyes were shut — not screwed up but lightly closed. (Golding 1956: 45–6).
The backward movement of Pincher’s surrogate into the seemingly bottomless crevice
expresses Pincher’s retreat into a solipsistic shell. In the course of this retreat, Pincher
substitutes  his  own  imaginative  signifiers  for  the  field  of  reference  that  the  other
characters share, and thus construct for himself a private world increasingly detached
from the public world where the other characters remain. The implication is that this
public world, unlike Pincher’s, is not made up of signs of images but consists in the
referents to which signs point, but that the world outside the novel, in which Golding
and his readers live, certainly runs the risk of becoming a spectacle of free-standing
signifiers.  Since  Golding’s  attitude  towards  Pincher  is  of  frank  condemnation,  the
castaway’s  solipsism, and the increasing similarity that  the  world outside the novel
bears  to  it  because  of  the  passage  from  modernity  to  postmodernity,  may  too  be
interpreted as reprehensible. At this point, it becomes clear that Golding’s defence of
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the  modern  project  includes,  apart  from  his  criticism  of  the  interference  of  other
approaches, particularly religion, with science, an attack on the treatment of signifiers
as if they were the referent. This confusion is an important ingredient of the process of
postmodernisation,  which  in  Lash  and  Urry’s  conception  not  only  involves  the  de-
differentiation among social spheres, but also between the signifier and the referent.
The  postmodern  frame  of  mind,  they  say,  ‘problematizes  the  relationship  between
representations and reality’  (Lash and Urry 1994: 272).  ‘Since what we increasingly
consume are signs or images, so there is no simple “reality” separate from such modes
of  representation’  (272).  In  sum,  postmodern  de-differentiation  questions  ‘our
experience of  reality itself’  (Lash 1990:  15).  This  is  a  questioning that  in  Golding’s
opinion must be resisted.
In Pincher’s case, the shell where he takes refuge is made up of physical objects
acting as barriers against the darkness of the undifferentiated essence that threatens to
swallow him up. However, the crevice in the rock prefigures the cracks which will cause
the shell to break down and which, from the point of view of Pincher’s surrogate, look
like a branching black lightning. The collapse of the shell will mark the end of Pincher’s
mental life, and with it his return to the undifferentiated essence from which he — like
all conscious beings — has issued and which is infinitely more powerful than his mind.32
For the time being Pincher’s surrogate is able to use his body as a stop that prevents his
imaginary world from going down one of  those crevices  where ‘a  terrible darkness’
lurks (Golding 1956: 124).  Eventually,  however,  the pressure exerted by the essence
that Pincher’s imaginary world excludes is too strong, and the crevice that Pincher’s
surrogate sees as a black lightning destroys it for good. Babb explains: ‘As his world
dissolves, his consciousness is increasingly invaded by indications of otherness in the
universe, an otherness that itself denies the postulate of Martin’s private universe’, the
‘total self-sufficiency’ of the egocentric subject of consciousness (1970: 79).
Frank  Kermode  and  Leon  Surette  bring  out  the  real  implications  of  Pincher’s
stubborn resistance to individual death. Kermode states that Pincher ‘will do anything
32 From the proper metaphysical perspective, says Schopenhauer, death means reuniting with the
essential  force  out  of  which  one  rises,  that  is,  returning  to  where  one  belongs.  Nowhere  in
Golding’s oeuvre is this clearer than in The Inheritors, even if there, as we shall see in the last
section of  this study, the force that engenders the individuals and with which they reunite is
identified as divine and given a (fictive) deity’s name — Oa.
211
Golding’s Metaphysics
rather than accept the loss of himself’ (Kermode 1971: 248). Surette makes a similar
point: ‘Martin is willing to go to any lengths to preserve his identity’; what looks like
‘indomitable fortitude’ is nothing more than ‘a senseless clinging to identity’ (Surette
1994:  220).  Confronted  with this  behaviour,  the  reader  may find it  hard to  pass  a
negative judgement on Golding’s character: ‘The sharpest difficulty this novel has for its
readers is its requirement that they withdraw their approval from Martin’s indomitable
struggle to maintain  his  identity’,  even if  it  only is  through an imaginary surrogate
(220).  What  both  Kermode  and  Surette  fail  to  see  is  that  the  original  function  of
Pincher’s identity is,  like that of tenacious personality to which it is associated, and
which  the castaway  is  eager  to  ‘“reinforce”’  (Golding  1956:  106),  to  be  a  necessary
instrument of the essential will to life. Nor do these critic realise that, if his egocentric
consciousness still clings to life, it is out of inertia: even when its services are no longer
needed, and Pincher is about to return to the will to life that gave birth to him and that
can dispose of him whenever it finds fit, his self-centred mind cannot help going about
its usual business.
By the end of this sixth day on the rock, after a long resistance, Pincher’s surrogate
is so exhausted that ‘black nothingness’ (extinction, both physical and mental) manages
to ‘engulf him utterly, finally’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor: 129). The black lightning is
just a crack in the mental shell that Pincher has built and that is waiting to deliver the
final  blow on his  fantasies  of  self-sufficiency.  When the black lightning widens and
branches to form ‘lines of absolute blackness’, Pincher’s world is reduced to a centre
and a pair of gigantic pincers clinging to the rock; then the rock is gone, leaving the
serrated, lobster-like claws — ‘huge and strong and inflamed to red’ — gripping each
other; finally the black lines advance towards the centre of awareness, as if ‘waiting for
the moment when they could pierce it’, and to the claws, ‘playing over them, prying for
a weakness, wearing them away … without mercy’ (Golding 1956: 201).
The  key  to  understand  what  has  happened  is  to  remember  the  intellect’s
subordination to the essential will: the essential will can only find satisfaction by means
of  its  manifestations,  and  only  insofar  as  they  are  endowed  with  an  egocentric
consciousness and, therefore, with a strong sense of individual identity. In Pincher’s
case, the egocentric predisposition to satisfy the needs of the body is so strong that it
tries to do so until the very last moment, when the last embers of the living body are
extinguished, that is,  even when the conditions are so adverse that the organism to
212
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
which the intellect is associated can no longer be satisfied. Pincher’s inert body — lungs
full  of  water  and,  most  likely,  heart  arrested — quickly approaches  cerebral  death;
meanwhile,  his  brain  tries  to  perform  its  function  at  all  costs  by  conjuring  up  an
imaginary world where it can do so. Within this world, Pincher’s surrogate makes the
same effort to survive as Pincher would have made, under similar circumstances, in the
world of which he is no longer aware. As Pincher used to do in this world, his surrogate
makes the mistake of behaving as if the satisfaction of his individual desires were an
end in itself. Finally, on the island the surrogate also tries to preserve his individual
identity until the end, because this is the only way in which satisfaction can be attained.
The attitudes  and the  behaviour  of  Pincher’s  surrogate  are  only  an exaggerated
version of that of the majority of people. By the same token, his rejection of death in the
imaginary world is consistent with Pincher’s vain struggle not to drown when he falls
overboard  at  the  very  beginning of  the  novel.  The  result  of  this  first  refusal  is  the
creation of  an imaginary rock surrounded by an imaginary sea.  After this has been
accomplished, we discover that his surrogate also refuses to die because he considers
his life to be irreplaceable and ‘Precious’ (Golding 1956: 14). Towards the end of the
novel we witness a similar refusal, to no effect:
‘What do you believe in?’
…
‘The thread of my life’.
‘At all costs’
…
‘Didn’t the others want to live then?’
‘There are degrees’ …




‘I will not consider!’ (Golding 1956: 196).
Pincher’s surrogate prefers an imaginary continuation of life, ‘“pain and all”’, to death
(Golding  1956:  197).  Perishing  involves,  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  egocentric
individual, a ‘“sheer negation”’ of what one most cherishes’ (70), including what John
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Peter calls ‘the theatrical paper world he has made for himself’ and where he can be the
absolute protagonist (Peter 1957: 590).
This kind of resistance to death is clearly a mistake. The black lightning destroys
Pincher’s  imaginary world,  and his  surrogate with it,  as  if  it  were erasing a flawed
creation or an unsatisfactory draft. This seems to align Golding with Schopenhauer, for
whom the wish to live indefinitely is an error that betokens the individual’s failure to
grasp the simple truth that surrendering to death is better than clinging to life:
To desire immortality for the individual is really the same as wanting to perpetuate an error for
ever; for at bottom every individuality is really only a special error, a false step, something that it
would be better should not be (Schopenhauer 1969b: 491–2).
Elsewhere Schopenhauer suggests that the error has to do with egocentrism, a mode of
consciousness  which  acts  as  the  principle  of  individuation  giving  rise  to  discrete
physical  things  and  thus  —  according  to  Schopenhauer’s  theory  of  the  exact
correspondence  between  object  and  subject  —  to  individual  perceivers.  Now
egocentrism is linked to so much suffering as would convince the individual ‘that it
would be better … not to exist’  (Schopenhauer 1969b: 605).  Moreover,  egocentrism
prevents all metaphysical knowledge — in Schopenhauer’s opinion, one of the possible
palliatives for suffering — and in particular the knowledge of the essence of the world.
This means that egocentrism makes us turn our back on what we essentially are. The
following remarks by Schopenhauer are especially relevant here:
however much my individual existence, like [the] sun, outshines everything for me, at bottom it
appears only as an obstacle which stands between me and the knowledge of the true extent of my
being.  And because in his knowledge every individual  succumbs to this obstacle,  it  is  simply
individuation that keeps the will-to-live in error as to its own true nature … Death is a refutation
of this error and abolishes it (Schopenhauer 1969b: 601).
Because  his  mind  works  egocentrically,  Pincher  conjures  up  a  world  of  physical
appearances, of surfaces without depth. This is the only world to which, for most of the
novel, his surrogate and we readers have access. I have already mentioned how this
private  world  resembles  a  theatrical  stage;  now  it  becomes  apparent  that  its
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background resembling painted cardboard prevents everyone — actor and spectators
alike  — from seeing what  happens  backstage.  Only  when the black  lightning starts
destroying Pincher’s mental shell do we begin to realise what the death that awaits all
the manifestations of the essential will might entail. Not only does death put an end to
an egocentrism that perpetuates our pain and hides from us our essential being. It is
also a remedy for the egocentric frame of mind on which moral egoism and malice rest,
and which therefore  has no small  share  in  the rest  of  the  world’s  sufferings.  What
exactly the role of egoism, malice and suffering is in Golding’s novels, Pincher Martin
among them, will be examined next.
3.1.2.3. Incarnations of Egocentrism: Egoistic and Malignant Characters
According to Schopenhauer, my egocentrism means that, as a rule, my consciousness
falls short of probing the essential kernel of the world; instead, it functions in such a
way that my apparent individuality is pitted against the others’. It also means that, as a
consequence,  my  attempts  to  fulfil  my  desires  take  it  for  granted  that  they  are
exclusively  mine, and that those attempts do not usually take into consideration the
well-being of my neighbour. Morally speaking, Schopenhauer argues that the prevailing
desires  among humans are  linked to  their  egocentrism.  This  is  what  happens  with
egoistic desires (by dint of which the egocentric seeks his or her well-being alone) and
malignant desires (by dint of which the egocentric seeks to harm the other, as if this
were  not,  in  a  sense,  an  attack  on  his  or  her  own  essence).  Having  analysed  the
presence of the essential will qua will to life in The Spire and Pincher Martin, we can
proceed to examine the most frequent moral forms that this craving for life can adopt
in  Golding’s  novels  when  coupled  up  with  egocentric  modalities  of  consciousness.
Golding  offers  a  wide  gallery  of  characters  that  can  be  identified  with  the  moral
categories  of  egoism and malignity.  Among them,  Pincher  Martin  is  predominantly
egoistic; Roger in  Lord of the Flies is malignant, and so are Philip in  Free Fall  and
Sophy in Darkness Visible.
In  Schopenhauer,  the  behaviour  of  every  thing  and  being  in  the  realm  of
appearances reveals their innate character and, indirectly, the single essence that they
share with the rest of the world. A person’s conduct is to some extent indicative of that
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person’s  desires  and  thus  of  his  or  her  innate  character,  in  other  words,  of  the
unchangeable way in which one wills what one wills. The same happens in Golding’s
novels, both in respect of the world’s essence, as we have seen, and in respect of one’s
innate character. In the most extreme cases, the novelist’s texts suggest that this innate
character can be summarised in one single word or sentence, as in a mediaeval morality
play:  the  main  character  in  Pincher  Martin,  for  instance,  is  described  as  greed
incarnated.  This  schematic  reduction  — on  occasions  to  a  single  trait  — bears  out
Golding’s  comments  to  Biles  that,  despite  his  belief  that  ‘what  is  important  is  the
people, and the ideas come second’, his first published novels ‘tend to lean towards the
ideas being important and the people not’ (in Biles 1970: 32).
Pincher  Martin’s  main  character  is  an  egocentric  who  regards  his  own  life  as
irreplaceable.  Golding  points  out  to  Baker,  in  an  exercise  of  understatement,  that
Pincher is ‘more of an egotist than most’ (in Baker 1982: 143). Both his stay on the
imaginary rock and his memories of the years before the war show that  Pincher not
only crushes and eats but proves insatiable. In the novel eating is the expression of
ruthless competition and violence. Pincher thinks that ‘You could eat with your cock or
with your fists, or with your voice. You could eat with hobnailed boots or buying and
selling or marrying and begetting and cuckolding’ (Golding 1956: 88). As Edmund L.
Epstein notes, in Golding’s narratives the gaping mouth is often used as ‘the symbol of
ravenous,  unreasoning and eternally  insatiable nature’  (1988:  303).  Pincher Martin
does indeed put the stress in its main character’s use of his mouth to bite, tear, chew
and swallow whatever  gets  in  his  way.  Indirectly,  this  draws attention to  a general
dynamic that characterises the world as a whole.
Thanks to the memories that insist on interrupting the train of thoughts of Pincher’s
surrogate,  we  gradually  learn  about  the  numerous  victims  of  his  consumptive
compulsion. There is Peter, the boy whom he maims by riding too dangerously in order
not to be defeated in a motorcycle race; and there is Sybil, a woman that Pincher takes
to bed so that his friend Alfred, who is in love with her, can see them together. He has
often had sex for power, with girls and with boys. He sleeps with his producer’s wife,
Helen, not only to obtain pleasure, but also because she can help him to advance his
career and to avoid forced recruitment. Not content with comparing his ‘phallus’ to a
‘sword’ and Helen to a ‘dog’, he recalls what he used to think about her: ‘I should love to
eat you’ (Golding 1956:  95). In addition, he tries to seduce and rape Mary Lovell, the
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chaste girl with whom he is obsessed, and who drives him to ‘a madness, not so much
in the loins as in the pride’, which instils in him ‘the need to assert and break’ (148). In
Pincher’s fantasy, lust and the hunt for pleasure go hand in hand with  violence and
torture (notice how his verbal abuse of her is ejaculated rather than merely shouted):
Those nights of imagined copulation, when one thought not of love nor sensation nor comfort nor
triumph, but of torture rather, the very rhythm of the body reinforced by hissed ejaculations —
take  that  and  that!  That  for  your  pursed  mouth  and  that  for  your  …  closed  knees,  your
impregnable balance on the high, female shoes — and that if it kills you for your magic and your
isled virtue! (Golding 1956: 149).33
Last, but not least, Pincher attempts to murder his best friend, Nathaniel, after serving
as best man at Nathaniel’s wedding with Mary. Pincher hates Nathaniel so much for
this that he thinks that he ‘could eat’ him too (Golding 1956: 100). When we learn about
the attempted murder, we infer that Pincher is as much the victim of his depravity as he
is of chance. Being on the same ship as Nathaniel, he orders a sudden change of course
in order to throw his friend — who is praying by the railing — into the sea. We cannot
know if Nathaniel dies or not as a result, but it eventually dawns on Pincher that it is
the change of direction that puts the ship in the trajectory of a Nazi torpedo. Pincher is
thus responsible for his own death.
Metonymically reduced to a pair of claws and a gaping mouth, Pincher is always
ready to clutch and devour whatever and whoever comes within reach: ‘“I kill and eat”’,
he says (Golding 1956: 115). His personality, thus summed up, depends as much on his
individuality,  his  ability  to  reason  and to  speak,  as  on  his  capacity  of  domination:
‘Domination.  Identity’  (191).  As  we  know,  Pincher’s  greedy  appetite  has  two  main
33 The Sea Trilogy provides another  illustration  of  the  rapport  between sexuality  and  violence:
Talbot describes his furtive sexual intercourse with Zenobia comparing it to a battle ‘with the
Delicious  Enemy’  (Golding  1991:  87).  Witness  the  choice  of  vocabulary,  which  stresses  his
aggressive assertiveness as well as his partner’s increasing passivity: ‘We wrestled for a moment
by the bunk, she with a nicely calculated exertion of strength that only just failed to resist me, I
with mounting passion. My sword was in hand and I boarded her! She retired in disorder to the
end of the hutch … I attacked once more. … Ah — she did yield at last to my conquering arms, was
overcome, rendered up all the tender spoils of war’ (77).
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objects, corresponding to two different stages in his life, before and after the shipwreck.
Sexuality and nourishment, two of the main goals of the essential will to life, meet in his
mind, for example, when he recalls calling his producer’s wife a ‘sweet’ that he would
‘love to eat’, and likewise when he remembers how much Mary’s ‘apple breasts’ used to
excite him (95, 148). Before being assailed by those memories, he has often conflated
sex with food, sometimes in the opposite direction, as when he compares the anemones
that he intends to eat to ‘breasts when the milk has been drawn from them’ (63).34
Inflicting suffering on others can be an end in itself (as in the case of malice) or as a
mere means to our egoistic ends. On the whole, Pincher’s behaviour is not the result of
34 The same link between consumption and sex appears in other novels. Though the list of possible
examples is longer, here I shall only make reference to those novels that I have analysed so far
(for  more  details,  see  the  discussion  of  each  individual  work  in  Crawford  2002).  In  The
Inheritors the New People are described as having ‘wolf teeth’ rather than the ‘broad’ teeth that
the primitive  People  use for ‘grinding’  (Golding 1955:  175,  174).  From the perspective  of  the
People, the sexual relations of  the New People involve not only ‘lying with’ but ‘eating’  one’s
partner, the ‘wolflike battle’  ending only when they have ‘consumed each other’  (175, 176). In
Free Fall,  as Crawford points out, ‘Sammy is seen as immersed in low, dirty sexual behavior
where women become meat to his greedy palate’ (2002: 107). Though Sammy is not the only
character in the novel whose sexual appetite is linked to consumption — the desire of the boy’s
benefactor, Father Watts-Watt, is for the ‘forbidden fruit’ of the pupil’s company (Golding 1959:
76) — but Sammy is the one whose desires are strongest: when he has casual sex with a girl called
Sheila, their relation consists in giving ‘each other a little furtive pleasure like handing round a
bag of toffees’ (91); and when he recalls Miss Manning, her sexy French teacher, he puts the
emphasis on her ‘creamy’ looks (227). Similarly, in Darkness Visible, Sophy’s sadistic appetite for
boys makes her describe them as ‘edible’ (Golding 1979: 176).
From a Freudian point of view, this emphasis on the link between sex eating would perhaps be
interpreted as pointing to an oral fixation.  Let us recall  that the oral stage corresponds to a
pregenital period during which sexual pleasure ‘is bound predominantly to that excitation of the
oral cavity and lips which accompanies feeding’,  and that ‘desire and satisfaction are forever
marked by this first experience’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 2006: 287, 288). As is usually the case,
in Golding’s novels this oral fixation has what Freud calls ‘cannibalistic’ features (Freud 1995:
273).  It  involves  ‘a  regression …  to  original  narcissism’  whereby  the  subject  attempts  to
‘incorporate’ the object ‘into itself’, and ‘to do so by devouring it’ (587). During the oral stage,
concludes Freud, ‘the act of obtaining erotic mastery over an object coincides with that object’s
destruction’ (621).
218
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
malignant desires; however violent and harmful to others his actions are, what seems to
move him is not so much the desire to hurt as his eagerness to satisfy his own wishes,
thus securing and incrementing his well-being, without . As his producer explains while
preparing a new play, the role that suits Pincher best is that of allegorical Greed:
‘This … bastard here takes anything he can lay his hands on. … He takes the best part, the best
seat, the best money, the best notice, the best woman. He was born with his mouth and his flies
open and both hands out to grab’ (Golding 1956: 120).
The producer’s reference to the use that Pincher makes of his hands anticipates his
imaginary surrogate’s transformation into a pair of claws stubbornly clinging to life. In
general,  the combination of  the will  to life and Pincher’s egocentrism results in the
ruthless domination, exploitation and consumption of everyone and everything round
him. As we share, in a series of flashbacks, his memories, we are revolted by his former
life, which ‘has been little more than a play for power, for domination, for the control of
other  human lives’  in  order  to  secure  the egocentric  satisfaction of  his  ‘monstrous’
appetites (Dickson 1991: 52). The character’s nickname is significant in this connection.
His  identity  disc  reads  Christopher  Hadley  Martin,  and,  Golding reminds  Biles,  all
‘Martins are called “Pincher” in the Royal Navy’ (in Biles 1970: 71). But in everyday
language,  pincher is also one who pinches, that is, hurts, extorts or steals (see Baker
1965: 39).  In the end,  just  before  the complete  obliteration of  the imaginary world
where he tries  to  survive,  Pincher’s  surrogate is  reduced to  the gripping claws,  the
perfect  image  of  the  character’s  egoistic  rapaciousness.  As  Golding  explains,  ‘He’d
spend his whole life acquiring things that really belong to other people, and bit by bit
they were taken away from him … till he ended as what he was’ (cited in Baker 1965:
39).35
35 The emblematic characterisation of Pincher Martin as greed bears out the novelist’s confession to
Biles that some of his books are ‘more interested in ideas than in people’ (in Biles 1970: 7). This
use of a simple, static character whose moral disposition can be summed up with just a couple of
words is not exceptional in Golding’s oeuvre. As it turns out, other characters of his can also be
profitably classified according to the moral parameters supplied by Schopenhauer.
Reflecting  on  his  penchant  for  this  kind  of  characterisation,  Golding  puts  it  down  to  his
admiration of Greek tragedy, which he regards as a major influence in his first published novels.
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Though  Pincher’s  egocentrism  results  in  an  egoistic  attitude,  Golding’s  novels
feature a number of egocentrics that are best classified as malignant. The most relevant
examples can be found in Lord of the Flies, Free Fall and Darkness Visible. Lord of the
Flies features one of the most terrifying characters ever created by Golding. Though the
novelist’s comments on the book usually focus on Jack, the head of the hunters, whose
desires are equally malignant, it is through its focus on Roger’s thoughts and actions
that the novel reveals the true colours of malice. As the story unfolds, Roger gradually
develops from a ‘furtive boy whom no one knew, who kept to himself with an inner
intensity of avoidance and secrecy’, to a painted torturer and murderer (Golding 1954:
20). He is a ‘dark boy’ (20), first because of his secretive personality, then because of
the fear that he inspires. A crucial moment in this development is when he and Maurice
destroy the sandcastles built by the little ones on the beach:
Roger and Maurice came out of the forest. They … had come down for a swim. Roger led the way
straight through the castles, kicking them over, burying the flowers, scattering the chosen stones.
Maurice followed, laughing, and added to the destruction. The three littluns paused in their game
and looked up. As it happened, the particular marks in which they were interested had not been
touched, so they made no protest. Only Percival began to whimper with an eyeful of sand and
Maurice hurried away. In his other life Maurice had received chastisement for filling a younger
eye with sand. Now, though there was no parent to let fall a heavy hand, Maurice still felt the
unease of wrongdoing. At the back of his mind formed the uncertain outlines of an excuse. He
muttered something about a swim and broke into a trot (Golding 1954: 59).
Left on his own, Roger continues to observe the little ones. Soon one of them, Henry,
leaves and starts to play at a distance from the rest. For no reason in particular, Roger
starts throwing stones at him:
Baker observes that ‘there is no question that the Greeks, taken collectively, represent one of the
most potent forces in shaping (or confirming) Golding’s conception of human psychology and
human fate’ (Baker 1965: xvii). In one of his interviews with Biles, Golding concedes that this
may be the reason why his novels ‘lack a number of dimensions of reality’ (in Biles 1970: 20). His
debt to the Greeks does not end with his early treatment of  character,  but also bears on his
conception of narrative plot (see Baker 1982: 165; for more details, see Baker 1965: 72–3, 94 n. 5;
Carey 1987: 182–3; Roncace 1997).
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Roger stooped, picked up a stone, aimed, and threw it at Henry — threw it to miss. The stone,
that token of preposterous time, bounced five yards to Henry’s right and fell in the water. Roger
gathered a handful of  stones and began to throw them. Yet there was a space round Henry,
perhaps six yards in diameter, into which, he dare not throw. Here, invisible yet strong, was the
taboo of the old life. Round the squatting child was the protection of parents and school and
policemen and the law. Roger’s arm was conditioned by … civilization (Golding 1954: 61).
According to William R. Mueller, here Roger, like Maurice, still ‘manifests a thin sheath
of  decency  and restraint’  (Mueller  1988:  265);  but  the  memory  of  moral  and legal
repression soon vanishes in him. Immediately after this episode, Roger comes across
Jack, who has covered his face and body with mud, clay and ash so as to prevent the
wild boars that he intends to kill from sensing him. Later, when Jack has already led
some of the boys to settle down away from Ralph and Piggy, Roger praises him as ‘“a
proper chief”’ (Golding 1954: 162). And when he learns that Jack has decided, without
giving any explanation, to tie another boy as a punishment, Roger receives the news ‘as
an illumination, assimilating the possibilities of irresponsible authority’  (163).  From
this moment on, Roger strives to outdo Jack’s cruelty. The highest point is his murder
of Piggy, when, ‘with a sense of delirious abandonment’, Roger leans all his weight on
the lever that moves a huge rock. The rock strikes Piggy a ‘blow from chin to knee’,
bursting the conch in his hands and killing him (185). The narrator reports how, from
this  moment  on,  ‘The  hangman’s  horror  clung  round  him’  (186).  He  becomes  ‘“a
terror”’ who hurts the other children and whom even Jack seems to fear (195). When
Roger and Jack decide to hunt Ralph down and behead him like a pig, it is the former
that Ralph is really afraid of, as he carries ‘death in his hands’ (201).
Roger has been called ‘a natural sadist’ (Epstein 1988: 301). The same label could be
applied to Philip Arnold, one of Sammy’s schoolmates in Free Fall. Of this ‘pale, timid’
boy, Sammy says that in comparison with himself and with their mutual friend Johnny
Spragg,  both of  whom were regular  school  bullies,  Philip  ‘was far  more dangerous’
(Golding 1959: 48). Philip ‘loved fighting when anyone else was being hurt’; he ‘liked to
inflict  pain’  so  much  that  ‘a  catastrophe  was  his  orgasm’  (48).  This  metaphorical
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description also fits Roger and Sophy, one of the main characters in Darkness Visible.
The actions of all three are not only egoistic, as in Pincher’s case, but truly malignant.36
Like  that  of  the  title  character  in  Pincher  Martin,  Sophy’s  consciousness  is
characterised by extreme egocentrism. Being only a child, she realises that the world
extends ‘out of her head in every direction but one; and that one was … the direction
through the back of  her head’ (Golding 1979: 112–3).  As in Pincher’s case,  it  is  the
overestimation of  this central  position that  prompts her to exclaim: ‘“I  shan’t die!”’
(112). Unlike Pincher’s, however, her egocentrism is not allied to egoism but to malice,
the  desire  for  the  other’s  suffering.37 The  antiquarian  bookseller  Sim  Goodchild,
another  of  the  characters  in  Darkness  Visible,  believes  himself  to  be,  despite  his
surname, dominated by a ‘diabolical thing down there’; the ‘sheer wantonness’ of the
actions that this demonic urge inspires involves ‘hindering’ a rival bookseller because it
is  more ‘fun’  than helping him (194).  Nevertheless,  Sim’s  description of  malice  fits
Sophy even better than himself.  The first clue to this effect comes from an episode
36 Reflecting on evil,  Golding says to Biles  that ‘intelligence and evil  are inextricably mixed up,
whereas knowledge and evil may not be’ (in Biles 1970: 109). The former claim is borne out in
Darkness Visible by the description of the Stanhope twins, whose malice soon becomes evident,
as  having  ‘phenomenal  intelligence’  (Golding  1979:  129).  From  Schopenhauer’s  perspective,
Golding’s  reference  to  intelligence  may  be  interpreted  as  pointing  to  rationality  (in  his
instrumental understanding of it). According to Schopenhauer, only rational animals, i.e. human
beings, can carry out evil actions (but, by the same token, only they can act altruistically). The
other  animals  may  have  knowledge,  in  the  form of  feelings,  but  are  not  capable  of  rational
thought. Regardless of the suffering that they may cause, their intentions and actions can only be
egoistic (exclusively concerned with their own weal). As for the question whether the presence of
evil only when there is rationality is a question of simultaneity or of dependence (a question that
Schopenhauer does not help us to settle), Golding suggests that ‘perhaps … intelligence and evil
are not inseparable, but parallel things, as a matter of genetics’ (109).
37 Like Sammy Mountjoy in  Free Fall, sometimes Sophy uses the language of moral relativism to
justify her attitude.  She has her ‘own wishes and rules’, which from her perspective are like ‘a
measuring rod’ (Golding 1979: 135). Examining such notions as ought and must, she reaches the
conclusion  that,  if  they  are  ‘not  appropriate’  to  her,  she  can  make  them  vanish  behind  the
imperatives of want (135). Moving from desires to actions, she believes that all acts are morally
neutral, therefore ‘that stealing was wrong or right according to the way you thought’ (124). If she
never takes to stealing, it is simply because she finds it ‘boring’ (124). Her aspirations are very
different, related to the gratuitous infliction of pain rather than with material gains.
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where she repeats Roger’s throwing of stones, the difference being that Sophy does not
feel the restraining force of parents and police. Having discovered a brook near her
house, the little girl feels the need to throw stones at a family of ducks that she has
caught swimming away (the description of the action emphasises her estimation of time
and space): ‘left arm held sideways, upper arm rotating back from the elbow past her
left ear in a little girl’s throw’, she is able ‘not merely to jerk her upper arm forward but
also to let go the stone at the precise moment, angle, speed’ (108); next she feels ‘the
satisfaction of the event’ (109; my italics). At this point in the novel, when Sophy is still
a child, this is an unexpected response to the damage which she has done, and which
the narrator describes in vivid detail:
the qualified splash, the mother shattering away from the water, half flying over it with a cry like
pavements breaking, the chicks mysteriously disappearing, all except the last one, now a scrap of
fluff among spreading rings, one foot held up at the side and quivering a little,  the rest of it
motionless except for the rocking of the water (Golding 1979: 109).
Though here we only have access to her feeling of achievement after killing one of the
chicks, we are not given any details about her motivation to throw the stone. In itself,
this absence of explanation is indicative that she does it simply because she can and
because she suspects that it can give her some pleasure. Subsequent events in the story
support this view of the gratuitousness of her action.
In the course of one of her first sexual relationships, lying on a divan, Sophy finds
the  whole  experience  mildly  ‘pleasant’  but  ‘ludicrous’  (Golding  1979:  145).  When
Roland, her partner, criticises her lack of implication, she feels some ‘deep rage’ boiling
out  of  her  (145).  Without  saying a  word,  she ‘fiercely’  jabs  a  little  knife  which she
happens to be holding in her hand (145). Roland jerks away with a howl, but when, still
‘spread on the divan’,  she sees his blood on the blade,  she notices a strange feeling
‘expanding  inside  her  and  filling  her’,  and  finally  becoming  ‘a  shudder  then  an
unstoppable arching of her body’ (146). Crying out ‘through her clenched teeth’, she lets
‘Unsuspected  nerves  and  muscles’  take  charge  of  her,  sweeping  her  forward  ‘in
contraction after contraction towards some pit of destroying consummation’ (146). Not
only does violence afford her a vague sense of satisfaction: it gives her, quite literally,
the orgasm that she has not been able to reach through conventional sex.
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Sophy’s leitmotiv is: ‘I hate! I hate! I hate!’ (Golding 1979: 138). It shows the extent
to which she is dominated by a ‘deep, fierce, hurting need, desire, to hurt’ everyone and
everything (127). It is in response to this desire that she becomes a terrorist. Waiting for
her accomplices to arrive with the boy that they were planning to snatch, she imagines
how it would be to murder him:
Should have brought a gun only I don’t know, it’s better with the knife — oh much better!
The boy was … waiting for her on the flat stone. She began to fumble at his jersey with her left
hand and he made no move; but when she pulled out the front of his shirt he began to struggle …
But the bonds were beautifully done, … and she swept her hand over his naked tum and belly
button, … and she felt the paper-thin ribs and a beat, beat, thump, thump at left centre. So she
got her trousers undone and held his tiny wet cock in her hand as he struggled and hummed
through his nose. She laid the point of the knife on his skin and finding it to be the right place,
she pushed it … and felt it touch the leaping thing or be touched by it again and again while the
body exploded with convulsions and a high humming came out of the nose. She thrust with all
the power there was, deliriously; and the leaping thing inside seized the knife so that the haft bet
in her hand … There was liquid everywhere and strong convulsions and she pulled the knife away
to give them free play but they stopped.
…
She was trembling with the passion of the mock murder (Golding 1979: 251–2).
While Sophy is still relishing the scene, the noise of her accomplices’ car pulls her out of
her reverie. One of them tells her that the operation has failed because ‘some burning
bugger’ has come out at him and rescued the boy (Golding 1979: 252). As we shall see in
the section devoted to the ways in which Golding’s characters die, the rescuer is Matty,
the novel’s main character, who ends up his life as he started it, shrouded in flames.
What matters here is that in this passage, as in the rest of the novel, Sophy’s  pleasure
stems from a combination of cruelty and sexuality. This reminds of what happens in
other novels. However, her satisfaction does not seem to be of the same kind as, for
example,  Pincher  Martin’s.  While  it  is  easy  to  interpret  the  behaviour  of  Pincher’s
imaginary surrogate as having to do with self-preservation, and Pincher’s own conduct
before his ship has been torpedoed as related to the reproductive instincts,  Sophy’s
actions seem to bear no connection with either individual survival or perpetuation. The
same  happens  with  other  malignant  characters  of  Golding’s,  a  fact  that  may  be
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indicative not only of the difficulties to explain why someone has a certain character,
but also of the difficulties that modern philosophy and literature have had to explain
the existence of malignant characters. Thus, though in Golding’s novels egoism can be
interpreted as serving the general goal of life to protect and perpetuate itself, in the last
analysis malice represent an inscrutable mystery.
3.1.2.4. ‘We Are in Hell’: Evil and Other Sources of Suffering
We have seen that many of Golding’s characters never manage to shed the egocentric
perspective from which, according to Schopenhauer, conscious beings generally grasp
their place in the world. We have also seen that, when it comes to satisfying their needs
and aspirations, their atomising egocentrism has important consequences, as it makes
them  establish  insurmountable  differences  between  themselves  and  the  others,
blinding them to the common essence that manifests in all individuals. Because of this,
egocentric individuals treat their personal desires as if they were theirs alone, that is, as
if they had nothing to do with the neighbour’s desires and as if they did not derive their
force, in all cases, from the same essential urge that keeps the entire world in motion.
Egocentrism is at the service of egoistic and malignant desires. In the case of such
predominantly  malignant  characters  as  Roger,  Philip  and  Sophy,  their  actions  are
always designed to harm others. In the case of predominantly egoistic characters, for
example Pincher Martin, the situation is slightly different. Though their conduct does
not necessarily cause the others harm, it frequently does: since their concern is not with
the neighbour’s weal or woe, they will normally try to find gratification in the easiest
way, even if this implies resorting to unnecessary violence. Schopenhauer teaches us
that, when this happens, the actions of egoistic individuals are indistinguishable from
the actions based on malice. And when the egocentric individuals’ attempts to satisfy
their desires increase the world’s pain, they deserve to be called evil regardless of their
motivation. This proves that, though Kinkead-Weekes’s statement, already mentioned,
that for Golding there is an evil kind of seeing may not be entirely accurate, it is not far
from the mark: looking at them from Schopenhauer’s perspective, it is evident that in
Golding’s novels there is a kind of seeing — egocentric consciousness — that is very
likely to result in evil. The best example of this perspective appears in Darkness Visible.
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During Sophy’s first encounter with the chicks and the mother at which she will shortly
start  throwing stones for no apparent reason, the birds seem, from her self-centred
point of view, to be going ‘right into her eyes’, and Sophy herself is described as being
‘nothing but seeing, seeing, seeing!’ in a way that resembles ‘reaching out and laying
hold  with  your  eyes’  (Golding  1979:  107–8).  Coupled  with  her  desire  to  harm and
consume the world round her, this way of seeing becomes ‘a kind of absorbing, a kind
of drinking’ (108). As we are about to see, in Darkness Visible the individual’s desire is
repeatedly expressed in terms of thirst.
In Golding’s novels, evil actions are not the only source of suffering. One interesting
thing that we learn from Schopenhauer is that, when they are not satisfied, the egoistic
or malignant desires dictated by a person’s innate character will also cause him or her
to suffer when combined with egocentrism. We have already seen that it is only from an
egocentric  perspective  that  objects  appear  as  potential  sources  of  pleasure  and
unpleasure, this being the reason why the egocentric subject spends his or her life in
anxiety.  What this means is  that  the very association of one’s innate appetites with
egocentrism can explain why suffering is so prominent in the world even without the
intervention of violence.
In the present  section  I  shall  deal  with  the  reasons  why,  in  Golding’s  writings,
suffering  is  presented  as  an  unavoidable  ingredient  of  the  lives  of  egocentric
individuals. I shall begin by showing how Pincher Martin’s main character explains his
scorn for the other’s  well-being as part  and parcel of a universal process of mutual
consumption. I shall move on to Free Fall, where Sammy reflects on the inevitability of
conflict and pain. Then I shall explore the roots of this lethal combination, which Lord
of  the  Flies and  Golding’s  comments  locate  in  human  nature  (in  Schopenhauerian
terms, in the innate character of the immense majority of humans), which is shared by
child and adult alike.  Finally, I shall turn to  Darkness Visible,  where Mr Pedigree’s
paedophiliac passion causes him to suffer whether it is physically satisfied or not. What
Mr Pedigree’s plight indicates is that egocentric individualism is necessarily tinged with
suffering: not only the other’s (when the egocentric individual’s desires are satisfied at
another  person’s  expense)  but  also  one’s  own  (in  all  cases,  simply  because  of  the
connection between those desires and egocentrism).
In many of Golding’s novels, the combination of willing and egocentrism results in a
panorama of universal strife in which all living beings are involved. Reflecting on the
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predatory conduct that Pincher Martin has engaged in throughout his life, his surrogate
tries to justify himself by arguing that he is just one example of a general process that
leads to never-ending conflict. Schopenhauer makes it possible for us to see that this
conflict  obeys  the  logic  of  manifestation  of  the  world’s  kernel,  whereby  myriad
individuals  are  created and destroyed so that  the  essential  will  can find fulfilment.
Towards the end of his stay on the rock, Pincher’s surrogate realises that his destiny is
not in his hands,  and that  he is  not just a victimiser but yet another victim of this
process, which in the novel is conveyed through images of eating. ‘The whole business
of eating’ to which he devotes so much time is ‘peculiarly significant’; in the surrogate’s
opinion, ‘eating with the mouth’ is ‘only the gross expression of … a universal process’
of mutual humiliation, defeat and consumption (Golding 1956: 88). A crucial passage
recalls how Pincher’s producer, who knows him very well, recounts a story aimed at
illustrating universal strife and the final destiny of all that are involved in it:
‘Y’see when the Chinese want to prepare a very rare dish they bury a fish in a tin box. Presently all
the lil’ maggots peep out and start to eat. Presently no fish. Only maggots.
…
They haven’t finished yet. Only got to the fish. … Well, when they’ve finished the fish, Chris,
they start on each other.
…
The little ones eat the tiny ones. The middle-sized ones eat the little ones. The big ones eat he
middle-sized ones. Then the big ones eat each other. Then there are two and then one and where
there was a fish there is now one huge, successful maggot. Rare dish’ (Golding 1956: 135–6).
It is only at the end of the novel that we understand the full import of this story. When
the maggots have devoured each other and there is only one left, the Chinese open the
tin box and take the last standing maggot out in order to eat it: ‘’N when there’s only
one maggot left the Chinese dig it up — … Have you ever heard a spade knocking on the
side  of  a  tin  box,  Chris?  Boom!  Boom!  Just  like  thunder’  (Golding  1956:  136).
Eventually, Pincher’s surrogate does hear a thunder-like bang, and it makes him realise
that the world that he has created is ‘a tin box so huge that a spade knocking at the side
sounded like distant thunder’ (144). Only then does it dawn on him that he is not the
last but, if anything, ‘the last maggot but one’ (184). Accustomed to be the biggest, most
voracious predator around, the castaway suddenly finds out that there is  something
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bigger, stronger than himself. When he hears ‘the sound of the spade against the tin
box’  (199),  Pincher  cannot  but  be  afraid  of  being ‘Eaten’  (186).  The  ‘“bloody  great
bully”’  that  finally  swallows  him up  is  not  a  person  like  him,  but  the  omnipotent,
amoral force that avails itself of countless short-lived individuals in order to achieve
satisfaction (191).
The story of the maggots concludes with an ominous hint at the way in which all
individuals, however violent and powerful, are eventually crushed by a force stronger
than themselves. Before reaching this conclusion, the story depicts the way in which
individuals come into conflict as soon as they attempt to satisfy the innate needs and
appetites  derived  from  that  essential  force.  The  title  character  of  Pincher  Martin
believes  that  violence  is  the  unavoidable  result  of  human  interaction,  and  other
characters of Golding’s reach the same disheartening conclusion. Sammy Mountjoy, the
character-narrator in  Free Fall, reasons, in the light of his own behaviour and of his
knowledge  of  the  others’  (first  his  communist  party  fellows’,  later  the  Nazis’),  that
‘“People don’t seem to be able to move without killing each other”’ (Golding 1959: 248).
Talbot makes a similar discovery in the Sea Trilogy. Fearing that he may have been
indirectly responsible for Colley’s and Wheeler’s suicides, and that he may also have
caused Mr Prettiman’s death by falling on him, he becomes paranoid about the ‘offhand
ability to spread destruction’ that allegedly makes him ‘“kill people without knowing it”’
(Golding 1991: 545, 620). This is a consequence not of any malignant desires but of his
careless  egoism,  which  blinds  him  to  the  seriousness  of  his  fellow  passengers’
problems.
Golding’s pessimistic belief in the inevitability of violence and suffering is rooted in
the horrors of the Second World War. During his service in the British Royal Navy —
which he joined in 1940 — he went into combat (see  Carey 2009: 83–6).  The war
brought  him face  to  face  with what  he  later  called,  in an interview with Biles,  ‘the
human condition’ (in Biles 1970: 33), and became much of a turning point in his life.
Because  of  the  humanistic  education  received  from his  parents,  he  had  previously
‘believed in the perfectibility of social man; that a correct structure of society would
produce goodwill’ (Golding 1965: 86).38 Golding does not grow up believing, as Sammy
38 In the essay entitled ‘The Ladder and the Tree’, Golding describes his father  Alec a rationalist
who ‘hated  nothing in  the  whole  world  unless  it  were  a  tory,  and  then  only  as  a  matter  of
principle  and  on  academic  lines’,  and  who represented,  in  his  young  son’s  eyes,  ‘incarnate
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Mountjoy does in Free Fall, that ‘The supply of nineteenth-century optimism … had run
out before it reached me’ (Golding 1959: 226). Nevertheless, the war persuades him of
the inherent viciousness of human beings. This assertion of human depravity is clearly
at odds with the liberal humanist defence of human goodness and with the warning
against the corrupting powers of society:
I had discovered what one man could do to another. … It is bad enough to say that so many Jews
were exterminated in this way and that, so many people liquidated — lovely, elegant word — but
there were things done during that period from which I still have to avert my mind less [ sic] I
should be physically sick. … I must say that anyone who moved through those years without
understanding that man produces evil as a bee produces honey, must be blind or wrong in the
head (Golding 1965: 86–7; my italics).
As we saw at the beginning of this study, previous Golding critics have applied the term
evil to human nature itself. Schopenhauer teaches us that evil actions, those that cause
harm to others, can follow from egoism as well as malice. Though Golding does not
describe  evil  in  so  much  detail,  his  position  is  certainly  compatible  with  the
philosopher’s. Moreover, it is evident that in this quotation the word evil characterises,
as in Schopenhauer,  a spontaneous or natural product of human behaviour.  In this
respect,  the comparison with the bee is  as misleading as it  is  telling:  even in those
species  of  bees  that  produce  honey  —  only  a  small  fraction  of  the  total  —  not  all
individuals do it, and even these are capable of other things too; nevertheless, Golding
speaks as if all that humans wanted was to harm their neighbour. Thus, despite being
aware — as the inclusion of other modes of consciousness in his novels proves — that
the egocentric perspective out of which violence arises is not the only one available, in
his non-fiction Golding, much as Schopenhauer, tends to overlook this dimension of
life.
While Golding’s remarks above express his personal stance after the war, elsewhere
he turns his own change of mind into a generational feature:
omniscience’ (Golding 1965: 168). Commenting on their political activities, Golding recalls how




Before the Second World War my generation did on the whole have a liberal and naive belief in
the perfectibility of man. In the war we … saw, little by little, what man could do to man, what the
Animal could do to his own species (Golding 1984a: 163).
Both passages are intended as warnings against the mistaken belief  that evil has its
origin  in  social,  economic  and  political  problems  which  can  be  solved  in  an  ideal
society. In Golding’s opinion, such a belief can only make things worse. Speaking about
the schoolboys on which Lord of the Flies focuses, he says to Biles that they run into
trouble because they do not understand ‘all the beastly potentialities of man’ (in Biles
1970:  38).  For  Golding,  the  solution  to  human  violence  involves,  to  begin  with,
acknowledging that this is one of the defining features of being human.
One of Golding’s favourite metaphors to express the human penchant for violence is
that of a disease. If one of his texts expresses his aspiration to know the truth bout
humankind — ‘What man is, whatever man is under the eye of heaven, that I burn to
know’ (Golding 1984a: 199) — another explains how, in the wake of the war, he came to
believe ‘that man was sick — not exceptional man, but average man’ — and ‘that the
condition  of  man  was  to  be  a  morally  diseased  creation’  (1965:  87).  As  this
generalisation shows, Golding’s main interest is not with social organisation, which is
always historical and provides a better or worse solution to the problem, but with our
timeless essence.
Much the same can be said of the religious expressions that he uses to describe
human nature. ‘Man is a fallen being. He is gripped by original sin’ (Golding 1965: 88;
my italics).39 Schopenhauer’s definition of the Fall and original sin adds an interesting
twist  to  our  understanding  of  these  expressions.  According  to  Schopenhauer  the
‘original sin’ of humankind has less to do with what people do than with what they are
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 254). The ‘Fall’ is related to the inborn combination of ceaseless
yearning and egocentric consciousness (1969b: 604). When Schopenhauer states that
original sin is ‘the affirmation of the will-to-live’ (608), he is making a similar point:
insofar  as  conscious  beings  feel  and  seek  to  satisfy  their  desires  in  an  egocentric
manner, they are affirming the essential will to life.
39 The Fall that I am going to discuss here is not the same as the fall on which Free Fall focuses. The
latter has its origin in the individual’s free choice of how and what to will. Since this position is
incompatible with Golding’s initial stance, I shall not examine it in this chapter, but in the next.
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For Schopenhauer the combination of egocentrism and desire results in malice and
egoism, and these bring about suffering. Because of this, egoistic and malignant beings
are fallen beings.  Even if  they were not in thrall  to  their  desires,  egocentric  beings
would be fallen beings, because they establish a sharp separation among individuals,
that is, because, subsequent to the subject–object polarity, the individuating forms of
representation  — time,  space  and causality  — start  producing  countless  competing
individuals. Even if they did not intervene in it, then, egocentric beings could never be
innocent witnesses to the endless war that is waged on a worldwide scale, for it is their
intellect  that  divides  the  world  into  conflicting  parts.  In  its  origin,  the  world  is
undifferentiated,  timeless  and without  shape,  but  when the  intellect  divides  it  into
separate elements, there arises a living theatre of death and destruction. Schopenhauer
thinks that, insofar as they are born to be egocentric, all egocentric creatures, human
and non-human, are guilty of the crimes that are committed in the world  (see Wicks
2008: 124–5). For him original sin, whether linked to the egocentric attempt to satisfy
the desires dictated our innate will or to egocentrism alone, comes hand in hand with
‘the guilt of existence itself’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 254).
Golding’s  treatment  of  the  Fall  of  humankind  and  of  guilt  is  compatible  with
Schopenhauer’s explanation in terms of what human beings are, in particular of their
being  desiring  beings  endowed  with  egocentric  consciousness.  As  Golding  says  to
Carey,  he  thinks  that  the  expressions  original  sin and  selfishness ‘could  be
interchangeable’  (in  Carey  1987:  174).  As  it  turns  out,  the  two  terms  cannot  be
interchangeable, because his malignant characters are obviously just as sinful as, if not
more than, his egoistic characters. What both types of character can be said to have in
common, however, is a perspective on the world that places them as its sole centre.
The  Fall,  original  sin,  guilt  —  Golding,  like  Schopenhauer,  believes  that  all
egocentric beings are affected by them. Among humans, they affect children and adults
alike: if  they are related to the timeless essence shared by all  humans, the roots of
suffering must already be present since birth; this is indeed Golding’s point when he
says to Carey that ‘the root of our sin’ is already ‘in the child’ (in Carey 1987: 174). The
idea that  young children are as capable of inflicting pain as adults — indeed that ‘the
most terrible things can be done by children’ (174) — appears as early as  Lord of the
Flies. Halfway through the story, when Jack’s choir (with the exception of Simon and
the  addition  of  Roger)  have  already  become  bloodthirsty  hunters,  we  witness  the
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ruthless imposition of their will on a wild boar: overwhelmed by ‘the compulsion to
track down and kill’, and excited at the memory of the chase and the bloodshed, Jack
tells Ralph how he and his hunters have ‘closed in on the struggling pig’, how they have
‘outwitted a  living thing,  imposed their  will  upon it,  taken away its  life  like  a  long
satisfying drink’ (Golding 1954: 50, 68).40 This is not the only occasion when the novel
directs our attention to humankind’s cruelty. The scene where Roger and Maurice kick
over  the  little  ones’  sandcastles  is  followed by  a  lengthy  description  of  the  smaller
children’s engrossed behaviour,  as seen from Roger’s perspective. The scene that he
witnesses leaves us in no doubt that the same qualities that we have observed in him
inhere in them too.  One of  the boys,  Henry,  entertains himself  controlling the tiny
animals that live at the edge of the beach:
He went  down the beach and busied himself  at  the water’s  edge.  The great  Pacific  tide was
coming in and every few seconds the relatively still water of the lagoon heaved forwards an inch.
There were creatures that lived in this last fling of the sea, tiny transparencies that came questing
in with the water over the hot, dry sand. With impalpable organs of sense they examined this new
40 In other  novels  this imposition adopts different forms,  but in all  cases it  has  to do with the
character’s belief that his or her individual will is radically separated from — and stronger than —
the others’. In Darkness Visible Sophy voices this idea several times, for example, while trying to
persuade one of her cronies to carry out the kidnap that they have been planning: ‘My will is
stronger than his’ (Golding 1979: 162). For her the whole operation is satisfying insofar as it is ‘a
triumph of the will’ (173). In the first volume of the Sea Trilogy, Colley’s journal describes his
public humiliation at  the hands of  the sailors during an an Equator-crossing rite of  passage,
saying that they have ‘had their sport, their will’ with him, and adding that what humans can do
to each other ‘with that snarling, lustful, storming appetite’ is incomparably ‘crueller than death’
(Golding 1991: 207, 209).
When it comes to impose one’s will on other human beings, knowing what makes them tick is
crucial. The echoes of this idea resonate in Free Fall.  Commenting on Philip, his sadistic crony,
Sammy  recalls  that  he  ‘knew  about  people’  (Golding  1959).  That  is  why  his  schemes  never
backfire. It is at Philip’s suggestion that Sammy robs the smaller boys of their ‘fagcards’ (50). At
first sight, the outcome of the operation is more favourable to Philip than to Sammy. The plan
brings Sammy ‘one king of Egypt and Philip about twenty assorted cards’  (51).  Likewise, it  is
Philip’s ‘careful manipulation’ that incites Sammy to spit on a church altar, his reward being a
slap from the verger (58). In both cases Philip’s intervention goes undiscovered, which shows the
extent to which sadism and calculation can go hand in hand.
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field.  Perhaps  food  had  appeared  where  at  the  last  incursion  there  had  been  none;  bird
droppings, insects perhaps, any of the strewn detritus of landward life. Like a myriad of tiny teeth
in a saw, the transparencies came scavenging over the beach.
This was fascinating to Henry. He poked about with a bit of stick, that itself was wave-worn
and whitened and a vagrant, and tried to control the motions of the scavengers. He made little
runnels that the tide filled and tried to crowd them with creatures. He became absorbed beyond
mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things. He talked to them, urging
them, ordering them. Driven back by the tide, his footprints became bays in which they were
trapped and gave him  the illusion of mastery.  He squatted on his hams at the water’s edge,
bowed, with a shock of hair falling over his forehead and past his eyes, and the afternoon sun
emptied down invisible arrows (Golding 1954: 60; my italics).
This description is significant because it highlights the universality of the attempts to
satisfy one’s desires at the expense of other living beings. Just as the older boys kill pigs
and throw stones at the little ones, the latter play with the tiny creatures that they find
in their way, exerting what little power they may have. This behaviour is the result of a
lethal combination of amoral desire and egocentrism. However,  the enjoyment thus
obtained by the subject has a cost in terms of suffering. As Golding explains to James
Keating, ‘giving way’ to the beasts that lurk within us ‘is always a pleasure,  in some
ways’ (in Keating 1988: 211; my italics). The key to Golding’s afterthought lies in the
fact that the pleasure obtained from satisfaction is not absolute, as it tends to be tinged
by the other’s pain. This is not the only problem. Precisely because it takes for granted
the barriers among individuals erected by the atomising power of the egocentric mind,
the satisfying feeling of mastery is based on an illusion: it rests on the unquestioning —
but erroneous — belief that the egocentric  I and the other have nothing in common,
while the truth is that they are manifestations of the same undivided essence.
So far I have focused on the suffering that is caused by the egocentric attempts to
satisfy one’s desires. However, even when one tries not to harm others, the essential
will’s  unquenchable  yearning  makes  it  impossible  for  egocentric  subjects  to  avoid
suffering: as long as we remain tied to egocentric modes of consciousness, we will suffer
even  in  isolation,  because  if  we  cannot  avoid  seeing  the  surrounding  world  as  a
potential  source  of  pleasure  or of  unpleasure,  our  life  will  always always tinged by
anxiety. The best example of this is Mr Pedigree, the paedophilic teacher in Darkness
Visible.  If Jack compares the fulfilment of his desires to a  long satisfying drink, Mr
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Pedigree compares the urgency of his appetites to a raging thirst. Trying to explain to
Matty how this thirst is, Mr Pedigree tells him that it is ‘the most terrible thing in the
world’  (Golding 1979: 32).  As if  to excuse himself of his own attraction to beautiful
boys, Mr Pedigree explains to Matty that there are ‘all kinds of thirst in all kinds of
desert’, that we are all ‘dipsomaniacs’ whose thirsts are ‘not to be controlled’, and that
therefore we are ‘not to blame for them’ (32). Mr Pedigree’s thirst follows, in his own
words, ‘a rhythm’ like ‘a wave motion’ (260). If his reference to thirst reminds us of the
hunter’s experience of killing a wild boar in  Lord of the Flies, his description of the
wave-like motion of desire echoes not only Jocelin’s inner feeling of dark water in The
Spire, to which I have already referred, but also ‘the feeling of waters rising’ that Matty
has when, looking at the glass ball in a shop window, he glimpses the common essence
of the world (48). This essence is a mighty, amoral craving from which Jocelin’s unruly
member, like that of many other characters of Golding’s, derives its tormenting force
and in which Mr Pedigree’s ‘disgusting appetite’ is rooted (213). Towards the end of the
novel, Mr Pedigree confesses that, despite people’s opinion, he has really ‘never hurt
anybody’ except himself, though he is afraid that he could in the future (265). What is
remarkable,  then, about desire is  that  it  results in terrible suffering even when one
succeeds in controlling it.
The problem with desire, as it appears in Schopenhauer and in Golding’s novels, is
that  the  essence  of  the  world  being  as  it  is  —  amoral,  blind  and  always  active  —
suffering is bound to ensue whether our desires are satisfied or not. We have just seen
that the feeling when we fail  to achieve gratification is of a raging thirst.  When our
desires are fulfilled, pain also follows. Though it is true that satisfaction often takes
place to the detriment of other conscious beings, from the aggressor’s point of view this
matters  very little.  More problematic  for the aggressor is  the fact  that  the  pleasure
obtained always gives way to boredom and then to new desires. This idea appears in
Schopenhauer, and in Golding too. The latter says that when one has found fulfilment,
‘satiety’ soon gives way to ‘boredom’ — and, presumably, to new desires (Golding 1965:
130). As Talbot complains in the first volume of Sea Trilogy, ‘the danger of being bored’
is a terrible thing indeed (Golding 1991: 162). In the second volume he repeats the same
complaint: after Colley’s death, his narrative lack a hero; it also lacks a heroine, a villain
‘and some comic relief to ameliorate [the narrator’s] deep, deep boredom’ (251). The
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reason for the passage from intense yearning to boredom lies, as he explains, in how
‘soon one accepts as normal a state once desperately desired’ (516).
The world’s inner kernel being what it is, and the suffering that ensues from it  being
so intense, Golding does not hesitate to describe this world as hellish. His essay ‘Belief
and Creativity’ begins with the speculation that there might exist other, ‘parallel’ worlds
(Golding 1984a: 201). Considering all the suffering that occurs in our world, and the
chance that some of those worlds might be more ‘joyous’ than ours, Golding makes the
bold guess that ‘we are in hell’ (201). This comment puts Golding in Schopenhauer’s
camp against Leibniz’s theodicy.
According to Leibniz, the world that we inhabit is the best possible world, created by
a benign God in such a way that, despite its flaws, it could not be better. Actually, he
argues, the world is defective only from the finite perspective of human beings. If we
were able fully to understand God’s plan, we would realise that the world’s alleged flaws
— the sins and the pain, both intentional and unintended — contribute to its overall
goodness.  Schopenhauer  considers  this  proposition absurd,  stating instead that  our
world is actually the worst possible, and comparing it to hell. As far as we know, he
explains, the essence of this world is an endless yearning which, in order to find some
satisfaction,  endows  itself  with  consciousness  and  manifests  itself  as  countless
appearances that feed on each other. This makes our world so bad that a worst world
would not be capable of existing at all.
We have seen that Golding also presents the world as comprising an essential side
of which the apparent side is but the manifestation. We have also seen that his novels
can be read as identifying, like Schopenhauer, the world’s inner kernel as the essential
will. To conclude this section, I shall focus on a series of human constructions which,
unawares  to  their  builders,  function  as  diagrams of  the  world  at  whose centre  the
essential will is. The flimsiness and state of dilapidation of Jocelin’s cathedral in  The
Spire and of the ship that carries Talbot to Australia in the Sea Trilogy give a good idea
of the sorry condition of the world.
In  The  Spire,  Jocelin  compares  the  cathedral  to  a  ‘“world  of  wood  and  stone”’
(Golding 1964: 148). When Jocelin states that after the works the cathedral ‘“will be
even more glorious than before”’, Pangall wonders if this can be done ‘“By breaking the
place down”’ (15). Actually, the works can be regarded not as damaging the building’s
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structure, but rather as transforming it into a more faithful map of the world.41 Before
the building of the new spire has even started, Roger Mason warns the Dean that the
foundations on which ‘“the building floats”’, as he says adopting Jocelin’s expression,
‘“are just about enough for a building of this weight”’ (38). To his trained eye, it is clear
that with those foundations the altered building will hardly be able to stand up. When
the pillars begin to snap under their own weight, Roger Mason tells Jocelin that it is
time to stop ascending (117). Otherwise, he says, the consequences will be disastrous:
‘Sooner or later there’d be a bang, a shudder, a roar. Those four columns would open apart like a
flower, and everything else up here, stone, wood, iron, glass, men, would slide down into the
church like the fall of a mountain’ (Golding 1964: 118).
The  pillars’  awful  noises  do  not  stop,  and  the  completed  spire  is  ‘“an  ungainly,
crumbling thing”’ (Golding 1964: 193). Yet, regardless of its structural weakness, when
we reach the novel’s  last  lines  we find  out  that  the  cathedral  has  not  and will  not
collapse.
At a certain point in The Spire, Jocelin imagines the finished steeple and compares
the cathedral to ‘the ark, the refuge, a ship to contain all … people and now fitted with a
41 Robert A. Scott points out that the ‘devotion to geometry’ according to which the great churches
are models of the whole world, and which was so widespread in the Christian middle ages, dates
back to classical antiquity (Scott 2003: 127). As Philip Ball explains, Plato’s  Timaeus presents
God as ‘a builder’ that works ‘using … strict geometric … principles’ (Ball 2008: 118). Augustine
adopts from Plato the idea ‘that the geometry of nature reveals its intrinsic “goodness” and thus
provides an objective basis for aesthetic judgement’ (188). In other words, he holds that beauty
comes  ‘not  from the  hands  and  minds  of  artists  but  from order  and  proportion’  (118).  The
architect, for example, ‘makes a “good” building by observing simple mathematical relationships
between its dimensions and by dividing space using geometric figures’ (118). The great churches’
proportions in physical space thus mirror the organisation of the world. This way, ‘one may build
a temple or church that reflects the true, divinely beautiful structure of the universe’ (118). In
Plato, and in the tradition that mediaeval builders inherit from him, the world is beautiful and
good, just like the divinity that is responsible for it and like the ideal order that serves as its
model.  By  contrast,  Golding  casts  doubts  not  only  on  the  benevolence  but  also  on  the  very
existence of the divinity, and presents the world as well as the buildings that replicate its true
character as run-down and dangerous.
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mast’ (Golding 1964: 107). We have good reason to mistrust Jocelin’s confidence that
the new spire will secure, as a ship’s mast would do, the faithful’s arrival at the port of
salvation. What is clear is that the building works as an artificial replica of the world,
performing this function in the same way as a ship would. Indeed, the Sea Trilogy can
be read precisely as an extended reflection on the link between a ship and the whole
world.  At  the  beginning  of  his  voyage,  Talbot  informs  his  godfather  that  the  ship
carrying him to Australia is ‘an ancient ship of the line’ which he describes as ‘a decrepit
vessel’  whose timbers are ‘falling apart’  (Golding 1991: 6, 444). This ship that takes
water and is ‘quite possibly sinking’ is ‘a universe in little’, a condensation of the whole
world with its two sides: the essential will and its myriad manifestations (490, 169). As
regards the former, her sprouting force poses — as in The Spire — ‘a real danger’ to the
smooth  development  of  ordinary  life  aboard  (373).  Ships,  the  on-board  carpenter
teaches Talbot,  are sometimes made of  a combination of  seasoned and unseasoned
timber; this composition, which resembles the world’s mixture of inanimate things and
living objects, explains why sometimes a seaman or a passenger can ‘come across a bud
sticking out of a knee’ (373). As in  The Spire, the budding boards remind us that, for
Golding, as for Schopenhauer, the entire world palpitates with an inner will to life that
pushes towards organic existence.  In the Sea Trilogy,  the awful force of the world’s
inner essence is  also symbolised, much as in  Darkness Visible,  by a swell that rolls
within.  Hence  its  description  as  an  ‘internal  wave’  that  produces  ‘the  glutinous
chuckling of appetite’ as it travels the ship’s length with a tireless ‘rhythm’ (389, 385).
While the image of the budding sprout evokes again the emergence of life as a process
that escapes human control, that of the inner wave suggests once more the unstoppable
force of desire. Together, both images remind us of the essential will to life whose force,
so  strong  in  comparison  to  that  of  its  individual  manifestations,  is  nevertheless
insufficient to engender a world that is not on the verge of destruction.
For all of its ‘“defects”’ — the unseasoned timber of which she is made, the broken
foremast, the water that she carries in her bowels — this ship that renders ‘“like an old
boot”’  will  continue her  way (Golding 1991:  392,  395).  Badly  built  as  this  world in
miniature may be, she will not collapse so easily — at least not yet. Only after reaching
her  destination,  the  ship  catches  fire  and  explodes.  Perhaps  the  explosion  occurs
because the controlled fire  that  Lieutenant  Benét  started down below to repair  the
foremast has acted as a slow fuse; perhaps because of the fireworks with which the
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authorities of the Australian colony have received the newcomers. Be that as it may, we
can take the fate of the old vessel as hinting at one of the possible reasons why the
world outside the fiction may be destroyed. Judging from this episode, the world is not
an  entirely  safe  place  to  live,  and  the  delicate  balance  that  keeps  it  going  can  be
tragically upset by human intervention.42
Human presence can make the world even worse, and perhaps, given enough time,
even destroy  it;  but  it  can  also  improve  it.  So far  I  have only  shown how humans
contribute to the pain that pervades the world. I shall also discuss the ways in which
humans can reduce it, but only after analysing the linguistic means whereby Golding
evokes the hidden source of so much suffering, that is, the inner essence which, in his
fiction, underlies the entire realm of appearances.
3.1.2.5. Dynamic Descriptions with Metaphysical Resonance
In the foregoing sections I have restricted my analysis of the essential will and suffering
to the actions of conscious beings, particularly human beings. Nevertheless, it is clear
that,  since by default  the intellect  separates  all  individual  things from one another,
pitting them against each other, the other living beings and the inanimate objects and
forces are also engaged in universal strife and conflict. This is an aspect of Golding’s
world view that appears as early as Lord of the Flies, and which his characteristic use of
description serves to convey.
Apart from describing static objects, Golding’s novels typically include exuberant
evocative  descriptions  of  conscious  actions  and  natural  events.  They  are  dynamic
descriptions.  In my analysis  of  the dynamic  descriptions  of  the physical  world that
appear at the beginning of Pincher Martin, I focused on the evocative uses of language
with a physical referent. These I called, as Watt does in his discussion of Conrad’s style,
42 The implications of the ship’s destruction can also be applied, in a more restricted way, to this
part of the knowable world that we call the Earth. If so, then this episode in the Sea Trilogy is
intended  to  support  Golding’s  warning,  issued  in  the  course  of  his  Nobel  lecture,  that
contemporary humans ‘face two problems — either we blow ourselves off the earth or we degrade
the fertility of the earth bit by bit until we have ruined it’ (Golding 1984: 210). In either case, he
adds, the attitude that has taken us here is ‘preposterous’ (213).
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impressionistic. There is another evocative use of language, one which in romantic and
post-romantic writing is typically bound up with metaphysical reference. In Golding,
the  purpose  of  these  passages  is  to  bring  to  the  fore  the  metaphysical  realm  that
underlies the physical side of the world, and which includes the essential will to life
shared  by  humans with  the  rest  of  nature.  This  use  of  dynamic  descriptions  is,  to
borrow another term from Watt, symbolic. Even more than impressionism, symbolism
is  characteristic  of  literature  texts  ‘whose  expressive  idiom  was  intended  to  be
inaccessible to exposition in any conceptual terms’, and which ‘demand … exegesis’ in
symbolic terms (Watt 1980: 197). Watt states that for Conrad, as for the romantics and
the  symbolists,  ‘The  world  of  visible  objects  was  valued  only  insofar  as  it  offered
concrete manifestations which correspond to spiritual … meanings’ (185). He adds that
‘Conrad wanted to pay as much attention to the inside as to the outside, to the meaning
as to the appearance; and this is one of the reasons why, in the last analysis, he is so
different … from the … Impressionists’ (179). Much the same can be said about Golding
(and about other authors such as Patrick White,  as argued in Clements 2012: 103),
whose writing also feeds symbolically upon its own impressionism, working itself up
from careful  depiction of  physical  realities  into a metaphysical  mode of  expression.
Watt’s  summary  of  the  way  in  which  Conrad  uses  physical  impressionism  as  a
preparation for metaphysical symbolism also applies to Golding (as seen in the first
chapter of Pincher Martin):
The  symbolic  method  …  begins  by  making  the  same  descriptive  demand  as  that  of
impressionism: the writer  must  render the object  with an idiosyncratic  immediacy of  vision,
which is freed from any … explanatory gloss; and the reader must be put in the posture of actively
seeking to fill the gaps in a text which has provoked him to experience an absence of connected
meanings (Watt 1980: 197).
The  recipient,  then,  appreciates a  ‘semantic  gap’  in  the  text,  and  only  a  symbolic
interpretation allows him ‘to see the larger implications of all the particularities which
confront him’ (Watt 1980: 197, 195).
As  far  as  Golding  is  concerned,  when  his  descriptions  take  on  a  symbolic
significance  it  is  most  often  thanks  to  a  recurrent  descriptive  technique  that  uses
metaphor to blur the limits among the conceptual spheres that denotation strives to
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keep separated. On the one hand, it sometimes happens that a person is likened to a
non-rational animal or a plant. It may even be that an living being is described as a
lifeless thing. This contributes to destabilising our notions of animate and inanimate
existence, of the differences between plants and animals, between humans and other
animals, effectively equating them all at some level. On the other hand, we have the
opposite  procedure:  if  we  envisage  nature  as  comprising  inorganic  objects  and
phenomena,  plants,  non-rational  animals  and rational  animals  (human beings),  we
realise that Golding tends to depict plants as if they were animals, and inanimate things
as if they were either animals or plants. The consequence of this latter stylistic resource,
which he never ceases to exploit, is that we see the world as dominated at all levels by a
force that I have identified as the essential will.43 What is more, it makes us feel that
behind the veil of appearances, where individuals enter into conflict with each other,
everyone and everything palpitates and breathes at unison, thus mirroring each other’s
fundamental  behaviour.  Symbolic  description thus works metonymically:  if  an inert
part of nature is described as if it were a living being and as behaving like a person or a
non-rational  animal,  then we can surmise that  all  of  nature  shares  in  this  life  and
behaviour. Moreover, the impact is cumulative: once the inner life of a given thing or
being has been symbolically evoked in this way, the effects of this resonate through the
entire narrative, so that subsequent mentions of the same or a similar object are likely
to trigger, even if they are not evocative at all,  an identical feeling of the inner drive
behind the veil of appearances. Finally, it could be argued that, thanks to symbolism,
the  non-conscious  essence  at  the  heart  of  the  world  shines  through  the  novelist’s
rational  representations  in  a  similar  way  as  it  shines  through  the  non-rational
representations by virtue of which the world emerges as a realm of appearances in the
first place.
If human beings are engaged in a constant war from which they cannot escape, the
same could be said  of  the rest  of  the world,  from the tiniest  creatures  to the most
powerful forces of nature. Two examples, one from Lord of the Flies and another from
the Sea Trilogy, illustrate this point. We have seen that, in the former novel, children
hurt each other on a regular basis. A kind of war also takes place among other living
43 This technical  procedure has gone unnoticed to previous critics,  including those — Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor — that have devoted more attention not only to Golding’s descriptive style
but also to its metaphysical import.
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beings, some of which die so that others can live on. The tiny creatures with which little
Henry plays on the beach are compared to ‘tiny teeth in a saw’ that feed on accumulated
‘detritus’  (Golding 1954:  60).  This  indicates  that  these  brainless  scavengers  are  not
simply  Henry’s  victims but also benefit  from the war of  all  against  all  in which all
beings are engaged.
The Sea Trilogy, written much later, brings to our attention the indifference, even
hostility,  of  inanimate  nature  towards  humankind.  Confronted  with  the  raging
elements and the icy cliffs of the Antarctic continent, Talbot reflects on the ‘neutral and
indifferent but overwhelming power’ against which the ‘ridiculous wood and canvas’ of
the ship — let alone the human flesh and bones that have built and govern it — are
powerless and run the risk of being ‘smashed to pieces’ (1991: 688). This is an ‘unequal
struggle with an ocean never intended for ships’  and with the ‘savagely indifferent’,
actually  ‘implacable’,  walls  of  Antarctica  (644,  694).  Earlier,  the  semblance  of
indifference of ‘a world of blind force and material’ is revealed to hide something even
more  sinister:  even  when  calm,  writes  Talbot,  the  sea  has  ‘“an  appearance  of
malevolence”’ (466, 390). In addition to his thoughts on inimical nature, Talbot records
what seems to be the mutual antagonism of some inanimate parts of reality with others.
He describes,  for example,  how in stormy weather  the air  and the water enter into
conflict,  prey and feed on each other:  ‘Wind against  wind,  wave against  wave,  fury
feeding on itself’  (697).  Both the reference to  the rest  of  nature  as  the  individual’s
enemy and the description of a world at war with himself reminds of Pincher Martin,
whose narrator describes, at the end of the first chapter, the interaction between the
rock and the waves that break against it in terms of conflict. Pincher’s surrogate, we are
told, is surprised that the rock dares ‘to interrupt the thousands of miles going about
their purposeless affairs’, and interruption that causes ‘the world’ to spring ‘into sudden
war’ (Golding 1956: 22). Later, he comes to see this same rock on which he is staying as
somehow ‘“inimical”’ to him ( 172).
Most of these quotations from the Sea Trilogy — and some parts of Pincher Martin
too — share a striking characteristic that we should not overlook: they present blind
force and matter as if they possessed some kind of life and consciousness of their own.
The ocean and the Antarctic cliffs are indifferent and implacable. Sometimes they even
give the impression of responding to some malevolent desire to make human beings
suffer, to thwart their plans. What is more, in the middle of the storm both the wind
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and the waves seem to prey on each other, as if the tempest consisted in little more than
their reciprocal consumption and the collateral damage that it causes. Given the late
date when the trilogy was written, the words of the character-narrator could certainly
be taken to be symptomatic of his state of mind rather than an accurate portrayal of the
world. Though it is true that Talbot’s words are in fundamental agreement with the way
in which the sea is represented in Pincher Martin, where the presence of the essential
will to life has already been established, it is equally true that in this latter novel too the
presentation  of  the  sea’s  behaviour  is  mostly  done  through  the  character’s
consciousness. What matters, however, is that the characters’ view of the surrounding
world as involved in perpetual conflict and as putting the individual’s life at risk, both
in Pincher Martin and as late as the Sea Trilogy (where Talbot is alone in holding it),
though clearly  associated  with an  egocentric  perspective  alone,  is  still  the  one that
tallies best with the author’s basic stance, according to which this one perspective is, as
in  Schopenhauer,  the  most  common  one.  It  is  true  that  in  Golding’s  fiction  this
viewpoint, shared by Pincher’s surrogate and Talbot, is neither the only possible nor the
only  valid  (we  have  seen,  and  shall  continue  to  see,  examples  of  non-egocentric
consciousness), but it is equally true that it is the one that Golding tends to emphasise
in his non-fictional comments about the basic stance embodied by his earlier novels. At
the  time  of  writing  Pincher  Martin,  the  problem  that  Golding  has  with  Pincher’s
surrogate is not so much that this character sees the world as dominated by discord —
an opinion that may not be entirely accurate but that Golding nevertheless tends to
agree with — as that his lack of restraint makes things even worse.
The restless activity of the sea is a recurrent element in Golding’s novels, where it is
also often described in terms of life processes. Though this descriptive technique may
be used in connection with other lifeless objects — the first occasion on which this
occurs is when the third-person narrator of Lord of the Flies refers to Ralph’s loosening
‘the snake-clasp of his belt’ (Golding 1954: 8) — it is the focus on the sea that yields
some of its  most remarkable effects. A good instance is  when Ralph, who has gone
searching the island for the beast that terrorises the little ones, pauses to examine the
way in which the waves erode and encroach on the rocks. The narrator successfully
conveys the idea that, though Ralph does not realise it yet, what the boy is seeing is the
outer appearance of the beast that lurks in the heart of all things:
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Soon, in a matter of centuries, the sea would make an island of the castle. On the right hand was
the lagoon, troubled by the open sea; and on the left —
Ralph shuddered. The lagoon had protected them from the Pacific: and for some reason only
Jack had gone right down to the water on the other side. Now he saw the landsman’s view of the
swell  and it  seemed like  the breathing of  some stupendous creature.  Slowly  the waters  sank
among the rocks, revealing pink tables of granite, strange growths of coral,  polyp, and weed.
Down, down, the waters went, whispering like the wind among the heads of the forest. There was
one flat rock there, spread like a table, and the waters sucking down on the four weedy sides
made them seem like cliffs. Then the sleeping leviathan breathed out, the waters rose, the weed
streamed, and the water boiled over the table rock with a roar. There was no sense of the passage
of waves; only this minute-long fall and rise and fall (Golding 1954: 106–7).
This passage begins by directing our attention to a temporal scale on which centuries
pass by as if they were years, hours, minutes. This is time in a dimension that is strange
to  human individuals,  whose  lifespan  is  much shorter.  This  confrontation  with  the
immensity of  time — and space — serves to  transfigure  the immediate  reality  with
which the individual observer is familiar. We are thus taken into a realm where human
consciousness  does  not  usually  tread,  a  region  that  escapes  our  habitual  focus  on
physical  appearances  but  which  can  only  be  understood,  we  begin  to  suspect,  by
looking into those appearances.  When the narrator  begins  to  introduce  unexpected
metaphorical references to the sea’s signs of life, our suspicions are confirmed. The sea
resembles a monster which, though asleep, does not stop breathing, and now and then
its whispers become an intimidating roar. The alliteration of /w/ in the waters went,
whispering like the wind is a good clue — one that reappears in other stretches of the
novel,  as  we  shall  shortly  see  —  that  the  description  is  going  beyond  mere
impressionism,  and  takes  the  description  to  unprecedented  levels  of  figurative
complexity. On the semantic plane, the sea in described as whispering not like a human
being but like the wind, which thereby undergoes a similar process of personification.
On the prosodic plane, the sea and the wind are likewise identified by virtue of their
identical  initial  phonemes.  Since,  on  the semantic  plane,  this  kind of  identification
extends to all  the other objects described, we can say the narrator’s  concern in this
passage is not only with the purely perceptual qualities — visual, auditory, kinetic — of
material objects, but also with the overwhelming power that is active in the sea, in the
forces of nature and in human lives. Despite being apparently inanimate, the ocean is
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represented  as  having  attributes  associated  with  organic  life,  animal  or  vegetable.
Interestingly, when the focus changes from the sea to the rocks, these are likened to a
table, that is, to a man-made object. While the description of these granitic structures
serves to convey the fact that all objects, natural and artificial alike, somehow resemble
each other,  the quasi-animistic tone in which the sea is described suggests that this
resemblance lies in being endowed with some kind of life.
Using the present passage as an example, Gregor highlights how Golding succeeds
in describing the physical detail of the scene, the ‘extraordinary sense of space’ and
distance (despite its  remoteness, the sea reaches down here) while making the reader
participate  (you  could  follow  with  your  eye the  motions  of  the  sea)  in  Ralph’s
absorption  (Gregor  1987:  90).  Gregor  also foregrounds  — without  mentioning  how
exactly  this  is  done — the  ‘extraordinary  ability’  of  Golding’s  narrators  ‘to  oscillate
between conscious attention to detail and … awareness’ of what lies behind physical
appearances  (90).  This  causes,  in  his  opinion,  ‘the  creative  tension  that  runs
throughout  the  entire  novel’  (90),  and  indeed  —  I  would  like  to  add  —  through
Golding’s entire oeuvre. By the end of Lord of the Flies Golding has created, thanks to
passages like this, ‘the imaginative conditions which make us feel, instinctively, in the
presence of an extraordinary mystery’ (90). The mystery is linked to the essence that
underlies that realm of appearances.
The symbolic references to the sea recur in Lord of the Flies. When Piggy is killed,
the narrator tells us, again in animal terms, that ‘the sea breathed again in a long, slow
sigh, the water boiled white and pink over the rock; and when it went, sucking back
again, the body of Piggy was gone’ (Golding 1954: 185). Towards the end of the novel,
when Ralph is running away from the hunters, the description combines animal and
plant imagery: ‘the restless ocean lay under his left hand, as awful as the shaft of a pit.
Every minute the water breathed round the death rock and flowered into a field of
whiteness’ (192).
The sea is the only element of the tropical landscape that is described in terms of
living matter. In the very first chapter of the book, Ralph’s encounter with Piggy occurs
against a backdrop of lush vegetation and intense sunlight. The wind and the spots of
are depicted as creeping, sliding and fluttering as if they were animals, while the ruffle
of the leaves, which are already endowed with life, is described as an animal whisper:
244
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
little  breezes  crept  over  the  polished  waters  beneath  the  haze  of  heat.  When  these  breezes
reached the platform the palm fronds would whisper, so that spots of blurred sunlight slid over
their bodies or moved like bright, winged things in the shade (Golding 1954: 13).
The wind is depicted as an animal in other parts of the novel too: as we follow Ralph
round the island, we share his awareness of ‘the declining sun and a little wind created
by his speed that breathed about his face’ (Golding 1954: 76). And so is the fire that, on
two occasions, threatens to burn the island to ashes. When the first bonfire that the
children light in order to attract passing ships gets out of control, the wind is presented
as a winged creature and the fire not as one but as two different kinds of tree-climbing
animals:
Small flames stirred at  the trunk of a tree and crawled away through leaves and brushwood,
dividing and increasing. One patch touched a tree trunk and scrambled up like a bright squirrel.
The smoke increased, sifted, rolled outwards. The squirrel leapt on the wings of the wind and
clung to another standing tree, eating downwards. Beneath the dark canopy of leaves and smoke
the fire laid hold on the forest and began to gnaw. Acres of black and yellow smoke rolled steadily
toward the sea. At the sight of the flames and the irresistible course of the fire, the boys broke
into shrill, excited cheering. The flames, as though they were a kind of wild life, crept as a jaguar
creeps on its belly toward a line of birch-like saplings that fledged an outcrop of the pink rock.
They flapped at the first of the trees, and the branches grew a brief foliage of fire. The heart of
flame leapt nimbly across the gap between the trees and then went swinging and flaring along the
whole row of them. Beneath the capering boys a quarter of a mile square of forest was savage
with smoke and flame. The separate noises of the fire merged into a drum-roll that seemed to
shake the mountain (Golding 1954: 43).
The  flames,  which  resemble  a  kind  of  wild  life, are  initially  likened  to  a  gnawing
squirrel, then to a presumably hungry jaguar. By referring to the flames as a short-lived
kind of foliage, the description suggests that the smoke and the fire have brought to
light the savage life force with which — perhaps less spectacularly but no less clearly —
the whole forest is also infused. Finally, the mountain is humanised by a drum-roll that
throws it into commotion.
In the last chapter of the novel we accompany Ralph as he is trying to avoid the
other children, who have set the entire island ablaze: ‘He swung to the right, running
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desperately fast, with the heat beating on his left side and the fire racing forward like a
tide’ (Golding 1954: 205). In this quotation the advancing flames are compared to a tide
which, in turn, is matter-of-factly described in human terms. It may be because of such
details  that,  whether it  be ‘Water,  air  — now fire as  a destructive force,  Golding is
always at his best writing about primal elements’ (Gregor 1987: 95). Golding’s writing
certainly reaches its highest peaks of intensity when evoking the raw forces of nature.
Their presentation offers him the perfect chance to display his mastery of description.
After  Lord  of  the  Flies,  evocative  description  recurs  in  other  novels.  If  at  the
beginning of this first novel the narrator speaks of ‘skull-like coconuts’ (Golding 1954:
8), at the beginning of The Inheritors, Golding’s second published novel, the members
of the primitive People explain the fact that the log that they have always used to cross a
certain stream has disappeared by saying that it has ‘crawled off on business of its own’
(1955:  14).  Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor  explain  that  the  People  ‘see
anthropomorphically,  investing  their  whole  environment  with  humanity.  The  river
sleeps or is awake, trees have ears, the island is a huge thigh, shin and foot, logs go
away, everything is alive’ (2002: 53). It is tempting to dismiss the style in which most of
the narrative is written as the third-person narrator’s attempt to convey the People’s
intellectual limitations. However, the fact that the third-person narrator of Lord of the
Flies uses a similar language, even on occasions when the children cannot possibly do
so, evinces that these descriptions are sanctioned by a higher diegetic authority than
the characters’. At the beginning of Darkness Visible, where the narrative voice is again
in the third person, Matty emerges from a ‘burning bush’, that is, from a building in
flames (Golding 1979: 9). From this point on, the description is once more carried out
in terms of animal life. The narrator refers to ‘the roar of the fire’, and adds that ‘the
heart of the fire’ is ‘shivering rather than beating’ (9–10, 11). As for the effects of the
flames, the narrator informs us that ‘the heat-induced contractions and expansions of
material … can mimic muscular movement’ (12). Overall, the idea conveyed is that ‘the
objects … seem endowed with life’ (12). The strangeness of the scene is compounded by
the fact that the burning structure of brick and metal gives birth to a child.
A  similar  case  is  that  of  the  descriptions  that  give  isolated  parts  of  the  body
attributes usually associated with the whole conscious agent. On the first page of  The
Inheritors the narrator informs us that ‘Lok’s feet were clever. They saw. They threw
him round the displayed roots of the beeches, leapt when a puddle of water lay across
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the trail’ (Golding 1955: 11). Similarly, in the first two chapters of Pincher Martin, we
find narratorial statements like the following: ‘the lips came together and parted, the
tongue arched, the brain lit a neon track’ (8), ‘His mouth slopped full’, ‘His mouth was
clever. It opened and shut for the air and against the water’ (10), ‘His eyes returned to
the pebbles and watched them idly’ (25), ‘His hand crawled round above his head’ (26),
‘His teeth came together and ground’ (27), ‘His shoulder lifted a little’ (28), ‘His mouth
shut then opened’ (29), ‘His hand … fumbled in oilskin. … The hand found the blunted
hollow, and pitched the limpet beyond the edge. … The fingers searched stiffly, found
the limpet, hit with the haft of the knife. … His hand let the knife go’ (38). According to
Paul  Simpson’s  linguistic  analysis,  these  expressions  serve  to  highlight  ‘the
fragmentation of  the  consciousness  of  a  drowning  man,  his  loss  of  physical  self-
control’  (Simpson  1993:  105;  my  italics),  and  for  this  reason  they  are  gradually
abandoned as Pincher’s surrogate (re)constructs his identity and his mind (re)gains
control of the situation within the little world that the drowning man has conjured up.
Additionally,  what  these  expressions  show is,  first,  that  at  least  in  certain  extreme
situations the consciousness of  a contemporary human is  not so different from the
consciousness of the primitive People; second, and more generally, that the same will to
life stirs the world as a whole as well as each of its parts.
As  has  been  noted,  these  descriptions  do  not  refer  to  static  objects  but  to
movements and events. What Watt has said of Conrad can be equally applied, with little
modification, to Golding: he typically presents ‘a picture, not of a static landscape [or
character]  but  of  nature  [or  characters]  in  motion’  (Watt  1980:  44–5).  Golding’s
descriptions  are  not  simply  vivid,  nor  do  they  only  recreate  something  before  the
reader’s own eyes. Golding’s novels typically include striking descriptions of action or
events.  When  this  kind  of  description  possesses  metaphysical  import,  it  does  not
necessarily reflect the perspective of metaphysically aware characters. More often than
not, it conveys metaphysical meanings to the audience, but behind the character’s back.
By contrast, static metaphysical descriptions usually convey those moments when the
characters leave behind causality, space, time and, with them, the egocentric pursuit of
their passions, that is, when they acquire aesthetic and saintly insight. The descriptions
are static because, from the perspective of the characters, the object that they depict has




When  dynamic  description  is  used  evocatively,  it  makes  readers  overcome
egocentrism, in particular, makes them realise that the same inner urge, externalised as
perceptible physical movement,  pervades the apparent world as a whole.  Though at
first its ground may seem physical, dynamic description is not merely impressionistic:
as soon as its metaphysical object becomes clear, the description is seen as symbolic of
something that remains unvoiced.44 The linguistic means signalling the transition from
physical impression to metaphysical symbol are manifold,  but they are all  linked to
metaphoric intensification. Sometimes there is a recurrent use of an expression linking
the conscious actions of people to natural events. The presence of the verb beat in Lord
of the Flies (for example in the last sentence that I have quoted from the novel) is a case
in point. The plot of the novel shows us how, once the power of conventional custom
has worn away, the rhythms of the children’s behaviour get back into synchrony with
those of the rest of the island. When we are told that, in the course of one of their
rituals, ‘The dancing, chanting boys’ free themselves from the shackles of adult life and
begin to follow ‘nothing but a wordless rhythm’ (Golding 1954: 99), we realise that the
gap between the children and rest of nature of nature is closing. At the same time, the
latter begins to be described in terms of the formers’ physical motions. The explanation
may be that, for Golding, it is through the body that one gets acquainted with nature to
begin with, in other words, it is first of all in the body that nature makes its claims felt.
In Golding, as in Schopenhauer, the parts come to display the same behaviour as the
whole world, but it is through the parts that we can know the whole. Thus, for example,
after having witnessed the continuous rise and fall of the waves, we are reminded of the
44 In Golding’s novels metaphysical feelings are seldom identified as such, and sometimes not even
described as a character’s. Rather, as Kinkead-Weekes says, they are often ‘actually created in the
reader’ by means of the narrator’s flamboyant handling of evocative language (1987: 78, 74). In
these cases, Golding’s attitude seems to be, in the critic’s words: ‘Those who have eyes to see, let
them see — and feel’  (75). Schopenhauer helps us to see that,  for the readers who have thus
gained metaphysical insight, the language of Golding’s novels is like a ‘ladder’  that is used to
climb ‘to the summit of knowledge’ but can then be thrown away (Schopenhauer 1969b: 80). By
contrast, states Kinkead-Weekes, ‘Those who have no such eyes will of course see nothingness,
meaninglessness, the absurd … — and space will be made for that reading’ (1987: 75). Golding’s
elusive  style  is  therefore  designed  to  allow  a  sceptical  reading,  ‘an  ending in  nothing,  or  in
ambiguity’ (80). Consequently, the risk persists that ‘the vision may fail, or be seen as delusion in
the character, or the author’ (76). It is up to the reader to finish the author’s work.
248
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
bodily dimension of the motif by the following description of Ralph’s vital signs: ‘He
caught sight of the rise and fall of his diaphragm and was surprised to see how quickly
he was breathing. Just left of center his heart-beats were visible’ (199). Throughout the
novel, the verb  beat is used with different meanings, which nevertheless come to be
identified  with  each  other:  one  has  to  do  with  the  pulsation  of  the  heart,  another
conveys the notion of hitting, still other senses are linked to that of rhythmic sound or
movement.  We have  just  seen one  example  of  the  first  definition  of  beat.  Another
appears during Simon’s interview with the dead pig’s head, on which occasion the boy
feels a pulse beating on his brain. Regarding the second sense, after killing a pig the
hunters explain how they have formed a circle round the panic-stricken animal, and
thus ‘the circle could close in and beat and beat —’ (74). As for the idea of rhythmic
movement, when Simon is killed the circle of children is described as beating with a
steady pulse. In all cases the impression is that not only the children but the whole
island — the entire world in fact — is a single organism propelled by a myriad hearts
that beat as one. If The Spire, then, like Schopenhauer, identifies the heart as the seat of
the inner force that runs through the individual, Lord of the Flies shows, in this scene
and elsewhere, that it is not only in the individual but in the whole world that a heart
palpitates, in fact that the heart of the individual is nothing but a miniature of the giant
pumping heart to which the entire world can be likened.
There  are  occasions  when  humans  are  described  as  if  they  were  non-rational
animals.  When he is  left  alone with Simon and Piggy,  all  the other children having
joined the hunters, Ralph describes the trio as ‘“Three blind mice”’ (Golding 1954: 92),
which gives a good idea of their loneliness and defencelessness. Piggy’s name is also
telling, and announces the way in which the mob will kill them — or at least try to kill
them — like pigs. During his first hunting spree,  Jack is  said to be first a ‘dog-like’
thing, ‘on all fours’ and with ‘his nose only a few inches from the humid earth’, then an
‘ape-like’ thing ‘among the tangle of trees’ (47, 48). Minor characters are also presented
as if they were animals. When Ralph sees Sam and Eric, the accommodating twins, for
the first time, they are ‘grinning and panting’ at him ‘like dogs’ after a long run (17).45
45 Similarly, Pincher Martin’s surrogate describes his situation on the imaginary rock that Pincher
has conjured up by comparing himself to ‘“a limpet”’ (Golding 1956: 36). Later, the surrogate’s
backward movement into a crevice resembles the wriggle of ‘a snake that cannot cast its skin’ or
‘a lobster backing into a deep crevice under water’ (46). In the end, as we have seen, the surrogate
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Taking a further step, there are people who are compared to plants. When Ralph sees
them approach  at  the  beginning  of  the  narrative,  the  intense  heat  and  their  black
uniforms have given the choir  boys ‘the complexion of newly washed peaches’  (18).
Finally,  there  are  descriptions  that  refer  to  an  organic  body  in  terms  of  inanimate
objects. Early in the novel we are told, for example, that ‘The palms … made a green
roof’  (10).  Later,  the  narrator  describes  the  unexpected  calm  that  follows  Simon’s
violent murder. The description, one of the few passages in the novel where the third-
person narrator does not stick to any of the character’s  perspective,  shows how the
moonlight has transformed the boy’s corpse into a marble statue:
The air was cool, moist, and clear; and presently even the sound of the water was still. …
The edge of the lagoon became a streak of phosphorescence which advanced minutely, as the
great wave of the tide flowed. The clear water mirrored the clear sky and the angular bright
constellations. …
Along  the  shoreward  edge  of  the  shallows  the  advancing  clearness  was  full  of  strange,
moonbeam-bodied creatures with fiery eyes. … The tide swelled in over the rain-pitted sand and
smoothed everything with a layer of silver. … The water rose farther and dressed Simon’s coarse
hair  with  brightness.  The  line  of  his  cheek  silvered  and  the  turn  of  his  shoulder  became
sculptured marble.  The strange attendant creatures,  with their fiery eyes and trailing vapors,
busied themselves round his head. The body lifted a fraction of an inch from the sand and …
turned gently in the water.
Somewhere over the darkened curve of the world the sun and moon were pulling, and the film
of water on the earth planet was held, bulging slightly on one side while the solid core turned.
The great wave of the tide moved farther along the island and the water lifted. Softly, surrounded
by  a  fringe  of  inquisitive  bright  creatures,  itself  a  silver  shape  beneath  the  steadfast
constellations, Simon’s dead body moved out toward the open sea (Golding 1954: 156–7).
In their discussion of the scene, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor state that this ‘studiously
scientific description’ intimates a wider perspective which ‘includes everything’ (2002:
37). At his point, they hold, the narrative asks us ‘to experience the fact’ that Simon ‘has
“got  back  to  where  he  belonged”’  (37).  Though  I  would  never  call  the  narrator’s
intervention as studiously scientific, I agree with them that Simon’s body is returning
to the fountainhead of life. The passage does not directly attribute any metaphysical
is reduced to a pair of gigantic pincers clinging to each other.
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dimension to the cycle of life and death in which Simon and the tiny creatures that feed
on his dead body are involved. However, all of the objects in the scene are described as
resembling each other by virtue of their being illuminated by a silvery light: the foam of
the sea and the sand of the beach, the phosphorescent bodies of the scavengers and
Simon’s corpse, the moon above from which this light comes. All of these are physical
objects; yet all participate in a dynamic of life and death that can only be grasped if we
are aware of their metaphysical roots in something that remains out of sight. In a sense,
the relation of these bodies to the invisible sun from which their brightness ultimately
comes can be interpreted as representing the relation between the appearances and the
hidden essence that manifests in them and lends them its energy. It is because this
common essence underlies  everyone and everything that  Simon’s inert  body can be
meaningfully  described  in  evocative  terms that  stress  its  resemblance  to  silver  and
marble. Like the earth, the moon and the sun, in the world at large everything keeps a
precarious balance that depends on countless births and deaths, and behind the scenes
everything is interrelated.
The  analysis  of  evocative  descriptions  in  Lord  of  the  Flies affords  a  good
opportunity to tackle the issue of the writer’s authority over his texts,  as well as its
implications for the functioning of language in the hands of a literary artist. Despite
priding  himself  in  keeping  the  plots  of  his  novels  ‘under  strict  control’,  Golding
acknowledges  that  in  the  process  of  writing  ‘the  imagination  can  get  out  of  hand’
(Golding 1965: 97). In a novel, he concedes, ‘there are many places’ where the story
‘splits at the seams’ and manages ‘to get out of hand’ through sheer ‘excess’ (99). When
this happens, ‘The author becomes a spectator, appalled or delighted, but a spectator’
(97). What matters to Golding is to be honest enough to recognise that ‘the splits do not
rise from ineptitude or deficiency but from a plenitude of imagination’ (99). It is often
at the moments when the fiction manages ‘to come to its own life’, thus disclosing the
seamy side of things, that the work ‘in fact may have become something more valuable’,
thereby  ‘succeeding’  independently  of  the  author’s  efforts  (100).  The  example  that
Golding gives is the sermon that the Lord of the Flies delivers to Simon. He does not
provide any details on the matter, yet it is to be surmised that the hallucinatory quality
of the scene was not a planned thing.
Though he puts the emphasis on the power of words rather than on the power of the
author’s imagination, Medcalf makes a similar point. He notes that there are moments
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in Golding’s oeuvre that evince ‘the contrast between the artist who more or less knows
all that he is doing, and the artist who is doing much more than he can account for’
(Medcalf  1987:  43).  The  former  uses  language  as  a  mere  tool  for  speaking  about
whatever he wants to, while the latter — the author’s daimon, as Medcalf calls it, which
resembles the author’s own voice but is  actually ‘a voice from beyond himself’  — is
happy to get carried away by the ‘peculiar power’ and ‘independent existence’ of the
flow of language (39, 38). The daimon does not use words to refer to objects, but lets
the objects emerge from the words.  Despite the occasional wrong notes,  the overall
result  is  a  tide  that  may  take  the  author  as  well  as  the  audience  to  unexplored
territories.  According  to  Medcalf,  the  contrast  between  both  voices  can  be  best
appreciated if we compare Darkness Visible with Talbot’s erudite but restrained style in
Rites of Passage, the first novel of the Sea Trilogy (the discussion could be extended to
the other two novels). Whereas the former’s style is like ‘an overtaking flood’ (33), the
latter’s  language comes ‘nearer’  than most of his fiction to Golding’s ‘conversational
self’ (33, 42).
Though mentioned by neither Golding nor Medcalf, the following description of the
ocean as seen through Ralph’s eyes is arguably another of those passages where where
the writing has escaped the narrator’s  conscious control  (I  have numbered the four
paragraphs for ease of reference):
[1] He turned and looked out to sea.
[2]  Here,  on  the  other  side  of  the  island,  the  view  was  utterly  different.  The  filmy
enchantments of mirage could not endure the cold ocean water and the horizon was hard, clipped
blue. Ralph wandered down to the rocks. Down here, almost on a level with the sea, you could
follow with your eye the ceaseless, bulging passage of the deep sea waves. They were miles wide,
apparently not breakers or the banked ridges of shallow water. They traveled the length of the
island with an air of disregarding it and being set on other business; they were less a progress
than a momentous rise and fall  of  the whole  ocean.  Now the sea would suck down, making
cascades and waterfalls  of  retreating water,  would sink past  the rocks and plaster  down the
seaweed like shining hair: then, pausing, gather and rise with a roar, irresistibly swelling over
point and outcrop, climbing the little cliff, sending at last an arm of surf up a gully to end a yard
or so from him in fingers of spray.
[3] Wave after wave, Ralph followed the rise and fall until something of the remoteness of the
sea numbed his brain. Then gradually the almost infinite size of this water forced itself on his
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attention. This was the divider, the barrier. On the other side of the island, swathed at midday
with mirage, defended by the shield of the quiet lagoon, one might dream of rescue; but here,
faced by the brute obtuseness of the ocean, the miles of division, one was clamped down, one was
helpless, one was condemned, one was —
[4] Simon was speaking almost in his ear (Golding 1954: 112–3).
Here, again,  we are confronted with the indifference of the roaring sea.  To this are
added the images of its obtuseness, of the foamy arms and fingers of the waves, of the
seaweed resembling hair. It has been said that this excerpt exemplifies the ‘essentially
visual’ nature of Golding’s imagination, which through ‘the accuracy of the seeing’ on
which his narratives rely tries ‘to make us see more than we know’ (Kinkead-Weekes
and Gregor 2002: 362). This means, I think, that here Golding’s language abandons
denotation for evocation — first impressionistic and then symbolic. When we direct our
attention from the signified to the signifier, we realise that the prosodic features of the
passage  —  ‘the  texture  and  movement  of  the  language  itself’  (362)  —  enhance  its
symbolic power by blurring the border between conceptualised sound and sense. This is
consistent with Medcalf’s reference to Golding’s daimon, and can be envisaged as the
untoward dehiscence of language. Before proceeding to the analysis of the description,
and pending further stylistic research, a caveat should be added: the conclusions drawn
here might not be applicable to other descriptions. On the one hand, the fact that in this
quotation  the  quasi-autonomous  movement  of  language  has  a  captivating  power  is
linked  to  the  metaphysical  meanings  simultaneously  conveyed.  In  other  passages,
where denotation rather than evocation prevails, a similar prosodic profile might not be
so noticeable. On the other hand, not all evocative descriptions should be expected to
have  the  same  phonological  properties,  and  even  in  those  that  did  it  would  not
necessarily respond to a relaxation of authorial discipline.
In the second paragraph of the quotation, the narrator asserts that, if you followed
Ralph down to the rocks,  almost on a level with the sea, then you could follow with
your eye the ceaseless, bulging passage of the deep sea waves. The rhythm of these
two  segments  is  characterised  by  the  regular  rhythmic  alternation  of  what  Derek
Attridge calls, in his introduction to poetic rhythm in English,  beats and  offbeats. A
similar pattern characterises subsequent segments such as  the island with an air of
disregarding it  and being set  on other business,  a momentous rise and fall  of  the
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whole ocean, gather and rise with a roar, swelling over point and outcrop, at last an
arm of surf,  to end a yard or so from him; likewise, in the third paragraph we have:
forced itself on his attention,  one might dream of rescue,  the brute obtuseness of the
ocean,  one  was  clamped  down,  one  was  helpless,  one  was  condemned.  Attridge
explains that  beats  and offbeats  — whose succession,  when purposefully  organised,
provides the foundation for metrical language in compositions that range from nursery
rhymes to dramatic monologues in blank verse — are usually realised as one stressed
syllable and one or two unstressed syllables, respectively (see Attridge 1995: 48–62). In
fact, however, what matters is the relative prominence of a syllable in relation to the
one that follows: a stressed syllable can be (part of) an offbeat if it is perceived as less
prominent than a contiguous syllable, which is a beat; and an unstressed syllable can be
a beat  if  it  is  perceived as  more prominent  than a  contiguous syllable,  which is  an
offbeat. This is what happens in the deep sea waves and in of the whole ocean. In the
former, sea is an offbeat if it is regarded as less prominent than the adjacent syllables.
In the latter,  whole is an offbeat if it is regarded as less prominent than the following
syllable,  while  the is  a beat  if  it  is  regarded as  more prominent than the preceding
syllable. Offbeats can also be realised by two syllables instead of one, as in  one was
clamped down (where I take one to be a beat and clamped to be part of the offbeat) and
one was condemned (where  I  take  the  anaphoric  one,  whose presence adds  to  the
overall  effect  of  recurrence,  to  be  a  beat  again).  When  double  offbeats  appear
consecutively, the rhythmic profile becomes more emphatic. This is what happens with
The filmy enchantments of mirage (where the first offbeat is nevertheless single) and
with gather and rise with a roar.
Gregor singles out the ‘hypnotic rhythm’ of one sentence in the third paragraph
(Gregor 1987: 90): Wave after wave, Ralph followed the rise and fall until something
of the remoteness of the sea numbed his brain. Though he does not explain how the
reader comes to be hypnotised, he may be referring to the impact of the segments wave
after wave, rise and fall and numbed his brain, whose rhythmic contours are identical
(a  central  offbeat  realised  by  one  or  two  unstressed  syllables  and  flanked  by  two
stresses, each realising a beat). In the passage where they are inserted, these repetitions
mimic  the ebb and flow of  the  sea  as  well  as  the  swing  of  the  pendulum used  by
hypnotists. Among the phrases that close the paragraph, there are others that display
the same strict succession of stressed beats and unstressed offbeats: one might dream
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of rescue is a case in point. By the end of the paragraph, it is clear that the author has
definitely  become dominated  by the  rise  and fall  of  stresses,  and that  the  beats  of
language — like the other kinds of beats that I have mentioned — have been functioning
as metonymies for the pulse of the inner force that inheres in the whole world.
The  repetition  of  phonemes  also  contributes  to  hypnotic  effect.  The  phonemes
/w/, /r/, /f/ and /s/ appear twice each at the beginning of stressed syllables. As with
the stresses, the semantic import of the sentence makes the very reiteration of these
phonemes acquire a significance that it would not have otherwise, such that the words
involved in that reiteration are linked semantically as well as prosodically.
The  repetition  of  lexical  words  (almost,  fall,  miles,  mirage,  rocks and  side all
appear twice;  down, five times;  sea and  water, four times;  here  appears three times,
and so do island and  ocean;  together,  follow and  followed appear twice;  wave  and
waves appear three times; rise appears another three times, as a noun and as a verb),
of phrases (rise and fall and on the other side of the island appear twice) and of other
syntactic structures (they — i.e. the waves — appears as the subject of three consecutive
sentences), in conjunction with the use of expressions with the same field of reference
(the divider, the barrier) serves to evoke the recurrent rolling of the surf. Apart from
the ones that I have already mentioned, in the quotation there are other phonological
repetitions: in the last sentence of the second paragraph alone, we find two occurrences
of /p/ (pausing … over point and outcrop), /r/ (rise with a roar), /k/ (climbing the
little cliff) and /s/ (sending at last an arm of surf); with the exception of /p/, between
the two occurrences of these phonemes there is not any other alliterating phoneme. The
overall impression is intensified by the use of  the sea as a subject of verbs like  pause
and  climb,  a  syntactic  function  that  endows  it  with  some  kind  of  agency.  As  we
approach the end of the quotation, the repetition of  one was at the beginning of four
consecutive  sentences  (preceded  by  another  instance  of  initial  one functioning  as
subject) turns the description into a sort of desperate litany that not only evokes the
obtuse insistence of the waves but betokens Ralph’s sombre mood. The opposition of
this one and the preceding they makes us share his sense of defeat at the prospect of the
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unequal struggle of the conscious individual — Ralph, who thus becomes, for all his
individuality, the representative of all humankind — and the insensible sea.46
The dash that ends the third paragraph marks the precise point when — after a
lengthy description of the ocean and its relentless rhythm, which eventually comes to
be mimicked by the rhythm of the phrases — the controlling author regains conscious
command of the text. Notice that the sentence Simon was speaking almost in his ear is
a iambic pentameter (with an initial inversion) and that from speaking onwards it has
the same prosodic alternation as we have seen in previous segments. Here, however,
prosody does not come hand in hand with evocative imagery. In fact, the very use of a
strict  iambic  pentameter  (a  form whose  deceptive  naturalness  epitomises  authorial
control  and  represents  more  than  any  other  the  triumph  of  literary  artistry  over
expressive spontaneity) can be seen as both indicative and inductive of a normal state
of consciousness (on the part of the author and of the reader, respectively). The abrupt
shift  interrupts  a  movement  that  threatens  not  only  to  obliterate  the  individual
observer  but  also  to  swallow  up  the  entire  island,  thus  prefiguring  what  the  black
lightning will do to the castaway and his rock in Pincher Martin.
Generalising  from  what  we  have  just  seen,  it  can  be  hypothesised  that  when
Golding’s narrators get carried away by their creative imagination and the thrust of
language, the consequence is always a symbolic heightening of words. From the point
of view of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it would be reasonable to say that, just as the
superhuman drive of the hidden, non-conscious essence of the world — including of the
speaker or writer — manifests itself through non-rational representation, so there are
occasions on which it emerges through such rational representations as words, and it
does so bypassing not only the focalising character’s awareness — which is limited to
physical surfaces — but even the writer’s conscious intentions. On the receiving side, it
is not only the imagery employed that appeals symbolically to the addressee’s feelings;
46 The judgement that Watt passes on Conrad is apposite here: ‘Conrad’s attitude to nature is in one
sense the opposite of Wordsworth’s. He does not feel love for the landscape, or try to persuade
himself that his feelings are in any sense reciprocated: … the ties which most obviously “bind”
mankind to the visible universe are really the shackles which the laws of the cosmos impose upon
human aspiration, the iron condition within which men must attempt to live’ (Watt 1980: 96–7).
In  Golding,  these  shackles  are  not  only  physical  (in  the  form  of  causal  determinism)  but
metaphysical (in the form of the essential will’s obtuse craving).
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the concentrated exploitation of the prosodic resources of language — resources that in
the  last  instance  are  non-conceptual  — also  sidesteps  rationality,  thus  fulfilling  its
symbolic function more effectively. When this happens, ‘out of the concretely focused
consciousness’ through which the narrative is presented, there wells ‘something at first
unconscious,  but  then forced on our  attention’  (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor  2002:
362).  It  is  important to insist that  this phenomenon may take place even when the
narrative consciousness through which the scene is focalised remains unaware of it.
In the last chapter of  Pincher Martin there is a revealing conversation that sheds
light on the response that this kind of symbolic evocation elicits from the audience. Mr
Campbell,  the  islander  who  has  found  Pincher  Martin’s  dead  body  on  the  beach,
describes  the  lean-to  where  the  corpse  has  been  provisionally  placed  as  ‘“Broken,
defiled.  Returning  to  the  earth,  the  rafters  rotted,  the  roof  fallen  in  —  a  wreck”’
(Golding 1956: 207). The description refers, in an indirect way, to Pincher’s own body.
More generally, the description of the derelict shed functions, like that of the leaning
cathedral in The Spire and of the superannuated ship in the Sea Trilogy, as a symbolic
reference to the sorry state in which the whole world is. Additionally, the third-person
narrator suggests that ‘the mossed stones, the caved-in and lichenous roof’ are like ‘a
profound … language’ that we are ‘privileged to read only on a unique occasion’ (205),
namely,  when an altered state of consciousness (of which Schopenhauer identifies a
number of varieties: aesthetic contemplation, inner observation, the saint’s vision or
compassion) gives us access to the metaphysical side and even to the essence of the
world.
Medcalf writes that, for Golding, it is ‘as if the world were words’ (Medcalf 1987:
38). Golding, this critic adds, believes that ‘there is a conversation going on in the world
which  we  are  not  exactly  excluded  from,  but  are  on  the  outside  of’  (38).  This
outsidedness is due to the limits imposed by physical consciousness (a mental state
dominated  by  egocentrism  and  thus  by  the  exclusive  focus  on  the  appearance  of
individual objects); at the same time, the states of consciousness that put an end to this
outsidedness can be spontaneous or induced by another person. On this view, when
Golding uses evocative descriptions that endow inanimate objects and natural forces,
for example, with attributes that are usually associated with living beings, the effect is
to  make  the  audience  grasp  the  common essence  of  the  world  through the  veil  of
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linguistic representation, a veil that thereby stops concealing in order to reveal what
lies behind.
3.1.3. Remedies for Suffering
We have just seen that in Golding’s novels the knowable world is characterised by pain,
and that one of the major causes of this pain is the constant conflict — often described
in symbolic terms — among the objects, forces and creatures in it. In this section I shall
deal with the ways in which, according to Golding, human intervention can reduce the
suffering that plagues  the world.  On the one hand, at the individual level there are
remedies like the aesthetic tranquillity associated with the contemplation of beauty, the
saint’s vision and compassion, and death; all of them avoid the pitfall of egocentrism,
and, except death, they involve metaphysical states of consciousness. As in other cases
of non-rational feeling, the proper language for referring to these states is evocative
language, which is precisely the kind of language employed to this effect in Golding’s
novels.  On the other  hand,  at  the collective level  there  are  remedies  that,  far  from
fighting  against  egocentrism,  take  advantage  of  it,  combining  it  with  repression  to
achieve their ends; these are moral restraints and the legal restraints established by the
state.
All of these solutions are analysed by Schopenhauer, who, however, adds one more
to the list of individual remedies: the renunciation to the satisfaction of individualistic
desire  that  sometimes  follows  the  saint’s  vision  of  the  world’s  essence.  Unlike  the
compassionate saint,  the resigned saint  realises that suffering cannot be eradicated,
renounces all action and withdraws from the world in order to have a secluded life.
Short of death, this is for Schopenhauer the most effective path that the individual can
follow to avoid suffering. It is interesting to note that Golding does not endorse the kind
of cloistered quietism that characterises some of Schopenhauer’s saints.  Instead,  he
associates  saintliness  only  with  those  characters  that  strive  to  improve  their
neighbours’ lives, even sacrificing their own in the process. In what follows I shall argue
that,  unlike  Schopenhauer,  Golding  envisages  active  intervention  as  the  way  of
straightening a crooked world.  Golding’s model for humankind is not an indifferent
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and person,  but the  compassionate  person that  actively  seeks  to reduce the other’s
pain.47
Another difference between Schopenhauer and Golding lies in their  approach to
death. The philosopher recommends not worrying about death and even welcoming it
when it comes. What he does not recommend is to pursue death as a means of avoiding
the suffering that comes hand in hand with egocentrism; pursuing death in this way,
argues s, would amount to pursuing the satisfaction of your egoistic desires. To be sure,
Schopenhauer’s position is  not entirely coherent,  because all  deaths, no matter how
they come about,  entail  the  suppression of  consciousness,  hence  of  pain.  Golding’s
attitude might be interpreted as pointing in this direction. Indeed, his novels include
characters who are so miserable that  let  themselves go and end up dying,  and who
arouse the other characters’ and the readers’ sympathy. Yet they also include characters
that will themselves to death to avoid unbearable suffering, and the expected reaction
from the other characters and from the audience might not be of total condemnation.
In both cases death can be understood the last resort of the desperate subject that finds
no other way of putting an end to pain. Finally, there are those characters that are killed
by others, whether intentionally or not. These are more problematic; but if we consider
the painful elements of their lives to outweigh its pleasures (think of Pincher Martin, of
Mr Pedigree — who, at least from his own perspective, is liberated from life by Matty’s
ghostly apparition — and of Wilf Barclay) we can argue that, as in the other two cases,
their deaths are a happy event.
In this light, the only reason why Golding’s characters do not look forward to dying
might be, as in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, because their egocentrism blinds them to
the fact that perhaps they would be better off dead than alive and conscious of pain.
Golding’s  novels  never  explicitly  justify  suicide,  they  never  allow  us  to  share  the
perspective of those characters that let themselves die or will themselves to die, and
they never advocate terroristic nihilism (of the kind attempted by Sophy in  Darkness
Visible).  The very contemplation of  other solutions to suffering may be intended to
persuade  us  that  killing  oneself  is  not  such  a  good  idea.  After  all,  aesthetic
47 Needless to say, this generalisation proves more accurate concerning some of Golding’s novels
than  others.  Compare  The  Spire,  where  aesthetic  contemplation  and  death  are  the  only
correctives, while compassion and altruistic action are conspicuous by their very absence, with
Darkness Visible, where Matty’s sacrifice is instrumental in saving a child’s life.
259
Golding’s Metaphysics
contemplation  and  compassionate  altruism  can  spare  us  a  considerable  amount  of
suffering,  while  an  adequate  social  organisation  can  prevent  us  from  hurting  each
other.  Given the inclusion of  all  of  these  solutions  in  his  novels,  Golding seems to
regard them as  complementary:  aesthetic  contemplation allows the subject  to  shun
egocentrism and anxiety for a time, but it  makes him or her vulnerable to external
aggression; compassionate altruism can mitigate the other’s pain, but it has the same
shortcoming as aesthetics; moral and legal repression is useful to prevent much violent
behaviour, but it can do nothing to alleviate the pain associated with egocentrism.
In this section I shall examine, first, the liberating power of beauty in The Spire and
Darkness Visible, where the observers are freed from the torment caused by their illicit
sexual  desires  (once  more,  the  emphasis  on  these  desires  confirms  the  primacy  of
sexuality,  the essential will  to life’s  stronger component,  in human life).  Secondly,  I
shall examine compassion and altruism in Lord of the Flies and The Inheritors. I shall
also pay attention to the mixture of aesthetic insight, saintly vision and compassion
that is attributed to Sammy in Free Fall. Thirdly, I shall focus on death. One of the most
striking  features  of  Golding’s  narratives  is  the  number  of  people  that  die  in  them.
Leaving  aside the deaths  of  non-rational  animals,  the most relevant  demises in  his
novels are those of Simon, Lok, Pincher Martin, Dean Jocelin, Matty, Mr Pedigree, Wilf
Barclay, Reverend Colley, Wheeler and Ionides, the main male character in The Double
Tongue. (As it turns out, it is only in Free Fall and The Pyramid that no main character
dies.) To simplify the issue a little, I shall group up these cases into three categories:
deaths  that  are  accepted  as  an  altruistic  sacrifice  (Matty’s;  perhaps  Simon’s);
involuntary deaths that represent an obvious release from egocentric suffering though
the  characters  may  not  realise  it  (Pincher’s,  Pedigree’s  and  Wilf’s;  perhaps  also
Jocelin’s);  voluntary  suicides that  the characters  commit  in the belief  that  personal
extinction is the only lasting liberation from egocentric suffering (Colley’s, Wheeler’s;
perhaps Lok’s and Ionides’, though it could also be argued that the pain of these two
characters is  so intense that they simply let themselves go and slip into death).  My
examples will be Matty’s sacrifice, Pedigree’s resistance to death and Colley’s voluntary
embrace of it.
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3.1.3.1. Individual Remedies: Aesthetic Contemplation; the Saint’s Vision 
and Compassion; Death
The  clearest  example  of  aesthetic  contemplation  in  Golding’s  novels  is  Jocelin’s
appreciation of the finished pinnacle’s beauty in The Spire. As we have seen, the Dean’s
old notebook tells us how, following on from the metaphysical explosion that rises from
his heart (the inner feeling of his own individual will), he is struck by the idea of a new
steeple.  To understand Jocelin’s  subsequent  obsession we must  remember that  the
feeling of the will  cannot be expressed through denotative words.  A writer may use
language to  arouse the audience’s metaphysical feelings; a painter may create a two-
dimensional  picture;  a  sculptor  and  an  architect  may  conceive  three-dimensional
structures.  The  spire  functions  not  only  as  a  monument  to  the  almighty  and
omnipresent will but also as a direct expression of Jocelin’s will and as a work of art.
Joelin’s  revelation  took  place  in  three  different  moments:  inward  contemplation
followed by repression and aesthetic sublimation. By virtue of this last moment the
novel would be a meditation on the artistic process, starting with the work’s inception,
proceeding to its production and ending, as we are about to see, with its reception. This
analysis tallies with Golding’s account of the novel, in the course of an interview with
Baker, as an exploration of ‘the problem of what is an artist, why is an artist, how is an
artist’ (in Baker 1982: 150).
Schopenhauer’s  aesthetic  theory helps  to  understand Golding’s  treatment  of  the
artistic  process  in  The  Spire.  In  his  frequent  mentions  of  beauty,  Schopenhauer
maintains that the artist’s task is to elevate the receiver’s mind beyond the physical
dimension  of  objects  to  the  metaphysical-aesthetic  sphere.  Aesthetic  contemplation
produces ‘the deliverance of knowledge from the [egocentric] service of the will,  the
forgetting of oneself as individual, and the enhancement of consciousness to the pure …
timeless subject of knowing’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 199).  The work of art makes the
aesthetic  dimension  accessible  to  the  audience  in  much  the  same  way  as  artistic
inspiration made it accessible to the author. Grasping objects in an aesthetic manner
(and any object can be treated in this way) allows individuals to transcend themselves
by reaching a state in which they become free from egocentrism and from all concern
about the satisfaction of the desires dictated by their innate character. In this state — in
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which the craving individual gives way to an observer that appreciates universal beauty
in a particular object — the door is opened, temporarily at least, to a better life.
All these features of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory are present in the aesthetic
experiences that Golding’s novels portray. The inner feeling that Jocelin records in his
notebook is immediately followed by a moment of aesthetic inspiration: the memory of
his inner insight turned into a mental image of the spire. Joelin is not aware of this last
step, but this is unsurprising: at first he is also unaware of the continuity between the
will that he locates outside and his own inner will. The concluding pages of the novel
foreground the dawning on Jocelin of the aesthetic dimension of the pinnacle.  As he
lies dying, he catches a glimpse of the finished spire, and sees it not from a religious
perspective but aesthetically, as an object of beauty. Golding writes: ‘The book is about
the human cost of building the spire’ (1984a: 166). Yet it is also about something else.
So important is the aesthetic interpretation for Golding, that he places it as the book’s
main  theme:  ‘after  all  the  theology,  the  ingenuities  of  craft,  the  failures  and  the
sacrifices, a man is overthrown by the descent into his world of beauty’s mystery and
irradiation’ (167). Jocelin ‘does not think of beauty’ until the very end of his life (166).
‘Only when he is dying does he see the spire in all its glory’ (167). Previously he has not
been aware of the aesthetic character of the enterprise, but after many hardships have
transformed him into a new man he comes to appreciate the pinnacle from an artistic
angle.
In the novel, aesthetic inspiration and aesthetic reception are separated not only by
a lapse of several decades but also by a gulf of unsettling experience. The place of the
pinnacle that does not initially exist outside the Dean’s imagination is at the second
moment occupied by a completed physical structure that everyone can admire. Jocelin
initially believes that the projected spire satisfies God’s all-powerful will, but later he
realises that it is his own lascivious desire that the spire fulfils. Eventually he discovers
the spire’s beauty, and this allows him to escape, during an instant of tranquillity, from
the egocentric ties to his innate will. Schopenhauer’s discussion of these two features of
aesthetic cognition (the contemplation of beauty and the accompanying relief) can help
us understand the ending of the novel.
Lying in his deathbed, Jocelin likens the spire to an ‘appletree’ (Golding 1964: 233);
for a man who — as Golding explains — has never paid any attention to aesthetics, this
is perhaps the only possible image of beauty, one that does not so much hint at the way
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in which aesthetics can turn a paradise lost into a paradise regained (as we shall see
when dealing with his view of history, Golding never seeks this kind of mythical solace)
as suggest the manner in which aesthetics can establish an unprecedented paradise on
earth.  Further,  the description of a human construction in terms of plant life is yet
another  example  of  the  kind  of  description,  by  virtue  of  evocation,  appeals  to  the
feelings of the reader by blurring the limits between animals,  plants and inanimate
objects. The peculiarity is that here the description is not dynamic but static: instead of
drawing attention to the conflict that characterises nature in movement, it focuses on
the calm associated with a motionless object. This description is a good example of a
characteristic  of  Golding’s  style  that  I  mentioned  when  dealing  with  dynamic
descriptions, namely, the focus on static objects that serves to convey not the essential
identity  of  a  world  torn  apart  by  ongoing  conflict  but  the  way  in  which  the
contemplation of things that do not move makes them seem to be unaffected by the
passage of time and simultaneously allows characters to escape not only the tyranny of
temporal, spatial and temporal consciousness, but also suffering.
Despite its fundamental function in Golding’s novels, this use of evocation has not
been well received by all critics. Lerner is probably the most critical of its use in  The
Spire. He writes:
There is no human purpose in an appletree, there is no spontaneous growth in a spire. Stone is
laid on stone by men for a reason; blossom bursts with cloud and scatter as part of a natural
process, and it is meaningless to ask of a tree what it is there for, and expect the same kind of
answer as for a cathedral. This is obvious, but it needs saying (Lerner 1981: 11).
Lerner is not aware that, by calling it an apple tree, the spire is seen as yet another
manifestation of the essential will  to life,  now aesthetically appreciated. By a happy
coincidence with Golding’s narrative, Schopenhauer explains the aesthetic dimension
of his philosophy through the example of a tree: ‘if … I contemplate a tree aesthetically
…  it  is  immediately  of  no  importance  whether  it  is  this  tree  or  its  ancestor  that
flourished a thousand years ago, and whether the contemplator is this individual, or
any other living anywhere and at any time’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 209). The particular
tree and the individual subject are abolished and nothing remains but the universal
dimensions of the beautiful object and of its observer. The coincidence of vocabulary
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makes  even  clearer  the  connection  between  Schopenhauer’s  ideas  and  Jocelin’s
contemplation  of  the  spire  qua  aesthetic  object.  The  universal  quality  that  the
philosopher attributes to art makes it easier to explain why the spire’s contemplation
makes Jocelin blurt out: ‘Now — I know nothing at all’  (Golding 1964: 223). On the
subjective side, aesthetic reception involves the suspension of the usual egocentrism of
the conscious subject: the  I is not longer the  I as we usually understand it,  i.e. as a
subject  that  is  not  only  individual  but  egocentric.  On  the  objective  side,  aesthetic
contemplation does not afford any kind of conceptual knowledge; nor does it consist in
the egocentric feeling of a physical thing in particular.
As the observer of the aesthetic dimension of an object, notes Schopenhauer, I leave
my needs and desires behind. Whoever comes across beauty becomes a ‘will-free …
intelligence without aims and intentions’, a person in whom the will ‘vanishes entirely
from consciousness’ (Schopenhauer 2000b: 415). Since the strife to satisfy one’s will is
the source of one’s suffering, ‘with the disappearance of all willing from consciousness,
there yet remains the state of pleasure, in other words absence of all pain’ (416). The
feeling of the object’s metaphysical-aesthetic dimension, then, is not knowledge as we
usually  understand  it,  but  a  new  knowledge  that  transforms  the  observer  and  the
observed into the universal and interdependent poles of representation, liberating the
subject  from the  suffering  associated  from an  egocentric  appreciation  of  objects  as
potential causes of pleasure or displeasure rather than as manifestations of timeless
beauty.48
The pain that sexuality causes Jocelin is so intense that not even sleep can interrupt
it. One of the most telling illustrations of the narrative’s carnal implications is a dream
of Jocelin’s  in which the cathedral  is  identified with his lying body, whose penis  is
stroked by a red-haired Satan resembling Goody: ‘Only Satan himself … clad in nothing
but blazing hair stood over his nave and worked at the building,  tormenting him so
48 The reference to trees in connection with the metaphysical experience of  beauty allows us to
interpret similar episodes in Golding’s novels aesthetically. The scene in Free Fall  where young
Sammy enters a garden and sees a tree in the moonlight  has  already been mentioned as an
example of the distance between non-rational feelings and rational concepts. It could also be
interpreted,  precisely  because  it  endows  the  non-rational  contemplation  of  a  tree  with  an
extraordinary aura, as another illustration of beauty. However, this episode lacks the liberating
dimension of the aesthetic experience.
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that he writhed … and cried out aloud’ (Golding 1964: 65). The appreciation of beauty
puts an end to the Dean’s suffering and crying. It also gives a moment’s rest to the other
characters.  It  is  Jocelin’s  desire  that  impulses  the pinnacle’s  construction  and thus
inflicts almost unbearable pain on all round him. By calming its inspirer, the beautiful
building also affords a moment of relief to all the other people that he has manipulated
as if they were mere puppets.
The appreciation of beauty reappears in Darkness Visible, a novel that reminds us
that all objects, not matter how ordinary, have an aesthetic side, and where, as in The
Spire, the experience brings the subject — here Sim the bookseller, whose scepticism
Matty tries to overcome — a brief relief from sexual desire.  While some believe that
Matty can ‘“pierce a partition”’ through the mesh of rational concepts and the fabric of
physical  appearances,  Sim  is  confident  that  partitions  will  ‘“remain  partitions”’
(Golding 1979: 225). Though his scepticism is very strong, it is not long before facts
prove him wrong, at least in part. In the course of a kind of seance with Matty, Sim
becomes conscious of the aesthetic dimension which all things possess, but which is
usually obscured by our egocentric consciousness of their physical appearance:
He looked into his own palm, pale, crinkled, the volume, as it were, most delicately bound in this
rarest  or  at  least  most  expensive of  all  binding material  — and then he fell  through into an
awareness  of  his  own  hand  that  stopped  time  in  its  revolution.  The  palm  was  exquisitely
beautiful,  it  was made of light.  It was precious and preciously inscribed with a sureness and
delicacy beyond art (Golding 1979: 231).
At the end of this quotation, the narrator speaks as if the beauty of Sim’s hand was such
that it could not be reproduced by works of art. Though this is an idea that Golding
never developed, the passage suggests that art can never do justice to natural beauty.
Moreover,  if  we  go  back  for  a  moment  to  The  Spire,  Jocelin’s  comparison  of  the
pinnacle to an apple tree suggests that the best way to comment on a work of art’s
beauty is by referring to previous experiences of natural beauty.49 What is clear is that,
49 Speaking about  The Spire, Golding remarks that, in order to assess the value of the novel, the
reader  should  ‘measure  the  intention  against  the  achievement’  (Golding  1984:  164).  This
recommendation (which, as is clear from Golding’s subsequent discussion, also applies to our
assessment of Jocelin’s achievement in the novel) might be taken to suggest that the reason why
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after the beauty of Sim’s hand has given him a ‘convulsion unlike anything he had ever
known’, the little room where he is fills his consciousness again (Golding 1979: 231).
Looking at his palm once more, he realises that it is ‘a tiny bit sweaty, but not in any
sense dirt, and just a palm like any other’ (233). Interwoven in these two quotations
there  are  several  important  themes  that  we  have  previously  examined.  First,  the
physical dimension of Sim’s hand is linked to rational calculation: its surface reminds
him of  the  cost  of  the  volumes that  he  stores  in  his  bookshop.  Secondly,  aesthetic
contemplation is a variety of metaphysical consciousness in which time halts, so to say.
Thirdly,  the  aesthetic  dimension  of  the  object  —  of  the  hand,  in  this  case  —  is  a
reservoir of beauty.  Fourthly, the aesthetic experience is  always temporary.  When it
ends, the object loses its universality — and with it its beauty — and so does the subject;
both return to their previous condition.
In  this  scene,  it  is  not  clear  whether  Matty  can  induce  involuntary  episodes  of
aesthetic contemplation or not. What is clear,  however, is that the contemplation of
beauty has a liberating dimension. Sim regards Mr Pedigree’s appetite for young boys
disgusting, but the desires of both men are more similar than Sim can imagine, as he is
as much a slave of his own sexuality as the old paedophile. When Sophy and Toni are
still little girls, Sim starts to buy children’s books with a ‘furtive passion’ in the hope of
attracting the twins to his shop (Golding 1979: 195).  At first he disguises his secret
desire  as  paternal  instinct.  Yet  when the girls  grow up,  he  finds  them ‘wonderfully
nubile’ (213). If Sim finds the twins attractive, even when they are still little girls, it is
not because he is just ‘a sentimental old thing’ suffering from the empty nest syndrome,
natural  beauty  is  superior  to  artistic  beauty  is  that,  with  the  former,  there  is  no  authorial
intention  with  which  the  finished  work  can  be  compared,  and  that  neither  the  technical
limitations  of  the  artist  nor  the  limitations  of  the  artistic  medium  itself  hinder  the  work’s
perfection. As we shall see when dealing with the place of the divinity in Golding’s works, there
are two problems with this interpretation: on the one hand, a number of of Golding’s texts do
compare the divinity to an artist; on the other, the created world is so far from perfect that the
divinity obviously lacks the necessary skills.  A possible clue to why the narrator of  Darkness
Visible speaks of natural objects as more beautiful than man-made objects may be that this novel,
and the ones that follow it, cast doubts on the accuracy of any characterisation of the essence of
the world  and,  therefore,  on  the  characterisation  of  the  world  as  the worst  possible.  I  shall
examine this issue in the next chapter.
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as he would have everyone believe, but because he is dominated by ‘the unruly member’
that  torments  him as  much as  it  does  Dean  Jocelin  in  The  Spire (226).  However,
Jocelin is not the character that, as far as his illicit craving is concerned, Sim resembles
the most.  After  all,  the  Dean’s  passion  is  for  an  adult  woman,  while  Sim does  not
discriminate on grounds of age. In this Sim is much more like Mr Pedigree, who is also
an ‘old thing’, but one whose ‘filthy’ proclivities are known to the public (265). There is
good reason to think, therefore, that the anxiety that has accompanied the old teacher
throughout his life is the same feeling that Sim has when he sees the girls, the real
difference between both men lying perhaps in the extent — greater in Sim’s case — to
which repression operates in them.
Sim’s  sexual  frustration  makes  him  suffer  as  much  as  Mr  Pedigree  and  Dean
Jocelin, and it is reasonable to suppose that beauty rescues him, as it does Jocelin in
The Spire, from this pain. Also as in  The Spire, Sim’s aesthetic respite does not last.
Jocelin  dies  immediately  after  becoming  aware  of  the  spire’s  beauty,  and  Sim
eventually returns to his previous life. Despite its undeniable liberating power, then,
aesthetic  contemplation is  marred by its  brevity.  As Schopenhauer  puts  it,  through
aesthetics we cannot achieve ‘a lasting emancipation, but merely … an exceptional, and
in fact  only momentary,  release from the service of  the will’  (Schopenhauer  1969b:
363).
Metaphysical  awareness  of  the  aesthetic  dimension  of  objects  is  not  the  most
extreme escape from egocentrism that  Golding’s  novels  bring to  our  attention.  The
place  of  honour  in  this  respect  corresponds  to  saintly  vision,  the  compassion  and
altruism that follow from it, and death.
Golding’s  first  saint  is  Simon,  one  of  the  main  characters  of  Lord of  the  Flies.
Initially introduced as a member of Jack’s choir, it soon becomes clear that he is not
only an introverted, self-effacing boy, but someone separated from the other characters
by his metaphysical insight and altruism. According to Golding, Simon is ‘a lover of
mankind’ (Golding 1965: 98). This is clear from very early in the novel, when we see
him supply with fruit a group of hungry little ones that he meets in the forest:
Simon found for  them the fruit  they could not reach,  pulled off  the choicest  from up in the
foliage, passed them back down to the endless, outstretched hands. When he had satisfied them
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he paused and looked round. The littluns watched him inscrutably over double handfuls of ripe
fruit (Golding 1954: 55).
We have seen that in Schopenhauer’s philosophy altruism is triggered by compassion,
which, in turn, is rooted in the awareness that we share the same essence with (the rest
of) sufferers. Schopenhauer explains:
whatever goodness, affection, and magnanimity do for others is always only an alleviation of their
sufferings; and consequently what can move them to good deeds and to works of affection is
always only knowledge of the suffering of others (Schopenhauer 1969a: 375).
For Schopenhauer, the compassionate identification of the others’ weal with one’s own,
and  therefore  the  urge  to  alleviate  their  pain,  is  ‘pure  affection  (’αγάπη,  caritas)’
untainted by egoism and malice (Schopenhauer 1969a: 375).
As the plot of Lord of the Flies unfolds we realise that Simon’s attempts to help the
others have to do with his unusual alertness to the fact that all human beings share the
same essence, and that this essence is the ultimate source of all violence and suffering.
Several hints are given of Simon’s gradual realisation that the difficulties that the boys
face might be caused by their own nature. It is Simon who first suggests, in the course
of  an  assembly,  that  the  beast  that  gives  the  little  ones  nightmares  might  be  in
themselves:
‘Maybe’, he said hesitantly, ‘maybe there is a beast’.
The assembly cried out savagely and Ralph stood up in amazement.
…
‘What I mean is  .  .  .  maybe it’s only us’ [ellipsis in the original].
…
Simon became inarticulate in his effort to express mankind’s essential illness (Golding 1954:
89).
In the context of the novel and of Golding’s whole oeuvre it is obvious that Simon is
right. The switch from the character’s voice to the more authoritative narratorial voice
at the end of this quotation contributes to highlight this point. Nevertheless, Simon’s
268
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
insight into human nature is not accepted by the other children. Piggy, for example, is
naive enough to believe that there are ‘“doctors for everything, even the inside of your
mind”’, and ‘“if there is something wrong, there’s someone to put it right”’; similarly, he
is certain that ‘“there isn’t no beast”’ on the island, and that there can be ‘“no fear,
either”’ (Golding 1954: 84). The only other person that comes close to Simon’s point of
view is Jack. At one point he remarks, in passing, that the beast might be a person —
not any kind of person, but ‘“a hunter”’ that, like himself, prowls the island (129).
Painfully  aware that  he ‘“couldn’t  kill  it”’  despite  his  best  efforts  (Golding 1954:
129), the only way that Jack finds of dealing with this supernatural hunter is to appease
it with a gift: a pig’s head on a stick that he and his followers leave in a clearing and that
soon gets covered with flies. Jack’s bloody offering, the obscene Lord of the Flies, plays
a pivotal role in the narrative, for it is a chance encounter with it that confirms Simon’s
suspicions about human nature:
Simon stayed where he was, a small brown image, concealed by the leaves. Even if he shut his
eyes the sow’s head still remained like an after-image. …
Simon … opened his eyes quickly and there was the head grinning amusedly in the strange
daylight, ignoring the flies, the spilled guts, even ignoring the indignity of being spiked on a stick.
Simon … saw the white teeth and dim eyes, the blood — and his gaze was held by that ancient,
inescapable recognition. In Simon’s right temple, a pulse began to beat on the brain.
…
Simon’s head was tilted slightly up. His eyes could not break away and the Lord of the Flies
hung in space before him.
‘What are you doing out here all alone? Aren’t you afraid of me?’
Simon shook.
‘There isn’t anyone to help you. Only me. And I’m the Beast. … Fancy thinking the Beast was
something you could hunt and kill!’ said the head. … ‘You knew, didn’t you? I’m part of you? …
I’m the reason why it’s no go? Why things are what they are? … You know perfectly well you’ll
only meet me down there — … I’m warning you. … We are going to have fun on this island.
Understand? We are going to have fun on this island! So don’t try it on, my poor misguided boy,
or else — ’
Simon found he was looking into a vast mouth. There was blackness within, a blackness that
spread.
‘— Or else’, said the Lord of the Flies, ‘we shall do you. …’
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Simon was inside the mouth. He fell down and lost consciousness (Golding 1954: 140–1, 146–
7; my italics).
This scene conveys a saintly vision of the inner nature of humankind, anticipated by
Simon’s feeling of blood beating in his temple, an unmistakable token that what follows
will refer to the essential dimension that can be grasped first of all by confronting what
lies deep down inside oneself. It is encounters like this that Golding has in mind when
he calls Simon ‘a visionary’ (Golding 1965: 98). The image of humankind that rises in
the boy’s mind is of a being ‘at once heroic and sick’ (Golding 1954: 104). According to
Golding, our disease consists in our capacity to harm our neighbour for no good reason;
our heroism rests on the attempt to mitigate the pain we feel. In other words, we are
sick because of the desires that fuel our acts and which frequently lead to mutual harm,
but the attempts at self-understanding and altruistic redemption can only be described
as heroic.
Needless to say, being a hero — a saint — is more difficult than it seems. As Baker
points out, even when we ‘make a heroic attempt to rise to a level ethically superior to
nature, and to our own nature, again and again we suffer a fall … because of the limiting
defects inherent in our species’ (Baker 1965: 6). That is why sometimes, after catching a
brief glimpse at the essence that humans share with the rest of the world, we fall back
into our daily routine as if we had not learnt anything, or as if what we have learnt was
of no consequence. Golding explains this attitude to Keating saying that the impulse ‘to
just go and … let the whole thing slide’ is a ‘perennial temptation’ (in Keating 1988:
213).
Though Simon does not succumb to this temptation, the other children do prefer to
ignore what he has to say. As in The Spire, in Lord of the Flies this suppression of the
truth about themselves has disastrous consequences.  Boyd states that  the children’s
‘self-congratulatory attitude’, the belief that they are ‘decent and fair-minded’, actually
‘allows the Devil to go to work, evils  to be perpetrated’ (Boyd 1988: 12).  Donald R.
Spangler  makes  a  similar  point  when  he  writes  that  the  children’s  complacency,
exemplified by Piggy, ‘causes imagined “beasts” forever to be misidentified and slain …
so that, unrecognized, the beast endures’; in the last instance, this amounts to ‘man’s
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inability  to  recognize  his  own responsibility  for  his  own self-destruction’  (Spangler
1988: 235–6).
After his encounter with the Lord of the Flies, Simon climbs the mountain where
the children believe to have seen the prowling beast. What he finds instead is a dead
fighter pilot whose parachute, at the mercy of the wind, makes him now sit up now lie
back down, over and over again. The child releases the rotting parachutist from the
tangle of lines, and hastes to tell the other children about his discovery, thus freeing
them — as he has freed the parachutist — from the compulsive behaviour in which they
are trapped. Baker writes: ‘The truth he brings would set us free from the repetitious
nightmare of history, but we are, by nature, incapable of receiving that truth’ (Baker
1965: 13). The sun has set, and the majority of children are on the beach, having a feast
of meat round a fire. During the frenzied ritual that follows, they dance in a ring and
intone an ominous chant.  Simon runs towards  them stumbling in  the dark,  and is
confused with the beast.  The description of  the scene that ends with Simon’s death
begins by putting the emphasis on the rhythmical beat that arises from and guides the
group’s movements. This pulse is an unequivocal sign that, even if they are not aware of
this, the hungry beast that they want to kill is also in them — notice the comparison of
the circle to a gaping mouth ready to swallow — and that, individual peculiarities of
character aside, in the last instance they are not so different from Simon as they think:
The movement became regular while the chant lost its first superficial excitement and began to
beat like a steady pulse … the center of the ring yawned emptily. … There was the throb and
stamp of a single organism.
The dark sky was shattered by a blue-white scar. An instant later the noise was on them like
the blow of a gigantic whip. The chant rose a tone in agony.
‘Kill the beast! Cut his throat! Spill his blood!’
Now out of the terror rose another desire, thick, urgent, blind.
‘Kill the beast! Cut his throat! Spill his blood!’
…
The  circle  became  a  horseshoe.  A  thing  was  crawling  out  of  the  forest.  It  came  darkly,
uncertainly. The shrill screaming that rose before the beast was like a pain. The beast stumbled
into the horseshoe.
…




The sticks fell and the mouth of the new circle crunched and screamed. The beast was on its
knees in the center, it’s arms folded over its face. … The beast struggled forward, broke the ring
and fell … to the sand by the water. At once the crowd surged after it, … leapt on to the beast,
screamed, struck, bit, tore. There were no words, and no movements but the tearing of teeth and
claws.
Then the clouds opened and let down the rain like a waterfall. The water … poured like a cold
shower over the straggling heap on the sand. Presently the heap broke up and figures staggered
away. Only the beast lay still, a few yards from the sea. Even in the rain they could see how small
a beast it was; and already its blood was staining the sand (Golding 1954: 155–6).
As his death makes clear, Simon is what Golding calls, in his interview with Keating, ‘a
Christ figure’ (in Keating 1988: 212). As Golding explains to Kermode, Simon’s fate is
exemplary of sanctity: ‘a saint isn’t just a scapegoat, a saint is somebody who in the last
analysis voluntarily embraces his fate’, be it simply bringing others the news about their
nature — as in Simon’s case — or dying to improve the others’ lives (in Kermode 1988:
219).  That those who have humiliated and laughed at him are among the boys that
Simon tries to help can be explained by Schopenhauer’s opinion that compassion is ‘the
spirit of love enjoining one man to spare his enemies’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 492–3). If
Simon attempts to liberate all the other children without distinctions it is because he
does  not  regard  any  of  them as  his  enemies.  Unlike  the  egoist,  the  compassionate
person does  not  consider  the world to  be populated by antagonistic  powers but  by
friendly beings.
After giving the above definition of compassion, Schopenhauer goes on to add that,
sometimes, this spirit of unconditional love pushes man, ‘even at the risk of his life, to
befriend a person never previously seen’ (Schopenhauer 1969b: 493). This explains one
of the most striking aspects of Golding’s second novel, The Inheritors, where Lok, the
main character, feels the need to go and greet with open arms those who will try to kill
him.
The plot of The Inheritors is as straightforward as that of Lord of the Flies, and in
some respects similar to it. The characters of the story are also divided into two groups:
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the primitive  People  and the  New People  who invade  their  territory.50 The  contact
between the two tribes proves fatal to the former. The People are a family formed by
two leaders (the Old Man, called Mal, and the Old Woman), two men (Lok, the novel’s
main focaliser, and Ha), two women (Fa and Nil), a small girl (Liku) and a baby (the
New One). At the outset of the narrative we witness Mal’s accidental death, and most
other members of  the group — beginning with Ha,  Nil  and the Old Woman — are
subsequently killed by the New People. The intruders also take Liku and the New One.
Liku is not only killed but eaten, whereas the New One is adopted by Vivani, one of the
New People’s women. After killing Fa with their arrows, the New People leave Lok to
his grim fate. Dimly aware of the fact that he might be the last of his kind, he dies out of
exhaustion and sorrow. The novel’s  last chapter is  narrated from the perspective of
Tuami, the New People’s artist, as they set sail in search of new lands.
Lok’s first encounter with the New People shows how, despite being as terrible ‘as
the  fire  or  the  river’,  they  draw  him  ‘like  honey  or  meat’  (Golding  1955:  198).  If
Schopenhauer equates compassion with a kind of non-sexual, unconditional ‘love’ even
for one’s enemies (Schopenhauer 1969a: 374), Lok’s feeling for those beings ‘who would
kill him if they could’ is also said to amount to ‘a terrified love’ (Golding 1955: 191).
Having seen the intruders from a tree, he hurries to hail them across a river:
‘Hoé new people’
A great strength entered into Lok. He could have flown across the invisible water between
them. He dared a desperate acrobatic in the thin boughs of the beech top, then shouted as loudly
as he could.
‘New people! New people!’ (Golding 1955: 102).
50 Both Golding and most of his commentators refer to the People as the last Neanderthal survivors.
However credible their characterisation might have seemed in the mid-1950s, it is now obvious
that the People are, if  anything,  a much more primitive species than the Neanderthalers (see
Hughes 1987: 161–2; Carey 2009: 178). Though Golding defended the scientific accuracy of his
portrayal (see Biles 1970: 106–7),  his well-known distaste for research raises justified doubts
about this theory (see Biles 1970: 96–8; Carey 2009: 25–6, 178, 285, 397). It is better to read
Golding’s  novel  as  recounting  the counterfactual  encounter  between the Cro-Magnons  and a
fictive species of more primitive anthropoids.
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The  reception  that  the  New  People  give  him  is  far  from  cordial  and  includes  the
throwing of arrows (the description of the attack is a good illustration of the style that
dominates much of the narrative):
A head and a chest faced him, half hidden. … The man turned sideways in the bushes and looked
at Lok along his shoulder. A stick rose upright … Suddenly Lok understood that the man was
holding the stick out to him but neither he nor Lok could reach across the river. Lok would have
laughed … The stick began to grow shorter at both ends. Then it shot out to full length again.
The dead tree by Lok’s ear acquired a voice.
‘Chop!’
His ears twitched and he turned to the tree. By his face there had grown a twig: a twig that
smelt  of  other,  and  of  goose  …  He  was  lost  in  a  generalized  astonishment  and  excitement
(Golding 1955: 106).
As the New People are shooting at him their arrows, Lok’s only thought is ‘a confused
idea’ that they are ‘trying to give him a present’ (Golding 1955: 111).51 Thereafter Lok
51 The whole description forces the readers to share Lok’s perspective,  and to perceive what he
perceives. Since the narrator refrains from giving the objects that Lok sees the usual names that
they  receive  in  present-day  English,  the  readers’  conceptual  decoding  of  the  episode,  which
initially depends on sense-impressions alone, will be delayed until they find the exact word for
the sticks that the New People have thrown. It is only after some moments’  thought that the
readers can realise that the sticks are arrows.
Both what  happens  in the  scene  and  how it  is  conveyed reminds  of  a  similar  passage in
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, where it takes Marlow some time to identify the long cane that has
killed his helmsman as ‘the shaft of a spear’ (Conrad 1990: 202). The kind of reception that both
descriptions  demand exemplifies  what  Watt  calls,  in  his  analysis  of  Conrad’s  style,  delayed
decoding. In Watt’s definition, this is ‘an original narrative solution to the general problem of
expressing the process whereby the individual’s sensations of the external world are registered
and translated into … conceptual terms’ (1980: 179). Conrad’s way to trigger delayed decoding is
‘to present a sense impression and to withhold naming it or explaining its meaning until later’
(175). As a result, the readers are forced to go through the whole process whereby the rational
consciousness elicits conceptual meaning from perception.
Plainly enough, delayed decoding works by putting the stress on the distance that separates
feelings from concepts. Though in this scene from  The Inheritors the narrator never gives the
objects that Lok sees their proper name, the readers are encouraged to supply it themselves. In
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and Fa come to understand how dangerous the New People can be. Fa explains to him
why they are so aggressive: ‘“The new people … watch the forest over their backs. …
They are frightened of the air where there is nothing”’ (206). Their paranoid fear, which
arises from their atomising egocentrism, makes them very dangerous. As for Lok, his
attraction  to  them is  so  strong  that  he  comes  to  identify  with  them  and  feel  how
‘“frightened and greedy”’ they are (97).
Despite  their  aggressiveness,  it  must  not  be  thought  that  the  New  People  are
incapable of compassion, that is, of unconditional love. In the last chapter of the novel,
where the focus shifts from the People to the New People, we witness Vivani’s motherly
affection for the New One, and Tuami’s surprise at finding out that the essential unity
of both species can be turned into an aesthetic object. As the New People sail away from
Lok, their leader Marlan, who insists on seeing the world round him as hostile, makes
‘stabbing motions at the mountains with his fingers’ (Golding 1955: 232). By his side,
Tuami whiles time away honing the blade of a knife with which he intends to kill him.
Something happens  next  to  Tuami  that  makes  him give  up his  murderous  desires.
Observing Vivani’s  play with the New One, it  dawns on Tuami that  ‘the frightened,
angry love’ between the woman and the abducted baby might provide ‘an answer’ to the
implicit question: how can fear and suffering be got rid of? (233). The affection that the
woman feels for the hairy baby exceeds rational explanation; but this does not prevent
it  from  being,  as  Tuami  suddenly  realises,  ‘a  password’  to  a  better  life  where  the
relations  among different  species  are  not  dominated  by aggression,  where  enemies
become friends, and where it is fraternity rather than violence that inspires the artist
(233). At the same time as Vivani shows her love for the New One, Tuami sees their
relationship as a source of beauty.52 If the knife that he feels under his hands matters,
he reflects, it is not because of the blade but because of the ‘shapeless lump’ of ivory
that he will turn into a carved haft (Golding 1955: 232). Tuami feels in his fingers how
Vivani and the baby are ‘waiting in the rough ivory of the knife-haft that [is] so much
more important than the blade’, not only because the haft can be turned into a work of
the end, their understanding of the events is likely to be, despite the delayed decoding, much
better than Lok’s.
52 This  example  of  how  compassion  can  become  an  aesthetic  object  recalls  the  artistic




art, but because this can be done by representing compassionate love, the only moral
impulse that, as he now realises, can counteract aggression (233).
If the ending of  The Inheritors adds the representation of beauty to compassion,
thus  offering  a  double  solution  —  aesthetic  as  well  as  moral  —  to  the  problem  of
violence,  Free  Fall goes  even  further,  blurring  the  limits  between  the  aesthetic
contemplation of beauty, compassion towards other human beings and the vision of the
whole  world’s  common essence.  In  the  scene where  he acquires  this  ‘new mode of
knowing’ that allows him to ‘see … through a brick wall’, that is, to pierce the physical
façade of the world (Golding 1959: 133), Sammy Mountjoy gains insight into the nature
of humankind and into the suffering to which everyone is exposed. Having undergone
Dr Halde’s psychological torture, Sammy suddenly sees his fellow prisoners, whom he
has just tried to betray, in a new light.53 This is the moment when Sammy undergoes
the conversion that justifies the writing of his autobiography. Sammy’s transformation
is a kind of new birth — to borrow an expression used by Schopenhauer to speak about
saintliness — or resurrection. Coming out of the interrogation room, Sammy feels like
‘a man resurrected’ (188). All of a sudden, the inmates, the trees and the mountains
53 His seeing them is accompanied by tears. It is not clear whether they are caused by the pain he
feels or by the pain that he sees in others.  What is clear though is that these tears — which
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor link, without further explanation, to the apprehension of the inner
kernel  of  the world  — call  back  to  mind  Schopenhauer’s claim that  saintly  vision,  which he
describes as the outcome of grace, has two possible sources. The first, occurring ‘only in the case
of  a  few’,  is  simply  the  spontaneous  apprehension  of  that  single  essence  that  underlies  all
appearances; but the second, the one that matters here, follows ‘the greatest personal suffering’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 392). Since Schopenhauer does not say why pain can turn a person into a
saint,  all  types  of  saintliness  are  presented  as  equally  mysterious.  His  failure  to  find  an
explanation does not prevent him from emphasising, as Christianity and other religions have
traditionally done, the ‘force of suffering’ as the most common source of sanctity (2000b: 348).
In this case, as in a few others, Schopenhauer’s model does not serve so much to explain the
elements included in Golding’s novels as to confirm their importance and to link them to other
elements in a suitable way. In Free Fall, the tears that Sammy sheds because of the intense pain
that he feels or sees in the others entail — like the pain that Schopenhauer links to saintliness —
giving up a certain way of being in the world, a lifestyle dominated by egocentrism and the search
for personal satisfaction at all costs. As usual with Golding’s characters, Sammy’s new frame of
mind involves being more alert to the others’ needs.
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that  surround the camp show a new face.  Sammy  finds himself  surrounded not by
‘unshaven, haggard’ soldiers but by the ‘kings of Egypt in their glory’ (186, 188).54 The
trees appear as ‘crowded shapes extending up into the air and down into the rich earth,
… aflame at the surface and daunting by right of their own nature’, while the mountains
reveal themselves to be ‘not only clear all through like purple glass, but living’ (186). As
the  accustomed  ‘paper  wrappings  of  use  and  language’  drop  from  him,  Sammy
discovers that everything is ‘related to everything else’ at a deeper level than that of
physical appearances, a level that whoever clings to denotative language can only find
‘indescribable’ (186–7). The experience of universal unity has an aesthetic dimension:
‘What had had the ugliness of frustration and dirt, I now saw to have a curious reversed
beauty’ (188). As in all cases of aesthetic contemplation, the transmutation of the object
is accompanied by a similar alteration in the subject: Sammy stands still, transformed
into  a  universal  subject  that  does  not  see  things  egocentrically,  that  is,  in  their
particularity and as means to satisfy his desires. For the first time in a very long time,
he feels as if he were ‘desiring nothing’, not willing to get what he wants at the cost of
the suffering of  others  (186).  Eventually  the  discovery  of  beauty  gives  way to  love.
Whereas egocentric cognition operates in such a way that aggression naturally results,
Sammy now feels — and the way in which he couches this feeling reverses Golding’s
own view of  why humans resemble bees,  thus challenging the novelist’s  pessimistic
outlook on life — his ‘transmuted’ heart ‘makes love as easy as a bee makes honey’
(188). This kind of love, if we are to believe Schopenhauer, is compassion, the impulse
where true moral  virtue lies  and which has nothing to  do with a  Kantian sense of
rational duty. The difference with Schopenhauer is that in Sammy’s case, as always in
Golding’s novels, saintly vision has nothing to do with the resigned withdrawal to which
the philosopher attributes the greatest value, but with the recognition of the dignity of
all conscious beings and the solidarity with sufferers.
Casting a retrospective glance on the episode, Sammy reasons that all these things
could be dealt with in two ways: ‘the one explained them away’ in a scientific manner
(as Nick Shales, his former science teacher, would do), while ‘the other accepted them
54 The apparently arbitrary reference to ancient Egypt has its explanation in Golding’s  habit  to
associate Egyptian culture with non-rational and metaphysical cognition, contrasting it with the




as … relevant to the nature of the cosmos’ (Golding 1959: 188). Giving up the outlook
that  he  has  inherited  from  his  teacher,  a  rationalistic  stance  that  is  blind  to  all
metaphysical considerations, he opts for the latter option. He accepts that the ‘wonder’
discovered in the Nazi camp involves ‘a kind of vital morality, … the relationship of
individual man to individual man — once an irrelevance but now seen to be the forge in
which all change, all value, all life is beaten into a good or a bad shape’ (189). This knew
knowledge, grounded in the virtuous feeling of compassion rather than in any rational
notion  of  duty,  nevertheless  means that  Sammy  can  no  longer  turn  his  back  on
suffering.
His mistreatment at the hands of Dr Halde leads Sammy to the realisation that the
pain that he has caused in the course of his life is the same kind of pain that the Nazis
are  inflicting  on  his  fellow prisoners  and on himself.  As  soon as  Sammy has  been
invaded by an  untoward feeling  of  compassion,  the  narrative’s  focus  shifts  back to
Great Britain. We are never told whether his new feelings for the other inmates were
followed by an effort to relieve their pain. What Sammy does tell us about is his new
perception of Beatrice, his former girlfriend, whose virtues — heretofore confused with
a ‘negative personality’ and an ‘absence of being’ or ‘vacuum’ — now are seen to include
being ‘simple and loving and generous and humble’ (Golding 1959: 191). Learning that
she has been confined in a mental institution resembling ‘a prison camp’ ever since he
jilted her (238), Sammy pays her a visit with the aim of atoning for his past behaviour
and, perhaps, of doing some good to her. Her reaction, however, is not at all what he
expects:  the  very  moment  she recognises  him,  she pisses  over her  skirt  and shoes.
Later, her doctor informs him that she will never be restored to normality. Insofar as
Sammy fails to undo, despite his good intentions, the wrong that he has done, we are
led  to  the  view  that,  for  Golding,  sometimes  compassion  and  the  readiness  to  act
altruistically are of little use. In a situation like this, the only thing that one can do is
learn to live with the memory of those that have been hurt, and try not to act in the
same way again.
Thanks  to  its  combination  of  aesthetic  contemplation  with  saintly  vision  and
compassion, the metaphysical insight that Sammy gains in the Nazi prison camp helps
him to abandon the way of life that brought so much suffering to Beatrice, but does not
take him beyond the limits of representation. However, Golding’s works remind us that
there is  a way in which we can escape from individuality and consciousness (hence
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suffering) forever. This way is death. For Schopenhauer death affords the long-awaited
‘deliverance’ from an existence that ‘presented itself to us as suffering’ (Schopenhauer
1969a: 408–9). In Golding’s novels death is also the most effective remedy for pain,
and for the same reasons: it allows us to escape the consciousness of suffering and to do
so for good. Therefore,  compared with aesthetic contemplation and with the saint’s
vision  and  compassionate  altruism,  death  has  the  advantage  —  in  Golding  as  in
Schopenhauer — of providing a more effective and permanent relief from an individual
existence that is too painful and too long.
Some of Golding’s characters see their lives and deaths as part and parcel of some
grand design that endows them with significance. This is indeed how Matty sees his
own existence, which is dominated by altruism and sacrifice, in Darkness Visible. This
does not mean, of course, that Matty is never tempted to act differently. The novel puts
a lot of emphasis on sexual desire (Mr Pedigree’s for young boys; Sim Goodchild’s for
young girls, including Sophy and Toni Stanhope; Sophy’s for their own father), and it is
undeniable, judging from his tendency to become infatuated with the women round
him, that perhaps not even Matty, whose character is mostly that of a saint, is totally
immune to the vicissitudes of sexuality. Nevertheless, it is not the gratification of his
sexual instinct but altruistic action that provides the standard of behaviour to which he
tries to live up. Not only does he stand out for his alertness to a dimension beyond
physical surfaces, the metaphysical realm, but he is willing to sacrifice his lives for the
benefit of other human beings. Like Simon’s in  Lord of the Flies,  Matty’s altruism is
rooted in a vision of the entire world’s common essence. These roots are emphasised on
several occasions. On one of them, already mentioned, he looks into a glass ball, and
what he finds there is  the loom where the threads of being are woven. As usual in
Golding,  Matty  is  not  content  with his  spontaneous feeling of  ‘the centre  of  things’
(Golding 1979: 91), but needs to transform that flash of insight into actions. Thanks to
Schopenhauer’s account of how the world’s inner essence gives rise to suffering in its
manifestations, and how the individual is tied to that kernel and to that suffering, we
can understand the reason why Matty feels this need: having caught a glimpse of what
the world is at bottom, he aspires to reduce the amount of pain that pervades it. He
does not revenge on a world that  has disfigured him and alienated him from other
human  beings.  What  he  does,  like  other  Golding  saints,  is  return  good  for  evil,
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preventing the outrageous suffering of a helpless child and thus making up, as far as
possible, for the ignominy that taints existence.
In their  attempt  to  kidnap  one  of  the  pupils  of  the  school  where  Matty  works,
Sophy’s accomplices detonate a number of bombs that set the building on fire. When
one of them tries to escape carrying a student wrapped in a blanket, he is stopped by a
‘fire-monster’  that  runs  out  of  the  garage  towards  him  (Golding  1979:  248).  The
monster is  Matty,  who has  been caught  in the fire  and who comes so close  to  the
kidnapper  as  to  frighten  him  and  make  him  drop  the  bundle.  Immediately  the
kidnapped boy frees himself and runs away. Matty jigs and whirls for a while, then falls
down and dies. Admittedly, it is hard to say whether Matty’s last act is intentional or
not.  If  it  is,  Matty’s  heroic  attempt  to  rescue  the  abducted  child  provides  a  good
illustration of Golding’s general emphasis on altruism as an active means of freeing the
world from suffering.
The  fact  that  Matty  is  burning  to  death  when he  rescues  the  abducted  child  is
significant: the terrorists’ bombs transform Matty into ‘a burnt offering’ (Golding 1979:
238). Throughout his life he has wondered about his identity, his nature, his purpose.
As he grows increasingly aware of practical issues, his original question,  Who am I?,
becomes What am I? and eventually ‘What am I for?’ (68). Convinced that his fate is
not in his hands, he comes to the conclusion that, since he has ended up working in a
school, the task for which he is destined has ‘something to do with children’ (100). As in
The Spire, it is not clear whether Matty’s destiny depends on God’s will, as he believes,
or not. What is  clear though is that his faith is  so strong that he is  ready to accept
whatever happens to him. Being in contact with schoolchildren makes him ‘more happy
than at any other time in his life’, simply because they seem to be ‘very interested’ in his
physical aspect and ‘not a bit frightened or horrified’ (100). However, this happiness
does not make him forget that, in the grand scheme of things, his life and his well-being
have very  little  importance.  His  death is  involuntary,  it  is  not  a  suicide;  but  Matty
accepts dying as a sacrificial victim because he believes that this is part of the divine
plan to which he has pledged obedience. This explains why, when he catches fire, he
does not seek the necessary help that might save his life but instead offers to rescue a
helpless child. Thus his death can be interpreted as the fulfilment of his life’s purpose
on two counts: because it is a sacrifice and because it is altruistic.
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Darkness Visible does not end with Matty’s heroic sacrifice but with Mr Pedigree’s
reluctance  to  die.  Golding’s  presentation  of  death  as  an  unavoidable  and  indeed
positive  conclusion  to  individual  life  helps  us  to  appreciate  the  magnitude  of  Mr
Pedigree’s error. The novelist says to Baker: ‘I hope devoutly that there is no survival
after death. I don’t wish to live with myself for eternity. Eternity is far, far too long’ (in
Baker 1982: 143). While he states that ‘to be endlessly extended is pointless’ (143), he
does not give a reasoned account of that pointlessness. To find an explanation, it  is
necessary to turn to Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
According to Schopenhauer, the existence of most living beings is characterised by a
constant attempt  to  escape death.  This  fear  arises  with the individualisation of  the
essential will.  When the essential will  endows itself  with an egocentric intellect, the
resulting individual cannot see that  his  or her desires are not so personal after  all.
However, what one needs and ambitions — be it money, knowledge or the wish to live
forever  —  is  rooted  in  one’s  innate  character,  that  is,  ultimately,  in  the  essential
yearning  that  underlies  the  whole  world.  Once  the  individuals  have  served  their
purpose, they are invariably sacrificed on the altar of death. The essential will can only
achieve gratification through the mediation of egocentric individuals, whose instinct of
self-preservation is  but  a  part  of  the  essential  will’s  general  tendency to  find  some
fulfilment;  but  egocentrism  prevents  those  individuals  from  realising  that  they  are
disposable, that their lives are too tainted by suffering to be worth living for a long time,
and that, in fact, death is a solution to that agony. For Schopenhauer, the acceptance of
death is a token of wisdom. Indeed, death is the moment of definitive ‘liberation from
…  individuality’  and  thus  from  pain  (Schopenhauer  1969b:  508).  Non-egocentric
modalities of consciousness like aesthetic contemplation, saintly vision and compassion
are a good preparation for death: a person whose egocentric ties to desire have been
‘burnt  up  and  consumed’  by  non-egocentric  cognition  will  no  longer  be  afraid  of
disappearing with death, and will in fact be content to die (609).
In this light, it can be argued that Mr Pedigree’s opposition to death stems — like
Pincher  Martin’s  —  from  his  limited  perspective  on  the  world:  like  Pincher,  Mr
Pedigree is unable to step out of the egocentric circle in which he stands. He is well
aware of the dangerous desires that dominate him, and he has come to understand that
everyone — each in their own way — is similarly caught in the wave-like rhythm of
those desires. ‘The thing they all want without knowing it’, he realises, may be ‘many
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things’; among those things he mentions money, power, knowledge and, of course, sex
(Golding 1979: 264). Even so, he falls short of grounding the inescapable influence of
those desires in an essence shared not only by all humans, but by inanimate things and
living beings alike. Just before dying, Mr Pedigree speculates that Matty might be ‘all
connected  with  everything  else’  (264).  This  view,  which  is  correct  but  incomplete,
indirectly shows the limitations of his perspective. Since he is looking at the world from
an egocentric standpoint, he does not realise that not only Matty, but everyone and
everything else, including himself, are connected below the disjointed surfaces around
which one’s daily life revolves.
Mr Pedigree has spent his sordid life pursuing his paedophiliac desires, which draw
an ‘anxious’ expression in his face (Golding 1979: 210). However, when he realises that
he is about to die, he rejects the chance to get rid of himself. Clutching the red ball that
he uses to attract small boys in the park, he cries: ‘“No!, No!, No!”’ (265). Like Pincher
Martin, he does not realise that the ‘terrible death of the self’ is actually the opportunity
to become ‘one-and-all’  with the rest of the world,  perhaps even with whatever lies
beyond  the  fathomable  world,  in  regions  that  remain  forever  unknown  (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 2002: 254). To avoid any possible confusion, the novelist does not
hesitate to tell us that, despite Mr Pedigree’s wish to go on living, death grants him
‘Freedom’ — freedom, that is, from his own individuality and from the demands that
the essential will imposes on his egocentric consciousness (Golding 1979: 265).
The last example of death that I would like to examine appears in the first volume of
the Sea Trilogy. Whatever his other defects, Reverend Colley realises the advantages
that the annihilation of selfhood has,  and does not hesitate to embrace it.  In some
respects, Colley’s attitude and conduct are the exact opposite of Mr Pedigree’s. Instead
of being aware of his own sexuality, Colley is naively blind to it: in the letter to his
sister, he describes how the sailors ‘go about their tasks, their bronze and manly forms
unclothed to the waist, their abundant locks gathered in a queue, their nether garments
closely fitted but flared about the ankles like the nostrils of a stallion’, without realising
how much the passage may reveal about his character (Golding 1991: 166). Instead of
remaining blind to the metaphysical side of all things, Colley often seems to revel in it:
in a passage that reminds us of Dean Jocelin’s folly, Colley records how, once in the
high sea, he offers up ‘a brief prayer’ for the ship’s safety ‘subject always to  HIS Will’
(165). Finally, instead of denying death, Colley throws himself into its arms.
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Of course, in other respects Colley and the old paedophile are two of a kind: as the
quotation  about  the  sailors  suggests,  the  parson’s  appetites  are  not  untainted  by
concupiscence,  and  his  inclination  is  for  young  men  rather  than  women.  Colley’s
admiration of men provides a crucial clue that cannot be overlooked when we study the
sequence of  events  leading to his  death.  They develop in two directions:  one is  his
estrangement from the crew and the other passengers; the other is his attraction to the
tanned sailors. The crossing the line ceremony brings both threads together: originally
designed as an initiation rite that could help Colley to ingratiate himself with the crew,
it ends with the parson’s engagement in oral sex with one of the shipmen.
Though his public humiliation by the ship’s captain turns him into ‘an object of
scorn and amusement’ not only to Talbot but to everyone aboard, Colley does not give
up hope of winning their hearts (Golding 1991: 183). Something similar happens when
he is forced to participate in the opening of the crossing the line ceremony. When he
surprises the sailors filling the badger bag — a tarpaulin awning — with stagnant sea
water and urine, he does not so much as suspect that he will soon have a bath in that
‘slippery paunch’ (209). The gruesome ritual that follows resembles the ceremony that
has traditionally served as an initiation rite among seamen, and whose purpose Golding
explains  to  Baker  in  these  terms:  ‘After  a  boy  had  been through that  he  was  then
accepted as a sailor’ (in Baker 1982: 161). Colley is no sailor, but to be admitted as a full
member into the ship’s society he must undergo this rite of passage nevertheless.
Because of what happens in the second part of the ceremony, when he is summoned
before King Neptune, Colley ‘fails to make the grade’ (Golding 1991: 161). The cause of
his failure lies in his infatuation to the King, who turns out to be no other than his
favourite shipman — his ‘particular hero’ (191). Colley likes him so much that in his
letter home he ingenuously confesses to have ‘yearned to kneel before him’ as a token of
appreciation (191). At first he is convinced that his heart’s ‘passionate longing’ is merely
‘to bring this young man to  OUR SAVIOUR’, but he soon has the occasion to find out his
real motivation (191). After the badger bag, Colley decides to come back to the deck in
order to ‘rebuke’ and bring repentance and reconciliation to the shipmen, whom he
calls  the ‘unruly but truly lovable children of  OUR MAKER’  (216).  He sees this as ‘the
happiest outcome of all [his] distress and difficulty’ (217); but his plan breaks down as
soon as he accedes to taste the sailors’ rum and, ‘helplessly drunk’, he not only urinates
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in front of  everyone but,  now out of  sight,  performs a fellatio on his admired King
(220).
When he comes into view again, Colley’s first reaction to this physical reconciliation
with his hero is of joyful exhilaration: ‘“Joy! Joy! Joy!”’, he exclaims flinging out his
arms ‘as if to embrace’ all round him (Golding 1991: 102). Only after he has returned to
his cabin and the effects of the rum have worn off does he realise what he has done.
Shut up in his cabin, he refuses to speak and to abandon his bunk. One of the officers,
Lieutenant Summers, says to Talbot that the parson is not only ‘“losing his wits”’ but
‘“willing  himself  to  death”’  (130,  134).  After  paying  him  a  reluctant  visit,  Talbot
surmises that, ‘in a passion of self-disgust’, the parson has surrendered to ‘a deepening
pain, deepening consciousness, widening memory, his whole being turning more and
more from the world’, and that in the end ‘he could desire nothing but death’ (137).
After  his  death,  Summers  shares  with  Talbot  the  conviction  that  ‘the  absolute
humiliation’ of his behaviour, and no other thing, has killed him (220).
Colley’s delicate position results directly from a failure to recognise his own desires.
Golding describes him to Baker as ‘a silly ass’ that is too ‘naive’ for his own good (in
Baker  1982:  164).  Not  only  has  he  ‘made  an  equatorial  fool  of  himself’,  as  Talbot
scornfully concludes; his infatuation to the young sailor, combined with a small amount
of liqueur, have sufficed to bring him ‘from the heights of complacent austerity to what
his sobering mind must have felt as the lowest hell of degradation’ (Golding 1991: 244).
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor describe Colley as ‘a man of desperate extremes, viewing
himself passionately in one way, then being forced to see himself intolerably in another,
torn apart by contradiction and shame that can be resolved by willing himself to die’
(2002: 269). For the young parson the shock of discovering his own sensuality proves
too painful to endure, and the only solution that occurs to him is to put an end to his
life as soon as possible.55
55 The desire to die brought about by extreme humiliation sets Colley’s death apart from Matty’s
and Mr Pedigree’s, but foreshadows the death of Ionides, the conceited High Priest of the temple
of Apollo, in The Double Tongue. Ionides is arrested for plotting against the Romans, and though
they show the utmost respect towards him, the whole affair — above all his unexpected liberation
— fills him with unbearable shame. When he returns to the temple, he tells Arieka about the
explanation of Roman power that Lucius Galba, the Roman governor of southern Greece, has
offered him: Rome robs conquered people ‘of their dignity’  (Golding 1995: 162). Immediately
284
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
At this point,  Colley’s  gesture raises an important question. As a solution to the
suffering caused by egocentrism, it is deeply ambivalent, at least from the perspective
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As Wicks explains, sometimes ‘a person kills himself or
herself  to avoid some present or anticipated pain’,  the suicide’s  motivation being ‘a
basic assumption that life would have been embraced, had pleasure been anticipated
rather than pain’ (2008: 129). When I examined Schopenhauer’s treatment of death, I
pointed out that for him a person’s suicide is not at odds with the will to life, but rather
an affirmation thereof. Schopenhauer regards voluntary death as a symptom of egoism,
distinguishing  it  from  the  deaths  for  which  the  individual  has  no  responsibility
whatsoever  and  from those  that  are  motivated  by  compassionate  love.  Despite  his
flirtations with the metaphysical realm, then, Colley’s death may prove that he is an
egoist who can neither accept his repressed sexual tendencies nor stand the pain that
he has brought upon himself. For the parson, as for other Golding characters, death is a
liberation from suffering. There is no doubt about that. But if this extreme liberation is
egoistic,  then  it  must  be  regarded  —  unlike  Simon’s  and  Matty’s  altruistic  deaths,
however limited their palliative effects may be — as a poor solution to the suffering that
egoism has contributed to create.
3.1.3.2. Collective Remedies: Moral and Legal Repression
Having analysed the ways in which isolated individuals can act against suffering,  we
can proceed to analyse the social measures that can be taken to prevent violence and to
reduce the chronic  pain that  ails  humans.  In The Inheritors,  morality  prevents  the
People from behaving violently; indeed, the People’s contrast with the New People can
be understood in moral terms. In  Lord of the Flies, legal repression is also necessary
because morality alone is not enough to hold society together. According to Golding,
Jack, like any person that fulfils his desires in violent ways, should become a police
officer (more specifically, a member of the riot squad) or even a hangman. Given his
defence  of  democratic  values,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  for  Golding,  as  for
after this revelation,  Ionides is  overcome by ‘a silliness  without any wisdom in it’  (164),  and
begins to slide into an imagined corner where he can ‘hide, … draw into and away from himself,
his shame’, a quiet place ‘where at last there is the peace of … nothingness’ (163).
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Schopenhauer, this use of (the threat of) suffering is only legitimate when it serves to
prevent a greater suffering. This means that, in becoming a police officer, Jack could
cause as much harm as he wanted, but always with within the limits of the law, which
must sometimes exert a certain amount of pain to prevent even greater suffering.
Golding’s view of society is based on the belief that its functioning depends on the
nature of its members: ‘society is the product of the people’, he says to Biles, and so
‘society is what men are’ (in Biles 1970: 46, 45). The reason why he decides to write
Lord of the Flies is precisely to illustrate this idea. The moral of the novel, he states, is
that ‘the shape of a society must depend on the ethical nature of the individual’, and its
whole plot is ‘an attempt to trace the defects of society back to the defects of human
nature’ (cited in Epstein 1988: 299). The natural roots of all social problems explain
why in Lord of the Flies it is not only among the children but also, to begin with, among
the adults — and on a bigger scale — that war has broken out. In the end, then, adult
life is not as ‘dignified and capable’ as it would seem to be, but ‘in reality enmeshed in
the same evil as the … children on the island’ (cited in Epstein 1988: 299). Of all the
possible opinions that a worldwide war may give rise to, Golding’s is one of the most
negative. Even if the British officer that the children meet on the beach has ‘interrupted
a manhunt’,  nothing good can come from the conflagration in which he is involved;
even if the adults’ war were, like the Second World War, a war against totalitarianism,
this is not enough to justify the violence that ensues. Thus, says Golding, the point of
the novel’s ending is that the cruiser in which the naval officer presumably intends to
take  the  children  off  the  island  ‘will  presently  be  hunting  its  enemy  in  the  same
implacable way’ as Jack and his hunters have tried to hunt Ralph (cited in Epstein
1988: 299). The aim of the scene, therefore, is to make the reader wonder: after they
have rescued the children, ‘who will rescue the adult and his cruiser?’ (cited in Epstein
1988: 299). For Golding the answer is obvious: no one.
Like Schopenhauer, Golding believes that an ideal state could only be created if it
was possible to produce individuals whose nature permitted them to sacrifice their own
well-being to public welfare. Though as a rule Schopenhauer states that it is impossible
to understand why a person has a certain innate character (a claim that is consistent
with his belief that it is impossible to say why the essential will is as he says that it is),
sometimes he comes close to a genetic explanation, arguing that utopia could only be
‘attained  on  the  path  of  generation  by  a  union  between  the  noblest  men  and  the
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cleverest  and most  brilliant  women’  (Schopenhauer  2000b:  256).  This  perfect  state
ought to be composed of ‘beings whose nature permits them generally to sacrifice their
own good to that of the public’ (1969a: 343). Sometimes Golding comes close to this
position, as this quotation shows:
we  have  had  australopithecus,  homo  habilis,  homo  neanderthalensis,  Mousterian  man,
Cromagnon Man, homo sapiens — has nature done with us? Surely we can search that capacious
sleeve and find something a bit better! … We must produce homo moralis, the human being who
cannot kill his own kind, nor exploit them nor rob them (Golding 1984a: 184).
In  Schopenhauer’s  terms,  the  only  disposition  that  is  worthy  of  moral  praise  is
compassion.  This  means  that,  from Schopenhauer’s  point  of  view,  Golding’s  moral
people could never be egoistic individuals, even if they could find the way of fulfilling
their needs and desires without hurting the others. This is clear when Golding adds that
‘With good people, loving, co-operative, unselfish people, any social system will work’
(Golding  1984a:  184).  Since  he  maintains  that  by  nature  most  people  are
predominantly egoistic and even malignant, and in these moral people to which he now
refers compassion and altruism prevail, it is difficult to see how their loving, unselfish
dispositions could be secured except through eugenics.
Since the eugenic solution would only work in the long term, ans since it would
perhaps be impossible to begin with, Golding suggests that interim solutions should be
found for the short term. Given that the prevalence of egocentric frames of mind results
in a preponderance of egoistic and malignant desires (and thus, very frequently, in evil
actions), it cannot be excepted that the good feelings of a few people alone will provide
an  adequate  basis  for  social  organisation.  Compassion  is  the  only  motivation  that
Schopenhauer’s moral theory finds praiseworthy; but given its exceptionality, and the
fact that it cannot be imposed artificially, a more effective solution is needed. In this
situation, Schopenhauer asks, what can be more effective than basing social order on
the majority’s egoism? As we saw in the presentation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the
protection that the state offers does not attack egoism but takes advantage of it (see
Schopenhauer 1969a: 345). The state, then, relies on the rational egoism of the majority
(see  Schopenhauer  2009:  188). Golding’s  position  seems  to  rest  on  the  same
assumptions, as he agrees with Schopenhauer in proposing moral and legal repression
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as the solutions to the worst kinds of suffering. Unlike moral prescriptions, which go
against all actions — whether intentional or not — that cause the others pain, that is,
against all evil actions, legal prescriptions threat to inflict a certain amount of pain to
prevent even greater suffering; the law, therefore, does not so much seek to eliminate
suffering completely as to minimise it through the exertion of the minimum amount of
violence. Apart from this, everything suggests that for Golding, as for Schopenhauer,
neither morality nor the law can alter our innate character, but they can change  our
conduct insofar as they impose a careful selection of the objects by means of which we
can satisfy our appetites.
From  Schopenhauer’s  perspective,  it  is  easy  to  explain  why  the  legal  threat  of
sanctions appeals to the individual’s egoism: I comply with the law only because I want
to  preserve  my well-being.  In  the  case  of  moral  prescriptions,  the  ground  of  their
effectiveness is egoism too: I comply with moral prescriptions because I do not want to
suffer the pangs of conscience. The problem is to explain how moral conscience appears
in the first place. It can be argued that, though moral sanctions no longer need to be
associated with external disciplinary measures, they have originated in the threat of
punitive  measures.  Schopenhauer  never  says  that  this  is  the  case,  but according to
Freud  the  genesis  of  moral  conscience  is  a  two-stage  process:  first  comes  the
renunciation of our potentially dangerous intentions ‘owing to fear of aggression by the
external authority’,  and  then  comes  ‘the  erection  of  an  internal authority’  and the
renunciation of those intentions ‘owing to fear of conscience’ (Freud 1995: 759). In a
nutshell:  ‘The  aggressiveness  of  conscience  keeps  up  the  aggressiveness  of  the
authority’  (759).  Freud’s  account  is  useful  for  us  because  it  throws  light  on  the
relationship between morality and egoism in Golding’s novels, and because it does so
without contradicting Schopenhauer’s understanding of morality and legality.
3.1.3.2.1. Moral Repression in The Inheritors
The conflict between the People and the New People in The Inheritors can be explained
in two different ways: either as the clash between different innate characters or as the
clash between two groups that exercise moral repression more or less effectively, the
former  being,  paradoxically,  the  apparently  more  primitive  People.  In  contrast  to
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previous readings of the The Inheritors — and to Golding’s sporadic comments thereon
— I shall interpret the differences between the People and the New People not so much
in terms of nature as of culture, not of biology but of social and moral rules. My reading
will therefore focus not only on the quantitative differences in their natures but also in
the qualitative differences in their conceptions of society.
The  general  trend  among  previous  critics  of  the  novel has  been  to  analyse  in
qualitative  terms  the  contrast  between  the  meek  People  and  the  conquering  New
People — a race whose physical and intellectual features seem to be exactly the same as
ours, and whose mentality and social organisation also have many features in common
with  ours.  In  his  ground-breaking  stylistic  analysis  of  the  contrasting  mind-styles
associated with each group, Michael A.K. Halliday argues that the People’s and the New
People’s mentalities are completely different. For him, these differences have to do with
the People’s peculiar intellectual configuration:
At first, and for more than nine-tenths of the book … we share the life of the people and their
view of the world,  and also their view of the [New People’s]  tribe:  for a long passage … the
account of their doings is confined within the limits of Lok’s understanding, requiring at times a
considerable effort of ‘interpretation’. At the very end … the standpoint shifts to … that of the
[New  People’s]  tribe,  the  inheritors,  and  the  world  becomes  recognizable  as  our  own,  or
something very like it (Halliday 1971: 348).
Halliday attributes this difference to the fact that, in those passages that describe the
People’s actions, thoughts and language, ‘there is no cause and effect’ (Halliday 1971:
353). The People ‘do not act on the things around them; they act within the limitations
imposed by the things’ (354).
A  similar  difference  has  been  signalled  by  other  critics,  in  whose  opinion  it
conditions the People’s relationship with their environment. Since they do not employ
expressions like with which or by means of, they are allegedly devoid of instrumental
reason (see  Nelson 1986:  307 ff.).  Therefore,  the  People  ‘cannot  gain  mastery  over
nature’, and ‘they will always be controlled by chance and by their environment’ (Boyd
1988: 38). By contrast, the New People ‘will go to any lengths … in order to get on, to
gain control of the world’, an impulse that includes the ambition to ‘gain ascendancy
over other creatures’ inside and outside the group (39).
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According  to  this  line  of  interpretation,  the  intellectual  differences  have  direct
moral effects.  After observing that ‘it is generally the self-seeking, the aggressive, the
ambitious and the ruthless who gain and hold earthly power’, Boyd notes that in The
Inheritors ‘the meek and gentle’ People are murdered by the New People, ‘who possess
the monstrous and brutal qualities of ruthlessness and self-interest which will enable
them to survive’  (Boyd 1988: 24). Translating Boyd’s comments into the terms that I
have been using so far, it can be said that the New People prevail over the People not
simply  because  they  are  rational  but  also  because  they  are  egoistic,  perhaps  even
malignant.
Unfortunately,  this  sharp  separation  between  the  obtuse,  meek  People  and  the
ingenious,  destructive  New  People  is  unconvincing.  It  is  true  that  the  differences
between the styles through which the People’s and the New People’s consciousness are
presented are immediately noticeable. As recent stylistic analyses show, the language
associated with the People relies on ‘short, simple sentences’; it refers to ‘body parts
and inanimate  objects  as  agents,  and as  subjects  of  mental  process  and perception
verbs,  and  [of]  intransitive  verbs  of  motion’;  it  presents  ‘inanimate  objects  with
attributes  normally  associated  with  animate  beings’;  it  comprises  ‘a  small,
concentrated, peculiarly distributed vocabulary of short words’,  a high proportion of
which are ‘concrete, physical nouns and verbs’ used repeatedly; it lacks ‘words referring
to modern cultural phenomena and activities’ and instead uses ‘natural object words …
to refer to artifacts’ (Clark 2009: 190). But those same analyses prove that ‘it is not true
that the Neanderthal world as a whole lacks cause and effect, nor that the people cannot
act  as  agents  in  their  world,  as  Halliday  claims’  (cited  in  Clark  2009:  189).  Two
passages will illustrate this point. When Fa remembers the New One sleeping on her
back, we are told that ‘She did not fear that he would fall  because she felt his hands
gripping her hair at the neck and his feet holding the hair farther down her neck but she
trotted softly  so that he should not wake’; and when the People find that the log that
they have always used to cross a nearby stream has disappeared, we are told that Ha
‘had thought that he must make sure the log was still in position because if the water
had taken the log … then the people would have to trek a day’s  journey round the
swamp and that meant danger’ (Golding 1955: 12, 14; my italics). The People are just as
able to establish cause-and effect connections as the New People.
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To  be  sure,  from  Schopenhauer’s  point  of  view,  the  ability  to  establish  causal
connections would not itself be a token of rationality: insofar as they are egocentric, all
conscious  beings  —  whether  human  or  not  —  perceive  the  world  in  causal  terms.
Therefore, it can be assumed that in The Inheritors the hyenas with which the People
are occasionally forced to compete for dead meat are not rational, yet they impose on
the world the same causality as the People — and as the New People, for that matter.
Actually,  Schopenhauer would say that for the hyenas the world has the same basic
temporal, spatial and causal characteristics as for the People and the New People. Thus,
causality  alone  would  not  take  neither  the  People  nor  the  New People  beyond the
sphere of non-rational feeling.
It  is  certainly  true  that  the  People’s  consciousness  relies  more  on  non-rational
feelings — pictures, as they are called in the novel — than on rational concepts, and Lok
sometimes can find ‘no words’ to ‘formulate’ his feelings (Golding 1955: 78). For the
most part, they do ‘not need to speak’ to communicate with each other, because they
can share their feelings in other ways (12).  However, the People do resort to words
when they want to express particularly complex thoughts, for example when Fa asks a
question of Ha and he answers her ‘with his mouth’ (13), or when, trying to tell Lok
what has happened to the other member’s of the People, we are told how ‘Fa pressed
her hands on her head and gave her pictures words’ (114). Another token of rationality
is their awareness of the pastness of the past and of the futureness of the future, and
their creative representation of alternative states of affairs. Liku has a toy, a woman-
shaped root that they identify with the mother goddess Oa, and the Old man repeats the
mythical  narratives  composed  by  their  ancestors  to  explain  their  and  the  world’s
history. They use stones to cut branches, boil meat in water to make a broth that serves
as  a  medicine.  They  can  make  discoveries  that  go  beyond  their  own  and the  New
People’s  stage of  development,  as  proved by Fa’s  idea of  growing plants  instead  of
gathering them (if Fa’s idea is not implemented it is because of the Old Woman’s fear of
that kind of innovation, and because she is killed soon afterwards). They can devise
strategies to snatch Liku and the New One form their captors. When the Old Man dies
and Lok becomes the male leader of the group, even he, who until this moment has
proved less  than bright,  ends  up describing the New People  by  means  of  arresting
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similes. Moreover, the People can also resort to aggression, as proved by the way in
which Lok and Fa fight to rescue Liku and the New One.56
As far as the New People are concerned, they are just as capable of non-rational
feelings, including that of compassion, as their foes. They can feel,  for example, the
beauty of objects,  as  Tuami’s aesthetic  insight at  the end of  the novel  shows; more
generally, they cannot but be able to have the feelings on which their rational concepts
rest.  Moreover,  they  can  be  loving  and  tender  as  well,  as  illustrated  by  Vivani’s
motherly play with the New One, and they collaborate in the activities of exploring and
sailing.
As shown by their intellectual powers and their  moral dispositions, the respective
natures of the People and the New People are not so different: the People are rational
beings, and to some extent they are egoistical beings too; like the New People, they can
be creative as well as destructive. Why then is the impression that we get from them so
different? In part because of their lack of advanced tools and their reliance on concepts
that may strike us as primitive in comparison with the New People’s (let alone with
ours). In part because they do not resort to violence until they are attacked by the New
People. In part, as we shall presently see, because of the contrasting ways in which both
groups understand social organisation and government, on the one hand, and moral
rules, on the other.
As regards the way in which they are organised as a group, the qualitative difference
is  that  the  People  are  not  ruled  by  a  man alone,  but  by  a  man and a  woman.  As
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor note, among the New People the relationships between
men and women are strictly determined by dominance and subordination: ‘The society
56 In doing so Fa and Lok are merely exercising their right to self-defence, which is itself a token of
egoism. In Schopenhauer, this right is founded on the idea that, if we want to preserve our well-
being, ‘we are under no obligation to endure wrongs at the hands of others, such that we are
entitled to use force or cunning in order to repel any attempt to wrong us’ (Jordan 2009: 173).
Therefore, ‘if the will of another denies my will, as this appears in my body and in the use of its
powers for its preservation … then I can compel it [i.e.  the other will] … to desist  from this
denial’; and so ‘I have a right to deny that other person’s denial with what force is necessary to
suppress it; and … this may extend even to the killing of the other person whose encroachment as
pressing external violence can be warded off with a counteraction somewhat stronger than this’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 340). This is the only exception to the state’s monopoly of lawful violence.
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[of  the New People]  is  wholly  man-directed and the women are inferior’,  while  the
People see both sexes as ‘equally precious’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 76). The
New People have a single chief, Marlan, who acts both as the priest of the stag-centred
religion and as their guide in secular affairs. By contrast, the People’s men and women
are equals, and the group has two leaders: the Old Man, who decides on such matters as
when they must migrate from the coast to the inland forest, and the Old Woman, who
holds  the secrets  of  a  religious  creed centred on the  mother  goddess  Oa.  As  Janet
Burroway points out, the distribution of male and female roles is not hierarchical: as a
result of dividing their tasks according to ‘a “separate but equal” role-assignment’, the
Old Man has secular authority and the Old Woman has religious authority (Burroway
1981:  65).  ‘Each  accepts  the  other’s  authority  in  these  spheres,  and  there  is  no
cowardice either in man’s trembling before Oa or in a woman’s submission in a task’
(65).57 This division of roles is respected until the Old Man’s falls ill and dies; in the
absence of a male with the necessary experience, the Old Woman begins to take on new
responsibilities.
The New People’s religion and government are based on Marlan’s authoritarianism
and his subordinates’ fear. In contrast to the Old Man and the Old Woman’s traditional
authority, Marlan’s power depends on the force of violence, constraint (mainly in the
form of sanctions) and manipulation. This is one of the reasons why the New People’s
hierarchical organisation — only reluctantly accepted by the subordinates — is always
in danger of being overthrown, whereas the New People never question the legitimacy
of the Old Man and the Old Woman’s authority.
Apart from the division of power within the People, which disappears as soon as
Lok and Fa are left alone after the Old Man and the Old Woman’s deaths, the other
qualitative  difference  between  the  two  groups  —  one  which  is  of  even  greater
consequence — has to do with the moral rules that they follow. In this respect, the clue
lies  in  an  apparently  trivial  episode  that  precedes  Lok  and Fa’s  attack  to  the  New
People. Prior to attempting to save the New One, they get drunk with the New People’s
57 A similar division of power is later found in ‘Clonk, Clonk’, one of the short stories collected in
The Scorpion God (1971) and in  The Double Tongue (1995). In all of these cases social life is
directed by  the  ‘patriarchal  government’  and  the  ‘matriarchal  religion’  (Kinkead-Weekes  and
Gregor 2002: 58). Translating these into the terminology that we have been using here, we can
speak of the physical authority of men and the metaphysical authority of women.
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mead, and suddenly start ‘pulling and shouting at each other’ in a ‘loud and savage’ way
(Golding 1955: 201). Lok feels ‘furiously angry’, but he also feels that he has ‘the power
of the new people in him’, as if he were ‘one of them’ (201, 202). After striking Fa with a
stick, as he has seen the New People do with Liku, he suddenly becomes ‘frightened’
(203). Before falling asleep, it occurs to him that ‘Fa must cut off his finger’ (204). The
idea is not original either, as it repeats one of the sacrificial rituals of the People’s which
Lok and Fa have just witnessed. The episode corroborates the view that, as far as their
capacity for evil is concerned, the People and the New People are not so different after
all. Though it is tempting to argue that Lok’s behaviour here is triggered by a dangerous
combination of alcohol and a proneness to imitation, it is clear that to act in that way
something apart from alcohol must have made that imitation possible. Why is it that
other Golding characters such as Simon never resort to violence?, and why is it that Lok
has so far refrained from it? The answer to these questions is that Lok is by no means as
compassionate as Simon, and that he usually appears to be more compassionate than
he really is because of the moral rules that he normally complies with.
I would argue that alcohol has awakened the potentialities that lay dormant in Lok,
but it would be more accurate to say that it has merely relaxed the curbs that prevented
those  potentialities  from  coming  to  light.  This  would  indicate  that  the  difference
between both groups lies in the People’s choice of objects to satisfy their desires. The
People are not only used to following their compassionate feelings — even at their own
peril, as when Lok feels irresistibly attracted to the New People and runs to greet them
— but also to controlling their egoism and malice so that they will not be a threat to
anyone. They prefer, for example, not to eat meat except from dead animals: if they do
not hurt the animals themselves ‘there is no blame’ in using their carcasses (Golding
1955:  37).  Within  their  group,  they  always  prefer  collaboration  over  competition,
though they could well do otherwise. Finally, they prefer a strict separation between
masculine and feminine roles, but only because there is a rule in this respect, and when
Fa proposes that Lok should go and find out who the New People are, the Old Woman
chides her for taking on the masculine role of planning actions: ‘“A woman for Oa and a
man for the pictures in his head. Let Lok speak”’ (70). It is these and the New People’s
contrary  preferences,  dictated  by  pre-existing  rules,  that  explain  the  divergences
between their  respective  behaviours,  rather  than the alleged  distance between their
intellectual and moral natures.
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The People’s choices show that they obey strict moral principles, and the description
of  the  Old  Man  and  the  Old  Woman  as  figures  of  authority  shows  where  moral
repression comes from. The People’s  two leaders  are portrayed as having ‘a remote
stillness’ in them that leaves the other member of the People ‘humble and abashed’;
they are ‘loved’ as well as ‘dreaded’, but always ‘without fear’ (Golding 1955: 109). The
love that the others feel for them is not without relevance: love also plays a crucial role
in  Freud’s  conception  of  morality.  Freud’s  starting  point  is  the  condition  of
‘helplessness and dependence upon others’ in which human beings find themselves,
especially in their childhood; in such a state, one tries to avoid whatever the others may
find reprehensible or punishable, in other words, ‘whatever causes one to be threatened
with loss of love’ (Freud 1995: 757). Loosing the other’s love would threaten one’s well-
being:
If he loses the love of another person upon whom he is dependent, he also ceases to be protected
from a variety of dangers. Above all, he is exposed to the danger that this stronger person will
show his superiority in the form of punishment (Freud 1995: 757).
This account of morality is based on what Schopenhauer calls egoism. The function of
moral regulations is to dissuade people from acting in such a way that someone else
may get harmed. This is applies even to predominantly malignant beings, who take the
greatest pleasure in harming others: even in them there must be a certain amount of
egoism (as is clear from the fact that they too strive to satisfy their basic physiological
needs), and it is to this that morality appeals.
The younger members of the People do not fear the Old Man and the Old Woman in
the same way as Marlan is feared by the rest of the New People. The old couple do not
employ manipulation to get what they want; they do not threat the rest of their family
with violence, nor with the promise of material rewards and physical sanctions. In the
last instance, Lok, Fa and the others fear losing the old couple’s love and being unable
to face the challenge of survival without them. And it is the group’s moral sense, rooted
295
Golding’s Metaphysics
in the love and reverential respect that the other members feel for their elders, that
prevents them from harming each other and keeps the group together.58
In  contrast  to  the  People,  who  believe  that  community  is  foremost  and  the
individual comes second, the members of the New People are fiercely individualistic.
They are alienated from each other and from the rest of the world. When the People
discover them they are encamped on an island, guarding themselves against the world
across the water. This is why Boyd has described the New People as the ‘island people’,
a collection of individuals ‘cut off  by mistrust,  fear and aggression from nature and
from one another’; contrary to what John Donne thought possible, but in line with the
extreme isolation seen in  Pincher Martin, within their group ‘each man is an island’
that  sees  everything  and  anyone  else  as  a  threat  (Boyd  1988:  35).  Among  them
competition and aggression often proves to be stronger than collaboration.
The People’s morality results in a very different behaviour: everything seems to be
permitted as long as it is not detrimental to the group or to any of its members. They
are dominated by a striking sense of togetherness, mutual dependence and solidarity.
As Lok says, ‘“People understand each other”’ (Golding 1955: 72). Before his encounter
with the New People, Lok has no doubts that he is ‘one of the people, tied to them with
a thousand invisible strings’ (104). This attachment to his family changes due to his
contact with the newcomers: when Lok smells and hears the New People in the forest,
he is suddenly seized with terror because he feels ‘cut off and no longer one of the
people’, as if his identification with the strangers ‘had changed him’ and now ‘he was
different’  from  his  relatives  (78).  The  further  he  moves  away  from the  People  the
stronger his feeling is that the strings that bind him to them are ‘not the ornament of
life but its substance’, such that ‘If they broke, a man would die’ (78). As he discovers
after all of his relatives have been killed,  ‘“It is bad to be alone. It is very bad to be
58 In his reading of  The Inheritors (see Sugimura 2008), Yasunori Sugimura relates the evocative
language and the social organisation associated with the People to Julia Kristeva’s semiotic mode
of representation, which is predominantly feminine and communal, and the language and the
social  organisation  associated  with  the  New  People  to  the  predominantly  masculine  and
individualistic  symbolic mode (see Kristeva 1986: 92). This kind of analysis can be developed
into a more general examination of Golding’s oeuvre along feminist lines. In the Conclusion I
point out some points that such an examination could deal with.
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alone”’ (196). Returning to the cave where his ancestors are buried, he lies down and
lets himself die. As he has always suspected, loneliness leads directly to death.
3.1.3.2.2. Moral and Legal Repression in Lord of the Flies
We have seen that, for Golding, the only realistic solutions to violence and suffering
that society can offer are morality and legality. We have also seen Freud’s view that the
respect for moral rules within a group is rooted in egoism. This section will deal with
the disastrous consequences that a relaxation of moral standards has in  Lord of the
Flies, and with Golding’s defence of legal repression.
In  his  interview  with  Keating,  Golding  confirms  both  the  importance  of  moral
prescriptions and its possible ineffectiveness: ‘I think that … attitude of voluntary curbs
put on one’s own nature is the only possible way for humanity’; nevertheless, since it is
impossible to know whether ‘an adult society … can put sufficient curbs on our own
natures to prevent it from breaking down’, it is impossible ‘to say that it’s going to work
out, or survive’ (in Keating 1988: 211).
One striking example of such failure of morality is the way in which the children’s
society collapses in Lord of the Flies. At first, the children take it for granted that decent
English people are immune from the evil to which the rest of people are prone. Not only
are the few rules that they lay to organise themselves insufficient to prevent aggression,
but the norms are rendered ineffective by the boys’ failure to establish the appropriate
repressive mechanisms to enforce them. The castaways must rely only on their own
moral resources to control the satisfaction of their desires, yet without adult authority
the repressive power of their conscience soon wears away.
The island where the action of  Lord of the Flies is staged is a tropical paradise:
‘Flower  and fruit  grew together  on the same tree  and everywhere was the scent of
ripeness and the booming of a million bees at pasture’ (Golding 1954: 55). If it becomes
a hellish place it is because of the children’s lack of restraint. This change does not
occur all of a sudden, but as a process of gradual degeneration. At the beginning of the
novel, the children can still feel the influence of adult morality. When he and Roger
destroy the little ones’ sandcastles on the beach, the narrator tells us how, ‘though there
was no parent to let  fall  a heavy hand, Maurice still  felt  the unease of wrongdoing’
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(Golding 1954: 59). Similarly, when Roger starts throwing stones at another boy, he
misses him on purpose because his arm is ‘conditioned by … civilization’ (61). As we
know, Roger eventually becomes the hunters’ torturer and executioner. His evolution is
bound up with Jack’s. Though at first Jack does not hide his enthusiasm about norms,
suggesting that they should have ‘“Lots of rules”’ (32), he is the first to violate them
when he discovers that killing pigs with his hunters is more entertaining than keeping
the fire. When Ralph reminds him of the rules, he exclaims: ‘“Bollocks the rules! We’re
strong — we hunt!”’ (92). After this, things can only go downhill. The community splits
into two groups — the bloodthirsty hunters and those that strive to maintain the adults’
standards of civilisation. As the story develops, the latter are hunted down one by one.
This kind of killing — so Golding’s argument goes — takes places when there is no one
around to ‘implement’ the law and to punish those who flout it (in Keating 1988: 211).
The  outcome  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  Schopenhauer’s  picture  of  what
human life would be without an adequate legislation enforced by the state:
At bottom, man is a hideous wild beast. We know him only as bridled and tamed, a state that is
called civilization; and so we are shocked by the occasional outbursts of his nature. But when and
where the padlock and chain of law and order and once removed and anarchy occurs, he then
shows himself to be what he is (Schopenhauer 2000b: 211).
It is because there is a state, founded on a collective desire the minimise violence and
suffering, that ‘the boundless egoism of almost all, the malice of many’ does not lead to
harmful actions: ‘compulsion has bound all’ (Schopenhauer 2009: 188). So great is the
illusion of meekness created by the influence of the state that when it is broken we can
hardly believe the consequences:
in individual cases where the power of the state is unable to protect or is evaded, and we see the
insatiable greed, … the spiteful malice of human beings appearing, we often recoil in horror and
raise a hue and cry, thinking we have been attacked by a monster never before seen; but without
the compulsion of laws and the necessity of civil honour such occurrences would be the order of
the day. You have to read crime stories and descriptions of states of anarchy to recognize what, in
a moral respect, the human being really is. The thousands that swarm around one another before
our eyes in peaceful intercourse should be regarded as just so many tigers and wolves whose bite
is made safe by a strong muzzle. So if we think of the power of the state being removed, i.e. that
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muzzle being thrown off, anyone with insight recoils trembling before the scene that we could
then expect (Schopenhauer 2009: 188).
Schopenhauer  believes  that  the  law  is  necessary  because  the  moral  appeal  to
‘conscience’  has  ‘little  effect’  on  most  people’s  conduct  (Schopenhauer  2009:  188).
Golding  is  of  the  same opinion.  Being  questioned about  the violent  conduct  of  the
hunters in Lord of the Flies, he says to Keating that ‘if you don’t curb yourself, then this
is what will happen to you’ (in Keating 1988: 212). He believes that the collapse of the
children’s society results from humankind’s natural tendencies, but he suggests that ‘it
is possible society will not break down’ if we keep our nature under strict control (211).
Sometimes  this  control  consists  in  offering  individuals  alternative  ways  of  fulfilling
their desires. In this respect, what Golding says to Biles about Jack, whom he presents
as  the  paradigm  of  sadistic  malice,  could  be  equally  applied  to  Roger  or  to  any
malignant character in his other novels: ‘If you can give a boy a box of paints and if he
does go along with the box of paints, instead of smashing shopwindows he will paint
pictures. You have diverted him’ (in Biles 1970: 48). This diversion can be in the form
of moral prescriptions, but Golding immediately shifts from morality to legality. If one
writes out rules for children, he says, ‘they will abide by the rules, provided the rules
give  them,  perhaps,  authority’;  and  if  children  are  induced  to  satisfy  their  desires
‘legally, that is a triumph for everybody’ (48). It is thus that even the evil behaviour of
‘pathological  killers’  can be ‘canalized in a good direction or,  at  least,  in a possible
direction, after all’ (47). In this way ‘the hangman can be integrated into society’ (48).
In Jack and Roger’s case, Golding says that they could become police officers, members
of the riot squad: ‘you give a cop with sadistic views a club and you give him laws to go
by, and he will become a good member of society instead of a bad one’ (46). According
to Schopenhauer’s moral theory, the malignant desires of sadistic policemen would still
be morally reprehensible. However, what matters to Golding is that — in a democratic
system at least — their actions would be under strict legal control and at the service of a
greater good.
Society  can  put  limits  to  the  infliction  of  pain  by  allowing  sadists  to  apply  the
physical punishments contemplated by the law. This implies the need to admit that
criminals must be punished by the state’s legal apparatus. It is thus that ‘the ordered
society … enables us to show our bright side’ (in Biles 1970: 44). When social systems
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forget their repressive function, they become ‘detached from the real nature of man’
(Golding 1965: 87).  Elaborating on the idea that Jack’s behaviour should have been
prevented or at least corrected, Golding wonders: ‘Why have we got police forces?’ (44).
Insofar as it is intended as an answer to this question, the first half of Lord of the Flies
can be read, as Woodward points out, a case for strict law and order. It shows that, even
when there are rules, without ‘the power to enforce them, incipient democracy breaks
down’ (Woodward 1997: 94–5).59
For Golding, as for Schopenhauer, historiography is a kind of self-knowledge, an
‘attempt to see how things have become what they are, where they went wrong, and
where right, that our only hope lies of having some control over own future’ (Golding
1965:  90–1).  On  this  view,  the  lesson  to  learn  from  history  is  that,  when  a  given
member of society acts in a disruptive way, he or she should be restrained by the other
members. Speaking to Kermode, Golding says:
I think that … arbitrary checks … are nothing but the fruit of bitter experience of people who are
adult enough to realise, ‘Well, I, I myself am vicious and would like to kill that man, and he is
vicious and  would like  to kill  me,  and  therefore,  it  is  sensible  that  we  should  both  have  an
arbitrary scheme of things in which three other people come in and separate us’ (in Kermode
1988: 218–9).
According to Woodward, Jack should be ‘hunted down as a public enemy’ (1997: 94). If,
despite this kind of legal measures, Jack managed to set up his own bellicose tribe he
should be ‘assassinated by a CIA, or incarcerated in a penal colony’ before his behaviour
got out of control (94). The second half of Lord of the Flies shows that, if this did not
suffice, Ralph’s group should be prepared to engage in direct confrontation: ‘England
was forced to go to war against Hitler, and Golding would certainly agree that such
action was required’ (94).60
59 As Talbot points out in the Sea Trilogy, the power to enforce the law must remain in the hands of
the majority,  otherwise it  will  not  be effective:  ‘A  minority,  even one possessing  the natural
authority of office, cannot guarantee obedience in making the body politic punish itself!’ (Golding
1991: 646). This is why, when the shipmen abandon their duty to protect themselves from the
fury of the sea, the captain is forced to let his subordinates’ neglect go unpunished.
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In Woodward’s opinion, Golding’s lesson is that sometimes ‘the democratic system
must be bent in order to perpetuate the system’, the obvious problem being when to
stop bending it so it will not break (1997:  94). Though this recourse to force involves
leaving aside any naive prejudices against violence, it must be employed judiciously so
as to protect democracy without destroying it. As Spitz points out, since societies need
to maintain a police forced and armies, they are in a double bind:
We are caught, then, in a pathetic dilemma: we cannot seem to do without force, and in this
respect every society runs the risk of being oppressive; but we cannot do without justice, and in
this respect force becomes not an end but a means, an instrument in the service of right (Spitz
1970: 32).
Golding takes it for granted, as he says to Keating, that ‘the democratic way is the way
in  which  to  move’,  and  adds  that  ‘democracy  is  moving  in  the  right  direction’  (in
Keating 1988: 210). But he cannot ignore the constant perils that democracy must face:
it seems to me that a democracy has inherent weaknesses in it — built-in weaknesses. You can’t
give people freedom without weakening society as an implement of war, if you like, and so this is
very much like a sheep among wolves. It’s … a question … as to whether democracy can survive
and remain what it is. Every time democracy pulls itself together and says, ‘Well, now I’m being
threatened  by  a  totalitarian  regime’,  the  first  thing  it  has  to  do  is  give  up some of  its  own
principles. In England during the Second World War we had to give up a tremendous number of
principles in order to achieve the one pointed unity which could possibly withstand Hitler. It’s
possible to look at the question in this way and say, ‘Is the remedy not as bad as the disease?’ I
don’t know (in Keating 1988: 210).
The obvious problem for democracy, then, is to strike a balance between irresponsible
leniency and totalitarian repression, as both increase rather than reduce the overall
amount of suffering, thus going against Schopenhauer’s ideal of applying repression
60 Even  Fa  and  Lok,  the  survivors  of  the  meek  People  in  The  Inheritors,  eventually  resort  to
aggression and order to defend themselves against the New People and to rescue little Liku and
the New One. It is obvious that the reader’s judgement of them is no more negative than before
because of this new behaviour than before. Given our knowledge of their technological inferiority,
we cannot but see their efforts as heroic.
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locally to control violence globally. Lord of the Flies does not provide a solution to this
problem. The reason why the children’s parents are waging a global war is not entirely
clear. The novel does not give any details in this respect, but we may speculate that it is
because they have not been severe enough with their enemies, or, alternatively, because
they have been too forceful to begin with. (The problem with the second explanation is
that it would imply a complete disassociation between the democratic ideology, which
the children inherit  from their  parents,  and the latter’s  behaviour,  which would be
characterised by an undemocratic excess of violence.) In either case, the fact remains
that  in  the  beginning  the  children’s  murderous  violence  does  not  spring  from  an
organised exertion of force, but from the lack of it.
3.1.4. ‘Change Rather than Progress’: History and the 
Impossibility of Utopia
For Golding, all societies depend on the innate characters of their individual members.
This  means that,  despite  the apparent  changes that  may take place,  the essence of
history cannot be understood in terms of progress, that is,  morally speaking, as the
triumph of compassion. However, his novels show that, though the innate characters of
the majority are egoistic and malignant, enduring societies are anything but helpless to
deal  with  the  threats  that  could  destroy  them.  We  have  seen  that  their  response
involves moral and, above all, legal repression, that is, a measure of controlled violence.
In this section we shall see that for Golding the tenor of history is anti-utopian. We
shall also see that the rejection of utopia has been taken to be a token of Golding’s
pessimism and political conservatism. Finally, we shall see that the grounds on which
Golding rejects utopia in the essay ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’ do not coincide with the
characterisation of human nature that has so far emerged from his novels.
Because it is rooted in human nature, which cannot be altered, Golding sees the
essential characteristics of history as repeating themselves over and over again. Given
that the nature of most people is egoistic and even malignant, historiography can be
seen as a record of numberless acts of cruelty. History, Golding says to Baker, is ‘really
no  more  than  a  chronicle  of  original  sin’  (a  sin  linked,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the
egocentrism that makes egoism and malice possible), and characterised, if anything, by
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apparent ‘change rather than progress’ (in Baker 1982: 158). This view coincides with
Schopenhauer’s  remark,  already  examined,  that  despite  the  superficial  changes  in
customs history always has the same violent tenor. In his reading of  The Inheritors,
Baker states that the technical advances have not served to improve human nature,
adding that  ‘We are  today essentially  what  we were in  the past  — heroic  and sick,
enisled and afraid’ (Baker 1965: 19).
The idea that  history  repeats  itself  is  voiced by Talbot halfway through the Sea
Trilogy,: ‘“I have studied history as much as I may. There will be no change’”, at least
not if that means making human beings virtuous (Golding 1991: 336). By the end of his
voyage,  the Prettimans will  have given ample reason to question this assertion. The
utopian prospect, which is indeed a crucial component of the political vision conveyed
by the trilogy, must be counted among those later elements added by Golding to his
initial  stance.  However,  Golding’s  previous  novels  generally  bear  out  the  novelist’s
rejection  of  utopian  forms  of  social  organisation.  It  does  not  matter  if  the  events
recounted are set on a tropical island, as in Lord of the Flies; in a prehistoric forest, as
in  The  Inheritors;  in  the  North  Atlantic  in  the  Second  World  War,  as  in  Pincher
Martin; in the English Middle Ages, as in  The Spire; in the years between the First
World  War  and  the  1970s,  in  England  and  in  other  Western  countries,  as  in  The
Pyramid,  Darkness Visible and The Paper Men. Most of the events that take place in
these settings resemble each other by virtue of the egoistic and malignant impulses
behind  them.  Despite  the  superficial  differences,  they  are  all  manifestations  —
mediated by the majority of people’s egocentric consciousness — of a force that takes
neither morality nor legality into consideration.61 Even in those cases in which those
61 Outside the novels,  other texts confirm this sombre view of history. In the essay ‘Digging for
Pictures’,  Golding tells  us about his passion for archaeology, warning against the tendency to
focus on the past in order to ‘escape from a corrupt present’ (Golding 1965: 68). In his opinion, if
we do so we run the risk of seeing in the remains from the past ‘what we want them to be, rather
than the truth’ (68). Thus, for example, he confesses that sometimes, having discovered what
seems to be the remains of a family, he has to suppress the thought that they ‘could not match
our wickedness’ because they lived in ‘the days of innocence’ (69). But in view of the strange
position of one of the skeletons that he has unearthed — ‘One arm twisted behind her back, and




desires  can be checked by means  of  repression the situation does  not improve,  for
repression,  even  in  the  case  of  the  People  in  The  Inheritors,  is  just  another
manifestation of the egoistic and malignant desires that prevail in human beings: as
they  want  to  survive,  they  set  up  institutions  of  moral  condemnation  and  legal
punishment.
As Crawford remarks, in Golding’s novels there is a clear connection ‘between the
“perennial” and the “political”’, and they ‘privilege “diagnosis” of the human condition
… over and above engagement with and reference to contemporary social, political, and
historical phenomena’ (Crawford 2002: 112–3). In an early reflection on the duties of
the literary writer, Golding describes himself as someone that treats ‘current affairs’ as
‘only the expressions of the basic human condition where his true business lies’;  in
describing human beings not in an everyday social setting but from the standpoint of
eternity, he ‘is committed to looking for the root of the disease [of human viciousness]
instead of describing the symptoms’ (Golding 1957: 817).  That is why his novels have
been seen, for instance by Crawford, as politically conservative: Golding’s ‘pessimistic
view of  “the  human condition”  suggests  that  nothing  [essential]  will  change  in  the
future  and  militates  against  political  intervention.  It  marks  him  as  a  small  c
conservative pragmatist’ (Crawford 2002: 235). This conservatism explains why many
of his novels, starting with  Lord of the Flies, reject utopia in favour of ‘a pessimistic
dystopian form’ (46).
Actually, the reasons why Golding dismisses utopia in his fiction are nor exactly the
same as the ones that he adduces in the essay entitled ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’, where
he presents  his  views  on the history  of  humankind and on its  possible  future.  The
problem, he says in an attempt to explain what it is that separates human societies from
perfection,  is  that  utopia  can  only  offer  a  ‘changeless’  ideal  (Golding  1984a:  178).
Comparing ‘any society of living things’ to a man riding a bicycle, Golding expresses his
conviction that ‘if at any point between the beginning and end of his journey he stops
moving and does not get off the bicycle he will fall off it’ (178). Just as ‘the bicycle that
stops  as  in  a  snapshot,  and  no  longer  relies  on  the  balance  between  change  and
stability, will fall on the road’, so a utopian community ‘would fall clean off the world
and vanish with the dinosaurs’ (179; my italics). Translated into the moral terms that I
have been using, it could be said that utopian societies would succumb because, even if
the  egoistic  and  malignant  satisfaction  of  one’s  desires  could  be  eradicated  (an
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impossibility, given the inborn and immutable nature of its members, despite the above
mention of  the  homo moralis),  at  the  individual  or  collective level,  this  apparently
desirable situation would amount to a state of  moral stasis which for some reason —
Golding never says why exactly — would lead directly to the collapse of the ensuing
social body.
Even  if  we  interpret  Golding’s  defence of  the  need  to  strike  a  balance  between
change and stability as referring to the impossibility of changing human nature and
simultaneous desirability of constantly improving the means of repression, so that they
will  be  not  only  increasingly  effective  but  also  increasingly  humane,  there  would
something odd in saying that the existing moral stasis — i.e. the inalterable prevalence
of egoism and malice — can be taken advantage of in order to make collective life better
(the solution suggested by  Lord of the Flies and Golding’s comments thereon), while
maintaining that the opposite kind of moral stasis — the prevalence of compassion —
would necessarily destroy the community.62 Nevertheless, in the last instance it matters
very  little  if  the  dismissal  of  utopia  in ‘Utopias  and  Antiutopias’  fails  to  convince,
because this failure does not affect the criticism expressed in many of Golding’s novels,
according  to  which,  if  human  nature  cannot  be  changed,  neither  can  the  moral
structure of society no matter how much, or how well, repression is applied.
3.1.5. Cosmic Optimism: Beyond the Knowable World
In the preceding I concentrated on Golding’s characterisation of the knowable world. I
have argued that according to Golding human beings can be conscious of the world not
only physically — when they grasp material objects — but also metaphysically. He also
believes  that  something  may  exist  outside  the  limits  of  human consciousness.  This
unfathomable  dimension  is  what  I  called,  in  my  overview  of  Schopenhauer’s
62 Alternatively,  Golding could have suggested something different,  namely,  that utopias cannot
survive because their greater reliance on compassion renders them helpless before any possible
threats. The difficulty here is that utopias are described as motionless to begin with, therefore no
such threats can arise from within. They might arise from without, but this is a situation which




philosophy, the unknowable thing-in-itself. Unlike Schopenhauer, Golding sometimes
uses the term universe in a special sense, to designate the physical side of the knowable
world, and he pits matter against spirit, the latter of which corresponds to a dimension
encompassing both what Schopenhauer calls the metaphysical side of the world and the
unknowable  thing-in-itself.  Moreover,  Golding  also  speaks  of  the  cosmos,  which
comprises the material and spiritual sides of our world. For the sake of clarity, I repeat













Table 4: Planes of Human Existence in Schopenhauer and Golding
In this section I shall focus on the way in which Golding acknowledges the existence of
the unfathomable thing-in-itself, especially in his writings from the late 1970s and early
1980s. Admitting the existence of something that can never be known gives Golding the
opportunity of declaring himself, in the non-fictional pieces published at the time, an
optimist. Responding to the charge that his pessimism is excessive, he points out that
he  is  indeed  pessimistic,  but  only  as  far  as  the  knowable  universe  is  concerned;
regarding the entire cosmos, which includes the sphere beyond all possible knowledge,
he describes himself as an optimist.
Despite the impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself, human beings have never
refrained from speculating about  it.  Some of  these theories  are  fuelled by religious
faith, though this does not always need to be the case. In two of his later non-fictional
pieces, the Nobel lecture and ‘Belief and Creativity’, Golding indulges himself in this
kind  of  exercise,  thanks  to  which  he  can  offer  a  new  perspective  on  his  alleged
pessimism. Golding’s position is  that,  if  this is  the worst possible world,  then other
worlds must also exist that are much better than ours.
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In  the  acceptance  lecture  that  he  delivers  upon  receiving  the  Nobel  prize  for
literature, in 1983, Golding confesses that, despite the widespread image of him as a
thoroughly pessimistic writer, he does not see himself as a bearded prophet of gloom.
Instead, he prefers to be described, for all possible qualifications, as an optimist. To
clear his stance out, he suggests an ad hoc differentiation between the universe — the
reality ‘which the scientist constructs by a set of rules’ (Golding 1984a: 204) — and the
cosmos.  This  is  a  distinction  that  also  appears  in  another  crucial  text  of  the  same
period,  ‘Belief  and  Creativity’,  where  he  says  that  the  universe  comprises  only  the
physical world which we know through the telescope and the microscope ‘is only part’
of  what  exists;  as  for the cosmos,  he  defines  it  as  the  totality  comprising both the
knowable world and an unfathomable dimension lying beyond all possible knowledge
(201). On the basis of this distinction, Golding presents himself in both pieces as ‘a
universal pessimist but a cosmic optimist’ (201, 203).63 His optimism stems from the
belief that, though the universe that we inhabit is a veritable hell, in that part of the
cosmos that we can never get to know ‘There must be an infinite number’ of worlds:
some as ugly and sad as our own hell, and some so beautiful and joyous that they are
difficult  to imagine (201).  Though our world is  composed of an unequal mixture of
‘transient beauties and horrors’ (with the emphasis on the horrific elements), Golding is
confident that outside the sphere of human consciousness ‘there is a Good which is
ultimate and absolute’ (202). At this point, Golding seems to find consolation in the
thought that other conscious beings might be living in worlds to which we have no
knowledge but where suffering would by no means be the rule.
When he describes the existence of parallel worlds that are immensely beautiful and
joyous, Golding’s argument — if an argument it is — takes on an unmistakable religious
dimension, as his those worlds coincide with what some religious people would call
heaven. But given that,  in his opinion, the best life that we can imagine is life in a
parallel world that might exist or not, and to which we have not access, those readers
with a pragmatic turn of mind may have difficulties to share his optimism.
Golding  may  have  been  aware  of  these  objections.  Given  the  way  in  which  he
presents his basic stance — which coincides with Schopenhauer’s presentation of his
63 This kind of assertion is not new in Golding. In an interview given in the early 1960s, he states
that  he  is  ‘basically’  and  ‘by  nature  an  optimist’  despite  being  ‘by  intellectual  conviction  a
pessimist’ (in Keating 1988: 211).
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own — cosmic speculation is, apart from repression, the only reason for hope that he
can admit. He does not realise that the possibility of metaphysical consciousness, in all
its varieties, means that the sombre picture of human life that he has been offering — as
dominated by egocentrism and tending to evil — is not entirely accurate. Accordingly,
in his attempt to find some reason for optimism in the known world, he feels the need,
as  his  literary  career  unfolds,  to  modify  the  most  pessimistic  aspects  of  this  basic
stance.  I  analyse  these  modifications,  as  a  result  of  which  his  novels  took  a  more
optimistic tone, in the next chapter.
3.2. Golding’s Gradual Additions to His Basic Stance: 
Towards Utopia
In the preceding chapter I dealt with those metaphysical themes of Golding’s which
coincide with Schopenhauer’s, and to which Golding gives a treatment that is generally
consistent with Schopenhauer’s. In this chapter I shall focus on how, at a certain point
in his  literary career,  Golding begins to give a different treatment to three of these
themes: the  chance of  free  choice  understood as  the individual’s  freedom to decide
what to will (a moral issue), the possibility of knowing the essence of the world (an
epistemological  issue)  and  the  chance  of  utopia  (a  socio-political  issue).  Golding’s
critics  have  been  more  concerned  with  Golding’s  determinism,  essentialism  and
pessimism  than  with  human  freedom:  in  shunning  moral  determinism,  Golding  is
forced  to  alter  the  way  in  which  he  interprets  the  essence  of  the  world  and  the
relationship that appearances have with it; additionally, free choice opens the door to a
reconsideration  of  socio-political  utopia  as  an  ideal  based  on  the  individuals’  free
decision to collaborate with each other, and in the ensuing abandonment of repression.
In order to analyse the moral and socio-political implications of free choice,  I  shall
introduce some basic notions of Kant’s philosophy, in particular his theory of  moral
norms.
From  Free  Fall to  the  Sea  Trilogy,  Golding  oscillates  between  two  ontological
creeds: one is compatible with Schopenhauer’s theory; the other dismisses that kind of
theory as deceptive, either because it denies the individual’s free choice (a possibility
that  Free Fall begins to assert), or because it denies that knowing the essence of the
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world is impossible (a denial that begins to be unmistakable in  Darkness Visible, but
which was maturing for a longer time). As it turns out, Golding’s new approach to these
issues sometimes makes its first appearance in a text published before another text in
which  the  old  approach  is  still  being  fleshed  out.  Moreover,  despite  its  growing
importance  the  new  approach  never  completely  replaces  the  earlier  approach.
Sometimes each of these approaches appears in different texts published at about the
same time,  and sometimes both approaches coexist  in the same text.  As far  as  the
possibility  of  knowing the essence of  the world is  concerned, for example,  while in
‘Fable’, a piece of non-fiction dating from the early 1960s, Golding begins to cast doubts
on the possibility of knowing the kernel of the world, in  The Spire, a novel published
somewhat later, he still encourages us to identify it with the essential will. As regards
free choice, in Free Fall we find old Sammy’s emphasis on the moral implications of his
feeling of  compassion towards sufferers  and,  side by side  with it,  his  suggestion —
corroborated by the novel’s  title — that  to understand his moral  trajectory the only
thing  that  matters  is  the  free  choice  to  meet  or  shirk  his  duty.  Something  similar
happens in  Darkness Visible,  where Mr Pedigree’s  servitude to  his  innate appetites
appears side by side with Sophy’s free decision to become a terrorist. In all these cases,
the result is a juxtaposition of heterogeneous stances that cannot be brought into line
with each other. Though this juxtaposition may raise suspicions about the basic world
view that  I  reconstructed in the preceding chapter,  it  does not invalidate it.  On the
contrary, the new way in which Golding treats some of his favourite themes can only be
appreciated by reference to that basic world view. My intention in this chapter is not to
resolve these contradictions, but to draw attention to the reasons why they appear.
The first section of this chapter will examine the way in which Golding comes to
defend the possibility of freely deciding what to will. The defence starts in  Free Fall,
where free choice is put forward as the explanation for Sammy Mountjoy’s behaviour
towards his girlfriend Beatrice.
The second section will address the challenge that  Darkness Visible  and the Sea
Trilogy pose to the identification of the kernel of the world as the will to life. In the
former novel, Sophy envisages the essence behind appearances as an entropic tendency
to total exhaustion. Because of this, she feels legitimised to contribute to that goal with
nihilistic violence. In the latter work, Mr Prettiman explains his view that the kernel of
the world is not amoral but absolutely good. If  we put the essential will  to life,  the
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entropic  tendency  and  the  absolute  good  side  by  side,  we  can  interpret  this  very
abundance of explanations as a criticism not only of the inward path that Schopenhauer
follows to grasp the inner kernel of the world, but also of the possibility of knowing that
kernel at all. At this stage, the kind of metaphysics of nature argued for in his earlier
novels is dismissed as an ideological product of psychological projection.
The third section will evaluate the feasibility of utopian solutions in a context where
the possibility  of  free choice  has been asserted and,  concurrently,  the possibility  of
knowing the essence of the world has been put into question. The discussion will focus
on the Sea Trilogy, where Mr Prettiman’s plan to set up a utopian community in the
Australian  outback  is  enthusiastically  supported  by  Miss  Granham  but  rejected  by
Edmund Talbot. Contrary to what happens in earlier novels, above all  The Inheritors,
here the sense of community does not depend on the realisation that all individuals
share the same essence, or in the acceptance of a series of moral prescriptions that
deepen that feeling of togetherness at the same time as they prevent mutual aggression,
but on the free commitment that individuals with very different personalities and from
very different backgrounds make to share their destinies. Neither Miss Granham’s nor
Talbot’s decisions depend so much on their innate characters or on social constraints as
on their  freedom to choose what to do and where to go.  Thus understood, Talbot’s
social and political cowardice throws light on the decisions made by Oliver, the narrator
and main character of an earlier novel, The Pyramid.64
3.2.1. The Freedom to Choose what to Will in Free Fall
Though  previously  an  advocate  of  moral determinism  (which  for  him,  as  for
Schopenhauer,  means  that  most  humans are  either  egoistic  or  malignant,  and that
these innate characters cannot be changed), in Free Fall Golding begins to contemplate
the possibility of freely choosing what to will, thus overriding, if necessary, one’s inborn
inclinations. This amounts to the possibility of selecting one’s moral rules. At this stage,
the belief in an essential urge of which our needs and desires are a direct manifestation
64 The first and third sections of this chapter develop the argument of my paper ‘A Forward Look
into the Past:  Moral and Political  Hope in William Golding’s First-Person Novels’ (Saavedra-
Carballido 2013).
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has not been abandoned yet, but the  moral situation is complicated by the assertion
that  we  are  capable  of  free  choice.  If  our  actions  result  in  suffering,  it  is  our  sole
responsibility: if we have decided, for example, to act in such a way that our appetites
can find satisfaction immediately and/or regardless of the consequences, we are the
only ones to blame. This evinces a new conception of the will in Golding’s works. Now
the will  is  not  (only)  the  seat  of  our  appetites,  which are  themselves  rooted in  the
essence of the world, but (primarily) a faculty or ability peculiar to humans and on
which the individual’s moral freedom depends.
This new freedom, which is more akin to Kant’s philosophy than to Schopenhauer’s,
adds a new twist to Golding’s  consideration of optimism. We have seen that  in his
Nobel lecture Golding declares himself an optimist of sorts. In the course of the 1980s
this optimism solidifies into a different literary approach. In the Foreword to the one-
volume edition of the Sea Trilogy he addresses what some readers have seen as the
sequence’s increasing optimism. To settle the matter once and for all, he protests: ‘I
myself  am commonly  thought  to  be  a  pessimist,  a  diagnosis  with  which  I  heartily
disagree’, asserting that in writing this narrative sequence he has found himself ‘less
and less inclined to portray life as a hopeless affair’ (Golding 1991: xi).
After  Pincher Martin, we witness  a shift  away from determinism, as  a result  of
which some of Golding’s subsequent novels begin to provide a more positive view of the
human condition. Lord of the Flies, he says, expresses all the things that he had come
to believe during the Second World War; yet by the 1960s — after what he describes to
Biles as ‘a long and slow process’ of reflection (in Biles 1970: 35) — he feels compelled
to point out that he has somewhat changed his mind (see Biles 1970: 31–2; Golding
1965: 86; Golding 1984a: 99).
This new direction coincides with the abandonment of third-person narration in
favour of the first-person. The shift  takes place with  Free Fall (Golding’s first first-
person novel, the only perspective that he will  employ from  Rites of Passage on.  It
seems to be no mere coincidence that the contrast between the earlier novels and the
later (more optimistic) works is also a contrast between narrative perspectives: while
the ambition of Golding’s first three books is to cast an objective glance at what the
author sees as the unchanging order of things (the innate propensity to violence and the
ensuing need for moral and legal repression), in his last works he offers the subjective
perspective of individuals who have had the opportunity to change the course of their
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lives.  Though  Kinkead-Weekes  and  Gregor  do  not  draw  explicit  attention  to  the
adoption of the first person, yet they correctly observe that, beginning with Free Fall,
‘the tragedy … has a before and after, we are led to examine what led up to it and what
… followed’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 138). In these novels, they go on to
say, the accent falls not on ‘being’ a vicious person or not, but on ‘becoming’ one (136).
The main characters  in these novels  have a look into their  past not (only) to show
readers how miserable human life can be, as the narrator’s of his third-person novels
usually do, but (also) to prove that our attitudes and our behaviour can be modified,
and so to open the door to hope in a brighter future.
The turning point in Golding’s treatment of freedom is  Free Fall,  a novel which
Monod considers ‘in many ways a new departure in the author’s career’ (1982: 250). It
tells the story of Sammy Mountjoy, who, reviewing his life from his childhood in the
slums of Rotten Row to artistic success, searches for the exact moment when he made a
crucial decision that exacerbated his natural inclinations, that is, the moment at which
he gave up his freedom to act against them. Though Sammy’s sense of moral autonomy
has been played down by some critics (most recently by Eagleton 2010: 40), there is no
compelling reason to doubt the honesty and accuracy of the character-narrator’s self-
analysis when he draws attention, at the very outset of his enquiry,  to ‘the decision
made  freely  that  cost  me  my  freedom’  (Golding  1959:  7).  This  interpretation  is
supported by the novel’s very title, by the text’s insistence on the free loss of freedom,
and by the author’s comments on the novel.
Sammy’s autobiography moves back and forth in time in order to trace the gradual
transformation of the boy that he was (and for whose acts  old Sammy does not feel
responsible at all) into the man that he is at the moment of writing. As we strive to put
the most important scenes that make up his life in chronological order, we see how the
child gives way to the adolescent that embraces sin, how the adolescent gives way to the
adult that turns his back on sin (a transformation from sinner into saint that takes
place when Sammy gains metaphysical insight in the Nazi camp), and how the adult
that  turns his  back on sin  gives  way to  the autobiographer  that  reviews his  life  by
turning it into a written story. While he rules out several moments in his life that could
be interpreted as a fall into sin — his childhood pranks, which he discards saying ‘“Not
there”’ (Golding 1959: 70, 78), or ‘Not here’ (217), and his infidelity, already as an Art
School student, to his girlfriend Beatrice, which he dismisses with the same ‘“Not here”’
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(132)  — Sammy points  to  the only  other  moment  when he  can  have  exercised  his
freedom to become a sinner:  the moment,  just before leaving the country grammar
school in which he and Beatrice are classmates, Sammy’s eagerness to seduce her leads
him to exercise his freedom by choosing a norm of conduct that determines all  his
subsequent acts, thus effectively putting an end to his freedom, and after which he is
‘no longer free’ (79). It is at this moment that he acknowledges his lust, proclaiming
‘Musk, shameful and heady, be thou my good’ (232), and sacrifices everything else in
order to gain her. Sammy makes his decision immediately after a brief conversation
with the school’s headmaster. Though he has heard conflicting reports about the boy,
the headmaster knows that Sammy is one of the most promising pupils. He calls the
boy into his office for a last word of encouragement before his departure for the Art
School in London, but soon becomes worried about the boy’s failure to see the link
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between artistic  talent  and  moral responsibility.65 Fearing  the  boy’s  desire  for  easy
gratification, the ‘wise man’ issues an ominous warning (208):
If  you want  something enough,  you can always get  it  provided  you  are  willing  to make the
appropriate sacrifice. Something, anything. But what you get is never quite what you thought;
and sooner or later the sacrifice is always regretted (Golding 1959: 235).
65 From  the  point  of  view  of  the  moral  development  of  the  main  character,  in  Augustine’s
Confessions the very conversion that justifies its writing introduces in the narrative a sense of
moral discontinuity, but at the same time the narrative brings together what comes before and
after  in  such  a  way  that  the  impression  is  of  preordained  development  fostered  by  divine
providence: as soon as ‘the pattern of the Redemption’ begins to emerge from Augustine’s life
there occurs ‘the transformation of autobiography into biblical allegory’ (Freccero 1986: 28). This
providential  pattern  underlies  what  Stephen  Kern  calls  the  religious  plot (2011:  18),  which
becomes increasingly rare in nineteenth and early twentieth-century literature. In the realistic
Bildungsroman, the sense is clearly of moral continuity, though often for internal rather than
external reasons. According to Kern, the typical realistic narrative is ‘grounded in the idea that
individuals develop in accord with an organic model, as a tree grows from a seed, through stages’,
towards  the  dual  goal  of  maturity  and  social  integration,  but  this  ‘teleology’  is  not  always
presented as ‘directed by a providential spirit or deity who cares for his creatures and directs
their lives’ (40–1). In the hands of the modernists, the sense of continual development is replaced
by that of  moral discontinuity, the lack of preordained goals and social alienation. Alienation
from the values of the rest of society also characterises the modernist  Künstlerroman  charting
the development of the artist, where the only sense of continuity is provided by the protagonist’s
aesthetic vocation.
In Golding’s  Free Fall the continuous trajectory of social ascent and artistic development is
subordinated  to  the  sense  of  moral  discontinuity,  between  the  child  and  the  adult,  which
Sammy’s free fall provokes (and which is hardly counterbalanced by a narrative structure that
fails to present Sammy’s life as informed by any teleological sense of moral purpose). Insofar as
Sammy’s free decision has, as he acknowledges, ‘Byronic’ overtones (Golding 1959: 232; see Boyd
1988: 80), and insofar as modernism inherited Lord Byron’s rejection of conventional morality in
favour of aesthetic rupture, Sammy’s condemnation of his youthful gesture can be viewed as a
tacit indictment of the modernist elevation of aesthetics ‘above everything, including morality’
(Childs 2008: 30).
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Too  young  and  reckless  to  care  about  regret,  Sam  forgets  the  last  part  of  the
headmaster’s monition, and concentrates on the satisfaction of his appetites through
the exploitation of Beatrice’s ‘white, unseen body’ (Golding 1959: 235). Apart from the
indirect allusion to the Faust myth, in Sammy’s vow there is a partial quotation of John
Milton’s Paradise Lost (book 4, line 110). While Milton’s Satan turns away from God
exclaiming: ‘Evil, be thou my good’ (Milton 2005: 80), Sammy subordinates everything
to his sexual desire. It hardly matters if sex is alien to Beatrice, who ‘knows nothing of
it, thinks nothing of it’, and who, seeing that Sammy can hardly think of anything other
than getting to bed with her, confesses not to ‘feel like that’ at all (Golding 1959: 232,
110). Impervious to the girl’s reticence, Sammy adopts a lifestyle whose exclusive aim is
the pleasure derived from her sexual exploitation. Like Milton’s Satan, Sammy is free to
choose good or evil, and he chooses evil as his guiding principle.
As Golding explained in an interview with Biles,  Free Fall is  his most articulate
attempt to substantiate ‘the proposition that man has free will’, and that ‘once you have
free will … you have alternatives before you’ (in Biles 1970: 76). The very  title of the
novel implies that these alternatives may lead in the direction of immorality. Taking
advantage of the use of the expression free fall in the physical sciences, Golding endows
it with moral significance.
Strictly speaking, free fall refers to a type of motion in which the only force acting
upon an object  is  gravity.  It  also designates,  somewhat improperly,  the absolute or
relative lack of gravity. The latter is the meaning that Golding uses first when talking
about the novel: ‘It is where your gravity has gone; it is a man in a space ship who has
no gravity’,  or one who, having got lost in deep space, can only ‘float about’ and ‘is
completely divorced from the … idea of a thing up there’ or down here (in Biles 1970:
81).
Taking his cue from the astronaut’s situation (which he also uses in Golding 1965:
115), Golding gives the expression free fall a couple of senses related to morals: one of
them has to do with the state of disorientation that, in his opinion, afflicts the modern
individual; the other has to do with the free choice of evil, which this state makes easier
than ever. According to Golding, moral relativism — the abolition of all moral points of
reference  —  has  infiltrated  contemporary  lifestyles  since  the  demise  of  traditional
standards of value, and makes it easier than ever to make choices independently of any
shared  criteria  of  moral  value.  This  is  what  he  means  when  he  says:  ‘Where  for
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hundreds of  thousands of  years  men have known where they were,  now they don’t
know where they are any longer’ (in Biles 1970: 81). This meaning of  free fall  can be
better understood in the light of Mary Midgley’s definition of morality as ‘a medium for
arbitrating,  and  to  some  extent  resolving,  inner  and  outer  conflict  by  acceptable
systems of priority’ (Midgley 2001: 178). While traditional systems of morality provide
a  ‘way  of  dealing  with  the  up-and-down  dimension which  everybody  who  thinks
seriously about human life must see as our central problem’ (199; my italics), Golding’s
novel  suggests  that  shared  priority  systems  no  longer  have  any  influence  on  the
individual’s choices. That is why Sammy compares these and other ‘systems’ to ‘hats’
that he has hung out of sight (Golding 1959: 6). As regards the interpretation of  free
fall as referring to the free choice of evil, Golding makes explicit mention of it when he
explains to Baker the ‘thesis’ that Sammy’s life illustrates (in Baker 1982: 133):
the fact that without a system of values, without an adherence to some, one might almost call it,
codified morality, right and wrong, you are like a creature in space, tumbling, eternally tumbling,
no up, no down, just in ‘free fall’ …. Also, of course, you can link it with the … concept of free will
(in Baker 1982: 133).
As the last sentence of this quotation makes clear, the last meaning that Golding gives
to free fall has to do with the free adoption of an immoral conduct. As Golding himself
acknowledges (see Biles 1970: 76, 80–1), this interpretation is based on the Satan’s fall
as recounted in Milton’s Paradise Lost (book 3, line 99). Golding’s novel, like Milton’s
poem, relies on the notion that we are all ‘Sufficient to have stood though free to fall’
(Milton  2005:  59).  This  indicates  that  starting  with  Free  Fall Golding  begins  to
countenance the idea, in Anthony Burgess’s words, that ‘one’s fall is free, one wills the
descent into evil’ (Burgess 1986: 819).
This sense of moral freedom differs from Golding’s earlier emphasis on the inborn
and  unchangeable  status  of  the  individual’s  will.  This  emphasis  on  a  new  kind  of
freedom can be better understood with the help of Kant’s theory of the individual’s
moral autonomy. One of the staunchest defenders of free choice, he argues that subjects
always act following the moral rules that they imposes upon themselves, and classifies
those into two types, depending on their generality.  On the one hand, there are the
316
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
specific moral maxims that we impose upon our own behaviour. On the other, there is
the overall moral attitude or disposition which governs those maxims.
Kant defines a maxim as a ‘subjective principle of volition’ (Kant 1998: 14 n.), that
is,  ‘a  rule  that  the  power  of  choice  itself  [Willkür]  produces  for  the  exercise  of  its
freedom’ (1996: 70). The assumption is that the subject is free to choose what to will. As
Fred  Feldman  explains,  ‘To  adopt  a  maxim  is  to  commit  yourself  to acting  in  the
described way whenever  the situation in  question arises’  (Feldman 1998:  187).  The
commitment to a maxim lasts indefinitely, unless another maxim is adopted. A maxim
can  be  good  or  evil,  depending  on  whether  or  not  it  obeys  or  not  the  categorical
imperative,  in  other  words,  depending  on  whether  it  can  be  generalised  and
transformed without contradiction into a universal law of conduct. Since the universal
law of conduct might well oppose both our desires and our personal aspirations, this
kind of generalisation will ensure that we act out of duty instead of personal inclination
or opportunism.
Regarding one’s disposition, Kant defines it  as ‘the first subjective ground of the
adoption of the maxims’, adding that it ‘can only be a single one’ and that it ‘applies to
the entire use of freedom’ (Kant 1996: 74). According to John R. Silber, Kant presents
one’s disposition as ‘the enduring pattern of intention that can be inferred from the
many discreet acts of Willkür’, a pattern that both ‘reveals’ the ‘ultimate motive’ of one’s
maxims, and ‘is essential to moral self-identity’ (cited in Bernstein 2002: 23).
The  primary  opponent  of  virtue  is,  Kant  contends,  human  nature  itself.  In  his
opinion, humankind is characterised by what he calls radical evil: ‘a natural propensity
of  the  human  being’  to  give  individual  inclinations  priority  over  the  categorical
imperative in our moral rules (Kant 1996: 77). In this consists ‘the depravity of human
nature, or of the human heart’ (77). This propensity ‘is universal’, because ‘it is woven
into human nature’ (78). We can deviate from the imperative not only out of ‘ambition,
self-love in general’, but even because we follow ‘a kindly instinct such as sympathy’
(78). In all these cases we are acting in a way that is not moral, because our duty is to
follow the categorical imperative regardless of the consequences of our actions (it could
well be that our conduct increases our pain or the other’s, but this is irrelevant from the
moral point of view).
According to Richard J. Bernstein, it  is tempting to identify radical evil  with the
‘natural  inclinations’  rooted  in  ‘our  phenomenal  sensuous  nature’  (2002:  27).
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Nevertheless, Bernstein argues against this reading of Kant, stating that bodily needs
and desires are not the source of our disobedience to the law. In his view, radical evil ‘is
related  solely  to  the  corruption  of  the  will’,  and  this  corruption  consists  in  the
propensity ‘not to do what duty requires’ (28).
Despite recognising the existence of a natural propensity in humans to act against
the categorical imperative, Kant asserts the fact that we are always capable of choosing
what  to  will,  that  is,  of  choosing  to  obey  a  valid  universal  law.  A  person  is  at  all
moments responsible for his or her disposition, that is, for his or her ‘overall character’
(Bernstein 2002: 24). Kant claims that ‘The human being must make or have made
himself into whatever he is or should become’, and this ‘must be an effect of his free
power of choice’ (Kant 1996: 89). As Bernstein explains, in Kant’s understanding free
volition  ‘is  never  compromised  by  external  events  or  by  our  natural  inclinations’
(Bernstein  2002:  27).  Given  that  our  moral  autonomy  has  no  conditions,  it  is
impossible to explain ‘why we freely adopt the maxims … that we actually adopt’; the
ultimate ground for our choices is ‘inscrutable’ (35, 235).
Kant’s vigorous defence of freedom is at odds with his introduction of radical evil;
this has led Bernstein to state that, as far as his moral theory is concerned, ‘Kant is at
war with himself’ (2002: 33). If ‘human beings as finite rational agents are free’, then
‘they are solely and completely responsible’  for their  moral choices (33). But in this
case, what is the role of radical evil? According to Bernstein, though it should explain
why we insist on deviating from the categorical imperative, in fact it does not have any
function whatsoever:
Presumably, the introduction of the notion of radical evil is intended to explain why … we deviate
from following the moral law. We do not always follow the moral law because, as human beings,
we have an innate propensity to evil. … But does this ‘because’ really explain anything? Does it do
any  conceptual  work?  I  do  not  think  so.  When  stripped  down  to  bare  essentials,  it  simply
reiterates the fact  that human beings who are conscious of  the moral law sometimes (freely)
deviate from it. Furthermore, it is  always within our power to resist this propensity, no matter
how strong it is supposed to be. In short, radical evil — the alleged propensity to moral evil which
is a universal characteristic of human beings — does not have  any explanatory force … at all!
(Bernstein 2002: 33).
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This brief detour can help us to see what exactly is at stake in  Free Fall and several
other  first-person  novels  that  follow  it.  It  is  obvious  that  Sammy  Mountjoy’s
circumstances  have  a  lot  in  common  with  the  ones  described  by  Kant:  there  is
something in human nature that can potentially separate the individual for the exercise
of duty. In Golding, as in Kant, this natural propensity has to do with the will: for the
latter, it is the corruption of the individual will; for the former — whose approach here
still  resembles  Schopenhauer —  it  is  the  essential  urge  in  which  the  individual’s
passions are rooted. Though Sammy sums up his childhood years in terms of the ‘lies’,
the ‘sensuality’  and the ‘violence’  which result from ‘selfishness’,  perhaps even from
‘cruelty’ and ‘wickedness’ (Golding 1959: 78), adolescence reveals his basic propensity
to the egoistic pursuit of sexual satisfaction. (The stress of this novel on sexuality links
Free Fall to most of Golding’s other fiction, beginning with the book that precedes it —
Pincher  Martin —  and  the  one  that  follows  it  —  The  Spire.)  In  the  last  analysis,
however,  Golding maintains,  like Kant,  that  neither  external circumstances nor  this
internal propensity can determine the individual’s free choice. Sammy’s commitment to
satisfy his sexual desire at all costs does not stem from Nick Shales’s or Miss Pringle’s
influence. Neither does it arise from his sensuous nature. Sammy’s embrace of musk is
a conscious choice, the free adoption of a moral disposition that determines his future
conduct.66 Sammy tells us how, after having made it, his choice ties him to a certain
course of action:
66 In real life these norms of conduct, maxims and dispositions alike, are likely to remain unvoiced;
yet it is only natural for a work of literature to put it into so many words, and for our response to
the work to be influenced by its explicit formulation. Hence Sammy’s bold appeal to musk, which
not only sums up the way in which Sammy sees himself as dominated by lust but also conditions the
reader’s opinion of him.
The maxims that follow from Sammy’s disposition are morally reproachable because they do
not conform to the categorical imperative. From Kant’s perspective, Sammy’s choices are evil but,
unlike Milton’s Satan’s, they are not diabolical. Apparently, for Kant diabolical choices would be
impossible to find among humans, because they — contrary to Satan — cannot side with evil for
evil’s sake all the time. From the perspective of Kantian rigorism, which judges not one’s actions
or their consequences but the maxims and dispositions behind those actions, Sammy is as evil as
a human being can be, simply because he fails to comply with the categorical imperative.
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as I remembered myself as well as Beatrice I could find no moment when I was free to do as I
would. In all that lamentable story of seduction I could not remember one moment when being
what I was I could do other than I did (Golding 1959: 191).
If  we accept Bernstein’s  description of a disposition as one’s overall  character,  it  is
evident that in Golding’s works the understanding of a person’s character undergoes a
transformation.  Though for  a  time his  novels  continue  to  assert  the  existence  of  a
knowable essence that is completely alien to moral considerations, the emphasis on the
inborn and unchangeable  innate character (exemplified by Pincher Martin) gradually
gives way to a foregrounding of the possibility of choosing one’s overall character or
moral disposition (as exemplified by Sammy Mountjoy).67
As we have seen, the belief in an essence that is common to all beings is a remnant
from Golding’s earlier stance, and it neither diminishes Sammy’s moral autonomy nor
justifies his evil choices. What this belief does, in combination with the new belief in the
freedom to do as one wills, is throw light on Sammy’s puzzling — and misleading —
explanation that the ultimate cause of Beatrice’s suffering is his own guilt. Old Sammy
recalls  his  younger  self’s  certainty  that  guilt  for  what  we  are  (for  being  essentially
amoral and for making the world a battleground through our egocentric consciousness
of it) sanctions even the most perverse behaviour: ‘Guilty I am; therefore wicked I will
be’  (Golding 1959:  232).  This  use  of  will with  the first-person pronoun reminds  of
Pincher Martin; what distinguishes it from that of Pincher’s imaginary surrogate is that
here  will does  not  convey an  innate  urge that,  independently  of  conscious  control,
determines the person’s conduct, but the individual’s free and conscious determination
of what to will. As regards the reversal of guilt and criminal action, it is as if young
67 Golding’s new position, with its focus on the individual’s free choice of a what Kant calls a moral
disposition comes hand in hand with a new attitude towards the representation of character in
his novels. Gone is his preference for ideas over people, and, with it, his use of flat (simple and
static) characters that, like Pincher Martin, can be summed up in a single word. Now, Golding
thinks,  the  novel  must  perform ‘no  less  an  act  than the  rescue  and  the  preservation  of  the
individuality and dignity of the single being, be it man, woman or child’ (Golding 1984: 209).
Though his former characterisations were not all as flat as his comments would suggest (Pincher
Martin is exceptional in this sense, even by Golding’s standards), it is true that now they tend to
be rounder.
320
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
Sammy’s sense of guilt about the sorry state of the world were so great that it could not
be possibly increased. This may have caused in him the feeling that, while none of his
actions can make the world a worse or better place, at least some of them — it does not
matter if they are the greatest crimes — can increase his pleasure. Combined with his
mistaken view that materialism leads to extreme moral relativism, Sam’s guilt liberates
him from all constraints, opening the door to all kinds of misdeeds. This explains why
old Sammy concludes that ‘Guilt comes before the crime and can cause it’ (232). Being
tortured by guilt to begin with, what difference does it make if, as Kinkead-Weekes and
Gregor put it (2002: 161), one takes ‘the conscious and deliberate decision that fixes
that guilt’?
According to the Schopenhauerian definition of  guilt  that  I  have employed until
now, Sammy is guilty from the moment of his birth. The problem at this point is that
Sammy describes the child that he was as ‘innocent of guilt’ (Golding 1959: 78). From
the perspective of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the meaning of this expression is that, as
a child, Sammy is still unaware of his own nature. Therefore the child’s ‘terrible and
irresponsible  innocence’  has nothing to  do with the lack  of  guilt  (25).  It  is,  rather,
ignorance of that guilt.
This  interpretation  depends  on  Schopenhauer’s  distinction  between  the  facts  of
being guilty and of feeling guilty (see Wicks 2008: 139). What distinguishes the feeling
of guilt from the fact of being guilty is that this feeling is peculiar to humans, for it
results from the knowledge of their nature: the feeling of ‘guilt is to be found not in
willing, but in willing with knowledge’, such that a plant’s innocence is not due to its
lack of will — for the will is in everything — but only ‘due to its want of knowledge’ of
itself (Schopenhauer 1969a: 156). As in the plant, and for similar reasons, the feeling of
guilt may be absent in small children. We feel guilty, writes Schopenhauer, only once
we have realised that we have certain needs and desires and that we are endowed with
consciousness: ‘we are all innocent to begin with, and this merely means that neither
we nor others know … our own nature’ (296). We are innocent while we are ignorant;
but as soon as we become aware of having certain appetites and of being endowed with
consciousness, we cannot but feel guilty about the sorry state of the world.
Something similar happens in Golding’s writings. As we saw in the Introduction, at
the  start  of  his  novelistic  career  Golding  used  to  think  that  people  suffer  from  an
appalling ignorance of their own nature. Like Schopenhauer, he equates this ignorance
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with innocence. This is evident if we turn, temporarily, to the ending of  Lord of the
Flies.  On the last page of the novel, when the schoolboys run into the naval officer,
Ralph cannot but weep for ‘the end of innocence’ which comes with a recognition of ‘the
darkness of man’s heart’ (Golding 1954: 207, 208). In a later interview Golding explains
in more detail what has happened to the children:
They don’t understand their own natures and therefore, when they get to this island, they can
look forward to a bright future, because they don’t understand the things that threaten it. This
seems to me to be innocence; I suppose you could almost equate it with ignorance of men’s basic
attributes, and this is inevitable with anything which is born and begins to grow up. Obviously, it
doesn’t understand its own nature (in Keating 1988: 210).
As Samuel Hynes aptly puts it: ‘Ralph weeps for the end of innocence, but when did it
exist, except as an illusion made of his own ignorance?’ (Hynes 1997: 63). When Ralph
bursts into tears, it is not only because of what Jack and his hunters have done on the
island, but because of the share that he has in the violence leading to Simon and Piggy’s
killings.
Though the English expression innocent of can mean ‘ignorant of’ or ‘unaware of’,
Golding sometimes suggests that he — unlike Schopenhauer — is conscious of having
mixed two notions, those of innocence and ignorance, that should be kept separated:
normally, he says to Carey,  ‘we confuse [ignorance] with innocence’ (in Carey 1987:
174), but, as he says to Biles, ‘it’s an equation which … is no longer valid’ (in Biles 1970:
109). Nevertheless, in his later writings he insists on using both terms as if they meant
the same. In the essay entitled ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’, for example, he still states
this: ‘I remember reading [such utopian narratives as]  Men like Gods by H.G. Wells
when I was a boy and I remember feeling with a positive surge of joy that I myself could
walk straight into such a society and live there. I do remember asking myself in my
innocence — or ignorance — why the world was not like that and was too young to
know the answer’ (Golding 1984a: 177).
Though more obliquely than  Lord of the Flies,  Free Fall also alludes to Sammy’s
loss of innocence as the realisation of his guilt. Indeed, Sammy stops being an innocent
child long before making the free choice to stalk and seduce Beatrice, when he is chided
for robbing the other elementary school children of their fagcards. Instead of punishing
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Sammy for  what  he has done, the head teacher  of  his  school  prefers  to  make him
‘conscious of his guilt’ (Golding 1959: 52). 
The  discovery  that  he  is  a  guilty  person,  together  with  the  feeling  of  guilt  that
follows serves old Sammy to rationalise, in a way that cannot makes us forget that his
free  adoption  of  an  evil  disposition  that  solidifies  his  moral character  and  will
determine all  his subsequent actions. However,  Sammy’s exploration of his past life
does not finish with his emotional and sexual exploitation of Beatrice. He also recounts
his  moral reformation and reconciliation with his former self, which take place years
later,  and only after he has been subjected, as a prisoner of war in a Nazi camp, to
exacting cross-questioning and psychological torture. As soon as the Nazis allow him to
go back with his fellow prisoners (and probably sensing that tortured has put him in a
similar position to the one in which he had put Beatrice, that is, feeling that he has
become the object of ruthless manipulation), he undergoes a revelation. Not only does
he see his fellow prisoners in a new light, as beings endowed with invaluable dignity
despite their sorry state in the camp. He is also able to realise, at long last, Beatrice’s
‘nun-like’ sanctity and true human stature (Golding 1959: 112). So much so that, when
he returns to England, he decides to visit Beatrice so as to atone for his mistreatment of
her.68 This is an unprecedented gesture in Golding’s fiction, but we cannot forget that it
is caused by a flash of metaphysical insight more related to  Golding’s earlier novels
than  to  the  new  moral  stance,  based  on  autonomous  choice  rather  than  on
compassionate feelings, that Free Fall adumbrates.
When Sammy tries  to  apologise  for  his  behaviour,  he  finds  it  impossible  to  get
Beatrice’s  forgiveness,  because  she  has  been  in  a  mental  institution  ever  since  he
abandoned her  (perhaps  because he  abandoned her,  though he cannot  confirm his
suspicion). Since she is no longer aware of either Sammy’s past cruelty or his present
good intentions, she is unable to grant him the expected forgiveness. The meaning of
this episode is clear: having made his choice, his control of its consequences is very
limited. Sammy did not want Beatrice to lose her reason, he just wanted to have some
fun with her; yet this does not change the outcome of their relationship. Likewise, even
68 Echoes of Dante’s Vita Nuova have been pointed out by a number of critics, who have, however,
limited their comments to Sammy’s infatuation with Beatrice (see,  for example,  Carey 2009:
226). In  moral terms, what follows Sammy’s decision to seduce her is truly a new way of life
whose sole centre is sexual satisfaction at all costs.
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if  he starts  a  new life  and becomes a  new person,  he  cannot  change the past,  and
neither can he shun responsibility for what he did before his moral conversion: though
Sammy tries  to  congratulate  himself  with  Beatrice,  the  fact  remains  that  she is  no
longer able to accept his excuses. Her present condition reminds Sammy of his past
cruelty, haunting him as he writes his confession.
Needless to say, Sammy’s failure to make amends does not diminish the collective
implications of  Golding’s  new assertion of  freedom. Once he has acknowledged the
possibility  of  selecting one’s  moral disposition, he has little  difficulty in offering an
alternative to the universal war that he has diagnosed and the constant repression that
he has advocated as a solution. The implication is that, if we are free, there is a chance
that our joint decisions may lead to better, perhaps utopian ways of organising social
life.
3.2.2. The Refusal to Characterise the Essence of the World
The link between Kant’s and Golding’s concern with free choice can help the literary
historian to locate the latter, who prided himself in keeping his distance from the work
of his contemporaries, in the mid-century British and Continental literary scene. The
connection lies in the affinity between the Kantian disposition and one of the central
notions  of  Jean-Paul  Sartre’s  existentialism,  the  projet  fondamental,  defined  as  a
groundless  choice  that  is  responsible  for  the  whole  mode  of  life  of  a  person  (see
Bernstein 2002: 24). At the time when Golding was writing Free Fall, an existentialist
morality had crystallised across  the channel  thanks to  philosophers  like  Sartre  and
writers like Albert Camus. According to Clements, in Kant ‘Goodness … is not found,
nor aspired towards — it is made’; this notion, adds Clements, ‘was taken to its logical
extreme in the 1940s and 1950s in the philosophy of  Sartre and Camus’  (Clements
2012: 3).  According to this interpretation, for the existentialists,  as for Kant,  moral
value is not given but created through one’s virtuous action.
In Britain, the existentialist movement’s influence made itself felt in the writings of
such authors as Colin Wilson, whose The Outsider appeared in 1956. As Alan Sinfield
notes, two of the principal aspects of existentialism, philosophical and literary alike, are
the  ‘anguish  at  our  meaninglessness’,  a  feeling  exacerbated  by  human  self-
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consciousness, and the ‘affirmation of human responsibility’ (Sinfield 1983: 101). In its
Sartrean  variety,  existentialism  is  a  kind  of  humanism  that  tries  to  create  ‘the
possibility of genuine human existence’ by making ‘man “responsible for what he is”’
(102). Like Kant, among others, the existentialists believe that the human subject is not
the passive viewpoint from which subjective experience is  had, but the locus where
value-judgements and choices of action are made. It is free to act, and constructs itself
in the course of action. In this sense, the subject’s fundamental project forms the core
of a whole nexus of choices and behavioural dispositions making up the totality of the
individual I.
Though  Golding was aware that he belonged to ‘the existentialist generation’ (in
Biles 1970: 75), it is difficult to identify his world view with either existential or Kantian
philosophy. However, the fact remains that a heady combination of Kant-like autonomy
and quasi-existentialist angst becomes apparent in the view of  moral action conveyed
by  Free Fall. The novel’s stress on of free choice  Free Fall features intermittently in
Golding’s subsequent novels: though it does not appear in  The Spire, for instance, it
does  appear  in  The  Pyramid,  Darkness  Visible and the  Sea  Trilogy.  In  Darkness
Visible, for instance, one of the things that Sophy finds in Sim Goodchild’s bookshop is
an old notice announcing a conference by Bertrand Russell  ‘on  HUMAN FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY’ (Golding 1979: 121). Later it is suggested that Sophy’s attempt to become
a terrorist issues from a free choice: when she gets involved in the child’s kidnap, Sophy
reassures herself with the memory of her decision: ‘I chose’ (251). This insistence on the
ability to make one’s own choices notwithstanding, the fact is that  Darkness Visible
also offers another explanation of human behaviour, one that still fits in with Golding’s
basic stance: as we have already seen, Mr Pedigree is characterised as dominated by a
passion — a thirst — that he has not chosen and that he cannot control. To the extent
that it includes these two alternative views showing any clear preference for either of
them,  Darkness Visible is perhaps the novel in which the tensions between Golding’s
basic stance and the gradual additions to it are most conspicuous.
Apart from problematising the issue of how best to account for people’s actions, in
Darkness Visible Golding begins to treat the possible knowledge of the essence of the
world in a way that differs from his basic stance. Thus, in addition to questioning the
position that human conduct is determined by our inborn nature, Darkness Visible also
starts to contemplate the impossibility of accurately describing the essence of the world
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by implicitly suggesting that those descriptions may be as diverse as the feeling that
every person may have of what lies inside him or her. The fact that  Darkness Visible
appears after Free Fall suggests that Golding’s increasing doubts about to the idea that
we can provide an acceptable description of the inner kernel of the world — doubts
which the Sea  Trilogy  stresses  — are  not  the  precondition for  his  assertion  of  free
choice,  but  the  consequence  of  that  assertion.  Together  with  the  foregrounding  of
individual  autonomy and the undermining  of  all  conceptions  of  the  essence  of  the
world,  there is  another  change in  Golding’s  later  novels  that  allows him to present
alternative  ways  of  picturing  the  world,  a  diversity  of  opinions  that  contributes  to
further  undermine  the  accuracy  of  all  such  conceptions.  At  the  same time  as  they
include only one possible characterisation of the essence of the world, namely, as an all-
powerful will to life, Golding’s first novels present non-egocentric, i.e.  metaphysical,
forms of consciousness as exceptional and even (think of Simon in Lord of the Flies and
of the People in The Inheritors) as leaving the subjects defenceless against a majority of
beings dominated by egocentric, i.e. physical, consciousness. Both elements cooperate
to  create  the  impression  —  strengthened  by  Golding’s  non-fiction  —  that  the  only
plausible description of the world is as a hellish place where the natural elements and
the immense majority of living beings are in perpetual war with each other. In his later
novels  Golding  modifies  both  of  these  elements,  such  that,  apart  from  starting  to
present alternative ways of conceiving of the essence of the world, he stops presenting
non-egocentric consciousness as weakening the subject in any way. Having made these
changes,  in the Sea Trilogy Golding presents Mr Prettiman’s metaphysics of nature,
according to why the world is  a place populated by friendly beings where harmony
rather than discord prevails,  not as implausible or impractical,  but as being neither
more  nor  less  tenable  —  and  in  many  respects  even  more  desirable  —  than  the
alternatives. However, the very inclusion of this new stance on an equal footing with
the others has the effect of undermining them all, such that, in the last instance, Mr
Prettiman’s stance is just as questionable as any other. Let us see why Golding seeks to
create this effect and and how exactly he does it.
Given the affinities between Golding’s treatment of the world’s essence in his early
novels and Schopenhauer’s,  it  could be argued that the objection raised against the
philosopher’s metaphysical views, namely, that his  arguments for the identification of
the world’s essence as will cannot be demonstrated (a fact that he concedes),  is also
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valid for the novelist’s.  Perhaps aware of this kind of criticism, in  Darkness Visible
Golding begins to challenge the reliance on inner observation as the path along which
the metaphysics of nature can proceed by showing that each of us can feel something
different inside. He does so by presenting conflicting conceptions of what the essence of
the world may be, all of which begin with the subjects’ feeling of their inner being.
In order to understand the full import of Golding’s new position, it is convenient to
return  a  moment  to  the  description  of  one  such  episode  of  inner  observation  that
Sammy Mountjoy offers in  Free Fall. We have already seen that,  at  a certain point
during his confinement in a Nazi camp, Sammy is overcome by a sudden a feeling that
blends compassion towards his fellow prisoners, the appreciation of their beauty and
dignity, and the apprehension of the surrounding mountains as something living. Then,
looking inside himself,  he catches a glimpse of ‘the most loathsome substances that
man  knows  of,  or  perhaps  the  most  loathsome  and  abject  creatures,  continuously
created’ (Golding 1959: 190).Sammy never links what he sees inside himself to the will,
yet he suggests that it could be the inner manifestation of ‘human nature’, itself linked
to the process whereby new appearances are forever coming into being — a process, in
his own words, that ‘continually defied the law of conservation of energy’ (190). Though
the relationship between Sammy’s feeling of what lies outside and his feeling of what
lies  inside  is  not  totally  clear,  it  is  undeniable  that  the  latter  resembles,  like  the
experience that young Jocelin records in his notebook in  The Spire, the inner feeling
whereby, according to Schopenhauer, one becomes aware of the motions of the will to
life within.
Like Sammy in  Free Fall and Jocelin in  The Spire, Sophy in  Darkness Visible is
presented as undergoing episodes of inner observation. However, her experience differs
in important respects  from those described in the two other novels.  To begin with,
Sophy realises while she is still a child that she can intentionally direct her attention
inside as well as outside. What she sees on those occasions is very different from the
outer appearance of things:
There are eyes in the back of my head. The … thing called Sophy can sit looking out through the
eyes, the thing which really is nameless. It can choose either to go out into the daylight or to lie in




She shut her eyes with sudden excitement. … With her front eyes shut it was as if those other
eyes opened in the back of her head and stared into a darkness that stretched away infinitely, a
cone of black light (Golding 1979: 134).
Sophy believes that self-consciousness allows her to apprehend her true being as an
‘interior,  nameless  thing’  (Golding  1979:  188).  She initially  holds  this  urge  to  be  a
private characteristic that separates her from the rest of the world. But when she hears
about the notion of entropy on a radio programme, she becomes convinced that, in fact,
what she has found inside her is closely bound with the inner being of the world, and
that  she is  more  attuned to  it  than  most.  In  her  opinion,  the  dark  recesses  of  her
interior are the site or source of her wish to hurt, a wish which she has been calling, for
lack of a better term, ‘a passionate desire in the darkness to be Weird — … Weird and
powerful’, or else ‘a hunger and thirst after weirdness’ (126, 132). After she has heard a
radio talk ‘about the universe running down’, a theory that for her ‘explained so much it
was  obvious’,  she  is  able  to  find  a  more  accurate  designation  for  this  urge  (131).
According  to  the  second  law  of  thermodynamics,  entropy  is  a  modification  of  the
principle of conservation of  energy,  to which the first law of  thermodynamics gives
expression:  though  energy  can  neither  be  created  nor  destroyed,  under  certain
circumstances it can no longer be transformed. It is thus that highly energetic systems
lose the energy that they need for their own conservation, and unless new energy comes
in from outside their structure dissolves as a result (see Safranski 2010: 272). In this
light, it could be said that everything is governed by a kind of will to death. This is
precisely the conclusion that Sophy seems to reach.69
Sophy establishes a connection between the entropic movement towards dissolution
and the dark abyss that spreads in her interior. In other words, she links, like Dean
Jocelin before her (and like Schopenhauer before both), the physical realm outside and
the metaphysical realm to which inward observation grants privileged access. She is
thus  able  to  articulate  a  holistic  interpretation  of  the  world,  according  to  which
69 The entropic  tendency towards absolute  exhaustion must  be distinguished from the  possible
disappearance of the world as representation, which will come about when the last conscious
being perishes (a scenario examined in connection with Pincher Martin), but which has nothing
to do with the disappearance of non-conscious life — let alone with the unavailability of energy.
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everything is metaphysically connected to everything else.70 In her view, the inside and
the outside of the world like the two sides of a coin, both bearing the stamp of death.
Living in harmony with the world means contributing to its extinction, and the best way
to do so is, in her opinion, through the malignant behaviour that has marked her life at
least since the killing of the chicks:
‘Everything’s running down. Unwinding. We’re just — tangles. Everything is just a tangle and it
slides out of itself bit by bit towards something that’s simpler and simpler — and we can help it.
Be a part’.
…
A truth appeared in her mind. The way towards simplicity is through outrage (Golding 1979:
167).
What is most striking about Sophy’s discovery is that, for the first time in Golding’s
novels, an individual’s understanding of the world is not dominated by sexuality and
the desire for individual survival, in sum by the will to perpetuation, but by the contrary
tendency towards annihilation. Sophy discovers that she and the rest of the world are
governed by entropy,  a  view that  is  the  exact  opposite  of  Sammy Mountjoy’s  idea,
quoted above, that his inner nature is characterised by an incessant activity that defies
the law of conservation of energy, hence entropy too. As far as Sophy is concerned, the
best description of the craving that keeps the world moving, and which Matty considers
the warp and woof of everything that exists, is no longer as a will to life, but rather as a
will to death and general dissolution.
The disparity between the philosophical notion of the will to life and the scientific
theory of entropy has been brought out by Barbara Hannan, according to to whom the
manifestations  of  Schopenhauer’s  essential  will  display  what  we  could call  an anti-
entropic behaviour:
70 The difference with Schopenhauer and Dean Jocelin is that Sophy does give the rest of the world
the name of what she finds inside her, but the other way round. The explanation may be that, as a
little  girl,  she  cannot  find  an  accurate  term  for  her  inner  being.  (Let  us  remember  that
Schopenhauer settled for the term will only after toying with the idea of referring to the essence
of the world as force or energy. He may have rejected these two terms to distance himself from
what, for him, was short-sighted scientism.)
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Today,  biologists  tell  us  that  life  is  differentiated  from  nonlife  by  various  entropy-resistant
activities, such as metabolism, self-repair, and self-replication. These are all features of … the
apparent striving of  the organism to keep itself  and its  kind in existence.  Schopenhauer’s …
theory says that all substances and objects possess just such autonomy (Hannan 2009: 52).
As Hannan goes on to add, to this day scientists have had difficulties to understand this
anti-entropic character of living organisms: ‘Life, with its purposeful, entropy-resistant
activities … is apparently a complex chemical phenomenon, but even modern scientists
remain stumped as to how exactly living matter arises out of nonliving matter’ (2009:
54).
As regards Golding’s novels, so far we have seen the way in which life is said to
sprout out of seemingly dead matter — stone and timber — in  The Spire  and the Sea
Trilogy. When Dean Jocelin’s and Edmund Talbot’s express their horror at the thought
of the buddying, disruptive force which could destroy the cathedral and the ship on
which their lives depend, they are merely reacting to the anti-entropic tendency of all
life. So strong is the emphasis that other Golding novels place on the kind of behaviour
that  results  from  the  entropic-resistant  tendency  towards  reproduction  and  self-
preservation that, for the reader familiar with those novels, Sophy’s description of the
world as entropic must come as a shock.
Sophy’s  view  of  the  essence  of  the  world  is  not  only  different  from  the  main
characters’ in the novels that precede Darkness Visible, but also from Mr Prettiman’s in
the Sea Trilogy. Mr Prettiman is an optimist who does not want to destruct the world
but to improve it. In the course of his conversations with Talbot, he tries to convince
the young  toff  that  the  world  is  surely  ‘great  and glorious’,  because,  he  says,  ‘“the
whole”’  cannot ‘“be less  than good”’  (Golding 1991:  667,  676).71 Upon his arrival  in
71 This explanation that equates wholeness and goodness can be applied not only to the knowable
world, as Mr Prettiman does, but also to the cosmos. Golding believes that the cosmos, which
contains the world that we know and that can only be described as hellish, is not accessible to our
knowledge in all its dimensions. His cosmic optimism, already examined, not only implies that in
that part of it that we cannot know there must be worlds that are better than ours, but also that,
despite comprising our hellish world, on the whole the cosmos must be good by virtue of that
unknown part. His guess is ‘that there are … infinite universes, and beyond that there is a thing
that I call the Good’ (cited in Clements 2012: 69).
330
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
Australia, Mr Prettiman plans to set up a community where each individual — even the
‘“poor depraved criminal”’ (676) — can live in harmony with the whole and with his or
her fellow humans.
If we understand Mr Prettiman’s explanation of  universe as the  world, that is, as
the sum of everything that can be known, in the physical as well as the metaphysical
realms, it will be easier to understand why his ideal society is a community in which
every man can ‘“live in conformity”’ with the Good, ‘“take it to him and open himself to
it”’ and, ‘“lifting his head, gaze straight into the fire of … love, … χάρις”’ (Golding 1991:
676). As Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor put it, Mr Prettiman sees the world as dominated
by an all-inclusive harmony and love ‘to which it is the longing and destiny of man to
conform’ (2002: 329). The meaning of the Greek noun that Mr Prettiman uses, χάρις,
throws light on his views. According to Henry G. Liddlell and Robert Scott’s lexicon, the
most usual translations of the noun include ‘grace’. Other meanings go from external
‘beauty’, through ‘goodwill’, ‘kindness’, ‘favour’ and ‘gratitude’, to ‘delight’. Since it is
akin to the verb χαίρω, ‘to delight’, ‘to rejoice’, ‘to express one’s joy’, χάρις can also be
translated as ‘joy’ (Liddell and Scott 1996: 1978–9, 1960–70). Thus the term used by
Mr  Prettiman  brings  him  close  to  a  fellow  passenger  who  also  feels,  though
intermittently,  the  joy  of  existence  —  Reverend  Colley.  According  to  the  social
philosopher, joy appears when there is ‘“nothing between our eyes and the Absolute’”
(Golding 1991: 676), that is, when one can look straight into it without the mediation of
rational concepts. In the course of a private conversation with his friend Lieutenant
Summers, Talbot provides more details about Mr Prettiman’s position, explaining that
the social philosopher believes in a force that can be felt both ‘“up there”’, in the outer
world, and ‘“down here”’, inside the individual (681). This suggests that Mr Prettiman,
like other Golding characters, may be describing the world according to the opinion
that he has of his inner self. If this is the case, then it can be surmised that his  joy arises
not only from the belief that there is an exact correspondence between the inner and
outer dimensions of the world, between the common essence and the way in which it
appears in consciousness, but from the feeling that the entire world thus described is
good.
The implications of the characters’ disagreement about the nature of the world are
far-reaching.  While  in  his  earlier  works  Golding  usually  gives  preference  to  the
description of the world as a hellish place pervaded by an amoral life force, in his later
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novels he not only offer other world views but presents them as equally defensible.
When  Pincher Martin and  The Spire point to a will  that might be identified as the
essence of the world, the novelist remains silent on the matter; if we can interpret these
characters’ views as an indication of Golding’s beliefs, it is because his early works did
not  offer  any  credible  alternatives.  Now that  his  characters  become engaged  in  an
implicit debate about the essence behind the appearances, referring to it in other terms
than will, Golding continues to refrain from taking sides. However, the very fact that
more that one view is now presented as plausible shows a recognition on the author’s
part that there may be a problem with the strategy of focusing inside in order to grasp
how the world is behind the screen of appearances. The lack of agreement among his
characters  suggests  that  inner  observation  is  bound  to  yield  different  results  with
different people: while some see the activity of the world as constant, others, such as
Sophy in  Darkness Visible,  see this activity as decreasing (hence the world itself  as
dominated by entropy); while Jocelin sees obscene lust, Sophy sees nihilism and Mr
Prettiman sees perfect  goodness. At  least  in the last  stage of  his  career,  Golding is
convinced that, in general, ‘seeing the situation from the point of view of two people’
without lending more weight to one than to the other serves to ‘undercut both of them’
(cited in Clements 2012: 97). In Golding’s view, this clash of different perspectives with
the same chances of being true should be enough to convince his readers that knowing
and reaching a consensus about the essence of the world is impossible.72
A good way of understanding how the very structure of Golding’s novels serves to
convey  this  authorial  change  of  attitude  towards  the  metaphysics  of  nature  is  by
72 At the same time as he problematises our knowledge of what lies behind appearances, Golding
asserts his belief in that ‘the great god Entropy’ dominates the physical world (Golding 1984:
204).  Golding’s treatment of  entropy is interesting in two respects.  First,  it  is  different from
Sophy’s, insofar as he does not establish any connection between this physical phenomenon and
his inner impulses. This can be interpreted as an implicit rejection of Sophy’s belief that entropy
is the essential drive that stirs the entire realm of appearances; in his later works, Golding’s point
is  that,  if  it  exists,  the  essence  of  the  world  cannot  be  known  in  any  way.  Secondly,  the
recognition that entropy will eventually prevail in the physical realm does not prevent Golding
from  taking  account  of  its  local  exceptions.  Life  itself  —  its  appearance,  preservation  and
reproduction — is exceptional in the context of  an entropic universe, and, indeed, Golding is
keenly interested in this and other violations (as noted by Medcalf 1987: 38).
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explaining  it  as  a  shift  from what  the  Russian  theorist  Mikhail  M.  Bakhtin  calls  a
monologic narrative to a dialogic narrative. As Bakhtin puts it, the monologic work can
be compared to a ‘stenographer’s report of a finished dialogue, from which the author
has already withdrawn and over which he is now located as if in some higher decision-
making position’ (Bakhtin 1984: 63). The dialogic work is strikingly different:
the … artistic position of the author with regard to the hero … affirms the independence, internal
freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the hero is not “he” and
not “I”, but a fully valid “thou”, that is, another and other autonomous “I” (“thou ar t”). … This is
… an authentic and unfinished dialogue (Bakhtin 1984: 63).
This contrast occurs because, in the monologic work,  ‘The all-encompassing field of
vision of the author enjoys an enormous and fundamental “surplus” in comparison with
the fields of vision of the characters’ (Bakhtin 1984: 70). With the dialogic work this
surplus does not exist.  This  means that,  ‘By the very construction of  the novel,  the
author  speaks  not  about a  character,  but  with him’  (63).  When  this  happens,  ‘A
character’s word about himself and his world is just as fully weighted as the author’s
word usually is; it is not … a mouthpiece for the author’s voice’ (7).
If  we turn  to  Golding,  we  see  that  some of  his  earlier  characters  do  act  as  his
mouthpieces — think of Simon’s mention of the  essential illness that plagues human
beings.  Concerning the use of  narratorial  perspective that  he makes throughout his
career,  it  is  evident  that  the  shift  from monologism to  dialogism is  related  to  the
gradual abandonment of third-person narrators whose reliability and authority over
the contents and characters of the story is never put into question in favour of first-
person character-narrators whose opinions have the same authority and validity — or
lack of it — as the other characters’ — and as the author’s — and whose remarks about
the limitations of their knowledge and narrative skills, on the one hand, and about the
scepticism about the metaphysics of nature with which experience has inoculated them,
on the other, become more and more frequent.
Golding’s change  from  monologism  to  dialogism  is  also  related  to  his  writing
method.  As he acknowledges in  The Hot Gates, his first book of non-fiction, Golding
intended his first published novel to be a novel of thesis or, as he prefers to call it, a
fable (Golding 1965: 85 ff.). Recalling its conception, Golding explains how one day,
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‘tired of these islands with their paper-cutout goodies and baddies and everything for
the best in the best of all possible worlds’ (Golding 1984a: 163), he said to his wife,
‘Wouldn’t it be a good idea to write a book about real boys on an island, showing what a
mess they’d make?’ (cited in Tiger 2003: 22).73 Before starting writing, then, he already
had a clear and ‘coherent picture of the subject’ (Golding 1965: 96). Discussing with
Carey the process of writing itself, Golding says: ‘I planned that very carefully’ (in Carey
1987:  187;  see Biles  1970:  60–1).  His  intention,  in brief,  was  to  work ‘within strict
limits’ so as to exclude as many superfluous details that might distract the reader as
possible (Golding 1965: 96). Given his view, shed with Biles, that ‘any book is infinitely
complicated, no matter how simple it looks’ (in Biles 1970: 57), Golding would surely
have acknowledged that the exclusion of all such details may become an impossible
task. Apart from the elements that Golding intended to support his thesis but that can
be interpreted in a different way, then, in Lord of the Flies there are others that do not
contribute to that thesis or even contradict it. In his subsequent novels, whose writing
relies ‘less and less’ on this ‘careful planning’ (in Carey 1987: 187), and these elements
take up more and more space, such that from a certain point on they may make us
forget what the original thesis was.
When he begins to challenge the possibility of knowing the inner kernel of the world
Golding does it by suggesting that all essentialist interpretations of the outside world
can  be  labelled  as  psychological  projections.  Generally  speaking,  projection  is  ‘the
operation whereby a … psychological element is displaced or relocated in an external
position,  thus  passing  either  from  centre  to  periphery  or  from  subject  to  object’
(Laplanche and Pontalis 2006: 349); in Freudian psychoanalysis, the term designates
the defence mechanism ‘whereby qualities, feelings, wishes or even “objects”, which the
subject refuses to recognise or rejects in himself, are expelled from the self and located
in another  person or  thing’  (349).  The process  of  projection involves  perceiving an
element of the outside world not objectively, as the subject believes, but according to
the subject’s own internal characteristics.
Golding’s criticism has failed to notice the complex process whereby Golding comes
to substitute the notion of projection for his initial belief that everything shares the
73 Generally speaking, Golding wrote Lord of the Flies to answer the question, ‘What would happen,
if?’ (in Carey 1987: 183). In his interview with Carey, he suggests that this imaginative search for
answers through the formulation of hypotheses is what links the literary writer to the scientist.
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same essence, that this essence can be known, and that the most accurate knowledge
that we can have of it derives from an analogy between one’s own body — which one see
not  only  from  without  but  also  from within  —  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Indeed,
projection  has  often  been  adduced  as  a  way  of  accounting  for  the  attitudes  and
behaviour of Golding’s earlier characters. McCarron, for instance, writes about Lord of
the Flies:  ‘When the hunters  place the severed head of a pig in a clearing they are
performing an act of propitiation: they have projected evil outside themselves. Simon,
however, realizes that the severed head is an ineradicable part of humanity’ (McCarron
2005: 293). In a like vein, Baker states that, in seeing Simon as the Beast, the other
children feel free to complete the circle and get rid of their feared enemy: ‘the beast
materializes in the only form he [sic] can possibly assume, the very image of his creator.
And once he is visible, projected (once the hunted has become the hunter), the circle
closes in an agony of relief’  (Baker 1965: 13–4).  This serves Baker to diagnose that
people are ‘incapable of perceiving [the] truth’ about human nature (13). In an early
psychoanalytical  analysis  of  the  novel,  Claire  Rosenfield  likewise  argues  that  the
children’s  ‘new mythology’,  according to which the outside world is  populated with
demons and spirits, results from ‘the projection into a beast of those impulses that they
cannot accept in themselves’ (Rosenfield 1988: 291).
The problem with these readings is that they refer to a novel that, when examined in
company with Pincher Martin and The Spire, makes better sense without mentioning
projection  at  all.  In  Schopenhauerian  terms,  Lord of  the  Flies is,  like  The Spire,  a
fictional account of the way in which many individuals repress the essential urge which
is active inside them (just as it is active in the whole world), and whose activity they
recognise in external reality but deny in themselves.74 The confusion of that role that
repression plays in these novels with the workings of projection can only be understood
if we take some of Golding’s comments about projection, later in his career, to refer to
his earlier works. Trying to explain the way in which human beings generally come to
terms with the world, he says to Baker: ‘I think there has been a tendency in man’s
mind, man’s nature, to make the universe in the image of his own mind. After all, there
is very little else he can do with it’ (in Baker 1982: 131). The example that precedes this
74 A comparable mistake is made in the reading of The Spire offered by Saavedra-Carballido (2014),
where projection is mentioned instead of repression as the reason why Jocelin initially sees the
will as something external to himself.
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assertion throws some light— despite the awkward reference to inner and outer black
holes — to Golding’s position:
I think it’s quite likely that we’ve got black holes out there because we’ve discovered them in here.
You know we’ve done some things in this century that we didn’t think human beings could do
and which are indescribable, and those are black holes in a way. So the next thing we do is find
them out there in the universe (in Baker 1982: 131; my italics).
This is a recognition that the structure of our minds affects the way in which we see the
world; this is a recognition that our grasp of our inner tendencies (man’s nature as we
know it  in  here)  will  also  affect  our  comprehension  of  the  world at  large.  Yet  this
recognition can be taken to refer to spurious projection only if we consider the resulting
picture of the world as unreliable. In my reading of his earlier novels, Golding does not
see  this  unreliability.  Rather,  in  them Golding  accepts  — like  Schopenhauer  — the
contents of inner consciousness as being a solid base on which to build a complete and
accurate picture of the world. In the course of time, however, Golding learns to refrain
from saying that the analogy from one’s body can result in a better knowledge of the
world. In this sense, we cannot forget that the interview in which he speaks about the
black holes  within was given after  the publication of  Darkness Visible and  Rites of
Passage,  that  is,  after  Golding had already begun to  question the legitimacy of  the
picture of the world resulting from inner consciousness. This means that, even if we
interpret his remarks as casting doubts on the legitimacy of any metaphysics of nature,
these  doubts  cannot  be  taken  to  reflect  the  picture  of  nature  offered  in  his  earlier
novels.
Even in the novels in which Golding lends credibility to the analogy between inner
and outer experience, many of his characters do not realise what is at stake. With the
exception of such gifted individuals as Simon, Golding’s characters are usually unaware
that they and the rest of the world share the same essence. As we have seen in Lord of
the Flies and  The Spire, people frequently repress what lies inside them, that is, they
regard themselves as free from uncontrollable impulses that they hold — correctly — to
dominate the rest of the world. In this respect, the situation in  Pincher Martin is the
exact reverse, because its main character sees himself as he really is, but when he is
confronted with the force that rules the world, he tries to dismiss it — mistakenly — as a
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mental creation. ‘“You are a projection of my mind”’ (Golding 1956: 194). Ironically,
Pincher’s surrogate refuses to admit that the whole island world where he has been
since his fall overboard is only a mental product.
Starting with Darkness Visible, the extrapolation from what is inside the individual
to the rest of the world is not as straightforward as in the works that come before. The
new perspective also affects the way in which he reinterprets the earlier novels, at the
cost of ignoring much textual evidence, so that their treatment of the metaphysics of
nature will be more consistent with the treatment given in the later novels. The seed of
such a change can be found in ‘Fable’: Lord of the Flies, he says in hindsight, illustrates
‘the objectifying of our own inadequacies so as to make a scapegoat’ (Golding 1965: 94).
If this is not a retrospective reference to projection, it sounds very much like one.
In acknowledging that our search for essences may incur the error of projection,
Golding reaches the same point as some of Schopenhauer’s critics. The characterisation
of the inner essence of all things and beings that Schopenhauer puts at the centre of his
pessimistic  world view may tally  well  with  how the egocentrism of  most  conscious
beings makes them see the world, but Magee considers this pessimism to be ‘logically
independent  of  [the  rest  of]  his  philosophy’  and  rooted  only  in  ‘his  psychological
development’, in particular in the experience of ‘maternal rejection’ (Magee 1997: 13,
241,  20).  Eagleton’s  criticism  is  slightly  different,  insofar  as  he  contends  that
Schopenhauer’s description  of  the  world  as  dominated  by  ceaseless  yearning,
‘irrespective of this or that particular hankering’  (Eagleton 1990: 158–9), is nothing
more than a spurious extrapolation from the commercial world of the early nineteenth
century (a world in which Schopenhauer occupies a privileged position by inheritance).
By Schopenhauer’s time, Eagleton explains, capitalist society has evolved to the point
where
the determinant role and regular repetition of appetite … permits a dramatic theoretical shift: the
construction of desire as … a momentous metaphysical event or self-identical force, as against
some earlier social order in which desire is still too narrowly particularistic, too intimately bound
up with local or traditional obligation, to be reified in quite this way (Eagleton 1990: 159).
What permits this kind of reification is not only ‘the emergence of a social order in
which, in the form of commonplace possessive individualism, appetite is now becoming
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the  order  of  the  day,  the  ruling  ideology  and  dominant  social  practice’,  but,  more
specifically,  ‘the perceived infinity of desire in a social  order where the only end of
accumulation  is  to  accumulate  afresh’  (Eagleton  1990:  159).  As  it  is  hypostasised,
‘desire comes to be seen independent of any particular ends, or at least grotesquely
disproportionate to them’ (159). In the end, capitalist appetite ‘begins monstrously to
obtrude  itself  as  … an  opaque,  … self-propelling  power  utterly  without  purpose  or
reason’ (159).75
While Schopenhauer ‘privileges the inward in Romantic style’ as the royal road to
the  essential  will,  ‘he  nevertheless  refuses  to  valorize  it’  (Eagleton  1990:  170).
Hypostasising  desire  as  he  does  allows  Schopenhauer  to  accept  ‘the  categories  of
Romantic humanism’ while simultaneously ‘inverting the valuations’ (160). Thus, on
the one hand, he ‘can retain the whole totalizing apparatus of bourgeois humanism at
its most affirmative — the singular central principle informing the whole of reality, the
integrated cosmic whole, the stable relations of phenomena and essence’ (160). On the
other hand, he can empty these forms of their idealised content — the ‘freedom, justice,
reason, progress’ that provides ‘the ideological substance of the system’ — and proceed
to replace it with ‘the actual degraded materials of everyday bourgeois existence’ (160).
As a result,  ‘the uncouth rapacity of the average bourgeois’  is  transformed into ‘the
prime metaphysical mover’ of the entire world, which is thereby ‘recast in the image of
the market force’ (160). The image of the individual that emerges from this theory is
that of ‘a helpless puppet of the will’ (160). As such, it has very little in common with
the humanist  belief  in  an individual  that  is,  in  Paul  Smith’s  words,  ‘undivided and
whole’, rational and autonomous (Smith 1988: xxxiii). The human individual is thus in
thrall to the same inhuman force that underlies the rest of the world as appearance:
At the very root of the human subject lies that which is implacably alien to it, so that … this will is
the very pith of my being, which I can feel from the inside of my body … is absolutely unlike me at
all, without consciousness or motive, as blankly unfeeling and anonymous as the force which stirs
the waves (Eagleton 1990: 161).
75 I  have  omitted  from  these  quotations  the  parts  in  which  Eagleton,  following  the  popular
interpretation of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of nature, equates the essential will with ‘a Ding-
an-sich’ or thing-in-itself that is ‘unfathomable’ (Eagleton 1990: 159).
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The claim that  the  bourgeois  person  and the waves  or  the  polyp  share  a  common
essence, and that this essence is sordid craving, ‘shakes bourgeois ideology to the root’,
and ‘removes the hope of any historical alternative’ (Eagleton 1990: 160). This is indeed
what  happens  in  Schopenhauer,  and in  Golding  too,  insofar  as  his  metaphysics  of
nature coincides with the philosopher’s.
If what Schopenhauer presents as the essential will is actually the very essence of
the capitalist enterprise, then his presentation ‘naturalizes and universalizes bourgeois
behaviour’  (Eagleton 1990:  160).  Since the naturalisation and universalisation from
which Schopenhauer’s characterisation of the essence of the world results are two of the
main  features  of  ideological  discourse  that  Eagleton  mentions  in  his  Ideology:  An
Introduction (1991), it is obvious that — contrary to what its initial lack of philosophical
impact might suggest — this aspect of Schopenhauer’s theory is much ‘in keeping with
the temper of the time’ (Magee 1997: 419), because it is actually linked to the period’s
predominant economic ideology. As defined in the Marxist tradition, to which Eagleton
himself belongs, ideology is a set of beliefs, practices and normative aspirations that
may  function  to  preserve  the  social  status  quo  and  that  often  employ  to  that  end
strategies  of unification,  rationalization,  legitimation,  naturalisation  and
universalisation.76
As Eagleton explains, its naturalising and universalising components are ‘part of the
dehistoricizing thrust of ideology, its tacit denial that ideas and beliefs are specific to a
76 I shall define these strategies in turn. According to Eagleton, ideologies ‘are rarely homogeneous’,
but,  by virtue of  their thrust towards social  unification,  they ‘strive to homogenize’  and ‘lend
coherence to the groups or classes which hold them, welding them into a unitary, if internally
differentiated,  identity,  and  perhaps  thereby  allowing  them  to  impose  a  certain  unity  upon
society as a whole’  (Eagleton 1991:  45).  In the psychoanalytical definition of  the term, which
Eagleton adopts, the rationalisation of the social situation is a ‘Procedure whereby the subject
attempts to present an explanation that is either logically consistent or ethically acceptable for
attitudes, ideas, feelings, etc., whose true motives are not perceived’ (cited in Eagleton 1991: 51;
originally in Laplanche and Pontalis 2006: 375). The legitimation of the social situation is ‘the
process by which a ruling power comes to secure from its subjects an at least tacit consent to its
authority’  (Eagleton  1991:  54).  Naturalisation  involves  making  the  social  situation  ‘appear
spontaneous and inevitable’  (55).  Universalisation consists  in  presenting values and interests




particular time, place and social group’ (Eagleton 1991: 59). Therefore, extending the
capitalist organisation of human life to all historical periods and, beyond the human
sphere, to all animate and inanimate beings, thus giving the idea that the capitalist way
of life is necessary and unavoidable, is doubtlessly an ideological manoeuvre. This is
precisely  the  move  made  by  Schopenhauer  when  he  reifies  the  passions  that  keep
capitalism going into a timeless urge that underlies the world as a whole irrespective of
spatial and temporal considerations. Despite this fundamental flaw, Eagleton does not
dismiss Schopenhauer’s thought as totally worthless. On the contrary, it deserves being
paid attention to because of what it reveals about human history. Once its ideological
underpinnings  have  been  laid  bare,  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  can  be  read  as  an
indictment  not  of  the  entire  world,  but  of  past  human  history,  of  the  history  of
capitalism in particular, and thereby as a guiding light for the future. Thus Eagleton
admits that Schopenhauer’s ‘appalling vision’ of history is accurate in many respects:
‘The dramatic mutations of human history, its epochal ruptures and upheavals, have
been  in  one  sense  mere  variations  on  a  consistent  theme  of  exploitation  and
oppression’  (Eagleton  1990:  158).  Though  Eagleton  hurries  to  specify  that
Schopenhauer’s bleak portrayal is only a characterisation ‘of all  history  to date’,  the
qualification does not prevent him from adding that the philosopher’s thought serves as
a reminder that this ‘intolerable narrative cannot continue’ (158; my italic).  It is the
belief  that the course of history can be changed that inspires emancipatory political
struggles (of the kind that Eagleton supports), ‘even as the crippling burden of that
history would seem to bear mute witness against the feasibility of such a faith’ (158).
It can be argued that Golding’s earlier novels too are a testimony to the horrors of
history, insofar as they are trapped by the same ideology as Schopenhauer’s thought,
that is, insofar as they repeat Schopenhauer’s naturalising and universalising move by
depicting individuals as dominated by an uncontrollable thirst, a desire to explore and
exploit  whatever  resources  they  come across,  in  sum to  obtain  as  much benefit  as
possible  from any situation.  There  is  a  difference though between the two authors.
While Schopenhauer maintains his position concerning the world’s essence throughout
his  life,  Golding  does  not.  Starting  with  Darkness  Visible,  he  does  not  hesitate  to
problematise  the  hypostasisation of  the  contents  of  inner  consciousness.  However,
whereas  Eagleton criticises  Schopenhauer’s  model  as  a  vehicle  of  ideology,  Golding
seems to have moved beyond his earlier stance for empirical reasons: since the contents
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of inner observation are bound to vary among individuals, positing those contents as
the door to the inner side of the entire world will not develop into a unified body of
theory but will degenerate into an intractable proliferation of conflicting opinions.
We have seen that, as they cast doubts on the kind of extrapolation carried out by
Schopenhauer, Golding’s later works start to dismiss essentialism and to consider it a
case of psychological projection. This does not mean that the new approach will save
Golding from criticism. His characters tend to view the external world as characterised
by fragmentation and conflict, hence by suffering; but perhaps their view is the result of
their projecting inner fragmentation and conflict.  Judging from what psychoanalysis
has to say about the fragmented psyche, Golding’s presentation of external conflict as
arising from projection could be ideologically inflected too.
From  a  psychoanalytical  perspective,  fragmentation  and  conflict  are  the  most
salient  features of  the human psyche.  According to Freud,  the psychic apparatus is
divided  into  systems (according  to  the first  topography,  these  are  the  unconscious,
preconscious and conscious) and into agencies (according to the second topography,
these are the id, ego and superego). According to Lacan, the subject is constituted by a
gap, essentially divided, a split that ‘indicates the presence of the unconscious’ (Evans
1996: 192). Lacan’s ‘objection to any reference to totality in the individual’ stems from
the  fact  that  subjectivity  itself,  which  is  a  consequence  of  socialisation,  ‘introduces
division therein’ (Lacan 2006: 242). Psychoanalytical theorists are well aware that the
way in which the individual deals with this gap is historically inflected. Sometimes the
solution is projection. In this regard, Lacan argues that there is a certain psychological
attitude that is  peculiar to the modern mind: ‘The me [moi] of modern man … has
taken on its form in the dialectical impasse of the beautiful soul who does not recognize
his very reason for being in the disorder he denounces in the world’ (233). In Muller
and  Richardson’s  interpretation  of  this  passage,  it  is  not  only  the  belle  âme that
‘projects internal conflict onto the world and then proceeds to denounce it’ (Muller and
Richardson 1982: 313). In their opinion, this attitude is characteristic of the modern
frame  of  mind  as  a  whole:  in  Western  modernity,  they  say,  ‘the  defensive  self-
righteousness of the ego arises to cover the gap and overcome the fear of fragmentation,
and this internal disorder is in turn denounced in the other, who is seen as a threat to
the ego’ (130). It could be argued, in this light, that what Golding does is to present this
kind of projection not as peculiar to modernity but characteristic of all human history.
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Thus, Golding himself  could be accused of projecting the modern frame of mind to
other eras,  turning it  into a transhistorical  constant.  The outcome would be just  as
ideological as that of the extrapolation from the desires of contemporary humans to the
entire world.
As it turns out, not all of Golding’s characters see the external world as the stage of
never-ending discord and antagonism. As we have seen, in his latter novels some prefer
to project  an ideal  order  or  harmony of  goals.  This  applies  even to  Sophy,  who in
Darkness Visible offers a nihilistic version of that harmony: in her opinion, as we have
seen, outer reality is as much dominated as her own interior by an entropic tendency
that will inevitably result in a state of peace from which there is no escape. A naive
observer might conclude that the way in which the world runs down is through violence
and conflict;  yet  the entropic impulse to general  consumption which dominates the
whole is  also characteristic  of  its  separate parts,  all  of  which move together in this
direction. More straightforward examples of the harmony that the world may reach can
be  found  in  the  Sea  Trilogy;  two  of  its  main  characters,  Reverend  Colley  and  Mr
Prettiman, display the same faith as Sophy in a harmonious whole, the difference being
that they see that whole not as heading for self-destruction but as glorious and good.
Certainly not all of the characters in the trilogy are as optimistic as them: Talbot, to
take a case in point, still sees in both humans relationships and natural phenomena a
perpetual inclination to conflict.
From Eagleton’s and Lacan’s perspectives, it is obvious that all of these characters
are trapped by an ideological dynamic of projection. It is equally obvious, however, that
in his later novels Golding’s attitude is very different from the one in his earlier novels:
instead  of  endorsing,  as  he  used  to  do  (e.g.  through  the  use  that  his  third-person
narrators make of dynamic descriptions), the metaphysical view — always the same —
that his visionary characters hold, now Golding prefers to refrain from endorsing any of
the metaphysical theories that his characters put forward. In itself, this is an implicit
gesture of  authorial rejection, a gesture that Golding no doubt wants his readers to
imitate. By virtue of the diverging metaphysical attitudes towards the external world
that they contain, and by virtue of the distance that Golding now — unlike before —
prefers  to  keep from all  of  those views,  Darkness Visible and the Sea  Trilogy  thus
succeed in offering a treatment of the metaphysics of nature that, by presenting it as
inevitably guilty of projection, avoids the ideological traps against which Eagleton and
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Lacan protest. As the introduction of the term projection in his retrospective discussion
of Lord of the Flies makes clear, Golding also wanted his readers to approach his earlier
novels from the position of suspicious detachment that his later novels were meant to
place them.
3.2.3. The Path to Utopia in the Sea Trilogy
The  realisation  that  all  the  descriptions  of  the  world’s  immanent  essence  along
Schopenhauerian lines are likely to be cases of projection must have been a difficult one
for  Golding,  because  it  involved  abandoning  one  possible  explanation  for  his  own
personality. Golding’s dismissal of this kind of metaphysics of nature involves rejecting
not only his later  characters’  opinions in this respect,  but also the opinions that he
defended in his earlier novels and which might have served him to explain why some
individuals  can  have  the  kind  of  visionary  experiences  he  himself  claimed  to  have
undergone, and why so many people, starting with himself, nevertheless find it so easy
to  engage  in  violent  behaviour.  In  this  latter  respect, we  must  not  forget  that  he
sometimes  described  himself,  in  terms  that  remind of  many  of  the  children  in  his
novels, as having been a self-centred and ‘difficult’ child who not only loved ‘fights’ and
had ‘a desire to be rowdy, and a leader in rowdiness’, but ‘enjoyed hurting people’ and
‘exulted in … the complete subjugation of [his] adversary’ (Golding 1965: 159–61); his
journals record how, being an Oxford undergraduate, he ‘tried unhandily to rape’ a girl
in the same way as Oliver does in  The Pyramid (cited in Carey 2009: 46); and like
Sammy Mountjoy in  Free Fall he later ‘ditched the girl [he] was going to marry’  to
marry another instead (cited in Carey 2009: 76).
At the same time as he abandons the essentialist positions that inform his earlier
novels (and which are connected with the way in which he sees his own personality),
Golding moves closer than ever to the optimistic political positions that he associates
with  his  radical  parents  (whose  personal  qualities  he  always  admired  but  whose
opinions in this respect he had hitherto described as naive). Actually, this movement
has less to do with the rejection of essentialism than with the defence of the individual’s
moral autonomy offered in Free Fall.  In this novel, let us recall, Golding’s individuals
become autonomous  moral subjects, in whose power it is to alter the course of their
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lives  and  to  contribute  to  social  transformation.  Though  in  this  novel  the  positive
political opportunities afforded by free choice remain unexplored, Golding elaborates
on them in his last finished books: in the Sea Trilogy Golding examines the possibility
of  setting  up  a  utopian  community  as  an  alternative  to  existing  social  structures.
Together,  the  three  novels  recount  a  year-long  voyage  to  Australia  in  the  early
nineteenth-century, and the events that take place immediately after his arrival there.
For young Edmund Talbot, the main character and narrator, the journey consists in an
often painful process of maturation. Among the numerous events that contribute to
this, the main ones can be brought under just a few thematic headings: love, aesthetics,
death, the value of compassion, society and politics. Here I shall only focus on the last
two.
In Free Fall we see how, as he recalls his confinement in a Nazi camp during the
Second World War, Sammy Mountjoy establishes a direct connection between the free
adoption of a moral disposition and the socio-political situation of the age: the Second
World War, he says, is like ‘the ghastly and ferocious play of children who having made
a wrong choice of a series of them were … helplessly tormenting each other because a
wrong use of freedom had lost them their freedom’ (Golding 1959: 150). This passage
draws attention to  the negative  consequences  of  one’s  misuse of  freedom, not  only
those that follow from the adoption of the wrong kind of moral disposition, but also
those added by stubbornly clinging to this evil disposition. In the latter case (on which
existentialist philosophy put a lot of emphasis), the autonomous subject betrays his or
her freedom by renouncing use it in order to abandon the evil disposition that he or she
has  adopted.  According  to  Sartrean  existentialism,  this  ‘loss  of  freedom’,  to  which
Monod draws attention (1982: 252), would be an example of bad faith.
Though it does explore the negative consequences that the misuse of freedom may
have,  Free  Fall does  not  explore  the  positive  consequences  that  may  follow  from
people’s choices. This is something that Golding postpones until the Sea Trilogy. Like
Free  Fall,  the  trilogy is  a  first-person  narration.  The autobiographical  mode allows
character-narrator to assess, in hindsight, his own evolution towards maturity over a
period whose memory keeps haunting him many years later. Crucially, this process of
self-assessment has an important socio-political dimension.
The vicissitudes of the voyage on which Talbot has embarked teach him, among
other things,  to differentiate between the social  façade and true worth (respectively
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exemplified by Lieutenants Deverel and Summers), and to assume the social duty of
improving collective life. By the end of his narrative, he is virtually a new man. The
distance  between  Talbot’s  younger  and  older  selves  can  be  measured  by  the
descriptions that he provides at the beginning and at the end of his story. Young Talbot
smugly  considers  himself  ‘a  good  enough  fellow  at  bottom’  despite  his  ‘boundless’
ambition (Golding 1991:  3,  9).  By contrast,  old Talbot is  wise enough to remember
neither ‘a young gentleman’ on his way ‘to assist the governor in the administration of
one of His Majesty’s colonies’, nor ‘a man of breeding, education and intelligence’, but
‘a lanky young fool with everything to learn and nothing to lose’ (3, 484, 750).
Talbot’s  painful  re-education  begins  when  he  is  forced  to  face  up  to  the
consequences of his repeated social blunders, with the ship’s captain as well as with his
fellow passengers. As the narrative unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that many of
these errors are caused by his unfortunate proneness to social misjudgement. This is
especially evident in his relationship with Lieutenants Summers and Deverel. Owing to
his excessive reliance on external signs of  social  position such as  accent,  attire and
manners, Talbot is slow to realise that Summers, a good officer of humble origins who
has made his way through the ranks,  is much worthier of close friendship than the
better-bred Deverel, whom Talbot takes to be ‘the most gentleman-like of the officers’
(Golding 1991: 310). It is only after Deverel’s ‘negligence and intemperance’ has not
only put the ship and everyone’s lives at risk but also insulted his captain, that Talbot
becomes aware of the danger of relying so much on social appearances.
The passengers whom Talbot’s ‘lofty demeanour’ and obtuseness annoy most are
undoubtedly Letitia Granham, a former governess, and her fiancé and later husband
Mr Prettiman,  a  ‘social  philosopher’  whom everyone considers  an atheist  and upon
whom Talbot has to ‘keep an eye’ at his godfather’s request (Golding 1991: 247, 50,
240). Having just set out, Talbot declares his opposition ‘to those who approve of the
outrageous follies of democracy’ (34). By contrast, Mr Prettiman is said to be a declared
‘friend of Republicans and Jacobins’, and to extol ‘the social benefits of revolution’ (170,
250). Like many revolutionaries, Mr Prettiman is a firm believer in ‘the inevitability of
the process by which true liberty must lead to true equality’ (238); but his own methods
are pacific. His and his partner’s plan is ‘to lead a caravan to found the Ideal City’ in the
Australian outback, aided by ‘A handful of immigrants and freed government men’ (ex-
convicts),  and  ‘one  or  two  savages’  (704,  744).  While  that  moment  arrives,  the
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Prettimans  take upon themselves the task of  re-educating Talbot,  whose ‘birth  and
upbringing’ they regard a ‘disadvantage’ (242).
After many perils  (including, in  Fire Down Below,  a  near crash, which the ship
miraculously avoids, against the icy cliffs of as yet undiscovered Antarctica), the crew
eventually sights the coast of Australia. Paradoxically, it is upon his arrival at Sydney
Cove that young Talbot goes through what he calls ‘the unhappiest period of [his] life’
(Golding  1991:  733).  After  receiving  the  news  of  his  godfather’s  recent  demise,  a
‘disaster’ that thwarts his worldly ambitions (729), Talbot witnesses how Summers —
whom, despite the growing distance between them in social and political matters, he
still  considers  a  good  friend  —  dies  in  the  fire  that  destroys  the  moored.  Then,
unexpectedly,  two  letters  from  his  parents  announce  to  him  that,  thanks  to  his
godfather’s death, he has been bought into Parliament via a rotten borough, that is, via
an election constituency that, before the passing of the Reform Bills between 1831 and
1832, had so few electors that they could be personally bullied or bribed (see Arnold-
Baker 2001: 1054–6). Now that Talbot’s fortunes are restored, three alternatives open
up to him. In the first place, he can go back to his old self — and thus to the view that
the best form of government ‘“cannot be representation by everyone”’ (253), that, as
long as they remained ‘“in the right hands”’, rotten boroughs would be an invaluable
part of ‘“a contradictory and cumbersome system”’ whose ‘“imperfections”’ made it all
the  more suitable  to  govern  its  far  from perfect  subjects  (254),  and that  ‘“civilized
nations will more and more take over the administration of the backward part of the
world”’ (253) — and take possession of his seat ‘to exercise power for the betterment of
[his] country’, that is (and here that reader is expected to share the author’s distance
from the character), ‘for the benefit of the world’ (678). Alternatively, Talbot can reject
his seat  and join the Prettimans,  as  they expect him to,  in their  construction of  an
egalitarian  community.  Finally,  Talbot  can  steer  a  comfortable  middle  course  and
‘accept election by the route of … a “Rotten Borough” solely … to [work for] the reform
of an insane and unfair system!’ (757). Talbot has set out on the voyage as a committed
Conservative;  but  due  to  his  friendship  with  Summers,  and  his  flirtation  with  the
Prettimans’ radical sensibility, the choice proves more difficult than expected. In some
respects, Summers is just as conservative as Talbot; but, paradoxically, the discovery of
Summers’s professional and personal worth predisposes Talbot to admit the benefits of
meritocracy — a system upon which the strength of the navy seems to rest — over the
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aristocratic values in which he has been raised. For a while the Prettimans’ influence
seems to open Talbot’s  eyes to the need for a fairer social  structure than would be
achieved through mere reform; yet  in the end Talbot remains too tied to ‘common
sense’  to countenance the idea of joining the Prettimans’  ‘festival of joy’  (677,  761).
Though the  only  evidence  that  we  have in  this  respect  at  the  end of  the  trilogy  is
Talbot’s  own  statement  of  intent,  if  we  take  him  at  his  own  word  for  once  his
subsequent political career is in the reformist camp.
Obviously, the point of Talbot’s narrative is to show how his whole life turns — like
Sammy  Mountjoy’s  in  Free  Fall —  on  a  crucial  moment  of  choice.  This  moment
provides the coda to  Fire Down Below,  the last novel of the Sea Trilogy. McCarron
explains the relationship between Talbot’s and Sammy’s decisions:
Like Golding’s earlier novel Free Fall, Fire Down Below is principally concerned with choice. In
Free Fall, Samuel Mountjoy chooses Beatrice Ifor: the world of the flesh over that of the spirit. In
Fire Down Below,  Talbot makes precisely the same choice;  the narrative is  centred upon his
crucial decision not to accompany Mr Prettiman on his quest (McCarron 2007: 196).
Despite  his  refusal  to  join  Mr  Prettiman,  Talbot  is  no  longer  the  chauvinist
Conservative that he used to be. At the beginning of his narrative, he expresses his
scepticism about the promise of ‘“an impossible liberty and equality”’  offered by ‘“a
perfect scheme of government may be fitted over the poor, imperfect face of humanity”’
(Golding 1991: 289, 254). Upon his arrival in Australia, he is still too concerned that the
Prettimans’ success might destroy his ‘sanity and security’ (760). Nevertheless, he no
longer  identifies  utopian  revolution,  as  he  does  until  the  Prettimans’  disclose  their
pacific intentions, with an outbreak of violence that could turn ‘ordered societies into
images of chaos’ (290) Due to his conversations with the Prettimans, Talbot distances
himself from Summers’s (honest but short-sighted) conservatism, moving much closer
to radical positions than he was when he left home.
McCarron points out that ‘Talbot chose the life he would lead and it has been a good
one, but he never stops wondering whether he made the correct choice’ (2007: 199).
Some readers  may see  his  choice  as  wrong.  In  order  to  decide whether  this  is  the
conclusion that Golding wants his readers to reach, I think it necessary to compare the
character’s  position with the author’s.  Always a committed supporter of democracy,
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Golding describes himself to Biles as ‘more socialist than liberal’ (in Biles 1970: 49).
The  inclusion  of  the  Prettimans’  in  the  Sea  Trilogy,  and  the  respect  that  they  are
probably intended to inspire in the reader, shows that Golding does not see violence as
the  only  possible  path  to  utopia.  He  nevertheless  remains,  like  Talbot,  somewhat
sceptical about utopian solutions. Even in his later writings, political reform seems to
be the only route that viable societies can follow, first to survive, and then, if possible,
to  become  increasingly  fair.  In  the  piece  entitled  ‘Belief  and  Creativity’,  Golding
suggests  that,  confronted  with  the  choice  between  conservative  stasis  and  the
revolutionary leap of faith, he would like to be able to join the ‘revolutionary’ in the
‘revolt against reductionism’ represented by Lieutenant Summers (Golding 1984a: 187).
Nevertheless, the novelist confesses straight away to not counting himself among ‘the
geniuses of belief’ that ‘can murder for democracy’ or that, like the Prettimans, set out
to create a paradise on earth (189).
Commenting on the differences of character between the Prettimans and Talbot,
Golding  contrasts  the  former’s  ‘impossible  quest’  with  the  latter’s  lack  of  ‘passion’
(Golding  1991:  xi).  If  we  take  this  remark  to  cast  Talbot’s  reformism  in  a  slightly
negative  light,  the  same  judgement  must  be  passed  on  Golding’s  political  realism.
Because of the similarities between Golding’s and old Talbot’s political realism, the Sea
Trilogy can be read as an indictment of the novelist’s lack of political daring. Even so,
that Talbot and Golding fail to live up to the utopian promise does not mean that utopia
is out of the question. Judging from Talbot endorsement the Prettimans, it looks as if
he — like Golding — wished to be proved wrong in his conviction that utopias are not
feasible; but it also looks as if he — again like Golding — did not have the courage to
produce the proof himself. As it seems, Golding uses Talbot to examine, and distance
himself from, his own anti-utopian tendencies. It must be recalled, in this respect, that
Golding  could  never  forget  about  his  radical  parents’  utopian  longings.  As  Carey
suggests,  Golding’s  characterisation  of  the  Prettimans  is  reminiscent  ‘of  his  own
parents — the two idealists who, in family legend, had stood … forwarding the cause of
women’s rights and other worthy aims’ (Carey 2009: 477). In the piece entitled ‘The
Ladder and the Tree’, Golding himself states that her father was a ‘generous, loving,
saintly’ man whose ‘human stature’ grows the more he thinks of him (173–4) — just like
Mr Prettiman’s in Talbot’s memory.
348
An Interpretation of Golding’s Metaphysics
In comparison with Golding’s parents’ active involvement in the transformation of
existing society from inside, the Prettimans’ plan to set up an ideal community could be
interpreted  as  an  escapist  gesture.  From  this  angle,  our  judgement  of  Talbot  may
change  somewhat  (indeed,  it  may  become  more  positive  than  Golding  probably
intended):  despite  Mr  Prettiman’s  sympathy  for  the  French  revolutionaries,  he  can
offer no real hope for mankind, while Talbot’s return to the metropole is a token of
political  maturity.  In  general,  however,  readers  of  the  trilogy  have  sided  with  the
Prettimans against Talbot. In view of Talbot’s rejection of the Prettimans’ invitation to
accompany them, McCarron, for example, concludes that ‘the last of Golding’s books
published in his lifetime can also be read as a deeply conservative political allegory and,
overall,  as  one  of  his  most  deeply  pessimistic  novels’  (2007:  194–5).  Carey,  who
concurs, further states that the trilogy ends with the Prettimans ‘being shown as the
moral  and  intellectual  superior[s]  of  the  toff  Edmund  Talbot’  (Carey  2009:  477).
According to this critic,  the last stretch of the narrative puts the accent on Talbot’s
‘cowardly  failure  to  respond  to  [the  Prettimans’]  altruism  or  share  their  hopes  of
mankind’ (476).
From McCarron’s and Carey’s perspective, what makes the ending of the Sea Trilogy
sad is Talbot’s cowardice. But even if they are right about Talbot and the Pretimmans,
they  seem  to  miss  several  important  points.  To  begin  with,  Talbot  undergoes  an
evolution that brings him closer to progressive politics. As a result, the implications of
the Sea Trilogy are not  as  conservative  or pessimistic  as  McCarron says.  The same
conclusion can be reached if we compare the trilogy with the novels that precede it:
here Golding no longer endorses moral and physical repression — always within the
limits  of  democratic  legislation  —  as  the  only  way  of  improving  society.  Obviously
Talbot is not a revolutionary, but this does not mean that his newly acquired reformism
can be played down. In the context of Golding’s oeuvre, Talbot’s trajectory is a great
advance. If we compare the complicitous response that is expected from the readers of
Lord  of  the  Flies —  a  novel  that  sides  with  repression  unequivocally  —  with  the
indignation with which we are expected to react to Talbot’s view that violent repression
— additionally  tainted by classism,  sexism and imperialist  racism — is  ‘“a  civilized
attempt  at  reformation”’  whereby  ‘“the  violent  and  hopelessly  depraved  ones  are
restrained”’  and the ‘“really  wicked … are  sent  off  to  an island and beaten too”’  —
though ‘“never too much”’ (Golding 1991: 747). The moral and socio-political worlds
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depicted in  Lord of the Flies and the Sea Trilogy are very different — and so is the
authorial attitude to them. Long past is  the time when Golding could write a novel
whose theme is, as he says of Lord of the Flies, the ‘emotion’ of ‘grief, sheer grief, grief,
grief,  grief’  (Golding 1984a:  163). Even if  Talbot’s  tepid reaction to  Mr Prettiman’s
summons were a token of his political failure, in the trilogy there is another character —
Letitia Graham — who does choose to commit herself to Mr Prettiman’s cause. Though
Talbot is the main narrator and focaliser in the Sea Trilogy (the other being Reverend
Colley),  his  reliability  is  in  question  from  the  outset.  His  perspective  colours  our
understanding  of  almost  everything  that  happens  in  the  novel,  but  the  authorial
position is closer to the Prettimans’. From this angle, the political point of the trilogy is
that,  though many of  us  may lack,  like  well-intentioned Talbot,  the  courage or  the
determination to make a clean break with the past, thus contributing to alter the course
of history, many others may well be more daring.
At this  point  in  Golding’s  career,  what  makes radical  transformation or  gradual
improvement possible is that, however strong one’s innate propensities and the power
of habit, we are basically free, and nothing prevents us from taking a determined step
forward.  This  idea contradicts  the earlier  view that  the essential  features of  society
cannot be changed because it depends on human nature, which is dominated by egoism
and malice, and the ensuing advocacy of repressive measures as the only solution to
uncontrolled violence. There are several possible reasons for this authorial change of
mind. Golding’s earlier works suggest that, despite the impossibility of changing one’s
inborn character, everyone, including malignant persons, can find their lawful place in
a democratic system. Perhaps Golding realised that, depending on which laws are in
force, such practices as torture, even if morally reproachable, could be seen as desirable
from a legal  perspective.  This  position must  have seem to him untenable.  Another
possible reason why Golding came to reject his earlier views on character is even more
directly related to his political leanings. Precisely for their possible conservative thrust,
the implications of his earlier novels must have become unacceptable to a man who
describes himself to Boles as ‘Bitterly left  of center’ (in Biles 1970: 48). In order to
change the conclusion that only repressive societies are feasible he had to change the
premises, i.e. that because of their most humans are naturally inclined to cause evil.
This is indeed what he does in  Free Fall.  After this, nothing prevents Golding from
giving utopia a more positive treatment than, for example, in ‘Utopias and Antiutopias’.
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Interestingly enough,  Talbot’s  free embrace of  worldly comfort  instead of utopia
throws retrospective light on the choice made by the protagonist of an earlier novel,
The  Pyramid.  Like  Free  Fall and  the  Sea  Trilogy,  The  Pyramid is  a  first-person
narrative. It is made up of three juxtaposed episodes from the life of Oliver, who acts as
their  protagonist and narrator.  Though the narrative sometimes veers towards light
comedy, this does not suffice to counterbalance the ominous intimation of collective
paralysis. The tone of defeat of Oliver’s narrative has to do with his portrayal of social
prejudice, in such matters as class and sexual orientation, of the villagers’ lack of love
and of their obsession with materialistic calculation. On its very last page The Pyramid
tackles, like Free Fall and the Sea Trilogy, the thorny issue of free choice.
Set  for  the  most  part  in  the  1920s,  The Pyramid  tells  us  about  Oliver,  who,  at
eighteen, wants to enjoy himself before going to university to read chemistry. He lives
in  Stilbourne,  a  small  English  country  town  where  everyone  knows  everyone,  and
where the streets and their inhabitants are marked out in terms of social class and a
corresponding hierarchy that extends from the respectable to the disreputable. Oliver’s
family belongs to the lower middle class, and though his parents pin all their hopes of
social advancement on the shoulders of their only son, he endangers them by becoming
sexually  involved with Evie,  a  local  working-class  girl,  and by developing a  sudden
obsession  with playing the  piano (an activity  that  he  initially  takes  up because his
parents’ see this kind of hobby as a mark of social status). The novel finishes with a visit
that old Oliver, who has eventually pursued a career as a scientist, pays to Stilbourne,
during which he shares his suspicion that a musical vocation would have hindered his
material success. Reflecting on his ‘power of choosing the future’, a power that would
have  enabled  him  to  leave  behind  the  values  of  prudish  comfort  and  materialistic
calculation in which he has been raised, Oliver asserts, like Sammy Mountjoy in Free
Fall, that he ‘would pay anything — anything’ to change the course of his life; but ‘in
the same instant’ he rejects the idea, feeling compelled to admit, like Edmund Talbot,
that he ‘would never pay more than a reasonable price’ for such a life (Golding 1967:
217).
If we read it side by side with  Free Fall and the Sea Trilogy, we realise that  The
Pyramid turns on the notion of freedom, on the inevitability of making choices and on
the negative consequences that they may have.  The way in which Sammy Mountjoy
describes his own choice and its effects limits their influence to the personal sphere; but
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The Pyramid and, above all, the Sea Trilogy, open the focus in order to show the social
and  political  repercussions  of  our  decisions.  Like  the  emphasis  on  the  freedom  to
decide what to will, the idea that this individual freedom can affect social and political
organisation is a departure from Golding’s basic stance.  In the last analysis, this idea
opens the door to utopia, and for this reason it can be interpreted as giving Golding
some reason for hope.
3.3. The Changing Place of the Divinity
In the foregoing two chapters I have investigated the metaphysical themes that Golding
shares with Schopenhauer, first focusing on the way in which Golding’s basic stance
coincides with the philosopher’s,  and then proceeding to analyse the ways in which
Golding’s gradual additions diverge from Schopenhauer’s views. Now I shall look into
an element that is not included in Schopenhauer’s model, but which occupies a salient
place in Golding’s world view, both in the earlier and in the later phases of his career.
This element is the divinity, whose presence and function, inside as well as outside his
fiction, merits some examination.77 From the point of view of Golding’s metaphysical
views, the analysis of the treatment that he gives to the divinity receives in his novels is
interesting because it tends to run parallel to — indeed to become confused with — the
treatment of the inner essence of the world; though Golding’s novels eventually stop
paying attention to that essence, they still concern themselves with the divinity, and
their treatment of the latter can still throw light, by dint of that initial confusion, on
Golding’s changing views on the world’s essence.
Though Golding constantly refers to the divinity, in his fiction and outside it alike,
he always makes it clear, as we saw in the Introduction, that his beliefs do not conform
to the orthodoxy of any religious creed, whether Christian or otherwise. Though the
language that he uses to talk about the divinity outside his fiction brings him close to
Christianity, the image of if that transpires from his novels, even from those in which
77 Given the polymorphous characterisation of the divinity that Golding offers, I prefer to employ
the pronoun  it and the lower case,  except  when discussing the ways in which Golding (who
usually prefers the masculine pronoun he in lower case), his narrators or his characters tackle the
issue; in those cases I adopt the terms that they use.
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the knowledge of the divinity is asserted, often fails to conform to the Christian idea of
a benevolent Creator that takes care of His creation. In this regard, Golding’s novels are
closer  to  Schopenhauer  —  who  rejects  the  ‘ontology  of  traditional  Christianity’
according to which ‘world, God and devil as separate entities’ (Young 2005: 250 n. 8) —
than the novelist’s own opinions are. This is due to the confusion mentioned above: if
the divinity appears in the same terms as the essence of the world, and if this essence is
presented  as  having,  especially  in  Golding’s  earlier  novels,  the  same  features  as
Schopenhauer’s  will  to  life,  then  the  divinity  cannot  but  come over  as  a  fearsome,
amoral force. Outside his novels, Golding generally managed to avoid this confusion,
keeping his references to the divinity separated from those to the essence of the world.
My discussion of the ways in which the divinity appears outside Golding’s novels
will proceed in chronological order. The focus will be both in Golding’s retrospective
comments  on  his  novels  and in  he other  remarks  about  the  divinity  in  his  essays,
reviews and interviews. As we shall see, Golding speaks of the divinity in two different
ways: as a (probably transcendent) God whose attributes are generally compatible with
those of  the  Christian Creator,  and the (immanent)  mother  goddess.  Though these
descriptions of the divinity are incompatible with each other, their coexistence can be
understood as an embodiment of Golding’s opinion, expressed in the opening essays of
A Moving Target, that throughout history cultural beliefs have always come ‘in layers,
each age superimposed on an obscurer  and more savage one’  (Golding 1984a:  37);
despite  the  widespread  impression  of  historical  progress,  these  layers  have  always
‘existed  together’  (37),  especially  in  the  religious  sphere  where  all  the  successive
revolutions ‘have affected only the top half of our minds’, leaving us with older attitudes
‘deep in our … unconscious’  (9).  Using the cult  of  Apollo at  Delphi as an example,
Golding  explains  how  in  ancient  Greece  male-centred  religion  tried  to  displace  —
without complete success — the earlier cult of ‘the Great Mother, the Earth Mother’
(37). Similarly, Christianity did not supersede paganism completely, and the probable
reason  is  that  Christian  faith  derived  much of  its  power  from pagan beliefs  which
nevertheless continue to thrive — as  The Spire makes clear — ‘just below the surface’
(37).
As regards the view of the divinity as a male Creator, the emphasis of my discussion
will fall on the way in which Golding uses the existence of God — an existence that he
first presents, like His goodness, as a verifiable fact, but which he later reduces to a
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matter of faith — to explain certain aspects of his fiction. As we shall see, this kind of
explanation  separates  him  from  Schopenhauer.  This  is  evident,  for  instance,  when
Golding tries to explain the presence of saints — the living proof that a good God exists
— in his novels. Unlike Schopenhauer, he does not link the existence of saints to the
free  activity  of  an  essential  will  that  is  neither  good  nor  bad,  but  directly  to  the
existence and benevolence God. Apart from the existence of saints, God serves Golding
to explain why some of his characters die despite their reluctance to do so, and where
their vicious conduct comes from. Commenting on  Pincher Martin, for instance, the
novelists states that the main character’s death confirms the existence of a merciful God
that puts an end to a life dominated by suffering. Golding also suggests two possible
sources of the main character’s behaviour, both of which have to do with his status as a
divine creation: either he has been endowed by God with an innate character, in which
case he cannot but act as he does (an explanation that is consistent with Golding’s basic
world view),  or  God has granted him the power of  free  choice.  The final  aspect  of
human existence that Golding tries to explain through God is creativity. In ‘Belief and
Creativity’, he reduces the existence of God to a matter of faith. This does not prevent
him from claiming that, if we look at people’s creative efforts, we can imagine what God
is like, but also that the belief in God’s creativity, together with the belief that He has
created us in His own image, can serve to explain why humans are creative beings.
As regards the view of the divinity as the mother goddess Gaia that is identical with
our planet, it comes very close to the image of the divinity that we encounter in Lord of
the Flies — where God is said to have given shape to the island, and hence He is made,
by extension, responsible for the emergence of the realm of appearances — and in The
Inheritors — where the People worship the mother goddess Oa, who, being responsible
for the cycle of life and death to which human beings, like the rest of living beings, are
subjected, uses her power not only in a creative way but also to bring destruction. In
both  cases,  it  is  not  difficult  to  identify  the  divinity  with  the  essential  will  that
Schopenhauer speaks of. If we compare Schopenhauer’s attitude with Golding’s novels,
however,  we  should  not  be  misled  by  their  common  use  of  Christian  terminology.
Though Schopenhauer discusses the possible existence and attributes of the divinity, it
is only to argue against the inclusion of divine elements into any serious philosophical
model.  The  philosopher  strives  to  save  philosophy  from  the  claws  of  religion,  in
general, and of theism (broadly defined as the belief in the existence of a divinity or
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divinities),  in particular,  but at  the same time he preserves and takes advantage of
whatever  he  finds  valuable  in  theology:  the  ideas  of  aseity,  omnipotence  and
omnipresence, like those of original sin and inner illumination, are good examples of
his approach. The view of the world that Golding’s novels convey has many aspects in
common with Schopenhauer’s, but with unequivocal theistic overtones.  The frequent
references to the divinity have convinced some critics that it is necessary to attempt
theological interpretations of his fiction. To take a case in point, the article that Coskren
devotes to Lord of the Flies begins by arguing against previous Calvinistic readings of
the narrative, but only to assert that ‘theological terms … are perhaps the most accurate
critical tools for explaining this novel’ (1988: 275). Coskren’s observation is wrong.
While the hints at the presence of the divinity are a recurrent element in Golding’s
novels, its function is far from clear. Though in the beginning the existence of at least
one god and our knowledge thereof is taken for granted, the possibility of knowing it is
increasingly  put  into  question,  until  the  divinity  is  eventually  dismissed  as
unfathomable and its presence in the knowable world rejected. While in  Lord of the
Flies theistic references are used even by the authoritative third-person narrator, in his
first-person novels the knowledge of the divinity is put into question by the character-
narrators themselves. In Golding’s novels the divinity, which is indeed the origin of the
world,  can be identified both with Christianity  and with pagan cults,  and it  can be
masculine as well as feminine. Sometimes these contradictions appear even in the same
novel. In The Inheritors, for instance, the People revere a mother goddess and the New
People try to placate a divine stag; in The Spire, Demeter asserts her power in the face
of Jocelin’s belief in God the Father. Moreover, the divinity can be presented in a way
that tallies with the Christian ideal of morality or as its contrary. According to Golding,
a  compassionate  saint  like  Simon  in  Lord  of  the  Flies can  exist  only  because  a
Christian-like divinity exists, but the Lord of the Flies itself is a beastly god. In the long
but incomplete draft set in Ancient Greece and published posthumously under the title
The Double Tongue, the divinity is more Dionysian than Apollonian. Lastly, Golding’s
novels sometimes elaborate on the idea that our character is  innate and immutable
because  we  owe  our  existence  to  the  divinity,  while  on  other  occasions  our  divine
creation is adduced to support the claim that we are free to override or alter our inborn
nature (these two contradictory positions are asserted, almost simultaneously, by the
main character towards the end of Pincher Martin). In general, we can read Golding’s
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whole oeuvre as an extended evocation of a divinity whose nature — like that of the
immanent essence of the world — somehow escapes rational conceptualisation.
Though my analysis of the ways in which the divinity appears in Golding’s fiction
shall follow a chronological order, the discussion of the novels where the presence of
the divinity has already been acknowledged — mainly The Spire and Darkness Visible
— will be comparatively briefer. I shall argue that the place of the divinity in Golding’s
fiction is that of an all-powerful force that underlies the realm of physical appearances.
What is  more,  I  shall argue that  the theistic aspects of Golding’s novels are just an
alternative  way of  conceiving of  and speaking about  the essence of  the  world.  This
means that a correct understanding of Schopenhauer’s theory of that essence can help
us to appreciate the place of the divinity in Golding’s writings. In the novels that go
from  Lord of  the  Flies to  The  Pyramid,  the  knowledge  of  that  essence  and of  the
divinity is  affirmed, and,  despite the disparate names that the divinity is  given, the
characterisation of both is identical. When the knowledge of essences has already been
denied, as in  Darkness Visible and the subsequent novels, so is the knowledge of the
divinity;  as  far  as  the divinity is  concerned,  this denial  is  most conspicuous in  The
Double Tongue, the novel that Golding was writing when he died. Golding moves from
a tripartite  division into knowable appearances,  knowable  (and divine) essence and
unknowable  thing-in-itself,  to  a  bipartite  division  into  knowable  appearances  and
unknowable thing-in-itself (where the divinity is then suggested to belong). The latter
position is at odds with the one to which Schopenhauer gives philosophical expression.
If in Golding’s works the idea of the divinity has the same field of reference as that
of the essence of the world, then it is legitimate to analyse the latter — as I have done
until now — without using the alleged existence of the divinity as an explanation. It
would be tempting to say that in Golding’s texts the divinity performs no independent
role. Nevertheless, there is one fundamental respect in which references to the divinity
are important. Despite not providing any explanation that cannot be found elsewhere,
the divinity is a symptom both of Golding’s personal need to believe and of ingrained
religious  beliefs  that  modern  consciousness  has  been  trying  to  shed  since  the
Enlightenment.  Golding’s  novels,  especially  the earlier  ones,  go against  the modern
aspiration  to  disenchant  the  cosmos.  As  Weber  writes,  saying  that  the  cosmos  is
‘disenchanted’ means that ‘there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into
play’, and so ‘that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation’ (1946: 139).
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Golding’s references to the divinity — like his references to the metaphysical essence of
the world — amount to an attack on the modern descriptions of the world that remove
‘our fear’ of the cosmos, destroying ‘our sense of awe and wonder towards it’, and are
satisfied  with  a  rational  explanation  and  instrumental  manipulation  of  its  physical
forces  (Brennan  2011).  Those  references,  then,  point  to  the  need  to  reenchant  the
cosmos by positing the existence of regions beyond the physical surface of objects and
whose characteristics are beyond rational explanation. To be sure, Golding is not alone
in this concern. By virtue of this focus on the metaphysical, he becomes a member of a
widespread movement, noticeable in philosophy as well as literature from the Second
World War on (see Clements 2012: 185–6), to convince the general public that the due
attitude towards the surrounding world is one of humbleness and respect.
Some of Golding’s extrafictional reflections on the divinity are intended to establish
a link between the existence of God and the inclusion in Lord of the Flies of an altruistic
saint. Golding maintains that the function within the fiction of a character like Simon is
to prove without resorting to logical demonstrations both that God exists and that God
is good. Simon, he points out to Kermode,
is for the illiterate a proof of the existence of God because the illiterate person who is not brought
up on logic and not brought up always to hope for the worst says, ‘Well, a person like this cannot
exist without a good God’ (in Kermode 1988: 220).
In the novel, the most illiterate people of all must be the little ones whom Simon feeds
when they are hungry, but it is doubtful that their thoughts — or the other characters’ —
are  ever  occupied  with  theological  questions.  Another  unvoiced  presupposition  of
Golding’s is that in his saintliness Simon resembles real-life saints. The trick in both
cases is, as Kermode observes, to present the illiterate person (whose psychology and
beliefs  Golding  apparently  knows  very  well)  as  someone  ‘whom  we  are  tacitly  but
unmistakably  expected  to  attribute  a  correct  insight  here’  (Kermode  1971:  244).
Golding takes it for granted that this insight must be accepted as a piece of legitimate
knowledge, probably because he thinks (as Schopenhauer does about his discovery of
the  essential  will,  as  we  saw  when  setting  out  his  distinction  between  causal,
mathematical  or  logical  explanation, on the one hand,  and valid knowledge,  on the
other) that some truths are evident enough even if they cannot be explained. Actually,
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what really matters regarding Golding is not whether Simon can prove the existence
and goodness of God, but the fact that the latter’s inclusion in the novel responds to the
novelist’s certainty about the existence of a benevolent God that seeks the well-being of
humankind.
The image of the divinity that Golding gives when commenting on Pincher Martin
is similar. According to him, Pincher’s death at the end of the novel has to do with the
existence of a merciful God. By 1958, only two years after the publication of  Pincher
Martin, Golding had already realised that its first readers had not grasped its intended
religious meaning. To avoid misunderstandings, Golding offered an explanation that,
he suggested, should be reprinted in subsequent editions. According to this account,
Pincher does not believe in God, and therefore his encounter with Him is ‘not presented
to him in overtly theological terms’; but this does not prevent ‘the compassion of God’
from extinguishing the last embers of his consciousness (cited in Baker 1965: 35–6).
Elsewhere Golding makes the same point. Speaking to Biles, he puts the emphasis on
the negative feelings that Pincher’s surrogate has towards the divinity: ‘The reason God
seems  dreadful  to  Pincher  Martin  is  really  that  …  he  has  created  God  in  Pincher
Martin’s image. Pincher Martin is hateful, therefore God appears to him as hateful’ (in
Biles 1970: 76). Though the existence of an all-powerful force within the fiction is an
objective  fact,  the  specific  ways  in  which this  force  appears  vary  from character  to
character. In Pincher Martin’s case, his mind can only conceive of it as a sailor. This
does  not  mean  that  the  force,  which  Golding  calls  divine,  is  just  a  projection  of
Pincher’s mind; it simply means that, while God does exists independently of what his
thoughts,  Pincher  can only  conceive  of  God as  his  own creation and by drastically
reducing the stature of the divinity. The description of the sailor in divine terms tallies
well with the authorial explanation of Pincher’s death, which Golding presents to Baker
as  a  token  of  God’s  compassion:  ‘I  think  any  really  merciful  God  would  destroy
painlessly, let us hope, creatures who’ve had seventy or eighty years of it, or whatever
you get’ (in Baker 1982: 143).
Another aspect of Golding’s explanation of Pincher Martin is the status of the main
character’s surrogate as God’s creation. Golding’s 1958 explanation of the ending of the
novel turns on free choice. Though Golding tends not to make any distinction between
Pincher  and his  mental  surrogate,  in  this  case  his  argument  applies  to  both. Since
Pincher, says Golding, ‘was created in the image of God’ he has ‘a freedom of choice
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which he used to centre the world on himself’ (cited in Baker 1965: 35). During an
interview  with  Baker,  more  than  a  decade  later, Golding  elaborates  on  this  idea:
Pincher, like all human beings, ‘had free will because he was created in God’s image’,
that  is,  ‘he  had  free  will  the  way  God  has  it’;  Pincher’s  life  shows  that  ‘you  have
alternatives before you. You can either turn towards God or away from Him. And God
can’t stop you turning away from him without removing your free will’ (in Biles 1970:
76). As a result of his choices, Pincher has turned his back on the divinity that created
him. In Golding’s view, this is enough to explain why the lightning that puts an end to
his  surrogate’s  life  is  black  (Nathaniel  identifies  the  black  lightning  with  heaven,
whereas Golding — and the third-person narrator of the novel — identifies it with God;
the  point  in  both  cases  is  that  the  apparition  of  this  black  lightning  involves  the
extinction of individuality): ‘When you turn away from God, He becomes a darkness;
when you turn towards Him, He becomes a light’ (76). Golding finishes his account of
the novel explaining to Baker that Pincher represents ‘the experience of the human
being turning away from God and into egotism, the darkness of egotism’ as a result of
which it may even seem that God is one’s creation (in Baker 1982: 144).
The problem with this authorial explanation is that it does not account for those
thematic  elements  that  I  take  to  be  at  the  centre  of  the  novel:  the  varieties  of
consciousness displayed by the main character; the opposition between his will and his
intellect, and the prevalence of the former; his obsession with sexuality; his deep-seated
fear of death. Neither does it  help,  I think, to say,  as Golding does when talking to
Baker, that ‘Man, unless he is prevented somehow, will turn away from God’ (in Baker
1982:  144).  Though  it  suggests  that  people  reject  God  because  they  are  egoists,  a
statement like this does not even try to explain — as Schopenhauer’s philosophy does —
where this egoism comes from. At bottom, Golding claim does little more than stress
the need for moral and legal repression that I have already explored from a secular
point of view. To find a suitable explanation for egoism we have to return to the other
view that Pincher’s surrogate has on his behaviour. As we shall see below, in the novel
itself we can find a more familiar picture, one that turns on innate character.
Though,  in  some  respects,  the  traditional  image  of  God  on  which  Golding
sometimes  relies  is  not  suitable  to  explain  his  fiction,  he  continues  to  assert  His
existence,  and  to  speak  about  His  attributes.  As  before,  this  is  not  a  question  of
legitimate knowledge but of faith. This is the attitude that can be found in ‘Belief and
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Creativity’, where the divinity is cornered into the unfathomable thing-in-itself. In an
attempt  to  spell  out  his  ad  hoc  distinctions  between  the  cosmos  and  the  material
universe, he explains that for him the cosmos includes ‘God and man’ (Golding 1984a:
201).  This  God  may  or  not  be  present  in  the  physical  universe  (given  Golding’s
description of the universe as the object of scientific research, the latter option is more
plausible); but, even if He were, He would be in excess of it. Actually, He would even be
in excess of the metaphysical side of the world that we can have legitimate knowledge
of. ‘Belief and Creativity’ credits God with the creation of this and other universes that
we cannot know. At least  insofar as  He is  the Creator of  those other universes,  He
remains inaccessible to our knowledge. How can we be sure that He exists then? This
certainty can only rest on faith. At this moment in his life, Golding admits that he does
not have any evidence of the existence of God, but he still believes in it. Now how can
we be sure how He is? Again, this question exceeds our knowledge. In his attempt to
answer it, Golding begins by acknowledging that human beings often envisage God as
one of their kind. As a rule, he says, ‘men make God in their own image’ (200). And to
to the list of characterisations of God that humans have offered throughout history —
warrior, lover, father, mother, etc. — he adds the description of God as an artist:
he is of all things an artist who labours under no compulsion but that of his own creativity. … We
are said  to be made in his  image,  and if  we could but  understand our  flashes of  individual
creativity we might glimpse the creativity of the Ultimate Creator! (Golding 1984a: 200).
As this quotation shows, at the same time as Golding states that we can understand
God through human creativity, he states that we are creative beings because we have
been created by God in His image. As regards God’s creativity, Golding is confident that
it is not exhausted by the act of creating humankind and the universe that we inhabit.
Adducing his faith in the goodness of God, he remarks that, in view of the hellish nature
of this universe, it would a denial of both His goodness and His creativity to reject out
of hand the existence of other, better universes. Despite Golding’s reverential tone in
the above quotation, it is clear that the claim that the divinity’s creativity has produced
better  worlds  than  ours  cannot  amount  to  a  justification  —  à  la  Leibniz  —  of  the
suffering  that  pervades  our  world.  Given  the  theological  implications  of  his  earlier
works, Golding’s claim rather puts into relief the incompetence of a divine artist whose
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‘achievement’  —  an  expression  borrowed  from  Golding’s  comment  on  the  distance
between the human artist’s ‘intention’ and his or her results (Golding 1984a: 164) —
many have questioned.
The conceptualisation of God as a creative agent rests on an analogy that includes
not  only  God and the artist  as  a  representative  of  humankind but also the literary
character. Though in his earlier interpretations of Pincher Martin he does not touch on
this theme, now Golding begins to foreground the metaartistic implications of Pincher’s
retreat into an imaginary world and of his bid for omnipotence: like an artist, Pincher
‘is  God  of  his  own  …  world’  (Golding  1984a:  200).78 Moreover,  the  way  in  which
Golding describes the collapse of island world created by Pincher’s mind throws light
on the relationship between the literary character, the author and God. The untoward
intervention  of  an  external  force  that  puts  an  end to  the  imaginative  adventure  of
Pincher’s  surrogate  can  be  interpreted  as  a  reminder  that  he  is  just  a  novelistic
character, whose existence depends on a superior instance — the author — that can
dispose of  him even before  the novel  ends.  At  the  same time,  Pincher’s  death also
reminds us of the eventual death of the creative person whom, in Golding’s view, God
has created in His image and whose life He can bring to an end at will.
Though so far we have seen that, outside his fiction, Golding tends to refer to the
divinity as a God whose attributes are generally compatible with those associated with
Christianity, in his non-fictional texts it is possible to find an image of the divinity that
is very different. There is, for example, Golding’s reference, probably figurative, to ‘the
great god Entropy’ in his Nobel Lecture (Golding 1984a: 204); I have already analysed
it  as  a challenge to Sophy’s  interpretation of  the essence of  the world in  Darkness
Visible (entropy, as Golding knows well, is a physical rather than metaphysical notion).
More interesting is Golding’s introduction of the divinity in a 1976 review entitled ‘Gaia
78 In an interview with Carey, Golding reiterates his view that the artist ‘is bound to play at God’
with his materials; since he ‘has to decide what happens’ within his works, and since sometimes
this includes ‘terrible things’, this God ‘might well wish not to do what he has to’ (in Carey 1987:
186). When applied to the divinity rather than a human being, this kind of remark puts into
question the idea of free choice that Golding’s later novels assert. Nevertheless, we have already
seen  that,  however  hard  he  tries,  Golding  cannot  keep  all  of  his  imaginative  and  linguistic
materials under control: as he says, sometimes they get out of hand. There is no reason to think
that humans — the divinity’s creations — cannot go their own way too.
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Lives,  OK?’.  Here he speaks of the goddess Gaia (Earth),  whom he identifies,  as the
ancient Greeks used to do, with the entire planet, describing her as an irritable deity
that has often ‘wrecked cities’ and blown out ‘the side of a whole mountain’ (84); for
Golding, these are signs that Gaia ‘must be obeyed’ if we value our lives (84). It is not
difficult to link this comments to Golding’s ongoing environmental concerns. As Carey
notes, ecology is one of the global problems that starts to engage Golding’s attention in
the mid-1960s. This interest ‘came about through his friendship with Professor James
Lovelock, propounder of the Gaia hypothesis’ — as he called his theory at Golding’s
suggestion (Carey 2009: 290). It is even present in Golding’s Nobel lecture, which in
the end becomes ‘a plea for Mother Gaia’ (435). In ‘Gaia Lives, OK?’, he describes how, if
we succeed in ‘growing up out of our lonely egotism’,  we can ‘see our mother’  as a
‘creature of argent and azure’ rather than ‘a lifeless lump’ (Golding 1984a: 86).
The change from seeing the divinity as a benevolent God responsible for this world
to seeing it as a female goddess in whose lap human beings live is not the only one that
Golding . At the end of his life, he came to see the divinity as neither male nor female,
but  as  unfathomable.  According  to  Carey’,  he  shared  with  one  of  his  friends  the
suspicion that ‘on the subject of God or the gods nothing can be known’ (Carey 2009:
510). The divinity in which he continues to believe is no longer a benevolent God nor
the mother goddess Earth; but is a divinity nevertheless. As Carey puts it, ‘his religious
belief  seems to have become more and more tenuous as time went on, until  it  was
simply belief in something that could not be known. Yet it was still belief’ (520).
Outside Golding’s fiction, the divinity is initially presented as if its existence and
goodness  could  be  proved  by  the  existence  of  saints.  In  the  end,  however,  it  is
acknowledged that neither the existence nor the attributes of the divinity can be known
in any way. In his fiction we find a similar trajectory. While his first published novels
give the impression that the existence of the divinity and its attributes can be asserted
as an objective fact,  the characters  in his  later  novels  become increasingly sceptical
about the possibility of knowing the divinity, whose existence and qualities are reduced
to a question of faith. However, even while the knowledge of the divinity is asserted, the
image  thereof  is  seldom  that  of  a  good  God  that  provides  consolation  in  times  of
distress. Instead, the preferred view that the novels convey is that a divinity that either
displays its compassion in ways that human beings cannot quite understand or that is
so indifferent to moral considerations as to be frightening.
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The first mention of the divinity in Golding’s oeuvre appears in  Lord of the Flies,
where we are confronted with an ambivalent deity whose goodness can be inferred by
the conduct of compassionate saints but whose ways are so mysterious that it can also
be taken for a devil.  This is a conception of the divinity that Golding fleshes out in
subsequent novels. At the very beginning of Lord of the Flies, then, we are informed in
a matter-of-fact tone that the physical configuration of the island where the castaway
children have landed is the result of an ‘act of God’ (Golding 1954: 10). Though there is
no need to interpret the statement literally, doing so allows us to connect the content of
the novel  with Golding’s  religious  beliefs.  Interestingly,  the  comment  is  made by a
third-person narrator that is perfectly reliable and has a greater knowledge of what is
happening than any of the children.79 This is not always the case in the novel; on the
contrary, long stretches of the narrative rely on the limited perspective of the boys —
mainly Ralph, Jack and Simon, but also Roger — or of the naval officer that comes to
their rescue at the end of the novel. However, in the context where it appears there is
no doubt that the reference to God does not convey any of the children’s thoughts.
The narrator’s reference to the divine act that gave shape to the island where the
action takes place is the only direct assertion in  Lord of the Flies of the existence of
God. However, the Lord of the Flies from which the title of novel derives is an indirect
reference to the divinity. In a sense, this reference complicates the place of God in the
novel rather that clarifying it. The piked head of a pig is not only a ‘gift’ for the beast
that rules over the island, but its emblem and incarnation (Golding 1954: 140). During
a conversation with Keating, Golding does not hesitate to describe Simon’s ‘interview’
with the pig’s head as an encounter ‘with Beelzebub, or Satan, the devil’ (in Keating
1988: 213). As it turns out, finding out the real identity of the Lord of the Flies is not as
easy as it would appear. Despite accepting that the expression  Lord of the Flies is a
79 Witness how, at the beginning of chapter six, the same narrator tells us how ‘a sudden bright
explosion’  in  the  sky is  followed by ‘a  corkscrew trail  across  the  sky’  and the fall  of  a  dead
parachutist on the island; this is ‘a sign’ unwittingly sent ‘from the world of grownups’, though no
child is ‘awake to read it’ (Golding 1954: 96). The scene, already quoted, where Simon’s dead
body is carried away by the waves after the other children have already abandoned the crime
scene is another example of the third-person narrator’s ability to inform us in a detached and
reliable way about all of the events that take place in the story.
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literal translation of the name Beelzebub, Mueller traces the origins of the latter to one
among many pagan nature gods rather than to a devil:
The term ‘lord of the flies’ is a translation of the Hebrew word ‘Baalzebub’ or ‘Beelzebub’. The
Baal were the local nature gods of the early Semitic peoples. In II Kings 1:2 Baalzebub is named
as the god of Ekron. All three Synoptic Gospels refer to Beelzebub; in Luke 11:15 he is called ‘the
chief of the devils’. In English literature … it is left to Milton to delineate his character at some
length. Weltering by Satan’s side he is described as ‘One next himself [Satan] in power, and next
in crime,  / Long after known in  Palestine,  and nam’d Beelzebub’  (Mueller  1988: 268–9; the
quotation is from Milton’s Paradise Lost, book 1, lines 79–81 [Milton 2005: 6]).
What we have, then, is a pagan deity reinterpreted as a false god by the Jewish tradition
and as a devil by the Christian tradition. Therefore, Forster is right — partially at least
— when he writes: ‘When a deity does appear [in the novel], he is the Lord of the Flies,
Beelzebub’  (Forster  1988:  230).  He  is  also  right  in  adding  that,  in  Golding’s
presentation,  this  god is  not a transcendent entity:  ‘Beëlzebub,  Lord of  the Flies,  is
Roger and Jack and you and I’ (Peter 1957: 583). Supposing that this beastly deity that
can be confused with a devil is the same as — or another aspect of — the God that
Golding and the narrator mention (and which both Forster and Peter overlook), then
this would be a highly ambivalent god: on the one hand, its goodness would explain
Simon’s presence on the island; on the other, it would also be an ‘obscene’ deity that the
hunters  try  to  placate  (Golding  1954:  147).  In  Schopenhauer’s  terms  there  is  no
contradiction in saying that the groundless essence of the world is immanent and that
the realm of  appearances springs from an act  of this  essence:  in his opinion, every
movement  and every  action  is  the  ‘appearance’  or  manifestation  of  an  ‘act  of  [the
essential]  will’  (Schopenhauer  1969a:  107);  actually,  he  adds,  the  entire  realm  of
appearances ‘springs’ from ‘the act of [the essential] will’ (1969b: 645). Thus, to return
to Golding’s novel, it is possible for the Lord of the Flies to be identical with the God
whose activity has given rise to the island. To the extent that the beastly side of the
deity inheres in the children, its mark or emblem would also the totemic emblem of the
castaways and, by extension, of all humankind. Now if the bad side of the divinity can
be found in humankind, nothing prevents us from assuming that the same is true of the
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good side. This ambivalence of human beings would be what the narrator of Lord of the
Flies means by calling humans heroic as well as sick.
In a brief  psychoanalytical  reading of  Lord of  the Flies,  Epstein  emphasises  the
immanency of the Lord of the Flies, equating it with the Freudian id:
Golding’s Beelzebub is … the anarchic, amoral, driving Id whose only function seems to be to
insure the survival of the host in which it is embedded or embodied, which function it performs
with tremendous and single-minded tenacity. … The tenets of civilization, the moral and social
codes,  the  Ego,  the  intelligence  itself,  form  only  a  veneer  over  this  white-hot  power,  this
uncontrollable force (Epstein 1988: 300).
As  far  as  human  beings  are  concerned,  the  translation  of  this  passage  into
Schopenhauer’s  terms  is  straightforward:  the  Lord  of  the  Flies  is  the  essential  will
which provides the propelling power of human behaviour and to which the intellect
lends a guiding light.  Though Schopenhauer’s attribution of aseity to the immanent
essence of the world is  reminiscent of the divinity as presented by monotheism, he
insists that this kernel cannot be called divine; yet this is precisely what Golding does
when he invites us to identify this essence — as seen not only in the castaway children
but also in their surroundings — with the pagan Lord of the Flies.
Golding’s following novel,  The Inheritors, resembles  Lord of the Flies in offering
not one but two images of the divinity.  On the one hand, there is  Oa, the People’s
mother goddess. On the other, there is the stag that the New People associate with the
hunt. Given that the perspective through which most of the novel is narrated is that of
Lok,  one  of  the  members  of  the  People,  the  features  of  Oa  are  much  more  fully
delineated than those of the stag.
In the People’s opinion, the goddess has the power to bring forth and destroy life,
she is the principle of life and death in nature. Just before narrating the history of the
People, the Old Man explains that ‘“the great Oa … brought forth the earth from her
belly. She gave suck. The earth brought forth woman and the woman brought forth the
first man out of her belly”’ (Golding 1955: 35). When Lok and Fa come across a dead
doe that a big cat has killed, Lok cannot suppress his sadness, for ‘“Oa brought the doe
out of her belly”’ (54). By contrast, when the Old Man dies after a long illness the Old
Woman sententiously declares that ‘“Oa has taken Mal into his belly”’ (91). As Baker
365
Golding’s Metaphysics
explains, ‘Just as the making of a new life is the sacred prerogative of Oa, so is the
power to take a life’ (1965: 25). Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor draw attention to the fact
that, when Lok lies dying, at the end of the novel, ‘He curls up into a foetal position
again … This foetus is inhibiting life, it is “growing” only backwards into the womb’
from which he came forth (2002: 92).
The ambivalence of Oa is also evident in Lok’s comparison of the New People to her.
The New People  hunt  and kill  to  eat,  attack and abuse each other,  but  also create
fascinating artefacts for their use in everyday tasks and religious rites. Observing them,
Lok is reminded of the powerful creative and destructive force of the mother goddess.
Unlike the People, who are incapable of creating tools, and whose only toy, Liku’s Oa-
doll, is but a woman-shaped root, the people carry all kinds of handmade objects. Apart
from their weapons, tools and boats, and from their clothes, hairstyles and ornaments,
they create the propitiatory gifts and totems with which Lok comes across in the forest.
The  artistic-religious  objects  that  they  possess  are  made  by  Tuami,  and  when  the
narrator’s attention is focused on him, in the novel’s last chapter, he is sharpening the
blade of an ivory dagger which he intends to use against Marlan.  Astonished by the
New People’s ‘skill and malice’, both attracted and terrified by them, Lok reflects on
their fear and their viciousness, but also on their occasional tenderness: ‘“The people
are like a famished wolf in the hollow of a tree. … The people are like honey trickling
from a crevice in the rock”’  (Golding 1955: 194, 195).  They are bitter-sweet like the
mead that they produce and drink: ‘“The people are like honey in the round stones, the
new honey that smells of dead things and fire’” (195). They are destructive: ‘“They are
like  the  river  and  the  fall,  …  nothing  stands  against  them”’  (195).  But  when  he
remembers their astounding inventiveness, Lok compares their godlike destructiveness
and creativity to Oa’s omnipotence: ‘“They are like Oa”’ (195). Like the People’s mother
goddess, they are both frightening and attractive: ‘Terrible they might be as the fire or
the river but they drew like honey or meat’ (198).
It  is  not  difficult  to  identify  the  mother  goddess  Oa  with  the  force  that
Schopenhauer calls the essential will. After all, both Oa and the essential will underlie
the  natural  world  with  its  seemingly  uninterrupted  cycles  of  birth  and  demise.  If
Schopenhauer tells us that we can get a glimpse of the characteristics of the essential
will through the careful study of its manifestations, in Golding’s novel all living beings
—  even  the  cats,  the  hyenas  and  the  highly  ambivalent  New  People  —  and  such
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inanimate  elements  as  fire  (which can destroy life  but also make it  easier)  provide
constant information about Oa’s features. This takes us to the question of pantheism.
For Schopenhauer pantheism is the only creed that agrees with the assumption of an
immanent deity. However, this is a stance that he rejects, together with all other forms
of  theism.  The  Inheritors gravitates,  like  Lord  of  the  Flies,  towards  a  pantheistic
interpretation; but it never takes the crucial step of obliterating the difference between
the feminine creator of the world and her creation. All the creatures in the novel issue
from Oa’s womb, but they are not Oa and neither is Oa inside them. If we take the
People’s references literally, a pantheistic interpretation will not do, because Oa is still
characterised as distinct from her creatures. An alternative, less literal reading would
describe all individual beings as manifestations of Oa (or of her power), rather than as
their children.
The Inheritors is not the only novel of Golding’s that oscillates between the image of
the divinity as a force and as a creator, as occupying a totally or partially immanent
position  within  the  knowable  world  and  all  its  inhabitants,  thus  tending  towards
pantheism  or  panentheism  (the  doctrine  that  the  divinity  includes  the  world  but
exceeds it), and as occupying a transcendent position beyond the created world that we
can know. This kind of hesitation, which complicates the treatment of divinity in Lord
of the Flies, results from the fact that, as Kinkead-Weekes remarks, Golding ‘is both
intensely  “sceptical”  and  intensely  “religious”’  (1987:  66),  and  is  also  apparent  in
Pincher Martin. In this work, the attitudes towards the divinity are initially divided
between Pincher’s scepticism and his friend Nathaniel’s theism. Since the bulk of the
narrative sticks obstinately to the perspective of Pincher’s surrogate, and since the only
part of the novel that is narrated from a different point of view — the last chapter —
does nothing to dispel our doubts, it is difficult to say whether there is a divinity or not
outside  Pincher’s  mind.  Even  Nathaniel’s  opinion  is  presented  to  us  through  the
thoughts of Pincher’s surrogate, so it does not really help us to solve our doubts.
Everything depends on how we interpret the last moments of Pincher’s surrogate on
his island world, in particular his confrontation with a mysterious sailor that advises
him to surrender to death. Given that the whole island world is a creation of Pincher’s
mind,  his  encounter  seems  only  a  figment  of  his  imagination.  It  is  interesting  to
compare what Pincher’s surrogate and Golding have to say on the matter. When the
character  clings  to  madness  as  the  last  chance  to  keep  on  living,  he  mentions
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hallucinations among its symptoms. No sooner has he said this than the sailor appears
on the rock. Pincher’s surrogate does not hesitate to refer to the sailor as God; but he
does so in order to reassure himself that this God does not exist outside his mind. He
declares:  ‘“On the sixth day he created God.  … In his  own image created he Him”’
(Golding  1956:  196).  When  the  sailor  suggests  that  Pincher’s  surrogate should
reconsider his refusal to die, the latter adopts a defiant tone: ‘“I have created you and I
can create my own heaven”’, to which the sailor replies:  ‘“You have created it”’ (196).
Pincher’s imaginary island is all that a limited mind can invent, and for this reason the
private realm where his surrogate lives is, like his former life, full of anxiety, toil and
suffering.
The conversation with the sailor reminds us of the description that, according to the
memories of Pincher’s surrogate,  Pincher’s friend Nathaniel provides of the attitude
that most people — being what I have been calling egocentric subjects — adopt towards
heaven. Pincher’s imaginary world is, in the words that Pincher’s surrogate attributes to
Nathaniel, ‘“The sort of heaven we invented for ourselves … if we aren’t ready for the
real one”’ (Golding 1956: 183). In other words, the surrogate’s existence on the rock is
the kind of self-inflicted suffering reserved for those whom individualism prevents from
accepting death. Pincher’s  surrogate remembers Nathaniel saying: ‘as we are  now …
heaven would be sheer negation. Without form and void’ (70; my italics). That is, the
real heaven that awaits us after death consists in the abolition of the egocentric centre
of  consciousness.  Given  the  individualism round which  the  contemporary  frame of
mind is  organised,  this  annihilation amounts to a negation of  what  we value most.
According to Nathaniel, real heaven appears to us in the guise of the black lightning
that  destroys  conscious  life.  In  his  opinion,  we  should  welcome  this  extinction  of
individual consciousness as a liberation from ourselves; but Pincher can hardly see the
positive side of death.
Both Pincher and his surrogate end up dying, and their death is brought about by a
‘compassion’ that is ‘timeless’ (Golding 1956: 201). During my discussion of  Pincher
Martin in Schopenhauerian terms, I explained the force that encroaches upon Pincher’s
cloistered consciousness in terms of the essential will which precedes the emergence of
the subject–object division and remains not only outside time but also outside space
and causality. The fact that the characterisation of this essence in this and other novels
and the characterisation of the divinity in this one coincide lends weight to the idea that
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in Golding’s fiction both tend to be confused. The fact that both the essence and the
divinity  are  described  with  the  same  kind  of  evocative  language  provides  further
evidence  of  this  confusion.  At  the  same  time  as  the  God  that  destroys  Pincher’s
imaginary world is called compassionate, the novel speaks of Him as ‘without mercy’
(Golding 1956: 201). Whether we call it divine or not, describing it as simultaneously
merciful  and  merciless  is  a  contradiction  in  terms;  this  does  not  mean  that  the
description  is  devoid  of  significance.  As  it  happens,  it  exemplifies  pretty  well  the
symbolic  evocation  of  a  force  to  which  denotative  description  cannot  do  justice.
Golding’s  subsequent  practice  confirms  that  the  phrase  without  mercy —  which
actually contradicts what seems to be his own beliefs — must have seemed to him a
felicitous find, as it recurs in some of his subsequent novels.
During his confrontation with the sailor, Pincher’s surrogate argues that his created
nature includes the capacity of free choice, which should be respected: ‘“You gave me
the power to choose and all my life … my choice was my own”’ (Golding 1956: 197).
However, the suggestion that he has been created as a free creature is not enough to
explain some of the most important aspects of the novel. Actually, Pincher’s surrogate
has another explanation for his conduct, one that tallies better with these elements.
After  recalling  ‘“the  bodies  of  used  and  defeated  people”’  that  he  has  left  behind,
Pincher’s  surrogate protests: ‘“If I ate them, who gave me a mouth?”’ (Golding 1956:
197). Thus, by putting his voracious nature down to God’s act of creation, the surrogate
effectively recriminates God for his own compulsion to tear, chew and eat. The point is,
of course, that he should not be blamed for acting in accordance with his being, nor for
being as his alleged Creator has made him. Leaving aside the mention of God, there is a
clear relationship between this perspective and one that foregrounds the way in which
Pincher’s  behaviour  is  a  function of  the  essential  will  to  which he owes his  inborn
character. Equally clear is the relationship between Golding’s remark that ‘God is the
thing we turn away from into life  and therefore we hate and fear him and make a
darkness there’ (cited in Delbaere 1991: 5), and the view that, though living individuals
issue  from  and  are  destined  to  return  to  the  essential  will  originally  devoid  of
consciousness and operating in the dark, the egocentric perspective from which they
see the world leads them to fear and reject death. In both these cases, as in the others
that I mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, a secular explanation through the
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prism  of  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  is  superior  to  the  religious  explanation  that
Golding tries to force upon his readers.
At the end of Pincher Martin, the oscillation between a defence of determinism and
a full endorsement of free choice would seem to prevent settling the question of why we
act as we do. Indeed, the novel contains some elements that support the explanation in
terms of the power of free choice that the divine Creator gives human beings. However,
the elements that contradict this explanation are far more numerous. For this reason,
even if we accept Golding’s theistic terms (i.e. even if we refer to the inner kernel of the
world  as  divine),  Pincher  Martin has  more  to  do  with  Lord  of  the  Flies and  The
Inheritors,  which emphasise one’s inborn nature and on repression, than with  Free
Fall, which highlights one’s power to choose what to will and what to do. The recourse
to the freedom of choice is significant because it shows that the belief that a person can
freely choose what to will seized the novelist’s mind before the completion of Pincher
Martin. If his treatment of freedom in this novel is not entirely consistent, as it appears
side by side with an explanation grounded in inborn dispositions, Free Fall goes a long
way  towards  remedying  this  by  effectively  omitting  any  references  to  the  innate
character. What interests me here is not its assertion of free choice, an aspect of Free
Fall that I have already examined, but its description of the merciless judge in whom
Miss Pringle believes and that Nick Shales rejects.
During  her  religion  classes,  the  message  that  Miss  Pringle  conveys  is  not  of
meekness and tolerance but rather of fanatic cruelty. Her God is not Jesus Christ’s but a
deity  that  administers  justice  in  an  implacable  way,  delivering  rewards  and
punishments according to His assessment of one’s merit and showing no mercy. The
novel shows that not everyone finds this presentation of God to their tastes. Reflecting
on  the  different  personalities  of  Miss  Pringle  and  the  good-natured  scientist  Nick
Shales, Sammy Mountjoy reaches the conclusion that the latter’s embrace of atheism
was caused precisely by his personal antipathy to the religion that he had been taught at
school. Sammy’s narrative associates God with masculinity and with violence, linking
both to the imperialistic and totalitarian personality that he has frequently seen among
his fascist and communist contemporaries. To Sammy’s mind, this suffices to explain
Nick Shales’s  rejection of  the religious views held by his Victorian educators,  views
which, having been inherited by early twentieth-century schools, were also inculcated
in Sammy and his fellow schoolchildren:
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‘they showed you … in your Victorian slum … the old male maker,  totem of the conquering
Hebrews, totem of our forefathers, the subjectors and quiet enslavers of half of the world. … The
male totem is jackbooted … and ignorant and hypocritical and splendid and cruel. You rejected
him as my generation rejects him’ (Golding 1959: 250).80
Though it  lacks the socio-political  resonances that  it  acquires in  Free Fall,  in some
respects the characterisation of God the Father in  The Spire also diverges from the
Christian conception of a just, benevolent parent. I have already dwelt on the way in
which  Dean  Jocelin  envisages  God:  as  the  all-powerful  will  whose  intervention  in
human affairs is more likely to result in conflict, pain and death than in humbleness
and charity. In my previous discussions of the novel I mentioned that the supremacy of
this God in Jocelin’s eyes is threatened by the return of the older cults of such pagan
divinities as Demeter, the goddess of agriculture that for the ancients personified the
earth’s fertility. I also argued that the entity that Jocelin calls God can be interpreted as
the essential will which manifests as the sexual drive and which, sublimated, finds its
artistic  embodiment  in  a  soaring  spire.  This  explains  why  Jocelin  has  so  many
difficulties to make the outcome of a revelation allegedly inspired by the Christian God
tally with the Judaeo-Christian view of that God. The narrator neither supports nor
questions the idea that there is a superhuman power which acts behind the scenes and
on which Jocelin’s behaviour depends. Jocelin does not really question the existence of
the  divinity  or  the  possibility  of  knowing  it;  yet  he  does  question  the  Christian
80 Sammy suggests that,  though Nick Shales is  a rationalist,  his  embrace rationalism is not for
rational reasons but due to the visceral rejection of the kind of resentful religiosity represented by
Miss Pringle: ‘“You did not choose your rationalism rationally. You chose because they showed
you the wrong maker”’  (Golding 1959: 250). Nick’s is an ‘illogically adopted system’ (226). A
similar non-rational basis of rationalism is characteristic of another character of Golding’s, the
freethinker Mr Prettiman, who in the Sea Trilogy shoots an albatross during a voyage to Australia
in  order  to  prove  Coleridge  and  superstition  wrong.  In  fact  what  he  demonstrates  ‘to  the
thoughtful eye [is] how really irrational a rationalist philosopher can be!’  (Golding 1991: 65).
Both Nick and Mr Prettiman are modelled on Golding’s rationalistic father, whose ‘absence of
religious belief’ the novelist describes to Biles as ‘really founded in a profound religious feeling’
(in Biles 1970: 83). All of these examples confirm that our attitudes and behaviour normally owe
more to feelings than to reason, an idea that Schopenhauer’s philosophy throws more light on
than any theistic explanation.
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characterisation that he has always taken for granted. When the workers dig a pit at the
centre of the cathedral, they plant the seed of doubt about Jocelin’s belief in a male
God. In this respect, the opposition between Jocelin’s male God and the goddess whose
dominions  can  be  glimpsed  through  the  pit  exemplifies  some  of  the  different
interpretations of the essential will that have existed throughout history. What all this
indicates is that, at bottom, the omnipotent power that underlies the knowable world is
neither male nor female; it remains as unaffected by our generic definitions as by our
moral categories.
Coming after a novel that puts the divinity at its centre, The Pyramid may strike us
as the least religious among Golding’s novels.81 This goes some way towards explaining
why it is often considered the less typically Goldinesque, an opinion already voiced by
the  first  readers  of  the  novel  —  Babb,  for  instance,  states  that  ‘One’s  immediate
impressions  on  reading  The  Pyramid …  are  of  how  radically  it  differs  from  its
predecessors’ (1970: 169). This view has since become much of a critical commonplace,
and  it  can  be  accepted  to  a  certain  extent.  Concerned  as  it  is  with  the  character-
narrator’s  place  in  the  community  and  with  his  social  and  personal  blunders,  the
narrative has little time to reflect on the divinity. However, the fact is that The Pyramid
does allude to a merciless divinity, and it can be argued that the allusion contains the
seeds not only of a full-fledged criticism of the belief in the existence of the divinity,
but, given the connection in previous Golding novels between the divinity and a certain
understanding of the essence of the world, also of a criticism of this understanding.
Being dominated by an irresistible urge to accumulate riches, Henry, the owner of
an ever-expanding garage, is presented as exemplary of the philistinism and mindless
materialism of the town of Stilbourne as a whole. According to Oliver, the protagonist
and narrator,  what pushes Henry to such extremes of material accumulation is  ‘the
thrust  not  liked  or  enjoyed  but  recognized  as  inevitable,  the  god  without  mercy’
(Golding 1967:  159).  This  ‘god’  is  Mammon,  that  is,  materialism,  greed  and unjust
wealth.
81 The book is really an amalgam of three novellas that appeared earlier in periodicals.  Because
these novellas were purposefully drawn into a novel form, I have included The Pyramid within
my study.  This  principle  does not  hold  for  Scorpion God (1971),  which avowedly  remains  a
collection of novellas.
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Unlike Beelzebub, whom some pagans believed to be a real pagan god, no one has
ever believed that Mammon is anything but a false god or idol. This is a key difference.
I have been arguing that Schopenhauer’s theory of the essential  will  can help us to
understand  the  place  of  the  divinity  in  Golding’s  novels.  However,  if  the  urge  to
accumulate wealth which seems to dominate most of the characters in The Pyramid is
presented as a false divinity, and the basic features of this urge — its mindlessness, its
insatiability, its virtual universality — coincide with those of the essential will which
previous novels purport to be the kernel of the world, then this essence can also be
taken to be a false one. Thus The Pyramid would become the first of Golding’s novels to
challenge  the  earlier  characterisation  of  the  inner  kernel  of  the  world,  which  his
preceding  novels  present  as  true  In  doing  so,  it  perhaps  anticipates  the  criticism,
carried out from Darkness Visible on, of the belief that the essence of the world can be
known at all. If this is the case, then The Pyramid also anticipates Eagleton’s claim that
making the inexhaustible desire peculiar to capitalist societies — which Golding’s novel
designates as Mammon — function as the hidden essence to the realm of appearances is
an  ideological  gesture  which tries  to  pass  capitalist  appetite  off  as  the  natural  and
universal force that rules the world, and to which everyone must adapt. This is also a
gesture that, far from showing us the truth about the world that we inhabit, detracts
from our knowledge of it.
The following novels, Darkness Visible, The Paper Men and the Sea Trilogy, do not
really add to our understanding of Golding’s attitude towards the divinity.  Much of
what  has  been  said  about  Dean  Jocelin’s  faith  in  The  Spire is  valid  for  Matty  in
Darkness Visible. If anything, Matty’s attitude towards God is less complicated than
Jocelin’s:  while  the  latter,  who  starts  by  taking  God’s  existence  for  granted  and
expressing  absolute  certainty  about  His  will,  eventually  comes  to  suspect  those
certainties, Matty’s attitude throughout Darkness Visible does not vary so much. As I
have already noted, he soon becomes convinced that his fate is not in his hands and
that he must embrace the divine will. It is evident that Matty’s faith is strong enough to
make him accept whatever happens to him. However, the novel as a whole does not
really provide any evidence that Matty’s  destiny really depends on God’s will,  as he
believes, or that the God in which he believes exists.
I have argued that the characters’ talk of the divinity in previous novels is their way
of referring to the essential power that underlies the realm of appearances. Except in
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The  Pyramid,  the  characterisation  of  this  essence  as  an  insatiable  yearning  was
generally asserted: even if the characters in Golding’s earlier novels fail to grasp what
that essence consists in, the novels themselves can be interpreted as encouraging their
readers to grasp that essence, and to do so, most clearly in Lord of the Flies, within a
religious  framework.  In  Darkness Visible the  situation  undergoes  a  radical  change.
Sophy’s  conceptualisation  of  the  force  that  determines  the  destiny  of  the  world  as
entropy is radically different from that of the other characters in Golding’s novels. By
pitting Sophy’s view against the other characters in the novel (and in the novels that
precede and follow it), without ever taking sides, Darkness Visible challenges the very
possibility of knowing the essence of the world.
The questioning of our knowledge of both the world’s inner essence and the divinity
continues in the Sea Trilogy. At the same time as it casts a negative light on Talbot’s
religious scepticism, the first  part  of the narrative ridicules  Reverend Colley’s naive
Christian faith and his misguided attempt to impose it on his fellow passengers and on
the crew. However, when Talbot inserts Colley’s diary into his own narrative it becomes
clear that the depth and honesty of the parson’s beliefs deserve more respect. Having
seen the sun and moon simultaneously in the sky and flanking the ship, Colley writes
that they are both a natural sign of God’s presence in the world and an injunction to
fear a God that can become incarnate as a ‘MERCIFUL SAVIOUR’ (Golding 1991: 183), but
also administer His merciless justice:
Our huge ship was motionless and her sails still hung down. On her right hand the red sun was
setting and on her left the full moon was rising, the one directly across from the other. The two
vast luminaries seemed to stare at each other and each to modify the other’s light. On land this
spectacle could never be so evident because of the interposition of hills or trees or houses, but
here we see down from our motionless vessel on all sides to the very edge of the world. Here
plainly to be seen were the very scales of GOD.
The scales tilted, the double light faded and we were wrought of ivory and ebony the moon.
The people moved about forward and hung lanterns by the dozen from the rigging, so that I saw
now that they had erected something like a bishop’s  cathedra beyond the ungainly paunch of
tarpaulin. I began to understand. I began to tremble. I was alone! Yes, in that vast ship with her
numberless  souls  I  was  alone  in  a  place  where  on  a  sudden  I  feared  the  Justice  of  GOD
unmitigated by  HIS Mercy! On a sudden I dreaded both  GOD and man! I stumbled back to my
cabin and have endeavoured to pray (Golding 1991: 205).
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Having got drunk during the crossing the line ceremony (presided by a sailor disguised
as the pagan god Neptune), Colley tries to share his joy by flinging out his arms ‘as if to
embrace’ everyone on the ship (Golding 1991: 102); next he bestows his blessing on all
those present. This is Talbot’s account:
Mr Colley raised his right hand and spoke, though slurredly.
‘The blessing of God the Father Almighty, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost be with you
and remain with you always’.
Then there was a commotion I can tell you! If the man’s uncommonly public micturation had
shocked the ladies, to be blessed by a drunk man in a canvas shirt caused screams, hasty retreats
and, I am told, one évanouissement! (Golding 1991: 103)
After  this,  Colley  has  a  sexual  relationship  with  one  of  the  sailors.  When  Colley
eventually recovers his sobriety, his reaction to the enormity that, in his opinion, he has
committed throws light on the God in whom he believes. If everything is part of God’s
plan, including the trials that He imposes on us, as Colley believes, then He must be
held responsible, in Talbot’s words, for ‘all that is monstrous under the sun and moon’
(Golding 1991: 144). In this light, the ceremony organised by the sailors is not only a
social test but a divine test that Colley has failed.
In  hindsight,  old  Talbot  realises  that  his  spontaneous  prayers  in  the  frequent
situations of extreme risk that arise during the voyage were made ‘to a God in whom
[he]  did not  believe’,  but  to  whom, in situations  of  extreme peril,  he  finds himself
praying  nonetheless  (Golding  1991:  614).  According  to  Talbot’s  description,  Mr
Prettiman  is  even  more  sceptical  about  the  existence  of  the  divinity.  However,  we
gradually discover that Mr Prettiman’s alleged atheism is actually an unorthodox brew
of theism. When Talbot reads to him the passage in Voltaire’s Candide where one of the
inhabitants of Eldorado remarks ‘“We don’t pray to God, he gives us what we need, we
are eternally grateful — we do not need priests, we are all priests!”’ (664), Mr Prettiman
expresses his agreement with enthusiasm. Later, Talbot tries to defend Mr Prettiman
against  Summers’s  accusation  of  atheism,  explaining  that  the  social  philosopher
conceives of the force that pervades the world as a ‘“divine fire”’ that burns both inside
and outside the individual, and which is absolutely good (681). In this Mr Prettiman is
more  optimistic  than  Reverend  Colley,  and  indeed  than  any  other  character  of
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Golding’s. It is noteworthy that Mr Prettiman’s ideas influence Talbot’s outlook in this
respect as well,  for once the latter has arrived sound and safe in Australia and has
learnt about his choice as an MP, he begins to suspect that ‘good fortune and happiness
seem … much more compelling towards the Great Truths of the Christian Religion than
their dreary opposites!’ (756).
The last novel in which the possibility of knowing the divinity is contemplated, even
if questioningly, is The Paper Men. Wilf Barclay, the protagonist and narrator, is not a
believer. Early in the narrative, he puts down to his sceptical attitude the break-up with
one of her mistress, an Italian woman whose religious fervour he disapproves of:
My Italian connection came to an end. The fact is that religion, in the shape of Padre Pio, had got
to her. Out of curiosity we’d been to one of those dawn masses which always ended in a stampede
of the faithful, anxious to get a glimpse of the man’s stigmata before his helpers carried him away
out  of  sight.  I  was a  bit  shocked to see that  cool,  civilized woman scrumming with the rest
(Golding 1984b: 20).
Though God is always on his lips (usually in expletives, a habit that he shares with the
character-narrator of the Sea Trilogy), Wilf has ‘a passionate need for there not to be a
miracle’  (Golding 1984b:  20).  As he acknowledges,  he  himself  is  ‘very receptive to
hypnotic suggestion’ (21), and so is, in his eyes, everyone that believes in supernatural
events.
Despite  the  scepticism  that  he  flaunts  at  the  beginning  of  the  story,  personal
experience will soon prove Wilf wrong, at least partially. In a trip to Sicily, just after a
tremor that makes old women cross themselves, Wilf enters a cathedral whose dark
atmosphere betrays, from the very beginning, ‘a complete absence of gentle Jesus meek
and mild’ (Golding 1984b: 122). His suspicions are confirmed when he comes across
the shocking statue of  a man whose fierce,  intolerant expression hardly reminds of
Christ:
It was a solid silver statue of Christ but somehow the silver looked like steel, had that frightening
suggestion of blue. It was taller than I am, broad-shouldered and striding forward like an archaic
Greek statue. It was crowned and its eyes were rubies or garnets or carbuncles or plain red glass
that flared like the heat in my chest. Perhaps it was Christ. Perhaps they had inherited it in these
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parts and just changed the name and it was Pluto, the god of the Underworld, Hades, striding
forward. I stood there with my mouth open and the flesh crawling over my body. I knew in one
destroying instant that all my adult life I had believed in God and this knowledge was a vision of
God. Fright entered the very marrow of my bones. Surrounded, swamped, confounded, all but
destroyed, adrift in the universal intolerance, mouth open, screaming, bepissed and beshitten, I
knew my maker and I fell down (Golding 1984b: 123).
As in previous novels, but even more clearly, the narrative presents the Christian God
as being endowed with attributes  inherited from earlier  pagan cults.  The encounter
with this figure results in Wilf’s conversion — but to what religion? Wilf realises that, if
he is to take his past behaviour as an indication of what the implacable God worshipped
in the Sicilian church has in store for him, he can only be ‘predestined and damned’ by
‘the divine justice without mercy’ (Golding 1984b: 125). Since He is not only our Judge
but also our Creator, any ‘attempt at influencing divine intolerance, a steel Hades’ is
‘pointless’ (125). This last comment, made by Wilf in relation to the divinity, could also
be made in relation to the essential force that, in Golding’s earlier novels, determines
the individual’s character and hence his or her destiny.
Despite the centrality of Wilf’s strange conversion, The Paper Men fails to dispel our
doubts as to the novel’s endorsing his faith in the existence of the divinity. Towards the
end of his narrative,  Wilf comes to the belief  that, for  some reason that escapes his
comprehension, he has got the stigmata in his hands and feet: ‘like St Francis only in
reverse as it were, for being a mother-fucking bastard … instead of getting them as a
prize  for  being  good’  (Golding  1984b:  159).  The  problem  is  that  his  stigmata  are
invisible, therefore he feels the pain of wounds but has no external marks: ‘“You can’t
see the wounds, unlike with poor old Padre Pio. But I assure you my hands and feet
hurt like hell — or should I say heaven?”’ (188). Their invisibility, together with the
comments  that  Wilf  has  made  about  his  receptiveness  to  psychological  suggestion,
intimate, as in other novels by Golding, that maybe ‘it’s all in the mind’ after all (158).
The last quotation suggests that even Wilf can question, after his religious conversion,
the very existence of the divinity: it might be a figment of one’s imagination. This is a
suspicion with which many of Golding’s narratives confront his readers.
So far we have seen how, even as the structure of Golding’s novels — of Lord of the
Flies, for example — asserts the existence of the divinity, many of his characters have
doubts that it really exists. We have also seen that both the novels and the characters
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that believe in the divinity initially give a precise image of how it is (an amoral force
behind  the  realm  of  appearances),  but  that  the  novels  soon  begin  to  incorporate
characters that, despite continuing to believe that the divinity exists, come to suspect
that all our conceptualisations of it are bound to be inadequate, because they think that
this kind of knowledge is beyond human reach and because their faith is to no avail,
either because it is not strong enough to sanction any description of the divinity, or
because they think that faith alone does not suffice. In the narrative published as The
Double Tongue, which Golding left unfinished at his death, the existence of the divinity
is  still  asserted,  but  as  a  matter  of  faith.  The  same  happens  with  the  divinity’s
attributes, which are declared impossible to know for certain.
The Double Tongue is, according to John H. Stape, Golding’s ‘final statement about
a number of issues that had concerned him throughout his career’ (2001: 392). Like
Pincher Martin, this unfinished draft can be read figuratively as a meditation ‘on the
varied  facets  of  creativity’  (393).  More  literally,  this  novel  contributes  to  clarify
Golding’s position about the degree to which the divinity can be known.  The Double
Tongue shows that Golding’s final position is that God is absolutely unfathomable.
The story is  set in the Greek province of the Roman empire in the first century
before Christ, and its main character and narrator is an elderly woman called Arieka.
Born to a  rich Phocian family  that  resents  her  lack  of  feminine qualities,  Arieka is
brought to Delphi by Ionides, the cynical high priest of Apollo. After taking over as the
Pythia by whose mediation the god conveys his ambiguous messages (hence the title of
the novel),  Arieka becomes increasingly sceptical not only about the source of those
messages but also about the true nature of the divinity. Arieka’s attitude towards the
deity contrasts with that of Ionides, whose lack of faith recedes little by little under her
influence. After recounting Ionides’ death, Arieka ends her story with an assertion of
her faith in the existence of a divinity that, however, cannot be known.
From the very moment when Arieka delivers her first oracle, doubts arise as to the
identity and the very existence of the divinity that supposedly speaks through her. The
ceremony is preceded by the sacrifice of ‘the chosen goat’, after which Arieka occupies
her position in front of the multitude and is spontaneously seized by shudders and
convulsions (Golding 1995: 86). As her body stars to move ‘like some automaton’, she
hears a ‘rolling, rollicking laughter’ coming through her mouth; when her mouth starts
bleeding ‘at the passage of the god’s voice’, she manages to ask the god — but ‘What
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god, which god, where?’ — for mercy (87–8). Casting a backward glance on the event,
old  Arieka  describes  the  deity  as  taking  possession  of  her,  raping  and  tearing  her
mouth. Once the divinity has spoken and the ceremony has finished, Ionides explains,
perhaps to persuade Arieka of the need to get used to those violent trances, how the god
was also ‘“brusque … not to say brutal”’ with the former Pythia — ‘“He raped her”’ too
(63).
The violence of Arieka’s fit alerts us about the risk of taking for granted the identity
of  the  god  that  apparently  takes  possession  of  her.  According  to  popular  belief,
whenever Apollo is absent from the temple — ‘in the three winter months’ when he goes
to live among the Hyperboreans and Delphi is ‘almost deserted and dead’ — his place is
occupied by Dionysus (Golding 1995: 102). Though Apollo’s oracle is suspended during
those months, the possible presence of Dionysus in the temple is enough to complicate
the explanation of Arieka’s trances. On a certain occasion, while she is waiting to fall
into an oracular trance, she grows impatient with ‘the god or the gods’ (95). She asks:
‘Are you there? Both there, Dionysus, winter god for the three winter months, Apollo,
you who mastered me yesterday, are you … there?’ (95). Uncertain about the identity of
the deity that she is addressing, the only thing that she can add is that ‘There was no
answer’ (95). Arieka’s doubts are understandable, for in some respects the two gods are
not totally opposed to each other: in Greek mythology, both ‘provided inspiration for
seers  as  well  as  for  poets’  (Grimal  1957:  50).  Though  this  does  not  mean  that  no
differences between them exist, this common characteristic makes it more complicated
to say where the Pythia’s oracular messages really come from.
As it  turns out,  if  we are to trust  Nietzsche’s  theory of  Greek art,  it  seems that
Arieka’s trances are, if related to the divinity at all, more Dionysian than Apollonian.
After introducing it  in his  The Birth of Tragedy,  in  Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche
elaborates on the opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian impulses by
describing both ‘as types of intoxication’ (Nietzsche 2005: 196). Translating this brief
characterisation into the terms that I have been using in this study, it could be said that
both the Apollonian and the Dionysian involve altered states of consciousness in which
feelings prevail over rational concepts; thus both stand in opposition to the Socratic
frame of mind. According to Nietzsche, the Apollonian state is that of the painter and
the sculptor; the Dionysian state has to do with mimicry and play acting, dance and
music.  Using  a  language  that  is  clearly  reminiscent  of  Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche
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establishes a connection between the Apollonian and individual appearances, on the
one hand, and between the Dionysian and the essential unity of the world, on the other:
Apollo stands before me as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis, through
whom alone release and redemption in semblance can truly be attained, whereas under the …
jubilant shout of Dionysos the spell of individuation is broken, and the path to the Mothers of
Being, to the innermost core of things, is laid open (Nietzsche 1999: 76).
Nevertheless, if we look at from the angle of Schopenhauer’s theory of art we can also
interpret the connection between the two impulses in a different way: the Apollonian
drive that characterises painting and sculpture would thus involve what Schopenhauer
calls  the serene contemplation — and reproduction — of the aesthetic  dimension of
objects,  while  the  Dionysian  drive  that  characterises  music  (and,  according  to
Nietzsche,  other  art  forms that  Schopenhauer  does  not  mention  like  mimicry,  play
acting and dance) would consist in the direct expression or performance of the essential
will to life; therefore Dionysian manifestations would be intimately related to the inner
passions  that  the  subject  can  get  a  glimpse  of  when  looking  inside.  This
Schopenhauerian  interpretation  would  explain  the  ecstatic  excitement  that,  in
Nietzsche’s opinion, characterises Dionysian art: ‘In the Dionysian state … the entire
system of affects is excited and intensified’; the Dionysian ‘enters into any skin, into any
affect: he constantly transforms himself’ (Nietzsche 2005: 197). Thus considered, the
fundamental thing about the Dionysian state is the similarity ‘to certain hysterics who
can take on any role at the drop of a hat’, that is, ‘the ease of metamorphosis’ (197). In
the case of Arieka, her oracular trances involve either uttering the predictions of the
deity as if it were hers — sometimes in a voice that is different from hers — or faking
those  predictions.  Together  with  the  fact  that  they  are  accompanied  by  laughter,
shudders and convulsions, this lends her utterances an unmistakable Dionysian tone.
This  explanation  not  only  clarifies  the  nature  of  Arieka’s  oracular  episodes,  it  also
confirms  the  problems  surrounding  the  identification  of  the  divinity  in  Golding’s
novels.
An examination of Greek mythology may even tempt us to dismiss the opposition
between Apollo and Dionysus as secondary or irrelevant. Perhaps the Apollonian and
the Dionysian are just two sides — with their differences and their things in common —
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of the same deity. Indeed, the history of the oracle at Delphi teaches us that the site of
the temple was initially associated with Gaia (Earth), the mother goddess, from whom
not  only  Apollo  and Dionysus  but  all  the  twelve  Olympians  descend.  In  its  origin,
Delphi was believed to be the centre or navel of Zeus’ grandmother Gaia, a deity that in
The Double Tongue functions as the Greek version of Oa (the mother goddess that the
Pople worship in The Inheritors) and of Demeter (the goddess of fertility that appears
in  The  Spire).  According  to  Hesiod,  Gaia  was  the  primordial  element  —  born
immediately after  (or perhaps out of)  Chaos — from which sprang the divine races
(beginning  with  Uranus,  the  Sky,  to  whom  she  bore  Zeus’  father  Cronus).  In  the
beginning, Gaia’s navel was protected by the serpent Python, later slain by Zeus’ son
Apollo; this is why Delphi’s original name was Pytho. As regards the Pythia, originally
she was Gaia’s priestess, yet she retained her title after Apollo’s takeover.
The step of relating Apollo to Dionysus and both to Gaia is not taken by Arieka, who
is nevertheless aware that ‘the deep cleft in the rock’ in the innermost part of the temple
— the adytum — may be ‘that same cleft … which had been the lair of Pytho’, and from
which, according to popular belief, in former days a ‘compelling vapour’ used to issue
that put the Pythia in a trance (Golding 1995: 81). Though Arieka never denies the
existence  of  the  divinity,  she  does  suggest  that  the  impossibility  of  ascribing  any
unequivocal features to it amounts to the impossibility of knowing its features at all.
As it appears in this and the rest of Golding’s novel, the divinity has more to do with
the essence of the world as described by Schopenhauer than with the Christian God.
Arieka’s divinity is oblivious of human morality, which can make it frightening rather
than lovable. This is consistent with the image of the divinity in previous novels, in the
light of which critics have stated that  Golding’s characters inhabit a universe which is
more pagan than Christian. Storr, for instance, writes that the faith in God that his
novels convey ‘is not that of a Christian’ but ‘is closer to that of the ancient Greeks’
(1987: 141).  McCarron has a similar opinion. After acknowledging that ‘religion is  a
central issue in Golding’s fiction’, he adds that ‘it rarely manifests itself as conventional,
contemporary Christianity’ (McCarron 2005: 291). His description of the image of the
divinity in Golding’s novels is difficult to surpass (though it appears in an analysis of
Golding’s earlier novels, it is just as suitable for the later ones):
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Golding suggests that the supernatural forces at the center of existence, which his protagonists
are eventually compelled to recognize, are capricious and irrational, generating horror and fear
as much as joy and peace. … Religion, in Golding’s work, is often depicted as [being concerned
with] a force, morally neutral and even capricious (McCarron 2005: 291).
McCarron concludes that, despite incorporating not only ‘traditional Christian imagery’
but  also  ‘the  redemptive  possibilities  suggested  by  the  New  Testament’,  at  times
‘Golding’s religious vision … seems determinedly pre-Christian’ (McCarron 2005: 291).
As the plot of The Double Tongue unfolds, there are moments when Arieka comes
close to doubting that  the divinity really exists.  The fame of Arieka’s ‘suitability  for
mediating between the physical universe and the spiritual cosmos’ spreads throughout
Greece (Golding 1995: 70). But no one outside the temple can even suspect that her
doubts about the connection between the oracular trances and the divinity began as
soon as it occurred to her that burning leaves of laurel herself could remedy the silence
with which the audience’s queries often met. The first time that this happens, at the
start of her second oracular session, she takes some dry laurel leaves, as she has seen
her assistants do, and throws them into the brazier. As soon as she inhales the fumes,
she falls into a deep trance. When she speaks again, her voice contains what Ionides
later describes to her as a touch of the ‘“numinous”’ (98).
Once Arieka has learnt to take advantage of burnt laurel,  everything changes.  At
first she believes her first oracle was indeed ‘a rape’ by a God that ‘fitted [her] into the
seat,  twisted [her] anyway he would’  (Golding 1995:  88).  But later she admits  that
everything could have been just an effect of the laurel smoke coming from the nearby
brazier that she inhaled. As she says, ‘There had been a brutality in his rape of me or in
my hysteria’ (119; my italics). At the same time, Arieka realises how much the oracles
resemble  ‘dramatic  representations’  (96),  and  her  doubts  multiply.  Even  when  the
oracles  are  not  rehearsed  responses,  they  ‘“lack  a  certain  universality”’,  as  Ionides
complains,  and  end  up  ‘“restricting  the  god  to  looking  for  stray  sheep  or  finding
someone’s  grandmother’s  necklace”’  (121).  As  time  passes,  Arieka  notices  how  her
responsiveness to the divinity diminishes — or how her tolerance to laurel increases —
until the moment comes when not even the laurel can guarantee an answer that has not
been rehearsed in advance.  As the absences of the divinity become more and more
prolonged,  Arieka’s  faith  begins  to  falter,  and  there  follow  ‘years  of  part-belief,  of
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searching for a proof that all [she] had believed in was a living fact and if twelve gods
did not live on that mountain, they did in fact, in real fact, live somewhere, in some
other mode, on a far greater mountain’ (Golding 1995:  136). By contrast, we see how
Ionides — the ‘cynic, atheist,  contriver, liar’ who has always insisted that ‘there’s no
magic and nothing holy’ about the oracle (136, 92) — now begins to believe in a divine
power that speaks through her.
The proof of the divinity’s  existence that  Arieka demands never arrives,  and the
divinity stops being a household presence. The place that it used to occupy in Arieka’s
mind becomes a void that knowledge cannot fill. Until now, we have seen that, in many
of Golding’s novels, there is a tripartite division between the knowable appearances, the
knowable essence that manifests through them and the unknowable thing-in-itself. We
have also seen that in those novels the characterisation of the divinity and that of the
essence of the world tend to coincide. In The Double Tongue the knowledge vanishes as
a possibility of approaching the divinity, leaving an image of the cosmos as composed,
on the one hand, of a physical realm of knowable appearances from which the divinity
is absent and, on the other, an inscrutable thing-in-itself.
Arieka substitutes for the familiar divinity an unknowable sphere where either no
divinity exists, as she suspects in her bleakest moments, or where the divinity becomes
unfathomable. The first mention of a void left by the divinity’s absence appears when
Arieka recounts her childhood. On occasion of a punishment that her parents impose
on her, Arieka realises that her grief may be caused by fear of the gods’ anger rather
than of her family’s. She is afraid that her alleged misbehaviour may have caused the
gods to turn their backs on her: ‘There is a void when the gods have been there, then
turned their backs and gone. Before this void as before an altar there is nothing but
grief’ (Golding 1995: 23).
The feeling of grief returns to her years later, after becoming the Pythia, because of
the divinity’s reluctance to speak through her. As in her childhood, she sees the place
where the divinity used to be as a void. Unlike the little girl living at her parents’ house,
the Pythia now identifies this void with a nothingness, thus passing from the suspicion
that the divinity may be impossible to know to the opinion that it may not exist at all.
Once this idea has found its way to her mind, it threatens to develop into atheism:
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So that void which I felt I had come across and before which I lay in grief was — a kind of god?
No. A void is a void, a nothingness. My hair prickled and I felt as though the skin of my back had
frozen. I was an unbeliever. I was anathema (Golding 1995: 125).
Arieka’s narrative suggests that there is some kind of relationship between the empty
region where no divinity can be found and death. As a child, the grief caused by her
parents’  punishment  and the divinity’s  desertion turned death — the entrance to  a
dimension where she would not need to worry about her feelings, her parents and the
divinity — into an attractive prospect. She states: ‘of course the void was the door of
death, which … brought me a measure of peace: for I saw that death was an escape and
a refuge’ (Golding 1995: 25). As in the case of grief, the association between the void
and the absence of the divinity, of the authority figures, of individuality and of suffering
reappears in her adulthood. Having discovered that Ionides is involved in a plot against
the Empire, the Romans proceed to arrest him. After his return to the temple, Ionides
finds it so hard to cope with the feeling of humiliation that he can only look for a ‘place
to hide, to draw into and away from himself, his shame the last bit of clothing to be
dropped  before  the  void,  where  at  last  there  is  the  peace  of  not  god,  not-man  —
nothingness —’ (163). The conclusion, it seems, is that there is a dimension where no
human  individual  and  no  deity  can  live.  This  amounts  to  saying  that  the  divinity,
already banished from the knowable world, is also absent from the only place left where
it could be now — the unknowable thing-in-itself.82
In The Double Tongue, this conclusion is only temporary. Despite the lack of proof
about the existence of the divinity, Arieka attempts to keep the last embers of belief
82 The terms  void and  nothingness,  here employed here to refer to what lies beyond individual
appearances, are reminiscent of the ones that Nathaniel uses in  Pincher Martin to convey the
dissolution of egocentric identity in the formless realm that awaits the individual after death.
There  is  a  difference  though.  Nathaniel  characterises  this  void  without  form  as  the  radical
negation of individuality, not necessarily as what cannot be known in any way. In this and other
novels  of  the same period,  what lies beyond individuality but remains within the purview of
human knowledge  is  posited  as  the  essence  of  the  world.  This  essence  and  the  divinity  are
frequently confused or treated as identical. By contrast, Arieka’s position is that the void into
which  we  disappear  after  death  —  and  where  the  divinity,  should  it  exist,  would  be  —  is
impossible to know.
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alive. In the last scenes of the novel we see how she fails to prove to herself that the
divinity really inhabits the temple, and how she asserts her faith nonetheless.
Arieka’s  opportunity  to  check whether  the Delphic myth has any real  substance
comes when Ionides, at the moment of his arrest for plotting against the Romans, gives
her ‘a silver key’ with both ends ‘shaped as a labrys’ (Golding 1995: 160). Holding the
key, Arieka heads for the innermost part of the temple to find out the truth about the
divinity. What she expects to find there is a deep cleft in the rock from which, in former
days, a divine vapour used to issue (81). According to the myth, this is ‘the centre of the
world’, the place where its innermost secrets — the ‘mysterious heart’ or ‘hidden centre
of existence’ — come to light (10, 99). As Arieka knows well, in truth things are very
different: ‘“the centre no longer speaks”’, the intoxicating vapour rising ‘from the centre
of the earth’ has been replaced by the smoke of laurel, and ‘the fabulous cleft in the
rock’ is covered by two thick curtains (56, 95). When she approaches the curtains and
inspects them for the first time, she sees that they picture Apollo’s fight against Pytho:
‘A stiff, not to say crude image of Apollo woven into the stuff of the left-hand curtain
faced some misshapen monster in the right’ (161). The picture tallies with traditional
stories, but what she discovers behind the curtains does not:
The key with the double labrys was hanging round my neck. I pulled the drawstrings lowly and
the curtains slid back. There was a double door behind them. … I put the silver labrys into the
silver  lock  and  turned  the  key.  The  doors  were  easy  enough  to  open.  There  was  the  solid,
impenetrable rock of the mountain behind them (Golding 1995: 164–5).
Correctly understanding the meaning of the solid rock is crucial to understand not only
the novel as a whole but, more generally, Golding final opinion about the divinity.  In
Apollo’s temple everything is double and everything can be interpreted in two ways —
from the sex, identity and existence of the divinity to the equivocal oracles that Arieka
delivers when sitting in front of the multitude. Even the door is double, and the silver
key that opens it is doubly double. But whatever meaning we give to the specific details
of  this  passage,  the  presence  of  a  wall  of  solid  rock  gestures  towards  one  single
conclusion: the divinity cannot be known. Instead of the expected cleft in the side of the
mountain against which the temple leans, what Arieka finds is a solid wall without a
single chink through which to glimpse what might be behind. The wall of rock that the
385
Golding’s Metaphysics
curtains and the doors conceal correspond to the void formerly occupied in Arieka’s
mind by the divinity. Arieka feels, once more, that the gods have ‘turned their backs on
[her]’ (Golding 1995: 162). Once the curtains have been drawn and the doors have been
opened, there is only a wall of solid rock beyond whose surface we can never go.
Arieka’s encounter with the wall at the back of the temple, and the conclusions that
she draws from it, must be compared the opinion, voiced in  Free Fall and  Darkness
Visible, that the physical surface of things is like a brick wall. The comparison reveals
some interesting differences. While in earlier novels some characters believe that the
brick wall of physical appearances can be pierced through metaphysical cognition, and
that it is possible to gain metaphysical knowledge of the essence of the world, in  The
Double Tongue Arieka never goes beyond the surface of the wall, which for her means
that  the  divinity  cannot  be  known.  However,  the  differences  in  treatment  cannot
conceal the connection that is established between the essence of the world and the
divinity.  This  is  not  the  only  passage  in  Arieka’s  narrative  that  reminds  us  of  this
connection. We have seen that, at the beginning of one of her oracular sessions, she
grows impatient and addresses the divinity directly. To show her readiness, she refers
to her and the divinity’s will: ‘Here I am, I said, ready and willing. Do your will. … Will
you answer?’ (Golding 1995: 95). Here, as in The Spire, the will of the divinity — be it
Apollo, Dionysus or some other — and that of the individual that obeys it are confused.
In The Double Tongue, however, there are no further mentions to the role that the will
may play  as  the  essence of  the world.  Nor  is  Arieka’s  address  accompanied by the
dynamic descriptions of the surrounding world or the usual images of sprouting forces
and  rhythmic  waves  that  in  other  novels  evoke  the  influence  of  the  essential  will.
Because  of  this,  the  passage  looks  more  like  a  remnant  from  a  previous  stage  in
Golding’s career than like a continuation of that stage.
Together, Arieka’s references to the divine will and to the wall at the back of the
temple  confirm  the  idea  that,  in  Golding’s  novels,  the  presence  of  the  divinity  is
indissociable from the manifestation of the essential kernel of the world.  The way in
which Arieka opens the curtains at the bottom of the temple in order to find out the real
identity of the divinity has much to do with the image of drawn veils that Schopenhauer
uses to describe metaphysical experiences, in particular the knowledge of the essence of
the world. By the same token, her discovery of a wall of solid rock behind the curtains
can be read not only as a negation of the possibility of knowing the divinity but also as a
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repudiation of the view, voiced by some of Golding’s earlier characters, that achieving
metaphysical knowledge would be like seeing through a brisk wall. The physical surface
of objects is neither a veil nor a door. Even if Arieka could pierce into the impenetrable
rock,  what  she  would  find  would  be  even  more  rock,  more  physical  surfaces  that
preclude any insight into the inner recesses — the essence — of the earth. This essence,
if there is any, remains forever out of the bounds of human knowledge, and so does the
divinity that Golding’s novels insist on linking to that essence.
The discovery that knowledge cannot go beyond the realm of physical surfaces does
not  amount,  however,  to  denying  the  existence  of  the  divinity,  or  to  refusing  to
characterise  it  in  any  way.  It  only  means  that  believing  in  the  existence  and  the
meaningfulness of the divinity is a matter of faith. In this sense, the novel carries a
sobering  message.  Outside the  physical  there  is  no  knowledge  proper,  but  only
speculation that will never amount to knowledge.
The ending of Arieka’s autobiography focuses on the conclusions she draws from
her feeling of the void and her encounter with the wall of rock. Having received a letter
informing her that, in consideration of her long service as Pythia, the city of Athens
wishes to erect a stone statue of her among the altars on the Field of Mars, old Arieka
replies keeping the void in mind:
I wrote back — remembering the void — and feeling strangely that there was a kind of tenderness
in it that I could explain to nobody. I asked that rather than an image of me they should erect a
simple altar and inscribe there:
TO THE UNKNOWN GOD (Golding 1995: 165; my italics).
Despite her doubts, Arieka does not turn her back on the divinity. The divinity in which
she continues to believe is neither Apollo nor any of the other Olympians; it is not even
Gaia, but is a divinity nevertheless. She even has a feeling that the divinity must be
endowed with some kind of tenderness. Nevertheless, she realises that her feelings —
which she considers incommunicable — do not amount to legitimate knowledge, and
accordingly  she recommends that  the statue should be in honour of  a divinity that
cannot be known.
At this point we may recapitulate on the attitudes towards the divinity that appear
in Golding’s novels. I have shown that the trajectory of what is explicitly presented as
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the divinity runs parallel to the trajectory of what is implicitly presented as the inner
essence of the world. When the knowledge of the divinity is asserted, the essence does
not  take  on  the  attributes  of  the  Christian  God  but  of  a  force  reminiscent  of
Schopenhauer’s essential will (this happens, for example, in Lord of the Flies and The
Inheritors);  when  the  knowledge  of  the  divinity  is  questioned,  the  features  of  the
essence become (this happens, for example, in  Darkness Visible and the Sea Trilogy)
less clear. Finally, when the possibility of knowing the divinity is denied, so seems to be
the  knowledge  of  the  essence  (this  explains  why  the  inner  essence  of  the  world  is
strikingly absent from The Double Tongue). The ending of Arieka’s narrative points to
the  separation  of  the  knowable  world  from  the  unknowable  thing-in-itself;  it  also
suggests that whatever deity may exist belongs — as does the essence of the world — in
the latter. The existence and characterisation of the divinity is a matter of belief, and so
is the existence and characterisation of the essence of the world.
However hard Golding tries to separate the references to the essence of the world
and to the divinity outside his novels, the terms in which both are presented in his
fiction are generally indistinguishable. So much so that an interpretation in terms of
the knowable essence of the world hardly differs from an interpretation in terms of the
divinity. Despite their similarities, the former reading must be preferred for reasons of
economy: if referring to the undivided, formless kernel of the world — whether to assert
our knowledge of it or to deny that knowledge — suffices to explain the novels, there is
no compelling reason to bring in an endless panoply of  deities,  except to show the
conflicting  religious  conceptualisations  of  the  primordial  force  at  the  centre  of  the
world.  This  is  precisely  the  treatment  that  I  have given to  the  presence of  the  all-
powerful force that in Golding’s fiction is sometimes said to dominate human beings.
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In the Introduction to this  study I suggested that  William Golding’s world view, as
usually described by critics,  bears a striking resemblance to Arthur Schopenhauer’s.
Both the novelist and the philosopher take metaphysical wonder to be the spur of the
most valuable kinds of intellectual enquiry; both claim that the world is divided into a
sphere of appearances and a metaphysical essence of which those appearances are a
manifestation;  both  are  convinced  that  violence  and  suffering  are  rooted  in  that
essence, hence impossible to eradicate in a permanent way except through death or, at
the collective level, through a judicious use of repression whose total effectiveness can
never be guaranteed; both are dominated by what is generally taken to be a pessimistic
mood.
These  similarities  suggested  that  reading  Golding’s  novels  in  terms  of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy could improve our understanding of Golding, This applies
not only to aspects of his fiction that had already been dealt with by his critics, but also
to  other  important  themes  that  previous  critics  have generally  overlooked,  such as
Golding’s interest in the limits of human knowledge, or in the exact role of the intellect
in human life.
Having conducted an extensive analysis of Golding’s oeuvre through the prism of
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theories, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the
philosopher’s views have helped us to understand Golding’s literary treatment of the
human condition as well as the originality of the novelist’s approach. The comparison
with Schopenhauer shows that for Golding suffering and violence, the central problems
that human beings face, cannot be dealt with in a scientific way: physical science can
neither  identify  their  roots  nor  solve  them.  Among  the  discourses  that,  being
metaphysical,  can identify the sources of these problems, there are two that Golding
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also finds unsatisfactory:  the religious discourse,  which tends  to dogmatism and to
interfere with the other spheres of enquiry, hindering the attainment of their goals, and
the  philosophical  discourse,  which  Golding  never  deals  with  in  depth,  and  whose
rational,  abstract  aims Schopenhauer  takes to be likely to limit  its  practical  effects.
Unlike Schopenhauer, Golding thinks that the most adequate approach to suffering and
aggression is art, particularly literary art, not only because literature is able to pinpoint
the  roots  of  humankind’s  most  serious  problems  as  accurately  as  philosophy  and
without  falling  in  the  trap  of  religious  dogmatism,  but  also  because,  thanks  to  its
manipulation of language so that it will excite metaphysical feelings, it can change the
audience’s world view and also improve their behaviour towards their neighbour. In
this respect, Golding’s novels contradict Schopenhauer’s claim that the main difference
between art and the other descriptions of the world are found at the level of content
rather than at the level of form.
Golding’s  fiction  is  concerned  from  the  very  beginning  with  exploring  ways  of
escaping suffering. In his novels the source of suffering lies in the essential nature that
humankind shares with the rest of the world, understood as an all-powerful and amoral
will to life. This is why many of his characters, naturally programmed to secure their
own  self-preservation  and  the  reproduction  of  the  species  regardless  of  the
consequences, are obsessed with survival and sex.
Golding wonders not only at the horrifying spectacle of mutual aggression, pain and
death in which humankind plays a central role, but at the metaphysical sources of this
spectacle. As human beings cannot manipulate the metaphysical roots of suffering in
the same way as they manipulate physical objects, pain cannot be eradicated. Though
human nature, grounded as it is in the will to life, allows for some individual variations,
the individual character of each person is inborn and immutable; in Schopenhauer’s
terms,  for each compassionate person that  seeks the others’  well-being and tries  to
alleviate their suffering, there are countless egoistic people that only seek their own
well-being, and even malignant people that obtain pleasure when they make the others
suffer. Egoism and malice are linked to the basic modality of consciousness, on which
the individual’s  (and, ultimately,  the will  to life’s)  satisfaction depends and through
which only the physical properties that separate one thing from another are grasped.
Compassion  is  linked  to  a  different  mode  of  consciousness,  one  which,  instead  of
reducing things to potential sources of pleasure and unpleasure, that is, to mere means
390
Conclusion
to  the  desired  ends,  reveals  the  metaphysical  dimension  that  all  objects  have  in
common.
Despite highlighting their importance, both Schopenhauer and Golding consider all
metaphysical alternative states of mind exceptional and, in general, not for the subject
to choose: originally and by default the intellect is at the service of the essential will to
life,  whose  demands  can  be  met  by  physical  consciousness  alone;  this  makes  it
impossible  to  explain  why  the  human  mind  is  capable  of  metaphysical  forms  of
consciousness.  Nevertheless,  the recognition that  apart  from physical  consciousness
there  are  metaphysical  modes  of  consciousness  has  important  consequences.  Their
existence and the kinds of things that they allow to know mean that the purview of
human cognition is not limited to the physical realm, that is, to what can be explained,
for example, by science.
Apart from throwing into relief the difference between physical and metaphysical
consciousness, Golding’s fiction explores the difference, also present in Schopenhauer’s
philosophy, between the rational and the non-rational products of the human mind.
These  two  distinctions  are  useful  to  understand  Golding’s  intervention  in  the  two
cultures  debate  in  defence  of  the  arts,  and  his  privileging  of  certain  varieties  of
consciousness as the only ones that allow the individual to avoid suffering.
As  regards  Golding’s  defence  of  the  arts,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that,
according to Schopenhauer, all of the varieties of consciousness mentioned so far work
without  the help  of  reason.  They consist  in what  the philosopher  calls  feelings  not
concepts. As a rule, these feelings provide the foundation for the concepts with which
reason  operates,  and therefore  for  the  rational  descriptions  of  the  world  that  have
become institutionalised in the course of history. Though outside his fiction Golding
deals with science, history, art, philosophy and religion — the five descriptions of the
world that Schopenhauer characterises in detail — his novels usually focus on science,
art and religion.
In Schopenhauer’s writings, science is normally a conceptual elaboration of physical
perception, art is a conceptual elaboration of aesthetic contemplation, and religion, like
philosophy, is a conceptual elaboration, with the notion of an all-powerful will at its
centre, of the inner observation of one’s affects and passions. In Golding’s novels, as in
most of Schopenhauer’s texts, science does nothing more than create the best possible
conditions to secure the person’s survival and thereby the reproduction of the human
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species. Though Golding never plays down the importance of the scientific approach,
and though  he  defends  its  autonomous  operation  as  the  only  way  in  which  it  can
achieve  its  best  results,  he  suggests  that  the  current  hegemony  of  the  scientific
approach conceals its uselessness when it comes to questions of value, be it aesthetic or
moral, and that this approach cannot tell what the world and human beings really are
at bottom.
As  regards the possibility  of  putting an end to  suffering,  Schopenhauer’s  model
helps us to understand why in Golding’s fiction only metaphysical feelings can do this.
What  these  feelings  have  in  common,  and  what  separates  them  from  physical
perception, is that they do not present the world as a mere source of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction; they are not a means to the essential will’s ends. This is the reason why,
when entering a metaphysical state of mind, the subject ceases to relate things to his or
her desires. As a result, the temptation to compete with other individuals for the same
goal disappears, and with it the anxiety that accompanies the search for pleasure. In
Golding’s novels,  by contrast,  all  concepts serve as means to the end of making the
world comprehensible, less dangerous, and thus, ultimately, to the end of all ends: the
satisfaction of the essential will.
Apart from showing the difference between feelings and concepts, Golding’s fiction
tries  to  demonstrate  that  concepts  can  be  translated  into  words  that  excite
metaphysical  feelings  in  the  audience.  This  possibility  is  what  separates  the  use  of
language that science makes and the use made by religion and, above all, by literature,
both which are, in comparison, more likely to arouse metaphysical feelings (adapting
two terms employed by Clements 2012, these two uses can be called  denotation and
metaphysical  evocation,  respectively).  Though  Schopenhauer  is  also  aware  that
language can transform concepts into metaphysical feelings, his own writing does not
exploit this power to the same extent as Golding’s.
Some of the most memorable passages in Golding’s fiction convey a vivid feeling of
the metaphysical dimensions of things, characters and events. In this sense, a number
of  his  novels  begin  with  a  detailed  description  of  the  physical  concreteness  of  the
objects and elements with which the characters interact, but they go on to show, usually
in a figurative way which blurs the limits among discrete individuals, that this physical
façade is  but a manifestation of the entire world’s  metaphysical  kernel.  Whether to
reproduce the characters’ inner observation of their needs and appetites, their aesthetic
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contemplation of things, or their vision of the essence of the world, Golding’s use of
language reminds the reader that the contemporary dominance of scientific training at
schools can render students incapable of appreciating the metaphysical evocation, and
that this dominance can blind us to the aspects of experience that science turns its back
on because they are not amenable to explanation.
Schopenhauer’s  discussion  of  the  differences  between  the  physical  and
metaphysical descriptions of the world helps to understand Golding’s concern about
the possible demise of metaphysical evocation due to the hegemony of science. At the
same time, it throws light on the different metaphysical purposes that Golding’s prose
serves;  in  particular,  Schopenhauer’s  explanation  of  aesthetic  contemplation  as
wrenching the object out of the flux of time and simultaneously freeing the subject from
the demands of the will to life also helps to understand the difference between the two
ways in which Golding describes the metaphysical dimension of the world: both as the
source of suffering and as providing,  when seen from an aesthetic  angle,  a possible
remedy for that suffering. In this respect, Golding’s metaphysical descriptions not only
focus on things in movement, and thus, by extension, on a world dominated by an inner
force  that  gives  rise  to  constant  agitation,  conflict  and  suffering.  There  are  also
occasions on which Golding describes static objects whose contemplation puts those
characters fortunate enough to appreciate their beauty in a state of painless tranquillity.
Apart from aesthetics, one of the most important aspects of metaphysics, in Golding
as  in  Schopenhauer,  is  morals.  Schopenhauer’s  distinction  between  descriptive
morality, which differentiates the kinds of intentions behind people’s acts and praises
those that lead to a reduction of the neighbour’s pain, and prescriptive morality, which
prescribes a course of action that minimises the neighbour’s suffering, can improve our
understanding of the distance, in Golding’s novels, between the solution to suffering
offered by compassion and a solution involving moral repression.
Though Golding’s fiction abounds in egoistic and malignant characters whose grasp
of  the  world is  limited to physical  perception,  it  also includes a few compassionate
characters  that  have gained  an  exceptional  insight  into  the  metaphysical  links  that
connect all beings. While Golding’s egoistic and malignant characters do not see the
others’  weal  or  woe  as  being  directly  related  to  themselves,  his  compassionate




There  are  important  similarities  and  differences  between  Schopenhauer's  and
Golding's treatment of compassion. As in Schopenhauer, in Golding’s first novels moral
worth consists in doing justice to the common essence that all living beings, regardless
of their apparent differences, share. For Golding, as for Schopenhauer, those who gain
a compassionate insight into this common nature, and who assign the same dignity to
all, are the only kind of people that are praiseworthy from a moral point of view. That is
why they call them saints. But while Schopenhauer applies this label to two different
kinds of people that have grasped the essence of the world — those that are moved by
compassion and those that withdraw to live a solitary life without caring about the fate
of their neighbour — Golding never presents resignation as a solution: sanctity for him
necessarily involves a direct engagement with the suffering of others.
Despite his insistence on their value, Schopenhauer never misses a chance to point
out that neither the saint’s vision nor the other metaphysical feelings can offer a lasting
remedy for suffering. For this reason he also speaks of the death of the individual and
of collective repression. Golding does the same. Some of  his  characters  lead such a
painful life, or cause so much harm to others,  that their deaths seem an acceptable
solution. However, neither Golding not Schopenhauer are totally happy with death, not
only because it is often linked to the egoistic rejection of suffering but also because, if
taken to its logical extremes, would wipe most living creatures out of the the world. This
leads them to offer repression as a way of preventing people from making each other
suffer. In Golding’s earlier fiction repression does not prevent the fulfilment of people’s
desires,  but  encourages  them  to  attain  it  without  hurting  anyone.  In  this  respect,
Golding suggests that physical repression is  preferable to moral repression not only
because  the  threat  posed  by  moral  regulations  is  not  strong  enough  to  control
transgressions, but also because moral standards are easily forgotten.
Golding’s  early  emphasis  on  the  innateness  and  immutability  of  every  person’s
character,  and  on  the  egoism and  malice  of  the  majority,  and  his  endorsement  of
physical repression as the only feasible way to prevent society from collapsing, make it
certainly  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  he  is  a  pessimist.  Nevertheless,  in
Golding’s own writings we find several elements that put this alleged pessimism into
question.  As  we  have  seen,  his  novels  include  plenty  of  examples  of  metaphysical
consciousness and altruistic behaviour that show that he does not think that aggression
is  all  there  is.  Moreover,  in  contrast  to  Schopenhauer’s  exploration  of  the  human
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condition, Golding’s does not stick to the doctrines of a knowable essence of the world
and  of  determinism  that  lead  to  advocate  physical  repression  as  the  only  realistic
weapon that human societies have against suffering. Finally, in some of his essays and
lectures Golding, despite acknowledging that there is little room for hope in the world
as we know it,  affirms his  faith  that  there  might  be other  worlds  where things  are
better.
Even before  finishing to  exploit  all  the  fictional  possibilities  of  a  world view so
closely related to Schopenhauer’s, Golding was already putting some of its basic tenets
into question. In the course of his novelistic career, Golding gradually abandoned the
essentialist, deterministic and repressive attitudes that inform his earlier novels and
that became for him unfounded beliefs. It can be reasonably argued that these beliefs
derive not only from his participation in the Second World War but also from certain
ideologies  whose  influence  is  much  stronger  that  Golding  realises.  In  this  sense,
Eagleton’s interpretation of Schopenhauer’s universalising and naturalising doctrine of
essential desire as a projection of capitalist dynamics also applies to Golding’s position.
Implicitly  acknowledging  the  perils  that  speaking  of  essences  entails,  Golding’s
novels embark on a gradual exploration of other sources of suffering. The abandonment
of the view that the essence of the world can be known comes with the abandonment of
the view that a person’s attitudes and conduct are determined by his or her inborn
nature. And once essentialism and determinism have been rejected, there is less reason
to  go on  rejecting  utopia.  Indeed,  it  can  be argued that  in  his  last  finished  novels
Golding  contemplates  the  possibility  that  people’s  free  choices  might  lead  to  the
creation of an ideal community where competition would not be the rule.
The interpretation of Golding’s metaphysics proposed in this thesis has by no means
exhausted  the  richness  of  his  novels.  They  contain  many  elements  that  still  need
elucidating. The following pages present some of these issues and suggest possible lines
of analysis.
To begin with, Golding’s novels include a series of themes that can be approached,
at  least  in  a  preliminary  way,  through  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy,  but  whose  full
analysis  would  require  adopt  a  different  perspective.  These  themes  include  the
treatment  of  women  and  of  homosexuals,  and,  more  generally,  the  treatment  of
outsiders and the very definition of humanity.
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Schopenhauer  deals  with  gender  issues,  but  his  explanations  are  exclusively
grounded in natural factors to the detriment of the social factors that are so important
in Golding’s novels.  Thus,  for example,  Schopenhauer describes women as naturally
endowed  with  beauty,  charm  and  compassion,  but  also  as  incapable  of  prolonged
intellectual or physical work. In Golding’s novels, women are just as likely as men to be
compassionate,  and indeed one of his most memorable female characters,  Sophy in
Darkness Visible, is nothing short of malignant. As for their intellectual stamina, in The
Double  Tongue Arieka  is  the  focaliser  and  narrator  of  her  own  life,  and  her
performance of those roles throughout the entire novel shows that she is far from being
intellectually  limited.  Something  similar  happens  with  homosexuality.  Like
Schopenhauer,  Golding  only  deals  with  homosexual  men;  and  like  Schopenhauer’s
works, Golding’s novels explain their homosexuality, as we saw with Mr Pedigree in
Darkness Visible,  in  natural  terms.  However,  the  particularities  of  Schopenhauer  ‘s
account,  according  to  which  nature  decrees  that  homosexual  tendencies  should
increase  in  individuals  with  fewer  chances  to  beget  healthy  children,  such  that,  by
directing the sexual impulse away from procreation, the species itself is benefited by
not having individuals produce weak, deformed, and short-lived progeny, are totally
alien to the characterisation of male homosexuals in Golding’s novels.
Among Golding’s critics, the one that has devoted most attention to gender issues is
Crawford (2002). His examination of the characterisation that Golding’s novels offer of
heterosexual  male,  women  and  homosexual  men  in  terms  of  the  adoption  and
imposition of  different  cultural  roles  rather than of  natural  inclinations points  to a
possible way in which the limitations of Schopenhauer’s essentialistic model could be
overcome. However, Crawford’s reading of Golding’s novels is lacking on at least two
counts.  First,  it  hardly  pays  attention  to  the  similarities  and  differences  between
Golding’s and his contemporaries’ approach to gender, which would greatly clarify his
position in the contemporary literary scene. In this respect, it is necessary to carry out a
more exhaustive  analysis  than McCarron’s  in order to determine whether  Golding’s
attitude towards ‘the aggressive ethos of masculinity so prevalent in the literature of the
period’  (McCarron  2007:  290),  whether  he,  like  the  Angry  Young  Men,  equates
‘masculinity with … possession, attainment’, whether he also links male ‘success’ to ‘a
material acquisition, or … a favourable advance in society’ (185), and whether he shares
the Angry Young Men’s view of heterosexual relationships as ‘the site of class struggle’
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(Dollimore 1983: 69). Secondly, Crawford’s reading is lacking insofar as it ignores the
psychological process whereby the prejudices against women and homosexuals spread
through the social body.
The  first  of  Crawford’s  omissions  makes  it  necessary  to  compare  Golding’s
treatment of gender not only with that of the Angry Young Men, but also with that of
such female  writers  as  Iris  Murdoch and Muriel  Spark,  whose moral  concern is  as
strong  as  Golding’s  and  who,  like  him,  not  only  have  an  apparent  readiness  to
subordinate  character  to  the  ‘schematic  development’  of  moral  ideas,  but  likewise
‘depart  …  from  the  socially  concerned  “neorealism”  predominant  …  in  the  fifties’
(Stevenson 1986: 179,  181). As regards Crawford’s second omission, it can perhaps be
solved with the help of psychoanalytical theory, in particular of Lacan’s account account
of the relation but the real and fantasy. In some important respects, Lacan’s theory of
the real is compatible with Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of nature. Though he usually
reserves  the  notion  of  antagonism  for  the  sphere  of  (physical)  appearances,
Schopenhauer sometimes states that the essential will itself should be interpreted not
only  in  terms of  a  desire  rooted  in  lack  or  deficiency  but  in  terms of  ‘antagonism’
(Schopenhauer 1969a: 161, 253, 331). Similarly, Žižek describes the Lacanian real not
only  in  terms  of  a  ‘lack’  (of  consistency,  of  harmony)  which  is  also  an  ‘excess’  of
negativity  (Žižek  1989:  54),  but  also  in  terms  of  an  inner  ‘split’,  a  ‘fissure’  or
‘antagonism’ (126–7). As regards Lacan’s theory of fantasy, what links it to the real is
the notion of the objet petit a. This concept, applied to The Inheritors and Free Fall by
Sugimura  (2008:  48,  87),  was  already  mentioned  in  this  study  when  discussing
Jocelin’s  relation to the pinnacle in  The Spire;  it  can also be used to analyse other
natural  or  man-made  objects  in  Golding’s  novels,  from  the  conch  that  some  boys
treasure  and  others  want  to  destroy  in  Lord  of  the  Flies to  the  netsukes  that  Mr
Pedigree fingers compulsively in Darkness Visible. Regarding gender issues, the object
a may be relevant because, as Sacido-Romero explains, its function is to provide the
illusion that the inner lack that the subject, individual and collective alike, suffers from
can be remedied, either by filling it through identification with an ideal mirror-image or
by displacing it to another subject (see Sacido-Romero 2003: 90–1). In connection with
Golding,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  whether  the  first  strategy  can  explain  the
assumption of stereotyped heterosexual roles by his male characters, and whether the
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second strategy can explain the violent behaviour to and sexual exploitation of women
to which Golding’s males are prone.
Apart from its possible application to Golding’s treatment of gender, Lacan’s theory
of the object  a can perhaps provide a better explanation than Schopenhauer of why
some of Golding’s characters see the others as less than human or even monstrous.
Schopenhauer  distinguishes  human  and  non-human  animals  according  as  they  are
capable of rational thought or not. Though this criterion would perhaps explain why in
Free Fall Sammy Mountjoy describes Minnie, an intellectually challenged schoolmate
of his, as a non-human animal, it does not serve to identify the reasons why, in  The
Inheritors, the New People refuse to see the People — who are more capable of rational
thought than Minnie — as human beings. Nor does Schopenhauer’s criterion explain
Jack and his hunters’ attempt to exterminate their rivals — Piggy, Ralph and Simon —
in Lord of the Flies. A possible explanation may come from the Lacanian idea that the
displacement  of  inner  lack  sometimes  involves  seeing  another  person  as  a  ‘foreign
body’, that is, as an ‘intruder’ (Žižek 1989: 126, 127). The outsider, of which the Jew as
seen  by  the  Nazis  is  a  paramount  example,  is  hold  to  be  guilty  of  ‘introducing  …
disorder, decomposition and corruption [in] the social edifice’ and therefore ‘appears as
an outward positive cause whose elimination would enable us to restore order, stability
and identity’  (126–7).  From this  perspective,  it  would be interesting to  analyse the
purpose of  the contrast  between the corporativist  view of  the  outsider as  the ‘anti-
figure’, the ‘antichrist’ that threatens to destroy the group’s illusory ideal (Stavrakakis
1999: 140), and Golding’s description of an outsider like Simon, whose murder takes
place precisely when the other boys stop seeing him as a person and confuse him with a
beast,  as  a  saintly  martyr  or  Christ-figure. Finally,  psychoanalytical  theory  could
perhaps determine the extent  to which,  as  Golding states  in  his  early  piece ‘Fable’,
violence in  Lord of the Flies is the consequence of ‘an unconscious legacy wished on
children by their parents’ (Golding 1965: 92).
The last aspect of Golding’s novels that Schopenhauer deals with, but whose full
elucidation  in  Golding’s  novels  calls  for  a  different  theoretical  perspective,  is  the
sublime. Though this thesis has focused on the characters’ contemplation of beauty,
this is not the only aesthetic feeling theorised by Schopenhauer. Following Kant, he also
mentions the feeling of the sublime, which arises when someone contemplates without
fear ‘a power beyond all comparison superior to the individual, and threatening him
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with annihilation’ (Schopenhauer 1969a: 205), and which reveals more of the terrible
nature of the essential will than beauty. Though it is clear that the feeling that Golding’s
characters have when confronted with unbound nature is never of aesthetic exaltation,
but rather of pure terror (remember, for example, the descriptions of the raging sea
that  panic-stricken  Talbot  sees  in  the  Sea  Trilogy),  it  is  necessary  to  assess  the
possibility  that  Golding’s  portrayal  of  humankind  and  of  the  whole  world  may
sometimes excite a sublime feeling in  the reader.  Should this  be the case,  it  would
further  be  necessary  to  analyse  the  effects  that  this  sublime  component  may  have
outside the fiction. Finally, dealing with this effects of the sublime would lead to an
analysis of the relationship between Golding’s world view and literary Romanticism.
Though  a  number  of  critics  have  compared  his  metaphysical  interests  to  those  of
writers like William Blake, William Wordsworth and Samuel T. Coleridge (see Acheson
1976; Boyd 1988: 25, 31; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 269–70, 368; Carey 2009:
201–2, 397), none of them has focused on the possible links between Golding’s outlook
and  such  Romantic  concerns  as  the  emphasis  on  the  power  of  the  productive
imagination — operative not only in the arts but also, as Percy B. Shelley claimed, in
science — to counteract ‘the selfish constraints of the liberal atomistic self’ at whose
service reason allegedly is (Habib 2005: 410); the place of humankind within nature
and the need for an environmental ethics (let us remember the comments on ‘the rape
of our planet’, in Golding 1984a: 212–3); the ambivalent view of individualism, now
condemned as one of the ‘central features of the new bourgeois social and economic
order’ based on ‘the principles of “utility” and “calculation”’ and fostering the illusion of
self-sufficiency (Habib 2005: 409), now praised as the true expression of the liberty
and possibilities of self-development that every person must have and which the artist
embodies  better  than  anyone  (remember  the  claim  that  artists  represent  ‘the  true
human  being’,  in  Golding  1984a:  197).  Though  this  thesis  has  already  compared
Golding’s  handling  of  most  of  these  topics  with  Schopenhauer’s,  the  comparison
between  their  treatment  in  Golding’s  fiction  and  in  Romantic  literature  is  still  a
pending task.
Apart from the issues that Schopenhauer deals with, but whose full elucidation calls
for  a  different  approach,  in  Golding’s  novels  there  are  a  number  of  themes  that
Schopenhauer  ignores.  These  include  imperialism  and  racism,  the  postcolonial
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encounter with the native and the multicultural consequences of the collapse of the
British empire.
As a number of critics have pointed out, Golding’s novels from Lord of the Flies to
Pincher Martin  deal, indirectly, with the way in which white men have explored and
conquered new territories, often exterminating their original inhabitants. Though even
more evident, the imperial theme in the Sea Trilogy, set in a period when Australia has
just begun to be conquered by the British, and  The Double Tongue, where Greece is
ruled by the Roman empire, still  needs to be examined. Something similar happens
with  racism,  postcolonialism  and  multiculturalism.  When  mentioning  Hawlin’s
criticism of Lord of the Flies as an imperialist and racist novel that equates Jack and his
hunters’ savage behaviour to that of the inhabitants of Western colonies (see Hawlin
2008), it was argued that the attack is groundless, because for Golding those (English)
people that pride themselves in being civilised are just as savage as the rest. Though the
problematic role of the native in Golding’s earlier novels has already attracted some
critical attention, the role that the colonial and postcolonial subjects play in Golding’s
later works is virtually unexplored. The only exception is An Egyptian Journal (1985),
a travelogue which focuses on the distance between real Egyptians and the mythical
Egyptians fantasised by and for Western visitors,  and which has received strikingly
polarised responses, from those that condemn it as the work of a chauvinist (see Soueif
1985)  to  those  that  praise  it  for  challenging  Orientalist  preconceptions  of  cultural
superiority  (see  Regard  2005).  More  light  on  the  encounter  with  the  native  in
postcolonial  contexts  could  perhaps  be  thrown  by  analysing  the  marginal  but
unforgettable role  played by Australian Aborigines in  Darkness Visible and the Sea
Trilogy,  where  their  behaviour  is  either  misunderstood  by  the  main  characters’  or
presented as impossible to understand. As regards multiculturalism in contemporary
societies,  particularly  in  Britain,  the  phenomenon  makes  a  fleeting  appearance  in
Darkness Visible, where some of the locals resent the transformation of London into an
ethnic  and  cultural  mosaic  due  to  the  arrival  of  immigrants  from  former  British
colonies.  The reasons why former colonies  like Australia  suddenly started to awake
Golding’s interest at such a late date merit attention in their own right. Moreover, the
themes  of  imperialism,  racism,  the  postcolonial  encounter  with  the  native  and
multiculturalism call for a of properly historicised analysis of the possible relationship
between the positions contained in Golding’s writings and the general context in which
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the latter appeared. Though Golding’s emphasis on humankind’s essential nature and
the invariability of history has served to discourage this kind of reading, Crawford’s
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Como William Golding (1911-1993) reconoció en más de una ocasión,  toda su vida,
desde su más tierna infancia, estuvo dominada por un sentimiento de estupor ante el
inagotable espectáculo que el mundo le ofrecía. En parte, Golding heredó este asombro
de sus padres. Sin embargo, las similitudes no pueden oscurecer las diferencias entre su
sentimiento de admiración y el de sus padres. Golding consideraba que la curiosidad de
estos era limitada, porque era meramente científica; por contra, él nunca se contentó
únicamente  con  las  explicaciones  que  la  ciencia  ofrecía,  y  siempre  creyó  que  su
insatisfacción abría la puerta a una comprensión más exhaustiva del mundo. Se podría
decir que el enfoque de sus padres era físico, mientras que el de Golding era metafísico.
Y  eran  precisamente  el  encuentro  con  este  ámbito  metafísico,  y  el  estupor  que  le
provocaba, lo que llevaba a Golding a escribir.
En Golding, la admiración metafísica está estrechamente ligada a la convicción de
que  la  gente  adolece  de  una  terrible  ignorancia  de  su  propia  naturaleza.  Por  regla
general, la gente solo ve la cara física del mundo, y por tanto es incapaz de apreciar la
dimensión metafísica que sus vidas tienen. En este sentido, la principal aspiración de
Golding era llamar la atención sobre esta dimensión, la única en la que tienen algún
sentido  su  preocupación  por  la  capacidad  destructiva  del  hombre  (tanto  a  nivel
individual como colectivo), y, de manera más general, por el sufrimiento. En última
instancia,  este  es  el  motivo  por  la  cual  Golding  dirige  su  atención  a  la  naturaleza
humana para examinarla  sub specie aeternitatis, es decir, desde la perspectiva de la
eternidad. En general, se considera que las conclusiones a las que su investigación lo
conduce son pesimistas.
El  sentimiento  de  estupor,  la  adición  de  intereses  metafísicos  al  interés  por  la
dimensión  metafísica  del  mundo,  el  énfasis  en  la  violencia  y  el  sufrimiento,  y  el
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supuesto pesimismo resultante de todo ello están también entre las características más
destacadas de la filosofía de Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Schopenhauer declaró
en más de una ocasión que desde los albores de la historia todas las búsquedas por una
explicación adecuada a la vida han sido impulsadas por la admiración, añadiendo que
en su forma más pura esta admiración es necesariamente metafísica. De acuerdo con su
explicación  del  contraste  entre  la  física  y  la  metafísica,  esto  significa  que  algunas
personas no se asombran ante el funcionamiento físico del mundo, sino más bien ante
sus características ontológicas, morales y estéticas.
Los temas que la filosofía de Schopenhauer aborda incluyen la epistemología,  la
ontología  y  la  estética,  la  moral,  la  ley  y  la  política.  Estos  temas  coinciden  con los
principales intereses que, según la mayor parte de los críticos, conforman la visión del
mundo de Golding. Schopenhauer es famoso por haber defendido la existencia de una
voluntad  todopoderosa  y  ciega  que  opera  a  escondidas  como  la  esencia  de  la
humanidad y del resto del mundo. Lo sorprendente es que la voluntad también ocupa
un lugar  destacado en las  novelas  de  Golding,  donde a  menudo aparece como una
fuerza incontrolable alrededor de la cual giran las vidas de sus personajes. Como en
Schopenhauer, el tratamiento que en las novelas de Golding se da a este tema aspira a
mostrar la importancia primordial de la metafísica. Además, ambos autores coinciden
en resaltar las características morales de sus respectivos proyectos. Otra característica
común es  que ambos expresan sus intereses  metafísicos  en términos religiosos;  las
referencias a la santidad, por ejemplo, son recurrentes en ambos.
En general, la crítica de Golding ha sido capaz de dar una interpretación acertada de
los principales aspectos metafísicos de sus obras, pero los ha tratado de manera aislada.
Si comparamos la obra de Golding a un mosaico, está claro que los críticos non han
sido capaces de descubrir las posiciones que las diferente piezas ocupan en relación
unas con otras, menos aún de averiguar el significado global que expresan.
Esta tesis está basada en la hipótesis de que el modelo filosófico de Schopenhauer
ayuda a aclarar y unir entre sí los componentes metafísicos, aparentemente inconexos,
que aparecen en las novelas de Golding. El uso del modelo de Schopenhauer debería,
por tanto, permitir una reconstrucción crítica de la visión básica que Golding tenía del
mundo. Relacionada con esta hay una segunda hipótesis: que los intentos de Golding
por corregir esa visión del  mundo —los cuales se vuelven cada vez más evidentes a
medida  que  sus  novelas  se  van  sucediendo—  pueden  entenderse  mejor  si  los
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comparamos con la postura que aspira a dejar atrás. Mi análisis no presupone que las
visiones  del  mundo  de  Golding  y  de  Schopenhauer  tengan  una  coherencia  interna
absoluta ni que ambas sean enteramente idénticas. Sí que presupone que es más fácil
entender algunas de las cuestiones metafísicas más importantes que Golding aborda si
somos conscientes de las cuestiones que Schopenhauer abordó más de dos siglos antes.
Además, mi análisis presupone que las conexiones que Golding establece entre esas
cuestiones  son  más  fáciles  de  apreciar  si  somos  conscientes  de  la  manera  en  que
Schopenhauer las conecta.
Los puntos de contacto entre ambos autores son tan numerosos que es difícil evitar
la sospecha de que Golding estaba familiarizado con las obras de Schopenhauer. Sin
embargo, John Carey, que es no solo el biógrafo de Golding sino el único investigador al
que se le ha permitido acceder a sus documentos personales y a su biblioteca, no ofrece
ninguna prueba concluyente a este respecto. La biografía de Carey menciona los libros
más importantes que Golding leyó, pero la lista no incluye ninguno de Schopenhauer;
por  lo  que  parece,  Golding  tampoco  poseía  ninguna  obra  del  filósofo  alemán.  Las
similitudes entre el  novelista y  el  filósofo pueden ser o  no casuales.  A pesar de no
poseer ninguno de sus libros, Golding pudo haber entrado en contacto con un autor tan
conocido e influyente en otra parte.  Los argumentos propuestos en este estudio no
dependen  de  que  Golding  hubiese  leído  los  libros  de  Schopenhauer;  lo  único  que
pretenden  demostrar  es  que  el  pensamiento  de  Schopenhauer  representa  una
perspectiva fructífera desde la cual se puede dar cuenta de muchos de los aspectos más
básicos de los escritos de Golding. Esta actitud debería hacer más fácil no caer en la
tentación de tratar las novelas de Golding como si fuesen ilustraciones literarias de las
ideas de Schopenhauer.
La  comparación  entre  Golding  y  Schopenhauer  muestra  que  para  Golding  el
sufrimiento y la violencia, los dos problemas centrales a los que los seres humanos se
enfrentan, non pueden ser tratados de una manera científica: la ciencia física no puede
ni identificar las raíces de estos problemas ni solucionarlos. Entre los discursos que,
por ser metafísicos, sí pueden identificar las fuentes de estos problemas, hay dos que
para Golding no son totalmente satisfactorios: el discurso religioso, que es proclive al
dogmatismo y a entrometerse en los otros ámbitos del conocimiento, entorpeciendo la
consecución de los fines que les son propios, y el discurso filosófico, que Golding nunca
trata en profundidad, y cuyos fines racionales, abstractos Schopenhauer considera que
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quizá limitan sus efectos prácticos. A diferencia de Schopenhauer, Golding cree que el
enfoque más adecuado del sufrimiento y la violencia es el arte, en particular el arte
literario,  no solo  porque la  literatura es  capaz de identificar de manera tan precisa
como la filosofía, y evitando el dogmatismo religioso, las raíces de los problemas más
serios de la humanidad, sino porque, gracias a su manipulación del lenguaje para que
produzca sentimientos metafísicos, puede cambiar la visión del mundo de la audiencia
y mejorar su comportamiento hacia el prójimo. Debido a esto, las novelas de Golding
contradicen la opinión de Schopenhauer de que la principal diferencia entre el arte y las
otras descripciones del mundo no se produce a nivel de forma sino a nivel de contenido.
La obra narrativa de Golding aspira desde el principio a explorar las maneras en que
se puede evitar el sufrimiento. En sus novelas la fuente del sufrimiento se encuentra en
la naturaleza esencial que los seres humanos comparten con el resto del mundo, la cual
es entendida como una voluntad de vivir amoral y todopoderosa. Esta es la razón por la
cual  muchos  de  sus  personajes,  programados  por  la  naturaleza  para  asegurarse  su
propia conservación y la reproducción de la especia sin importar las consecuencias,
están obsesionados con la supervivencia y el sexo.
Golding no solo se muestra estupefacto ante el pavoroso espectáculo de agresiones
mutuas, dolor y muerte en el que la humanidad tiene un papel destacado, sino ante las
fuentes metafísicas de este espectáculo. Como los seres humanos no pueden manipular
las raíces del sufrimiento de la misma manera en que manipulan los objetos físicos, el
dolor no puede nunca ser erradicado. Aunque la naturaleza humana, a pesar de tener
su fundamento en la voluntad de vivir,  permite  algunas variaciones individuales,  el
carácter de cada persona es innato e inmutable; utilizando los términos escogidos por
Schopenhauer, por cada persona compasiva que busca el bienestar de los otros y trata
de aliviar su sufrimiento, hay innumerables personas egoístas que solo persiguen su
propio bienestar, e incluso personas malignas que obtienen placer del dolor que causan
a los demás. El egoísmo y la malicia están ligados a la modalidad básica de consciencia,
de la cual depende la satisfacción del individuo (y, en última instancia, de la voluntad
de vivir), y a través de la cual solo se pueden captar las propiedades físicas que separan
a una cosa de otra. La compasión está vinculada a un modo de consciencia diferente, el
cual, en vez de transformar todas las cosas en fuentes potenciales de placer o displacer,
es  decir,  en  meros  medios  para  la  consecución  de  los  fines  deseados,  revela  la
dimensión metafísica que todos los objetos tienen en común.
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A pesar de subrayar su importancia, ni Schopenhauer ni Golding ocultan que todos
los estados de consciencia metafísicos son excepcionales y que, en general, no está en
manos del sujeto el escogerlos: originariamente y por regla general, el intelecto está al
servicio de la voluntad de vivir esencial, cuyas exigencias solo pueden ser cumplidas por
la consciencia física; esto hace que resulte imposible explicar por qué la mente humana
está  capacitada  para  las  formas  metafísicas  de  consciencia.  Sin  embargo,  el
reconocimiento  de  que  aparte  de  la  consciencia  física  hay  modos  de  consciencia
metafísicos tiene implicaciones importantes. La existencia es estos otros modos y los
tipos de cosas que permiten conocer significan que el ámbito del conocimiento humano
no está limitado al ámbito físico, es decir, a lo que puede ser explicado, por ejemplo,
por la ciencia.
Aparte de poner de relieve la diferencia entre la consciencia física y la metafísica, las
novelas  de  Golding  exploran  la  diferencia,  también  presente  en  la  filosofía  de
Schopenhauer,  entre los  productos racionales  y no racionales  de  la  mente  humana.
Estas dos distinciones son de gran utilidad para entender la intervención de Golding en
el debate de las dos culturas en defensa de las humanidades, y la manera en que el
novelista privilegia algunas variedades de consciencia por considerarlas las únicas que
permiten al individuo evitar el sufrimiento.
Por  lo  que  respecta  a  la  defensa  que  Golding  hace  de  las  humanidades,  es
importante  tener  en  cuenta  que,  según  Schopenhauer,  todas  las  variedades  de
consciencia mencionadas hasta ahora funcionan sin ayuda de la razón. Consisten en lo
que  el  filósofo  llama  sentimientos,  no  en  conceptos.  Por  regla  general,  estos
sentimientos sirven de base a los conceptos con los que opera la razón, y por lo tanto a
las descripciones racionales del mundo que se han ido institucionalizando a los largo de
la historia. Aunque fuera de su obra narrativa presta atención a la ciencia, la historia, el
arte, la filosofía y la religión —las cinco descripciones del mundo que Schopenhauer
describe en detalle— en sus novelas Golding habitualmente se centra en la ciencia, el
arte y la religión.
En  los  escritos  de  Schopenhauer,  la  ciencia  normalmente  es  una  elaboración
conceptual  de  la  percepción  física,  el  arte  es  una  elaboración  conceptual  de  la
contemplación  estética,  y  la  religión,  al  igual  que  la  filosofía,  es  una  elaboración
conceptual, en cuyo centro se encuentra la noción de la voluntad todopoderosa, de la
observación interna, por parte del sujeto, de sus afectos y pasiones. En las novelas de
419
Golding’s Metaphysics
Golding, como en la mayor parte de los textos de Schopenhauer, la ciencia no hace otra
cosa que garantizar la supervivencia de la persona y a través de ella la reproducción de
la  especie.  Si  bien Golding nunca resta  importancia  al  enfoque científico,  y  si  bien
defiende que su funcionamiento autónomo es la única manera en que puede alcanzar
sus mejores resultados, al mismo tiempo sugiere que la actual hegemonía del enfoque
científico  oculta  su  inutilidad  cuando  se  trata  de  cuestiones  de  valor,  sea  moral  o
estético, y que este enfoque no puede decirnos qué es lo que en el fondo son el mundo y
los seres humanos.
En relación a la posibilidad de poner fin al sufrimiento, el modelo de Schopenhauer
ayuda a entender por qué en las novelas de Golding solo los sentimientos metafísicos
pueden hacerlo. Lo que estos sentimientos tienen en común, y lo que los separa de la
percepción física, es que no presentan el mundo como una simple fuente de satisfacción
o insatisfacción;  no  son  un  medio  para  la  consecución  de  los  fines  de  la  voluntad
esencial.  Esta  es  la  razón  por  la  cual,  cuando  entra  en  un  estado  metafísico  de
consciencia,  el  sujeto  deja  de  poner  las  cosas  en  relación  con  sus  deseos.  La
consecuencia  es  que desaparece la tentación de competir  con otros individuos para
alcanzar el mismo objetivo, y con ella desaparece también la angustia que acompaña la
búsqueda del placer. En las novelas de Golding todos los conceptos, por contra, sirven
de medios para el  fin de  hacer  el  mundo comprensible,  menos peligroso,  y  de  esta
manera, en última instancia, para el fin de todos los fines: la satisfacción de la voluntad
esencial.
Además de mostrar la diferencia entre los sentimientos y los conceptos, las obras
narrativas de Golding intentan demostrar que los conceptos pueden materializarse en
palabras que dan lugar a sentimientos metafísicos en la audiencia. Esta posibilidad es la
que separa el uso que la ciencia hace del lenguaje y el uso que se hace en la religión y,
sobre todo, en la literatura, las cuales tienen, en comparación, más probabilidades de
producir sentimientos metafísicos (adaptando los dos términos empleados por James
Clements,  estos  dos  usos  pueden denominarse  denotación y  evocación metafísica).
Aunque Schopenhauer también es consciente de que el lenguaje puede transformar los
conceptos en sentimientos metafísicos, sus propios escritos no sacan partido de este
poder en la misma medida que los de Golding.
Algunos de los pasajes más memorables en la obra narrativa de Golding transmiten
un vivo sentimiento de las dimensiones metafísicas de las cosas, los personajes y los
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acontecimientos. En este sentido, algunas de sus novelas empiezan con una descripción
en  detalle  de  la  concreción  física  de  los  objetos  y  los  elementos  con  los  cuales
interactúan los personajes, pero pronto pasan a mostrar, normalmente mediante un
estilo  figurativo  que  difumina  los  límites  entre  los  diferentes  individuos,  que  esta
fachada física no es más que la manifestación del núcleo metafísico del mundo entero.
Sea  para  reproducir  la  observación  interna,  por  parte  de  los  personajes,  de  sus
necesidades y apetitos, su contemplación estética de las cosas, o su visión de la esencia
del mundo, el uso que hace Golding del lenguaje recuerda en todo momento al lector
que el dominio actual de la formación científica en las escuelas vuelve a los estudiantes
incapaces de entender la evocación metafísica, y que este dominio puede impedirnos
apreciar aquellos tipos de experiencia a los que la ciencia da la espalda por considerar
que no son susceptibles de explicación.
La discusión, por parte de Schopenhauer, de las diferencias entre las descripciones
físicas del mundo y las metafísicas nos ayuda a entender la preocupación de Golding
por la eventual desaparición de la evocación metafísica debido a la hegemonía de la
ciencia. Al mismo tiempo, arroja luz sobre las diferentes finalidades metafísicas que
cumple la prosa de Golding; en particular, la explicación que Schopenhauer da de la
contemplación estética como una experiencia que arranca el objeto del flujo del tiempo
y que simultáneamente libera al sujeto de las exigencias de la voluntad de vivir ayuda a
entender las dos maneras en que Golding describe el ámbito metafísico: por una parte,
como  la  fuente  del  sufrimiento,  y,  por  otro,  como  la  puerta  que  lleva,  durante  la
contemplación estética, a un posible remedio para ese sufrimiento. A este respecto, las
descripciones metafísicas de Golding no solo se centran en cosas que se mueven, y, por
tanto, por extensión, en un mundo dominado por una fuerza interna que da lugar a una
agitación, un conflicto y un sufrimiento constantes. También hay ocasiones en las que
Golding describe objetos estáticos cuya contemplación pone a los personajes que tienen
la fortuna de apreciar su belleza en un estado de tranquilidad sin dolor.
Aparte de la estética, uno de los aspectos más importantes de la metafísica, tanto en
Golding como en Schopenhauer, es la moral. La distinción que Schopenhauer establece
entre la moral descriptiva, que diferencia los tipos de intenciones detrás de los actos de
la gente y alaba aquellas que conducen a una reducción del dolor ajeno, y la moral
prescriptiva,  que  recomienda  conductas  que  minimicen  el  sufrimiento  del  prójimo,
mejora  nuestra  comprensión  de  la  distancia,  en  las  novelas  de  Golding,  entre  la
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solución al sufrimiento que ofrece la compasión y la solución que pasa por la represión
moral.
Aunque las novelas de Golding contienen numerosos personajes egoístas y malignos
cuya  comprensión  del  mundo  está  normalmente  limitada  por  la  percepción  física,
también  incluye  unos  cuantos  personajes  compasivos  que  han  alcanzado  un
discernimiento excepcional de los profundos vínculos que conectan a todos los seres
entre sí.  Mientras que los personajes egoístas y malignos de Golding no ven que la
buena  o  mala  fortuna  de  los  otros  esté  íntimamente  relacionada  con  la  suya,  sus
personajes compasivos sienten el sufrimiento ajeno como si fuese propio, lo cual los
empuja a actuar de manera altruista.
Entre  el  tratamiento  que  Schopenhauer  y  Golding  dan  a  la  compasión  hay
importantes similitudes y diferencias. Como en Schopenhauer, en las primeras novelas
de Golding la valía moral consiste en hacer justicia a la esencia común compartida por
todos los seres vivos, con independencia de las aparentes diferencias.  Para Golding,
como  para  Schopenhauer,  quienes  alcanzan  a  discernir  esta  naturaleza  común,
mostrándose compasivos y asignando la misma dignidad a todos, son los únicos dignos
de alabanza desde un punto de vista moral. Por eso los llaman santos. Pero mientras
que Schopenhauer aplica esta etiqueta a dos clases de personas que han captado la
esencia del mundo —los movidos por la compasión y los que se retiran para llevar una
vida  solitaria  sin  preocuparse  de  lo  que  le  acontece  al  prójimo— Golding  nunca
presenta la resignación como una solución válida: para él la santidad necesariamente
implica una preocupación directa por el sufrimiento de los demás.
A pesar de insistir en su valor, Schopenhauer nunca pierde oportunidad de señalar
que ni  la visión del  santo ni  los demás sentimientos metafísicos pueden ofrecer un
remedio duradero contra el sufrimiento. Por esta razón habla también de la muerte del
individuo  y  de  la  represión  colectiva.  Lo  mismo  hace  Golding.  Algunos  de  sus
personajes tiene una vida tan llena de penalidades, o causan tanto daño a los demás,
que  sus  muertes  parecen  una  salida  aceptable.  No  obstante,  ni  Golding  ni
Schopenhauer están totalmente satisfechos con este remedio, no solo porque a menudo
está ligado a un rechazo egoísta del sufrimiento, sino también porque, si se lleva a sus
extremos lógicos, borraría a la mayoría de los seres vivos de la faz de la tierra. Estas
consideraciones  llevan  a  ambos  autores  a  presentar  la  represión  como  una  buena
manera  de  evitar  que  las  personas  se  hagan  sufrir  mutuamente.  En  las  primeras
422
Resumen
novelas de Golding, la represión no evita la satisfacción de los deseos de la gente, pero
sí la anima a alcanzar esa satisfacción sin hacer daño a nadie. En este sentido, Golding
defiende que la represión física es preferible a la represión moral, no solo porque la
amenaza de las reglas morales no es lo suficientemente fuerte como para controlar las
transgresiones, sino porque las normas morales se olvidan fácilmente.
El énfasis que Golding pone inicialmente en la naturaleza innata e inmutable del
carácter de cada persona, y en el egoísmo y la malicia de la mayoría, y su apoyo a la
represión física como la única manera factible de evitar la destrucción de la sociedad,
hacen que sea muy difícil evitar la conclusión de que es un pesimista. Sin embargo, en
sus propios escritos encontramos abundantes elementos que desmienten este supuesto
pesimismo.  Para empezar,  sus novelas  incluyen numerosos ejemplos de consciencia
metafísica y de conducta altruista, los cuales muestran que Golding no piensa que no
haya alternativa a la violencia. Además, a diferencia de la exploración de la condición
humana llevada a cabo por Schopenhauer, la de Golding no se acaba con las doctrinas
de la esencia cognoscible del mundo y del determinismo, las cuales llevan a defender la
represión  física  como  la  única  arma  que,  siendo  realistas,  las  sociedades  humanas
pueden  blandir  frente  el  sufrimiento.  Por  último,  en  algunos  de  sus  ensayos  y
conferencias, donde reconoce que el mundo que conocemos no da muchas razones para
la esperanza, Golding también expresa su fe en que pueda haber otros mundos donde
las cosas vayan mejor.
Incluso antes de acabar de explorar todas las posibilidades literarias de una visión
del mundo con tantos parecidos a la de Schopenhauer, Golding ya había empezado a
cuestionarse algunas de sus premisas básicas. A lo largo de su carrera como novelista,
Golding  fue  abandonando  poco  a  poco  las  actitudes  esencialistas,  deterministas  y
represivas  que  informan  sus  primeras  novelas  y  que  a  sus  ojos  se  convirtieron  en
creencias sin fundamento. Es razonable afirmar que estas creencias derivan no solo de
su participación en la Segunda Guerra mundial, sino también de ciertas ideologías cuya
influencia es mucho más fuerte de que lo él creía. En este sentido, la interpretación que
Terry  Eagleton ofrece  de la  doctrina universalizadora y naturalizadora de un deseo
esencial  como  una  proyección  de  la  dinámica  capitalista  también  es  aplicable  a  la
posición de Golding.
Reconociendo implícitamente los peligros que entraña hablar de cualquier esencia,
las  novelas  de  Golding  se  embarcan  en  una  exploración  gradual  de  otras  posibles
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fuentes del sufrimiento. El abandono de la idea de que se puede conocer la esencia del
mundo viene acompañado por el abandono de la idea de que las actitudes y la conducta
de una persona vienen determinadas por su naturaleza innata. Y una vez rechazados el
esencialismo y el determinismo, hay menos razones para seguir rechazando la utopía.
De hecho, se puede afirmar que en sus últimas novelas acabadas Golding contempla la
posibilidad de que las libres elecciones de la gente puedan conducir a la creación de una
comunidad ideal en la cual la competición no sea la norma.
Aunque la lectura general de las novelas de Golding que aquí se ofrece está basada
principalmente en la filosofía de Schopenhauer, muchos de los detalles específicos de
mi  argumento  encuentran  apoyo  teórico  en  otros  modelos  filosóficos  como  los  de
Immanuel  Kant,  Friedrich  Nietzsche  y  Jürgen Habermas,  en  el  psicoanálisis,  en la
teoría marxista de la ideología y en la sociología. Una de las razones por las cuales estas
adiciones son necesarias es que, cuando se aplica a las novelas de Golding, se aprecia
que el modelo de Schopenhauer tiene algunas carencias significativas. Así, por ejemplo,
en el  capítulo dedicado a las posiciones básicas  de Golding,  la actitud del  novelista
hacia al proyecto de la modernidad, y en particular hacia la ambición de garantizar la
autonomía del proyecto científico, no se puede entender únicamente con la ayuda de
Schopenhauer, sino que debe ser abordada por medio de la caracterización, común a
Habermas y a  algunos  sociólogos,  de  la  modernidad como un proceso de creciente
diferenciación tanto de los ámbitos sociales como de los discursos asociados con ellas, y
de la posmodernidad como un proceso inverso. Asimismo, la noción de la represión,
tomada del psicoanálisis freudiano, ayuda a entender el mecanismo mediante el cual
algunos de los primeros personajes de Golding suprimen los deseos que surgen de la
voluntad esencial, y los comentarios que hace Sigmund Freud acerca del origen de la
conciencia  moral  sirven  para  llenar  un  hueco  importante  en  la  explicación  que
Schopenhauer  da de las  prescripciones morales.  La otra  razón para la  inclusión de
adiciones teóricas de autores diferentes a Schopenhauer es la perspectiva dual desde la
que se ha realizado la lectura de la obra de Golding: como una estructura más o menos
coherente  cuyas  líneas  temáticas  principales  generalmente  coinciden  con  las  de  la
filosofía  de  Schopenhauer,  y  como una propuesta  que va cambiando a  lo  largo del
tiempo  mediante  el  añadido  de  nuevos  elementos.  En  el  capítulo  dedicado  a  las
adiciones que las novelas de Golding van incorporando y que chocan con la visión del
mundo encarnada en la filosofía de Schopenhauer, la teoría de Freud ayuda a explicar
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por qué todas las descripciones de la esencia del mundo son denunciadas como otros
tantos  casos  de  proyección  psicológica.  Asimismo,  la  teoría  marxista  sirve  para
determinar  en  qué  medida  el  efecto  naturalizador  y  universalizador  de  estas
proyecciones se puede considerar una reificacion ideológica de actitudes que hunden
sus raíces en una situación cultural concreta (en este caso, en la sociedad capitalista).
En cuanto a la teoría kantiana de la autonomía moral, sirve para explicar el tipo de libre
elección que Golding niega a sus primeros personajes  —una posición que de hecho
cierra  la  puerta  a  la  utopía—  pero  que  concede  a  sus  últimos  personajes
—restableciendo así la posibilidad de la utopía—. En el último capítulo de esta tesis, la
teoría de Nietzsche sobre las similitudes entre el impulso apolíneo y el dionisíaco ayuda
a esclarecer la imagen que las novelas de Golding dan de la divinidad. Finalmente, la
teoría sociológica de Max Weber, según la cual el desencantamiento moderno consiste
en el uso de la razón instrumental para explotar los recursos físicos del mundo, aclara
hasta  qué  punto  la  subordinación  de  la  ciencia  por  parte  de  Golding  a  enfoques
metafísicos como el religioso y el artístico, que no describen el mundo en términos de
su  posible  utilidad  para  el  ser  humano,  está  conectada  a  sus  preocupaciones
medioambientales.
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